In this essay I criticize recent attempts to prove that the concept of lying does not include the intent to deceive. I argue that examples by Isenberg and Carson fail to prove that one can lie without intending to deceive and, furthermore, that untoward consequences would follow if these authors were correct. I conclude that since intending to deceive is indeed a necessary condition of lying, the class of statements that constitute lies is smaller than what Isenberg et al. would (...) suggest. Hence the class of deceptive advertisements is also correspondingly smaller. (shrink)

Bioethics: Legal and Clinical Case Studies is a case-based introduction to ethical issues in health care. Through seventy-eight compelling scenarios, the authors demonstrate the practical importance of ethics, showing how the concerns at issue bear on the lives of patients, health care providers, and others. A range of central topics are covered, including informed consent, medical futility, reproductive ethics, privacy, cultural competence, and clinical trials. Each chapter includes a selection of important legal cases as well as clinical case studies for (...) critical analysis. The case studies are often presented as moral dilemmas, and are conducive to rich discussion. A companion website offers a curated collection of relevant legal precedents as well as additional case studies and other resources. (shrink)

SummaryIn this essay I critically discuss the views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend on the succession of scientific theories. I argue that, if Karl Popper's desiderata for theory succession are properly explicated, they constitute a basis for refuting the “incommensurability“ thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Popper's claim that a new theory must constitute an “improvement” over the old implies that the new theory must be able to be interpreted as referring to most of the phenomena as its predecessor.RésuméDans cet (...) essai, je discute les vues de Thomas Kuhn et de Paul Feyerabend sur la succession des théories scientifiques. Je montre que si les desiderata de Karl Popper pour la succession des théories sont correctement explicités, ils constituent une base pour réfuter la thèse ?incommen‐surabilité de Kuhn et de Feyerabend. Ľexigence de Popper selon laquelle une nouvelle théorie doit améliorer la précédente implique que la nouvelle théorie doit pouvoir être interprétée comme se référant à une plus grande part des phénoménes que ses prédécesseurs.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit werden Thomas Kuhns und Paul Feyerabends Auffassungen über die Frage, wie wissenschaftliche Theorien sich ablösen und folgen, erörtert. Ich zeige, dass Karl Poppers Forderungen für einen rationalen Theorienwechsel, wenn einmal richtig erläutert, eine Grundlage fiir die Widerlegung der Inkommensurabilitätsthese von Kuhn und Feyerabend lie‐fern. Proppers Forderung, dass eine neue Theorie gegenüber der alten eine Verbesserung darstellen müsse, impliziert, dass die neue Theorie so interpretiert werden kann, dass sie sich auf die meisten Phänomene bezieht, von denen auch in der Vorgängerin die Rede war. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the relationship between lawsuits for medical malpractice and the legal standard of care. I suggest that there is an insidious, dynamic relationship between physicians' reactions to the recent increase in malpractice litigation and an artificial elevation of the legal standard of care. Since, that is, the legal standard for proper medical care is based upon the community standard of care rather than the reasonable person standard, to the extent that overtreatment or “defensive” medicine becomes widespread (...) as a reaction to malpractice litigation, the legal standard becomes elevated as well. Thus, it will increasingly be the case that unless a physician practices defensive medicine, and hence practices unreasonably, she risks being found liable for medical malpractice. (shrink)

In this essay it will be argued that if preferential treatment for individuals who have suffered from past discrimination is permissible in any context, it should be extended to the allocation of scarce medical resources. This contention will be based on two facts: one, that health care, in particular certain life-saving operations, constitutes a scarce social good similar to but more important than other social goods such as desirable jobs and positions in desirable professional schools; secondly, that a claim can (...) plausibly be made that the greater incidence of death due to heart disease among blacks is a result of the effect of past discrimination. In addition, an argument to the effect that preferential treatment is indeed permissible will be sketched that is based upon a critique of the decision in the Bakke case. (shrink)

The proponents of the ‘vindication’ or ‘pragmatic justification’ of induction have attempted to show that induction will work if any method does. This in turn serves as grounds for their claim that we have everything to gain by using induction and nothing to lose. Hence, they conclude that it is rational to use induction. Their claim that induction will work if any mehtod does is based upon the following argument:If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not uniform (...) and some other method works, the success of that method will then constitute a regularity to which induction can be successfully applied. In that case, induction will sanction the continued use of the successful method and hence will be successful as well. (shrink)

In _Bioethics in Context_, Gary Jones and Joseph DeMarco connect ethical theory, medicine, and the law, guiding readers toward a practical and legally grounded understanding of key issues in health-care ethics. This book is uniquely up-to-date in its discussion of health-care law and unpacks the complex web of American policies, including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Useful case studies and examples are embedded throughout, and a companion website offers a thorough, curated database of relevant legal precedents as (...) well as additional case studies and other resources. (shrink)

The proponents of the ‘vindication’ or ‘pragmatic justification’ of induction have attempted to show that induction will work if any method does. This in turn serves as grounds for their claim that we have everything to gain by using induction and nothing to lose. Hence, they conclude that it is rational to use induction. Their claim that induction will work if any mehtod does is based upon the following argument:If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not uniform (...) and some other method works, the success of that method will then constitute a regularity to which induction can be successfully applied. In that case, induction will sanction the continued use of the successful method and hence will be successful as well. (shrink)

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. We reject arbitrary distinctions that deny adequate protections to other animals who share with protected humans relevantly similar vulnerabilities to harms and relevantly similar interests in avoiding such harms. We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as a nonhuman person, Happy should be (...) released from her current confinement and transferred to an appropriate elephant sanctuary, pursuant to habeas corpus. (shrink)

E. E. Constance Jones, a regular contributor to Mind and the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, and the author of several textbooks and a monograph, worked in both philosophical l...

Drawing heavily on recent empirical research to update R.M. Hare's two-level utilitarianism and expand Hare's treatment of "intuitive level rules," Gary Varner considers in detail the theory's application to animals while arguing that Hare should have recognized a hierarchy of persons, near-persons, & the merely sentient.

It has at various times been said, both before and since the fall of apartheid, that philosophers in South Africa are neglecting to do certain sorts of work. Behind this accusation lies a general claim that philosophers have responsibilities to their contexts. This essay is dedicated to (i) defending this claim against objections, and (ii) offering a positive argument for there being moral pressure on philosophers to increase understanding. My aim is not to accuse any philosopher or community of philosophers (...) of neglect. It is rather to defend an understanding of both philosophy and ethical responsibilities that makes room for philosophers to have moral responsibilities. Whether or not it has ever in fact been appropriate to accuse philosophers in South Africa, or indeed anywhere else, of neglect, philosophers do indeed have responsibilities to their contexts. (shrink)

The rapidly declining biosphere integrity, representing one of the core planetary boundaries, is alarming. One of the most widely accepted measures to halt the rate of biodiversity loss is to maintain and expand protected areas that are effectively managed. However, it requires substantial finance derived from nature-based tourism, specifically visitors from urban areas. Using the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) on 535 Vietnamese urban residents, the current study examined how their biodiversity loss perceptions can affect their willingness to pay for the (...) entrance fee and conservation in protected areas. We found that perceived environmental degradation, loss of economic growth, loss of nature-based recreation opportunity, and loss of knowledge as consequences of biodiversity loss has indirect effects on paying willingness through the mediation of the attitude towards conservation. Especially, the perceived knowledge loss also has a direct positive influence on the willingness to pay for the entrance fee and conservation. In contrast, perceived loss of health is negatively associated with the attitude towards conservation. Based on these findings, we suggest that building an eco-surplus culture among urban residents can be a promising way to generate more finance from nature-based tourism for conservation in protected areas and ease the domestic government's and international organizations' funding allocations problems. (shrink)

In his recent essay on moral pluralism in environmental ethics, J. Baird Callicott exaggerates the advantages of monism, ignoring the environmentally unsound implications of Leopold’s holism. In addition, he fails to see that Leopold’s view requires the same kind of intellectual schitzophrenia for which he criticizes the version of moral pluralism advocated by Christopher D. Stone in Earth and Other Ethics. If itis plausible to say that holistic entities like ecosystems are directly morally considerable-and that is a very big if-it (...) must be for a very different reason than is usually given for saying that individual human beings are directly morally considerable. (shrink)

Natural and supernatural explanations are used to interpret the same events in a number of predictable and universal ways. Yet little is known about how variation in diverse cultural ecologies influences how people integrate natural and supernatural explanations. Here, we examine explanatory coexistence in three existentially arousing domains of human thought: illness, death, and human origins using qualitative data from interviews conducted in Tanna, Vanuatu. Vanuatu, a Melanesian archipelago, provides a cultural context ideal for examining variation in explanatory coexistence due (...) to the lack of industrialization and the relatively recent introduction of Christianity and Western education. We argue for the integration of interdisciplinary methodologies from cognitive science and anthropology to inform research on explanatory coexistence. (shrink)

Those who conduct research on animals and those who advocate on behalf of animals have more in common than is generally supposed. A more nuanced understanding of the arguments defending animals' interests can help replace the current politics of confrontation with a genuine conversation.

Like all technologies, nanotechnology will inevitably present risks, whether they result from unintentional effects of otherwise beneficial applications, or from the malevolent misuse of technology. Increasingly, risks from new and emerging technologies are being regulated at the international level, although governments and private experts are only beginning to consider the appropriate international responses to nanotechnology. In this paper, we explore both the potential risks posed by nanotechnology and potential regulatory frameworks that law may impose. In so doing, we also explore (...) the various rationales for international regulation including the potential for cross-boundary harms, sharing of regulatory expertise and resources, controlling protectionism and trade conflicts, avoiding a “race to the bottom” in which governments seek economic advantage through lax regulation, and limiting the “nano divide” between North and South. Finally, we examine some models for international regulation and offer tentative thoughts on the prospects for each. (shrink)

Risk management of nanotechnology is challenged by the enormous uncertainties about the risks, benefits, properties, and future direction of nanotechnology applications. Because of these uncertainties, traditional risk management principles such as acceptable risk, cost–benefit analysis, and feasibility are unworkable, as is the newest risk management principle, the precautionary principle. Yet, simply waiting for these uncertainties to be resolved before undertaking risk management efforts would not be prudent, in part because of the growing public concerns about nanotechnology driven by risk perception (...) heuristics such as affect and availability. A more reflexive, incremental, and cooperative risk management approach is required, which not only will help manage emerging risks from nanotechnology applications, but will also create a new risk management model for managing future emerging technologies. (shrink)

This volume presents readings in philosophy from around the world and across history, from the Buddha to bell hooks, organized around traditional Anglo-European philosophical themes such as freedom and the existence of God. An introductory section discusses the nature of philosophy and gives advice on reading philosophical texts, and introductions to selections provide background and questions for thought.

There is much we do not know about nanotechnology. Despite its tremendous promise, nanotechnology today is mostly forecast and fervent hope. Predictions that spending on nanotechnology will increase from current levels of $13 billion to more than $1 trillion by 2015 are no more than that – simply predictions. Hopes that nanotechnology will be an essential part of solving the globe's energy, food, and water problems should be tempered by recalling a century of revolutionary technologies that failed to live up (...) to their early promise such as nuclear energy, supersonic airplanes, or gene therapy. Many other questions continue to nip at nanotechnology's heels, not the least of which are debates about what is and is not technically feasible. Despite these uncertainties, we can have complete confidence in one aspect of nanotechnology's future – it will be subject to a host of regulations. (shrink)

The standard means of seeking the classical limit in Bohmian mechanics is through the imposition of vanishing quantum force and quantum potential for pure states. We argue that this approach fails, and that the Bohmian classical limit can be realized only by combining narrow wave packets, mixed states, and environmental decoherence.

Scientific research is subject to a number of regulations which impose incidental (time, place), rather than substantive (type of research), restrictions on scientific research and the knowledge created through such research. In recent years, however, the premise that scientific research and knowledge should be free from substantive regulation has increasingly been called into question. Some have suggested that the law should be used as a tool to substantively restrict research which is dual-use in nature or which raises moral objections. There (...) are, however, some problems with using law to restrict or prohibit certain types of scientific research, including (i) the inherent imprecision of law for regulating complex and rapidly evolving scientific research; (ii) the difficulties of enforcing legal restrictions on an activity that is international in scope; (iii) the limited predictability of the consequences of restricting specific branches of scientific research; (iv) inertia in the legislative process; and (v) the susceptibility of legislators and regulators to inappropriate factors and influence. Rather than using law to restrict scientific research, it may be more appropriate and effective to use a combination of non-traditional legal tools including norms, codes of conduct, restrictions on publication, and scientist-developed voluntary standards to regulate problematic scientific research. (shrink)

Without looking beyond the conditions under which laying hens typically live in the contemporary U.S. egg industry, we can understand why the production and consumption of factory farmed eggs could be judged immoral. However, the question, What (if anything) is wrong with animal by-products? cannot always be adequately answered by looking at the conditions under which animals live out their productive lives. For the dairy industry looks benign in those terms, but if we look beyond the conditions under which milk (...) cows live, we can better understand some animal rights activists' reasons for objecting to dairy products. The contemporary U.S. dairy industry requires a slaughter industry between one-seventh and one-third the size of the contemporary beef industry. Today, beef slaughter is vastly more humane than poultry slaughter, but if today's beef slaughter industry is judged emmoral, the contemporary dairy industry should be judged similarly immoral, because the two are wedded. This is the deep reason for moral suspicion of the dairy industry. (shrink)