In this paper, we discuss the prevailing view amongst philosophers and many mathematicians concerning mathematical proof. Following Cellucci, we call the prevailing view the “axiomatic conception” of proof. The conception includes the ideas that: a proof is finite, it proceeds from axioms and it is the final word on the matter of the conclusion. This received view can be traced back to Frege, Hilbert and Gentzen, amongst others, and is prevalent in both mathematical text books and logic text books.

This paper consists of three main sections. In the first section, we consider how early attempts at understanding the relationship between mathematics and philosophy in Leibniz’s thought were often made within the framework of grand reconstructions guided by intellectual trends such as the search for “the ideal of system”. In the second section, we proceed to recount Leibniz’s first encounter with contemporary mathematics during his four years of study in Paris presenting some of the earliest mathematical successes which he made (...) there. In particular, we argue that recently published letters and papers reveal how his youthful mathematical reflexions were deeply intertwined with important philosophical insights that, in turn, acted as guiding ideas for his mathematical research. Finally, in the third section, we situate the central themes of the essays of the present volume within the new understanding of the interrelations between philosophy and mathematics in Leibniz’s thought briefly indicated in the opening section. (shrink)

This paper revisits some of Chateaubriand’s critical considerations with regard to representing our reasoning practices in logic and mathematics by means of “idealized syntax”. I focus on the persistently critical side of these considerations which aim to prepare the ground for “an interesting epistemology of logic and mathematics” that ought to make room for understanding the pragmatic dimensions of proofs as explanatory rational displays. First, I discuss the 20th century “syntactic conception” of the logical and the underlying set of values (...) it upholds. Secondly, I revisit the syntactic constraints on systematizing our formal forms of reasoning and ask about the relationship between “idealized” proofs construed as “syntactic objects” and the variety of formal forms of reasoning with its uses of the logical by the research mathematician. Finally, I consider the reasons why Chateaubriand thinks the syntactic requirements of “logical rigor” cannot be fulfilled, and why they ought not to be on the agenda. I conclude my paper by pointing to a deeper assumption which needs to be critically revisited as it stands in the way to what the author envisages as an “interesting epistemology of logic and mathematics”.O presente artigo reconsidera algumas das considerações críticas de Chateaubriand com relação a representar nossa prática de raciocínios em lógica e matemática por meio de uma “sintaxe idealizada”. Concentro-me no aspecto invariavelmente crítico dessas considerações, que têm por objetivo preparar o terreno para “uma epistemologia interessante da lógica e da matemática”, a qual deve abrir caminho para a compreensão da dimensão pragmática de provas como exibição racional explicativa. Em primeiro lugar, discuto a “concepção sintática” da noção de lógica do século XX e o conjunto de valores que ela sustenta. Em segundo lugar, eu reconsidero as restrições sintáticas impostas à sistematização de nossos raciocínios formais e pergunto sobre a relação entre provas “idealizadas” construídas como “objetos sintáticos” e a variedade de modos formais de raciocínios com os seus usos do lógico pelos pesquisadores em matemática. Por fim, eu considero as razões pelas quais Chateaubriand pensa que os requisitos sintáticos do “rigor lógico” não podem ser satisfeitos, e por que eles não deveriam ser parte da agenda. Concluo meu artigo apontando uma assunção mais profunda que precisa ser reconsiderada criticamente uma vez que ela representa um obstáculo àquilo que o autor vislumbra como uma “epistemologia interessante da lógica e da matemática”. (shrink)

La relación entre la teoría y la práctica en el derecho islámico puede ser examinada desde distintos puntos de vista. Por lo que se refiere a la sustancia del derecho islámico, se puede plantear la pregunta de cómo las normas de la šarī‛a son o pueden ser aplicadas. Otra pregunta relativa a los aspectos externos de la šarī‛a es hasta qué punto la situación política, la administración judicial, el sistema educativo y otros factores sociopolíticos permiten la existencia de una jurisdicción (...) conforme a la šarī‛a. Los cadíes que no tienen las cualificaciones necesarias, cuya competencia se ve limitada por los gobernantes o cuyos juicios se ven influidos por los intereses políticos, no pueden ejercer el cadiazgo en el contexto de la šarī‛a. El análisis llevado a cabo en este artículo tiene como objetivo reconstruir el contexto socio-político de los cadíes en Siria durante los siglos VIII/XIV. A partir de los datos de varios diccionarios biográficos que contienen descripciones auténticas y detalladas de más de doscientos cadíes sirios, se demuestra que existían las pre-condiciones esenciales para ejercer el cadiazgo en aquella época y región. Se argumenta que los cadíes, junto con otros ulemas, formaban un cuerpo específico dentro del sistema estatal mameluco que, por una parte, era lo suficientemente fuerte como para resistir intervenciones políticas y, por otro lado, suministraba un alto nivel de formación legal y se beneficiaba al tiempo de él. (shrink)

Las prácticas éticas, particularmente las cívicas o ciudadanas, están demostrando con toda propiedad que el desarrollo económico y político del Estado debería ir a la par con el cumplimiento de principios o normas de moralidad pública. En una sociedad cada vez más globalizada por el dominio de la razón técnica, es necesario orientar éticamente la racionalidad de nuestras acciones humanas hacia fines sociales mucho más justos, equitativos y democráticos. El ideal griego de la “res publica” todavía compromete al Estado moderno (...) con la práctica de valores éticos. Sin éstos, la gobernabilidad de la sociedad se hace mucho más conflictiva, en vez de tolerante y consensuada. La inclusión de normas éticas y principios morales en las políticas públicas del estado social, es cada vez más legítima si se quiere que el Estado cumpla cabalmente su rol de integración social. (shrink)

This volume starts where the four-volume work by Johannes Hoffmeister, Briefe von und an Hegel, left off. It consists of excerpts from letters, diaries, memoirs, newspaper and journal articles, etc., much of which has never been published before. What emerges is a conflicting picture of Hegel, the man--from which the reader can take his choice. The comments are from contemporaries: relatives, friends, acquaintances, students, colleagues, admirers, critics, and last, but not least, enemies. The chapters are organized chronologically by city of (...) residence, beginning with Stuttgart, 1770-1788, and covering the periods in Tübingen, Bern, Frankfurt, Jena, Bamberg, Nürnberg, Heidelberg, and Berlin. There is a special chapter on the period immediately following Hegel's death, and a final chapter on After-Effects. The biggest chapter by far is the one on the Berlin period, which spans the longest space of time and also covers the time when Hegel's fame had reached its zenith. All told there are 769 excerpts from the pens of such varied personalities as Karl, Christiane, and Marie Hegel, Hölderlin, Goethe, Schelling, Karl Rosenkranz, Eduard Zeller, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schiller, Schlegel, Brentano, Savigny, Michelet, Schopenhauer, Victor Cousin, Heine, Feuerbach, Bouterwek, Varnhagen v. Ense, K. F. Zeller, Arnold Ruge, Ranke, Eduard Gans, and many others. This book will undoubtedly figure prominently in future biographies of Hegel. However, it is not only for the Hegel specialist. Those who are interested in that specific period of German culture and those who simply enjoy anecdotal historical commentary will find much of interest and amusement here.--H. B. (shrink)

Although the essays in this book vary a good deal in quality, they all distort the eighteenth century to some extent by concentrating on its "modernity," about the scope of which, to increase the confusion, none of the authors is very explicit. One essay treats the emergence of scientific thought quite superficially; another presents Jacobi as an anti-type of Goethe and a fore-runner of existentialism. Herbert Dieckmann argues against the common "from classic to romantic" view of eighteenth-century aesthetic history. (...) Ernest Mossner characterizes "the enlightenment of David Hume," seeing him as a liberator of the mind from its various idols and reiterating his view that Hume was only a "mitigated sceptic." Dietrich Ritschl emphasizes Semler's contribution to the historical study of the Bible; his essay also contains, but only implicitly, some warnings for today's aggiornamento theologians.—W. B. K. (shrink)

This volume starts where the four-volume work by Johannes Hoffmeister, Briefe von und an Hegel, left off. It consists of excerpts from letters, diaries, memoirs, newspaper and journal articles, etc., much of which has never been published before. What emerges is a conflicting picture of Hegel, the man--from which the reader can take his choice. The comments are from contemporaries: relatives, friends, acquaintances, students, colleagues, admirers, critics, and last, but not least, enemies. The chapters are organized chronologically by city of (...) residence, beginning with Stuttgart, 1770-1788, and covering the periods in Tübingen, Bern, Frankfurt, Jena, Bamberg, Nürnberg, Heidelberg, and Berlin. There is a special chapter on the period immediately following Hegel's death, and a final chapter on After-Effects. The biggest chapter by far is the one on the Berlin period, which spans the longest space of time and also covers the time when Hegel's fame had reached its zenith. All told there are 769 excerpts from the pens of such varied personalities as Karl, Christiane, and Marie Hegel, Hölderlin, Goethe, Schelling, Karl Rosenkranz, Eduard Zeller, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schiller, Schlegel, Brentano, Savigny, Michelet, Schopenhauer, Victor Cousin, Heine, Feuerbach, Bouterwek, Varnhagen v. Ense, K. F. Zeller, Arnold Ruge, Ranke, Eduard Gans, and many others. This book will undoubtedly figure prominently in future biographies of Hegel. However, it is not only for the Hegel specialist. Those who are interested in that specific period of German culture and those who simply enjoy anecdotal historical commentary will find much of interest and amusement here.--H. B. (shrink)

The following observations reflect on the moral-psychological value of the form of reading and writing that Nietzsche referred to as the human, all too human, particularly as he saw it embodied in Goethe, and as taken up by Hans Blumenberg in his collection Goethe zum Beispiel.

The concept “mind” refers to the human and humanlike features of the brain. A historical review of thinking about the mind contextualizes humanity's search to understand itself by sketching biblical and philosophical perspectives from the Hebrew scriptures through the Greeks and Descartes to the German philosophers Goethe, Kant, and Hegel. These provide an enlarged context for an analytic approach to mind as focusing on the interface between physical signals and experiential symbolic expressions. Drawing on a holistic paradigm, several features (...) are discernible: empathic rationality, imaginative intentionality, meaningful memory, and adaptability. These reflect the evolutionary development of uncommitted cortex that contributes to the brain's explosive capacity for order, complexity, and novelty. The basic issue continues, namely, how are the distributed modules of information‐processing integrated into the meaning‐making reality of human beings? (shrink)

Logic and Knowledge -/- Editor: Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz and Emiliano Ippoliti Date Of Publication: Aug 2011 Isbn13: 978-1-4438-3008-9 Isbn: 1-4438-3008-9 -/- The problematic relation between logic and knowledge has given rise to some of the most important works in the history of philosophy, from Books VI–VII of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Mill’s A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. It provides the title of an important collection of papers (...) by Bertrand Russell (Logic and Knowledge. Essays, 1901–1950). However, it has remained an underdeveloped theme in the last century, because logic has been treated as separate from knowledge. -/- This book does not hope to make up for a century-long absence of discussion. Rather, its ambition is to call attention to the theme and stimulating renewed reflection upon it. The book collects essays of leading figures in the field and it addresses the theme as a topic of current debate, or as a historical case study, or when appropriate as both. Each essay is followed by the comments of a younger discussant, in an attempt to transform what might otherwise appear as a monologue into an ongoing dialogue; each section begins with an historical essay and ends with an essay by one of the editors. -/- Carlo Cellucci is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. He is currently completing a book entitled, Remaking Logic: What is Logic Really? -/- Emily Grosholz is Professor of Philosophy at the Pennsylvania State University, USA. She is the author of Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathematics and the Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2007). -/- Emiliano Ippoliti is a Research Fellow at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. His main interests are heuristics, the logic of discovery, and problem-solving. He is currently working on a book, Ampliating Knowledge: Data, Hypotheses and Novelty. -/- TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................. xxv -/- Section I: Logic and Knowledge -/- Chapter One................................................................................................. 3 The Cognitive Importance of Sight and Hearing in Seventeenthand Eighteenth-Century Logic (Mirella Capozzi) Discussion .............................................................................................. 26 (Chiara Fabbrizi) Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 33 Nominalistic Content (Jody Azzouni) Discussion ............................................................................................... 52 (Silvia De Bianchi) Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 57 A Garden of Grounding Trees (Göran Sundholm) Discussion.......................................................................................... .. 75 (Luca Incurvati) Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 81 Logics and Metalogics (Timothy Williamson) Discussion.......................................................................................... 101 (Cesare Cozzo) Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 109 Is Knowledge the Most General Factive Stative Attitude? (Cesare Cozzo) Discussion.......................................................................................... 117 (Timothy Williamson) Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 123 Classifying and Justifying Inference Rules (Carlo Cellucci) Discussion.......................................................................................... 143 (Norma B. Goethe) -/- Section II: Logic and Science -/- Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 151 The Universal Generalization Problem and the Epistemic Status of Ancient Medicine: Aristotle and Galen (Riccardo Chiaradonna) Discussion.......................................................................................... 168 (Diana Quarantotto) Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 175 The Empiricist View of Logic (Donald Gillies) Discussion.......................................................................................... 191 (Paolo Pecere) Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 197 Artificial Intelligence and Evolutionary Theory: Herbert Simon’s Unifying Framework (Roberto Cordeschi) Discussion.......................................................................................... 216 (Francesca Ervas) Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 221 Evolutionary Psychology and Morality: The Renaissance of Emotivism? (Mario De Caro) Discussion.......................................................................................... 232 (Annalisa Paese) Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 237 Between Data and Hypotheses (Emiliano Ippoliti) Discussion.......................................................................................... 262 (Fabio Sterpetti) -/- Section III: Logic and Mathematics -/- Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 273 Dedekind Against Intuition: Rigor, Scope and the Motives of his Logicism (Michael Detlefsen) Discussion.......................................................................................... 290 (Marianna Antonutti) Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 297 Mathematical Intuition: Poincaré, Polya, Dewey (Reuben Hersh) Discussion.......................................................................................... 324 (Claudio Bernardi) Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 329 On the Finite: Kant and the Paradoxes of Knowledge (Carl Posy) Discussion.......................................................................................... 358 (Silvia Di Paolo) Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 363 Assimilation: Not Only Indiscernibles are Identified (Robert Thomas) Discussion.......................................................................................... 380 (Diego De Simone) Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 385 Proofs and Perfect Syllogisms (Dag Prawitz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 403 (Julien Murzi) Chapter Seventeen ................................................................................... 411 Logic, Mathematics, Heterogeneity (Emily Grosholz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 427 (Valeria Giardino) -/- Contributors........................................................................................ ..... 433 Index............................................................................................... ......... 437 -/- Price Uk Gbp: 49.99 Price Us Usd: 74.99. 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Norma Goethe addresses my criticisms of the notion of formal proof as a representation of the practice of proving, and in the process revisits large portions of my discussion of proof. I agree with many of her comments, and direct my response to two specific issues. The first concerns the essential features of proof, and the second the distinction between actual proofs and idealized proofs.Norma Goethe tece seus comentários entorno de minhas críticas à noção de prova (...) formal como representação da prática de provar e retoma diversos aspectos da discussão de prova em meu livro. Concordo com muitas de suas considerações e dirijo minha réplica a duas questões específicas. A primeira é sobre as características essenciais das provas, e a segunda sobre a distinção entre provas atuais e provas idealizadas. (shrink)

Kurz bevor Goethe in den Jahren 1808/9 die Wahlverwandtschaften schrieb, hatte sich sein ehemaliger naturwissenschaftlicher Kooperationspartner Johann Ritter in Untersuchungen zu Wünschelruten und Pendeln (1807/8) verloren, aus denen angeblich eine weitere tiefgreifende Analogie zwischen den Polaritäten in der Natur und denen beim Menschen hervorgehen sollte. Ritter arbeitete damals schon seit Jahren erfolgreich mit Goethes Polaritätsbegriff, und war dadurch sogar auf seinen größten Erfolg geleitet worden (die Entdeckung des UV-Lichts). So ist es nicht überraschend, dass sich Goethe für die (...) Pendelexperimente interessierte – und ihnen im Roman ein literarisches Denkmal setzte (während er sich wissenschaftlich dazu sicherheitshalber nicht äußerte). Die von beiden geteilte Polaritätsidee lief auf mehr hinaus als den vagen Gegensatz zwischen irgendwelchen antagonistischen Wirkfaktoren; vielmehr hatte sie handfeste strukturelle Implikationen im Sinne einer mathematischen Symmetrie: Bei Vertauschung der entgegengesetzten Pole in irgendeiner gegebenen Konfiguration kehren sich die ursprünglich beobachtbaren Wirkungen genau in ihr Gegenteil um. Diese Idee ist ein Kerngedanke der Farbenlehre (1810) und liegt z. B. Goethes Farbenkreis zugrunde; überraschenderweise lässt sie sich an einigen entscheidenden Wendepunkten der Wahlverwandtschaften präzise dingfest machen, und dadurch gewinnt ein beliebtes Spiel unter Goethelesern einen neuen Dreh: Die Farben des Farbenkreises haben eindeutig identifizierbare Gegenstücke im Personentableau des Romans. (shrink)

In "The Metamorphosis of Plants" (1790) and the related didactic poem (1798) Goethe describes the generation and development of plants as six metamorphoses of the primal plant and its organ, the leaf. In a first step, I will try to analyze the nature of the primal plant and its organ, the leaf. Is the primal plant and its organ, the leaf, an idea or does it consist in matter? If it is an idea, is it the idea of all (...) plants (the plant), the idea of a particular species of plants, or the idea of the individual plant? If it is matter – which kind of matter? In a second step, I will analyze the generic nature of the primal plant and its organ, the leaf. How does the metamorphosis of plants proceed? Suppose the leaf is A and the parts of the plants are B, C and D. Does A transform into B, C, D by a process from A to B to A, from A to C to A, and from A to D to A; or does A transform into B, proceed from B as B to C, and proceed from C as C to D; or does A transform into B, while remaining at the same time A, and proceed from B as A to C, while remaining at the same time A, and proceed from C as A to D, while remaining at the same time A? Which of these models explains our experience of plant generation and growth and allows a meaningful interpretation of Goethe's mysterious claim that 'All is leaf'? (shrink)

En este trabajo ofrezco un análisis de algunas de las ideas más importantes sostenidas por Ricardo Caracciolo en su ensayo sobre hechos y justifi cación de las decisiones judiciales. Estas tesis son: a) tesis de la aplicación posible. Las normas generales sólo se pueden aplicar a los casos que ellas regulan; b) tesis de la aplicación efectiva. Una norma general es aplicada a un hecho sólo si la premisa que describe ese hecho es verdadera. Este artículo muestra que hay (...) buenas razones para revisar ambas tesis ya que ellas pasan por alto una distinción relevante entre distintos sentidos de ‘casos individual’: casos individuales de un universo del discurso y casos individuales de un caso genérico. Como consecuencia de ello, se señala que es necesario modelar un concepto de justifi cación jurídica que no presuponga a esas mencionadas tesis. (shrink)

Bridging the gap between the world of science and the realm of the spiritual, B. Alan Wallace introduces a natural theory of human consciousness that has its roots in contemporary physics and Buddhism. Wallace's "special theory of ontological relativity" suggests that mental phenomena are _conditioned_ by the brain, but do not _emerge_ from it. Rather, the entire natural world of mind and matter, subjects and objects, arises from a unitary dimension of reality that is more fundamental than these dualities, as (...) proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung. To test his hypothesis, Wallace employs the Buddhist meditative practice of _samatha_, refining one's attention and metacognition, to create a kind of telescope to examine the space of the mind. Drawing on the work of the physicist John Wheeler, he then proposes a more general theory in which the participatory nature of reality is envisioned as a self-excited circuit. In comparing these ideas to the Buddhist theory known as the Middle Way philosophy, Wallace explores further aspects of his "general theory of ontological relativity," which can be investigated by means of _vipasyana_, or insight, meditation. Wallace then focuses on the theme of symmetry in reference to quantum cosmology and the "problem of frozen time," relating these issues to the theory and practices of the Great Perfection school of Tibetan Buddhism. He concludes with a discussion of the general theme of complementarity as it relates to science and religion. The theories of relativity and quantum mechanics were major achievements in the physical sciences, and the theory of evolution has had an equally deep impact on the life sciences. However, rigorous scientific methods do not yet exist to observe mental phenomena, and naturalism has its limits for shedding light on the workings of the mind. A pioneer of modern consciousness research, Wallace offers a practical and revolutionary method for exploring the mind that combines the keenest insights of contemporary physicists and philosophers with the time-honored meditative traditions of Buddhism. (shrink)

Kategoria prawdy budzi kontrowersje od czasów filozofii starożytnej aż do współczesnej. W związku z dyskusjami na temat korespondencyjnej, klasycznej teorii prawdy powstały teorie nieklasyczne, łączące pojęcie prawdy z oczywistością, skutecznym działaniem, koherencją, powszechną zgodą itp. Ostra polemika próbuje w ogóle wyeliminować kategorię prawdy. Powstaje pytanie: czy taka radykalna krytyka jest słuszna i uzasadniona? Wydaje się, że jest ona przesadna. Celem artykułu jest argumentacja za tezą, że prawda — jako wartość i norma („wzorzec”, element systemu odniesienia itp.) — jest niezbywalna (...) przy epistemicznej ocenie twierdzeń, które mają swoje konsekwencje teoretyczne i praktyczne. Strukturę artykułu wyznaczają następujące punkty: (1) krytyka kategorii prawdy, (2) prawda jako wartość i (3) prawda jako norma w systemie odniesienia. W punkcie wyjścia przyjmuję syntetyczną charakterystykę prawdy sformułowaną przez Michaela P. Lyncha w jego monografii pt. Prawda i życie. Dlaczego prawda jest ważna (2020): (a) Prawda jest obiektywna. (b) Prawda jest wartością, jest dobra. (c) Prawda jest wartościowym celem dociekań. (d) Prawda jest wartościowa ze względu na nią samą. Prawda faktycznie jest wartościowa, umożliwia bowiem stwierdzenie, że ktoś myli się, kłamie, popełnia krzywoprzysięstwo, manipuluje kimś w życiu osobistym czy społecznym. Oprócz tego, bez kategorii prawdy nie można nawet stwierdzić — jak to usiłuje czynić sceptycyzm — że prawdą jest, iż prawda nie jest czymś wartościowym, godnym uwagi itp. Kategoria prawdy — pełniąca funkcję poznawczego celu i normy — pomimo różnych kontrowersji jest wciąż niezbywalna przy ocenie wartości logicznej zdań (i wyrażanych przez nie twierdzeń). Kategoria prawdy jest semantyczna, lecz jej rozpoznawanie — uznawanie zdania przez kogoś za prawdziwe (czyli asercja) — jest kategorią pragmatyczną. Stwierdzana post factum skuteczność działania, podjętego na podstawie jakiegoś zdania, jest mocną racją za tym, aby dane zdanie uznać za prawdziwe. Respekt dla prawdy jest lepszy niż jego brak. (shrink)

Do psychological traits predict philosophical views? We administered the PhilPapers Survey, created by David Bourget and David Chalmers, which consists of 30 views on central philosophical topics (e.g., epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) to a sample of professional philosophers (N = 314). We extended the PhilPapers survey to measure a number of psychological traits, such as personality, numeracy, well-being, lifestyle, and life experiences. We also included non-technical ‘translations’ of these views for eventual use in other (...) populations. We found limited to no support for the notion that personality or demographics predict philosophical views. We did, however, find that some psychological traits were predictive of philosophical views, even after strict correction for multiple comparisons. Findings include: higher interest in numeracy predicted physicalism, naturalism, and consequentialism; lower levels of well-being and higher levels of mental illness predicted hard determinism; using substances such as psychedelics and marijuana predicted non-realist and subjectivist views of morality and aesthetics; having had a transformative or self-transcendent experience predicted theism and idealism. We discuss whether or not these empirical results have philosophical implications, while noting that 68% of our sample of professional philosophers indicated that such findings would indeed have philosophical value. (shrink)

Bridging the gap between the world of science and the realm of the spiritual, B. Alan Wallace introduces a natural theory of human consciousness that has its roots in contemporary physics and Buddhism. Wallace's "special theory of ontological relativity" suggests that mental phenomena are _conditioned_ by the brain, but do not _emerge_ from it. Rather, the entire natural world of mind and matter, subjects and objects, arises from a unitary dimension of reality that is more fundamental than these dualities, as (...) proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung. To test his hypothesis, Wallace employs the Buddhist meditative practice of _samatha_, refining one's attention and metacognition, to create a kind of telescope to examine the space of the mind. Drawing on the work of the physicist John Wheeler, he then proposes a more general theory in which the participatory nature of reality is envisioned as a self-excited circuit. In comparing these ideas to the Buddhist theory known as the Middle Way philosophy, Wallace explores further aspects of his "general theory of ontological relativity," which can be investigated by means of _vipasyana_, or insight, meditation. Wallace then focuses on the theme of symmetry in reference to quantum cosmology and the "problem of frozen time," relating these issues to the theory and practices of the Great Perfection school of Tibetan Buddhism. He concludes with a discussion of the general theme of complementarity as it relates to science and religion. The theories of relativity and quantum mechanics were major achievements in the physical sciences, and the theory of evolution has had an equally deep impact on the life sciences. However, rigorous scientific methods do not yet exist to observe mental phenomena, and naturalism has its limits for shedding light on the workings of the mind. A pioneer of modern consciousness research, Wallace offers a practical and revolutionary method for exploring the mind that combines the keenest insights of contemporary physicists and philosophers with the time-honored meditative traditions of Buddhism. (shrink)

In Byron, Shelley, and Goethe’s Faust, author Ben Hewitt has provided us with a carefully done and convincing study. Given this, it would have been interesting to see Hewitt’s effort to integrate Mary Shelley’s work into his narrative. Apart from any similarities between Faust and Frankenstein, it bears remembering that Goethe himself remained unconvinced by efforts to clearly demarcate works as “tragic” or “epic”; a fact that becomes especially clear in the number of works he’d devoted to rewriting (...) the story of Prometheus. One cannot help but wish that Hewitt had considered the connection between these works and Shelley’s own “Modern Prometheus” in juxtaposition to his reading of P.B. Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, for this would have made for an especially good ending to Hewitt’s story. Wayne Deakin’s consideration of Hegel and the English Romantic Tradition does indeed close with a brief consideration of Mary Shelley’s Prometheus, but this comes only at the end of a much longer set of considerations. In this book Deakin adopts a similar strategy as that of Hewitt, namely, foregoing any historical recovery of Hegel’s direct influence on the English Romantics—in Deakin’s case, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and P.B. Shelley—to focus instead on a reading of key poetic works in concert with their Hegelian framework. This reading essentially flows from Deakin’s effort to rethink Hegel’s relatively early notion of self-consciousness through his late lectures on aesthetics. For Deakin, this leads to “aesthetic recognition”; a situating of the self in relation to the world that remains in tension so far as the subject’s drive for autonomy will automatically be humbled by its reception of and to alterity—be that other “Nature” or other subject. (shrink)