We highlight recent progress in neuroimaging and neuropsychological research on memory mechanisms in the medial temporal lobe that speaks to the involuntary nature of memory retrieval processes. We suggest that evidence form these studies supports Barzykowski and Moulin's proposal that memory signals involved in experiences of familiarity and déjà vu can be generated in the absence of retrieval intentionality.

This article compares Wolfgang Köhler's pioneering field theory of the consciousness–brain relation with Benjamin Libet's conscious mental field theory and Karl Popper's mental force field hypothesis. In the discussion of Köhler's theory we devote special attention to his analysis of problems of sense perception and to his explanation of figural after-effects. Both Libet and Popper take consciousness to causally interact with the brain, and we argue that even Köhler presupposes an interactionist interpretation of the consciousness–brain relation. We argue that nothing (...) necessarily rules out that consciousness as something subjective may causally interact with the brain as something objective. We discuss an evolutionary argument for the theory that consciousness causally interacts with the brain, and we consider some arguments for consciousness having had a survival value. (shrink)

The problem of the judge: judicial freedom of decision, its necessity and method, by F. Gény.--Judicial freedom of decision, its principles and objects, by E. Ehrlich.--Dialecticism and technicality; the need of sociological method, by J. G. Gmelin.--Equity and law, by G. Kiss.--The perils of emotionalism, by F. Berolzheimer.--Judicial interpretation of enacted law, by J. Kohler.--Courts and legislation, by R. Pound.--The operation of the judicial function in English law, by H. B. Gerland.--Codified law and case-law, by É. Lambert.--Methods of juridical (...) thinking, by K. G. Wurzel.--The problem of the legislator: methods for scientific codification, by A. Alvarez.--The legislative technic of modern civil codes, by F. Gény.--Scientific method in legislative drafting, by E. Freund. (shrink)

The articles in this volume discuss the relation between values and ontology, focusing on the significance of ontology for ethics and aesthetics, i.e., themes which due to the raising interest in ontology come to play a central role in contemporary philosophical debate. The contributors address the questions of whether and in which sense values can be considered to be real, whether it is possible to experience them, and in which sense we can speak about their objective validity. These topics which (...) were also discussed by early phenomenologists like Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels, proponents of Gestalt psychology like Kohler, by Husserl, and by French phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty are approached by both historical and systematic analysis.". (shrink)

Wittgenstein formulates the paradox of gestalt switches thus: ‘What is incomprehensible is that nothing, and yet everything has changed, after all. That is the only way to put it’. In the course of isolating what I take to be the best of the various solutions to the paradox explored by Wittgenstein, the following claims are defended: (a) A significant strand in Wittgenstein’s own formulation of, and solution to, the paradox can best be understood as a response to three specific claims (...) made by the Gestalt psychologist Kohler. (b) The most promising avenue Wittgenstein explored in his many attempts to resolve the paradox gives perceptual attention a constitutive role in the solution (c) This role is best elaborated, partially, by appeal to information processing theories of attention. (d) There are good reasons to think that the kind of solution to the paradox this yields would have been welcomed by Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Formal principles governing best practices in classification and definition have for too long been neglected in the construction of biomedical ontologies, in ways which have important negative consequences for data integration and ontology alignment. We argue that the use of such principles in ontology construction can serve as a valuable tool in error-detection and also in supporting reliable manual curation. We argue also that such principles are a prerequisite for the successful application of advanced data integration techniques such as ontology-based (...) multi-database querying, automated ontology alignment and ontology-based text-mining. These theses are illustrated by means of a case study of the Gene Ontology, a project of increasing importance within the field of biomedical data integration. (shrink)

While the meta‐ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become expressivists. Additionally, the paper explores certain important but largely ignored methodological issues that arise for reforming definitions generally and with a vengeance (...) in the context of a radical error theory about all practical normative judgements, and suggests how these issues can be resolved. (shrink)

Empathy means understanding another person’s emotional or intentional state by vicariously sharing this state. As opposed to emotional contagion, empathy is characterized by the self–other distinction of subjective experience. Empathy develops in the second year, as soon as symbolic representation and mental imagery set in that enable children to represent the self, to recognize their mirror image, and to identify with another person. In experiments with 126 children, mirror recognition and readiness to empathize with a distressed playmate were investigated. Almost (...) all recognizers showed compassion and tried to help, whereas nonrecognizers were perplexed or remained indifferent. Several motivational consequences of empathy are discussed and its special quality is outlined in comparison with theory of mind and perspective taking. (shrink)

Empathy means understanding another person’s emotional or intentional state by vicariously sharing this state. As opposed to emotional contagion, empathy is characterized by the self–other distinction of subjective experience. Empathy develops in the second year, as soon as symbolic representation and mental imagery set in that enable children to represent the self, to recognize their mirror image, and to identify with another person. In experiments with 126 children, mirror recognition and readiness to empathize with a distressed playmate were investigated. Almost (...) all recognizers showed compassion and tried to help, whereas nonrecognizers were perplexed or remained indifferent. Several motivational consequences of empathy are discussed and its special quality is outlined in comparison with theory of mind and perspective taking. (shrink)

This monograph is the first comprehensive source-based description and investigation of the theoretical fundament of philosophical reflection on man during the thirteenth century.

Self–other distinction, as documented by mirror self-recognition (MSR), allows for empathy which offers a motivational base for helping a person in need. Kärtner and Keller propose a different, culture-related, possibility of helping based on shared intentional relations and emotional contagion which could explain helping behavior in Indian children not yet capable of MSR. Due to the experimental setting, however, other releasers of children’s sadness and helping behavior have to be considered. An alternative setting is proposed. With respect to MSR, the (...) question of false negatives is discussed. The issues mentioned by Klann-Delius address fundamental theoretical questions that cannot be answered briefly. (shrink)

As part of the social distancing measures for preventing the spread of COVID-19, many university courses were moved online. There is an assumption that online teaching limits opportunities for fostering interpersonal relationships and students’ satisfaction of the basic need for relatedness – reflected by experiencing meaningful interpersonal connections and belonging – which are considered important prerequisites for student motivation and vitality. In educational settings, an important factor affecting students’ relatedness satisfaction is the teachers’ behavior. Although research suggests that relatedness satisfaction (...) may be impaired in online education settings, to date no study has assessed how university lecturers’ relatedness support might be associated with student relatedness satisfaction and therefore, student motivation and vitality. This study tested this mediating relationship using data collected during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. The study also investigated whether the relations were moderated by a high affiliation motive which reflects a dispositional wish for positive and warm relationships. The possible importance of the communication channel selected by the lecturers and the format of a class were also investigated. In a sample of N = 337 students, we tested our hypotheses using structural equation model. Results confirmed mediation, but not moderation. The use of video chat seems to facilitate the provision of relatedness support but our data did not show that the format of a class was associated with relatedness. Our findings indicate that both teaching behavior and the technical format used to deliver lectures play important roles in student experiences with online classes. The results are discussed in light of other research conducted during the pandemic. (shrink)

It is often assumed that morally permissible acts are morally better than impermissible acts. We call this claim Betterness of Permissibility. Yet, we show that some striking counterexamples show that the claim’s truth cannot be taken for granted. Furthermore, even if Betterness of Permissibility is true, it is unclear why. Apart from appeals to its intuitive plausibility, no arguments in favour of the condition exist. We fill this lacuna by identifying two fundamental conditions that jointly entail betterness of permissibility: ‘reasons (...) monotonicity of permissibility’ and the ‘weak classical view’. We then argue that there are good reasons for accepting both of the fundamental conditions. We note that there exist plausible moral theories that reject one of the fundamental conditions. However, the way in which those theories reject the fundamental conditions does not allow them to endorse the counterexamples that motivate the belief that Betterness of Permissibility might be false. (shrink)

Mental time travel and theory of mind develop, both phylo- and ontogenetically, at the same stage. We argue that this synchrony is due to the emergence of a shared competence, namely, the ability to become aware of frames of reference.

The advent of intelligent artificial systems has sparked a dispute about the question of who is responsible when such a system causes a harmful outcome. This paper champions the idea that this dispute should be approached as a conceptual engineering problem. Towards this claim, the paper first argues that the dispute about the responsibility gap problem is in part a conceptual dispute about the content of responsibility and related concepts. The paper then argues that the way forward is to evaluate (...) the conceptual choices we have, in the light of a systematic understanding of why the concept is important in the first place—in short, the way forward is to engage in conceptual engineering. The paper then illustrates what approaching the responsibility gap problem as a conceptual engineering problem looks like. It outlines argumentative pathways out of the responsibility gap problem and relates these to existing contributions to the dispute. (shrink)

Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are related (...) to motivation in a fairly tenuous sense. It is also argued that this approach currently lacks a plausible and informative account of the nature and workings of these doxastic dispositions, and, hence, an explanation of the range of phenomena internalist theses typically set out to explain. The most promising route for developing such an account, based on recent expressivist work, is investigated and found inadequate for the task. (shrink)

This paper questions the fairness of our current tort-law regime and the philosophical underpinnings advanced in its defense, a theory known as corrective justice. Fairness requires that the moral equality and responsibility of persons be respected in social interactions and institutions. The concept of luck has been used by many egalitarians as a way of giving content to fairness by differentiating between those benefits and burdens that result from informed choice and those that result from fate or fortune. We argue (...) that the theory of corrective justice, along with its institutional embodiment of tort law, is at odds with an egalitarian commitment to fairness because it allows luck an unjustifiable role in determining dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and dissimilar compensation for similar losses to bodily integrity. Many egalitarian political theorists have also recognized, if not defended, the notion of distinct forms of justice, namely corrective, retributive, and distributive. Although theorists of these different forms of justice have been concerned with negating unfair luck inside the operations of each form of justice, there has been little attention to the way in which luck operates to sort cases into each form of justice. We claim that there is a significant way in which luck operates to subject different people to principles of corrective, retributive, and distributive justicewhich flies in the face of the egalitarian value of fairness. After surveying the arguments put forward by theorists defending a categorical distinction between corrective justice and retributive and distributive principles, we argue that although analytical distinctions can be made between different forms of justice (although, we also suggest that the distinctions are not as sharp as some commentators suggest), there is no good reason to defend an acoustic separation between these forms of justice when doing so creates unfair outcomes. (shrink)

The field of bacterial physiology illustrates some of these patterns of innovation in normal science. Bacterial physiology did not emerge as a distinct specialty until the mid-1940s, when systematic efforts were made (especially in Britain) to organize societies, journals, training programs, and patronage net- works for "general microbiology," as the discipline was then called. However, the fundamental ideas and methodologies of bacterial physiology had already been worked out between about 1915 and 1940. In this period, the nascent re- search field (...) developed under the aegis of half a dozen disciplines in half a dozen countries. By 1940 there were active centers of research in bacterial physiology at the Pasteur Institute in Paris; at the Rockefeller Institute in New York; in agricultural schools at the universities of Iowa, Wisconsin and Helsinki; in bi- ology departments at Stanford University, the University of Delft, and California Institute of Technology; in biochemistry at Cambridge University; and in bacteriology at the Middlesex Hospital in London and the London School of Hygiene. (shrink)