In this essay I criticize recent attempts to prove that the concept of lying does not include the intent to deceive. I argue that examples by Isenberg and Carson fail to prove that one can lie without intending to deceive and, furthermore, that untoward consequences would follow if these authors were correct. I conclude that since intending to deceive is indeed a necessary condition of lying, the class of statements that constitute lies is smaller than what Isenberg et al. would (...) suggest. Hence the class of deceptive advertisements is also correspondingly smaller. (shrink)

Increasing working memory (WM) capacity is often cited as a major influence on children's development and yet WM capacity is difficult to examine independently of long‐term knowledge. A computational model of children's nonword repetition (NWR) performance is presented that independently manipulates long‐term knowledge and WM capacity to determine the relative contributions of each in explaining the developmental data. The simulations show that (a) both mechanisms independently cause the same overall developmental changes in NWR performance, (b) increase in long‐term knowledge provides (...) the better fit to the child data, and (c) varying both long‐term knowledge and WM capacity adds no significant gains over varying long‐term knowledge alone. Given that increases in long‐term knowledge must occur during development, the results indicate that increases in WM capacity may not be required to explain developmental differences. An increase in WM capacity should only be cited as a mechanism of developmental change when there are clear empirical reasons for doing so. (shrink)

Pioneering work in the 1940s and 1950s suggested that the concept of chunking might be important in many processes of perception, learning and cognition in humans and animals. We summarize here the major sources of evidence for chunking mechanisms, and consider how such mechanisms have been implemented in computational models of the learning process. We distinguish two forms of chunking: the first deliberate, under strategic control, and goal-oriented; the second automatic, continuous, and linked to perceptual processes. Recent work with discrimination-network (...) computational models of long- and short-term memory (EPAM/CHREST) has produced a diverse range of applications of perceptual chunking. We focus on recent successes in verbal learning, expert memory, language acquisition and learning multiple representations, to illustrate the implementation and use of chunking mechanisms within contemporary models of human learning. (shrink)

Bioethics: Legal and Clinical Case Studies is a case-based introduction to ethical issues in health care. Through seventy-eight compelling scenarios, the authors demonstrate the practical importance of ethics, showing how the concerns at issue bear on the lives of patients, health care providers, and others. A range of central topics are covered, including informed consent, medical futility, reproductive ethics, privacy, cultural competence, and clinical trials. Each chapter includes a selection of important legal cases as well as clinical case studies for (...) critical analysis. The case studies are often presented as moral dilemmas, and are conducive to rich discussion. A companion website offers a curated collection of relevant legal precedents as well as additional case studies and other resources. (shrink)

SummaryIn this essay I critically discuss the views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend on the succession of scientific theories. I argue that, if Karl Popper's desiderata for theory succession are properly explicated, they constitute a basis for refuting the “incommensurability“ thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Popper's claim that a new theory must constitute an “improvement” over the old implies that the new theory must be able to be interpreted as referring to most of the phenomena as its predecessor.RésuméDans cet (...) essai, je discute les vues de Thomas Kuhn et de Paul Feyerabend sur la succession des théories scientifiques. Je montre que si les desiderata de Karl Popper pour la succession des théories sont correctement explicités, ils constituent une base pour réfuter la thèse ?incommen‐surabilité de Kuhn et de Feyerabend. Ľexigence de Popper selon laquelle une nouvelle théorie doit améliorer la précédente implique que la nouvelle théorie doit pouvoir être interprétée comme se référant à une plus grande part des phénoménes que ses prédécesseurs.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit werden Thomas Kuhns und Paul Feyerabends Auffassungen über die Frage, wie wissenschaftliche Theorien sich ablösen und folgen, erörtert. Ich zeige, dass Karl Poppers Forderungen für einen rationalen Theorienwechsel, wenn einmal richtig erläutert, eine Grundlage fiir die Widerlegung der Inkommensurabilitätsthese von Kuhn und Feyerabend lie‐fern. Proppers Forderung, dass eine neue Theorie gegenüber der alten eine Verbesserung darstellen müsse, impliziert, dass die neue Theorie so interpretiert werden kann, dass sie sich auf die meisten Phänomene bezieht, von denen auch in der Vorgängerin die Rede war. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the relationship between lawsuits for medical malpractice and the legal standard of care. I suggest that there is an insidious, dynamic relationship between physicians' reactions to the recent increase in malpractice litigation and an artificial elevation of the legal standard of care. Since, that is, the legal standard for proper medical care is based upon the community standard of care rather than the reasonable person standard, to the extent that overtreatment or “defensive” medicine becomes widespread (...) as a reaction to malpractice litigation, the legal standard becomes elevated as well. Thus, it will increasingly be the case that unless a physician practices defensive medicine, and hence practices unreasonably, she risks being found liable for medical malpractice. (shrink)

In this essay it will be argued that if preferential treatment for individuals who have suffered from past discrimination is permissible in any context, it should be extended to the allocation of scarce medical resources. This contention will be based on two facts: one, that health care, in particular certain life-saving operations, constitutes a scarce social good similar to but more important than other social goods such as desirable jobs and positions in desirable professional schools; secondly, that a claim can (...) plausibly be made that the greater incidence of death due to heart disease among blacks is a result of the effect of past discrimination. In addition, an argument to the effect that preferential treatment is indeed permissible will be sketched that is based upon a critique of the decision in the Bakke case. (shrink)

The proponents of the ‘vindication’ or ‘pragmatic justification’ of induction have attempted to show that induction will work if any method does. This in turn serves as grounds for their claim that we have everything to gain by using induction and nothing to lose. Hence, they conclude that it is rational to use induction. Their claim that induction will work if any mehtod does is based upon the following argument:If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not uniform (...) and some other method works, the success of that method will then constitute a regularity to which induction can be successfully applied. In that case, induction will sanction the continued use of the successful method and hence will be successful as well. (shrink)