Statistics and suspension

Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2877-2880 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has recently been argued that some cases of naked statistical evidence license a high credence, but not an outright belief. If this is correct, there cannot be an unconditional bridge principle from credence to outright belief. We show that at least one prominent putative counterexample to such a bridge principle is based on a mistake, by demonstrating that the statistical evidence falls short not only of licensing rational belief, but also of justifying a high credence.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.
Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel - 2020 - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-02

Downloads
87 (#193,275)

6 months
10 (#397,728)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alexandra Zinke
Goethe University Frankfurt

References found in this work

Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.
Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.

View all 6 references / Add more references