While there is much literature on autonomy and the conditions for its attainment, there is less on how those conditions reflect on agents’ ordinary careers. Most people’s careers involve a great deal of subservient activity that would prevent the kind of control over agents’ actions that autonomy would seem to require. Yet, it would seem strange to deny autonomy to every agent who regularly follows orders at work—to do so would make autonomy a futile ideal. Most contemporary autonomy accounts provide (...) purely theoretical analysis without reference to any practical goal that autonomy could serve. These accounts are likely to resolve this issue in one direction: either almost entirely including or excluding subservient workers from autonomy. Either solution would fail to distinguish agents who sufficiently control their lives, in spite of limited subservience, according to their own standards, from agents for whom subservience precludes a fulfilling life. I suggest the solution lies in a return to goal-oriented autonomy accounts, which can use the goal to distinguish when subservience overwhelms autonomy from when subservience and autonomy can coexist. I present an account that anchors autonomy in the happiness that it provides for agents who sufficiently control their lives as determined by their more important prudential standards. On this account, agents in subservient careers can be autonomous if they determine how to make their careers consistent with their happiness. (shrink)
Aggressive techniques within casual sex encounters, such as taking sexual liberties without permission or ignoring rejection, can, perhaps unintentionally, complicate consent. Passive recipients may acquiesce out of fear, which aggressors may not realize. Some philosophers argue that social norms are sufficiently well known to make this misunderstanding unlikely. However, the chance of aggression leading to non-consensual sex, even if not great, is high enough that aggressors should work diligently to avoid this potentially grave result. I consider how this problem plays (...) out in the common mating ritual of hooking up. I argue that aggressive hook ups can only be permissible if they are modeled on BDSM encounters: the participants must obtain prior consent and prepare safe words for voiding that consent during the hook up. While this solution removes the spontaneity of aggressive sex, I argue that spontaneously aggressive hook ups with strangers cannot be permissible. (shrink)
We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, declined to grant habeas corpus relief and order Happy’s transfer to an elephant sanctuary, relying, in part, on previous decisions that denied habeas relief for the NhRP’s chimpanzee clients, Kiko and Tommy. Those decisions use incompatible conceptions of ‘person’ which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or, in fact, compatible with Happy’s personhood.
In this brief, we argue that there is a diversity of ways in which humans (Homo sapiens) are ‘persons’ and there are no non-arbitrary conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can include all humans and exclude all nonhuman animals. To do so we describe and assess the four most prominent conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can be found in the rulings concerning Kiko and Tommy, with particular focus on the most recent decision, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Lavery.
Immanuel Kant, in a much-maligned view, thought that we could only have indirect duties to nonhuman animals who have no inherent moral value since they lack rationality. While there are various responses to this worrisome position, no one seems to consider that animals could conceivably qualify as having rationality, even on Kantian high standards. Animals engage in various activities that could be taken as indicators of the core aspects of rationality that Kant requires for having absolute worth. While these animal (...) behaviors will not prove that animals are rational, we must remember that we also cannot prove that other humans are rational. Instead, my goal is only to provide a basis for a precautionary moral principle that requires treating animals as minimally rational, given that they might be. On this basis, we ought to accept some direct Kantian duties for the respectful treatment of animals. (shrink)
Philosophers often rely on their own examples and intuitions, which can be problematic since philosophers are a small group with their own set of biases and limitations. Science fiction can assist with this problem through the provision of examples that are both designed by non-philosophers and intended to be thought-provoking and plausible. In particular, when philosophers teach, we can use science fiction for examples that raise relevant issues in interesting contexts, while also being fully fleshed out. In this paper, I (...) explain how I use Joss Whedon’s Firefly to teach political philosophy, ethics, and existentialism. I hope to show the usefulness of good science fiction for the purpose of teaching philosophy in new and engaging ways. (shrink)
We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. We reject arbitrary distinctions that deny adequate protections to other animals who share with protected humans relevantly similar vulnerabilities to harms and relevantly similar interests in avoiding such harms. We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as a nonhuman person, Happy should be (...) released from her current confinement and transferred to an appropriate elephant sanctuary, pursuant to habeas corpus. (shrink)
Environmental racism concerns the ways in which environmental protections are unfairly distributed along racial lines. One outcome of environmental racism is that environmental degradation does not harm us all equally, with oppressed racial groups facing greater burdens. Consequently, members of privileged groups can more comfortably engage in environmentally destructive consumerism because they will neither initially nor primarily face the worst impact from environmental destruction. I will argue that the ability to feel comfortable while engaging in environmentally destructive consumerism is a (...) form of racism, and that this racism strengthens the blameworthiness of such privileged consumerism. (shrink)
This schedule, provided as a companion to my “Teaching Firefly” article, was used for a sophomore level philosophy course that was populated mostly by non-majors. The original idea for the course was to develop a popular culture philosophy course that would attract students from all over campus, which was meant to both introduce them to multiple philosophical ideas and theories and hopefully convince some of them to major or minor in philosophy. The course was quite successful at drawing Whedon fans (...) from across the university (after a certain amount of advertising through posters and social media). Students were very engaged with both discussions of episodes and the readings. (shrink)
There is disagreement in the coercion literature over whether an offer, which necessarily lacks a threat, could be coercive, which tends to imply at least some affinity with coercion, which, in paradigm cases, includes a threat. In one difficult sexual harassment case, someone is offered a promotion in exchange for sex, but there is, due to the arrangement of the case, no implied threat or repercussion for refusal. I argue this case counts as coercive since the offer-making attempts to recast (...) the agent's self-image simply by making the offer: the harasser attempts to define his employee as a sexualized object in the workplace to whom it is acceptable to make this kind of offer. Yet, such an offer can only be acceptably made to a woman who would accept sexual intrusions in her career, and it can never be right to assume others are willing to have their business lives sexualized. Thus, the offer is coercive in its disrespect for the employee's autonomy, although it involves no threat. (shrink)
Tom Regan argued that animal sports cannot be morally permissible because they are cruel and the animals do not voluntarily participate. While Regan is correct about actual animal sports, we should ask whether substantially revised animal sports could be permissible. We can imagine significant changes to certain animal sports, such as horse racing, that would avoid cruelty and even allow the animals to make their own choices. Where alternative options are freely available, we can consider the horses to have preference (...) autonomy in that they make their own decisions, and we could thereby claim that we have their hypothetical consent. Though this scenario would be sufficient to constitute permissible animal games, these activities could not amount to sports because the events would be unpredictable with the animals not following the rules in the precise way that sport requires. Therefore, permissible animal sports are not possible. (shrink)
While politicians seek to increase punitive measures against so-called "illegal aliens," it is worth asking whether unauthorized immigrants are obligated by immigration laws that would demand their punishment, whether it is deportation or jail time. I seek to examine this question in light of the traditional defenses of legal obligations: consent, prudential interest, and fairness. Due to the various ways in which the benefits of society are largely excluded from them and the severe penalties that the state seeks to impose (...) on them, these obligations cannot be justified. Unauthorized immigrants do not consent to follow these immigration laws under any of the usual meanings of "consent." We cannot provide a Hobbesian argument since the state refuses to offer its protection in exchange for the acceptance of benefits. Finally, the principle of fairness could not require these immigrants to be obligated since their contributions to society outweigh the benefits they receive. (shrink)
The Ethics of Hooking Up: Casual Sex and Moral Philosophy on Campus provides a systematic moral analysis of hooking up, or sexual activity between people who barely know each other, frequently while intoxicated, and with little or no verbal interaction. It explores the moral quandaries resulting from this potent combination of sex, alcohol, near-anonymity, and limited communication, focusing in particular on issues involving consent and respect. After delineating common practices involving casual sex on college campuses and exploring the difficulty of (...) reaching mutual consent, author James Rocha argues that respect, kindness, sensitivity, and honest communication are also necessary conditions for morally permissible casual sex. Key Features Provides a rare, systematic examination of the ethics of the hook up practice, which is the dominant mating practice for young people today. Analyzes the moral concepts of consent and respect in the context of hooking up, which provides significant moral challenges that highlight how we should obtain consent and show respect to one another. Argues for a moral paradigm shift in how young people hook up, emphasizing ways to avoid unintentionally committing grave moral wrongs. Situates the philosophy of casual sex in real life hook up practice, enabling us to rethink overly abstracted moral views on casual sex. (shrink)
It is well established that nonhuman animals are sentient, have feelings, have desires, and are conscious. For many of us, some set of those points is sufficient to ground moral duties to nonhuman animals. Yet, others retain doubts about whether humans have such duties. Perhaps these doubters set even higher standards—standards that they believe nonhuman animals are incapable of meeting. The task of this paper is to consider how nonhuman animals fare against an incredibly high standard for moral duties: autonomy. (...) Given that we use autonomy as our theoretical starting point, this paper’s arguments will only apply to... (shrink)
There is something mysterious about what explains the foundations or grounding for professional responsibility. What grounds the distinct professional responsibility that an engineer, doctor, or lawyer has that is separate from their moral duties and legal requirements? I argue that professional responsibility can derive from a systematic response to ambiguities that occur within moral issues that arise for given professions. Moral problems can often be solved in different ways that are equally permissible, which I will say provides a “moral ambiguity.” (...) Sometimes these moral ambiguities in professional settings require the same solutions across the profession because of the public’s legitimate expectations for uniformity. In such cases, professional organizations set professional responsibilities to provide a uniform set of duties to establish a necessary and predictable order. (shrink)
Among the various proposed ultrasound laws, a few have provisions that either provide the option for the pregnant woman to hear the heartbeat or require that the heartbeat be played and merely give the woman the option to somehow avert her ears. I will argue that these heartbeat provisions actually belie the argument that these laws are intended to assist autonomous choosing. Since the information could be provided just as easily through a factual statement , it cannot be justified to (...) involve emotions in a way that the pregnant woman did not autonomously choose for herself. (shrink)
In sexual harassment law scholarship, it is often argued that the reasonable person standard should give way to a reasonable victim standard. Yet, this latter standard may unintentionally invite homophobic employees to attempt to use a reasonable homophobe standard to charge gay supervisors with harassment merely for being openly gay at work. In response, I argue that we currently act on an unjustifiable distinction whereby we treat sexuality behavior as necessarily sexualized only for GLBTQ behavior. By disallowing this discriminatory treatment, (...) we can preserve the reasonable victim standard and undermine the homophobe's warrantless charges. (shrink)
In a nearly paradoxical manner, the virtue of martial courage is best understood through violent acts that are typically vicious, such as killing, maiming, and bombing. To ameliorate this worry, I make a new distinction that is dependent on whether the agent acts in accord with social norms or against them. We usually understand martial courage through social courage, where soldiers are courageous through performing violent acts that society determines are necessary. While this understanding is accurate for a just war, (...) violence cannot be virtuous when fighting for an unjust cause. The oppositional form of martial courage involves acting contrary to social norms by refusing to fight on behalf of an unjust cause or in unjust ways. As a virtue, martial courage should include bravely renouncing and resisting unjust wars. In this way, oppositional courage provides a non-violent grounding for martial courage: while martial courage often requires violence, it also requires a vigilant readiness to refuse to be violent when justice requires oppositional courage. (shrink)