Nondualism, ontology, and anthropology -- Anthropology and the synthetic a priori: Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty -- Blind faith and the binding of Isaac: the Akedah -- Excursus I: sacrifice as human existence -- Counter-sacrifice and instrumental reason: the Holocaust -- Bourdieu's anti-dualism and "generalized materialism" -- Habermas's anti-dualism and "communicative rationality" -- Technological efficacy, mythic rationality, and non-contradiction -- Epistemic efficacy, mythic rationality, and non-contradiction -- Contradiction and choice among the Dinka and in Genesis -- Contradiction in Azande oracular practice and (...) in psychotherapeutic interaction -- Epistemic and ethical gain -- Transcending dualism and amplifying choice -- Excursus II: what good, ethics? -- Anthropology and the generative primacy of moral order -- Conclusion: Emancipatory selfhood and value-rationality. (shrink)

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking (...) or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking. (shrink)

A simple model, illustrating the transition from a population of free swimming, solitary cells to one consisting of small colonies serves as a basis to discuss the evolution of the cooperative group. The transition is the result of a mutation of the dynamics of cell division, delayed cell separation leads to colonies of four cells. With this mutation cooperative features appear, such as synchronised cell divisions within colonies and coordinated flagellar function which enables the colony to swim in definite directions. (...) The selective advantages under given, environmental conditions are defined and the periods necessary for complete allelic replacement in small populations are calculated for asexual and sexual reproduction. The assumption of a steady-state population during allelic substitution is critically considered, particularly under conditions of competition. It is shown that density-dependent population control must operate in the process of selection. Sexual reproduction slows down the rate of selection even though all cells dre haploid. This phenomenon can be explained in general terms of `organizational dominance', where individual units coordinate the function of their neighbours which may be of a different allelotype.Cooperativity is pointed out as an a priori systemic feature which resides in the sub-units of systems, group formation and coordination appears thus as an almost inevitable event. A particular type of system described as ‘closed cycle of positive fitness interaction’ is discussed in more detail. It has the remarkable feature that its members cannot compete with each other; selection takes place between whole cycles .Gonium has a wide spectrum of `somatic plasticity' which enables it to assume various colonial configurations depending on physiological and environmental conditions. This feature can be explained as the result of dynamic flexibilities on the macro-molecular level. The particular relationship between the vast, molecular complexity and the relative simple dynamics of the cell cycle must lead eventually to the genetic fixation of an environmentally induced phenotype. (shrink)

I argue here that in the end Bourdieu's theory of practice fails to overcome the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism. The failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though significantly "generalized," remains what it says: a materialism. In order to substantiate my criticism, I examine for their ontological presuppositions three areas of his theoretical framework pertaining to the questions of (1) human agency (as seen through the conceptual glass of the habitus), (2) otherness, and (3) (...) the gift. By scrutinizing Bourdieu's powerful and progressive social theory, with an eye to finding fault, I hope to show the need to take a certain theoretical action, one that is patently out of keeping with the usual self-presentation and self-understanding of social science. The action I have in mind is this: because the problem of subject-object dualism is in the first place a matter of ontology, in order successfully to address it there must take place a direct shift of ontological starting point, from the received starting point in Western thought to one that projects reality in terms of ambiguity that is basic. With this shift the dualism of subject and object dissolves by definition, leaving a social reality that, for reasons of its basic ambiguity, is best approached as a question of ethics before power. (shrink)

This article explores the ways in which predictive information technologies are used in the field of personalized medicine and the relations between this use and how patients and disease are perceived. This is examined in a qualitative case study of a personalized cancer clinical trial, where oncologists made clinical decisions for each patient based on drug matchings and efficacy predictions produced by bioinformatic technologies and algorithms. I focus on personalized practice itself, as a postgenomic phenomenon, rather than on epistemic, ethical (...) and institutional critiques. Personalized medicine aims to process molecular, clinical, environmental and social data into individually tailored decisions. In this case, however, the engagement of clinicians with data and digital artefacts that processed multiple information sources resulted in treatment choices that were paradoxically both immutable and uncertain. In contrast to the situatedness of the body in postgenomics, this practice subverted the personalized medical approach while decontextualizing both cancer and patients. (shrink)

This article utilises Gadamerian hermeneutics method and Freirean theory of the purpose of Religious Education to explore how Religious Education can contribute to achieving United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, emphasising education for sustainable development. The study contends that Religious Education in Lesotho occupies a distinctive position in the education system, surpassing other countries in its extensive integration. Due to historical factors, Religious Education is taught in nearly all religiously affiliated schools, comprising about 90% of all educational institutions in (...) Lesotho, and even in certain public schools. The curriculum of Religious Education in Lesotho aligns directly with the educational objectives of SDG 4. Additionally, Lesotho’s Religious Education corresponds to three levels of school education for sustainable development: whole school approach, classroom approach, and community approach. Nevertheless, the study asserts that for Religious Education in Lesotho to better align with education for sustainable development, various enhancements are required. Firstly, inclusivity across all religious traditions is essential, moving beyond a sole focus on Christianity. Secondly, there is a need for wider dissemination and implementation of Religious Education in all schools, irrespective of their affiliation. Lastly, a shift from traditional pedagogies to transformative approaches is recommended to boost the effectiveness of Religious Education in advancing sustainable development.Contribution: This article contributes by analysing Lesotho’s case and its implications for enhancing Religious Education teaching to effectively address SDGs. It broadens existing knowledge on Religious Education’s potential as a platform for sustainable development and provides recommendations for its improved implementation in a specific context. (shrink)

One of Tocqueville’s best-known empirical claims in Democracy in America is that there is no national-level public administration in the United States. He asserts definitively and repeatedly that “administrative centralization does not exist” there. However, in scattered passages throughout the text, Tocqueville points to multiple federal agencies that contemporary historians and APD scholars characterize as instances of a growing national administrative system, such as the Post Office Department and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. I reevaluate Tocqueville’s treatment of bureaucracy in (...) America in light of this evidence. I contend that Tocqueville, perhaps in spite of himself, reveals even the most paradigmatic examples of active, democratic self-government in Democracy in America—townships and other voluntary associations—to be embedded in and causally supported by a network of interrelated, centralized public administrative institutions. Crucially, Tocqueville never resolves the tension between his acknowledgment of the causal power of these institutions and his claims that they do not exist. This new picture of the empirical and normative complexity of Tocqueville’s treatment of bureaucratic institutions offers a rich set of conceptual resources for contesting, among other claims, the political construction of nostalgia for a lost age of do-it-yourself White settler democracy in a time before bureaucracy in America. (shrink)

This collection brings together several essays which have been written between the years 197 5 and 1983. During that period I have been occupied with the attempt to find a satisfactory explicate for the notion of tnithlike ness or verisimilitude. The technical results of this search have partly appeared elsewhere, and I am also working on a systematic presentation of them in a companion volume to this book: Truthlikeness. The essays collected in this book are less formal and more philos (...) ophical: they all explore various aspects of the idea that progress in science is associated with an increase in the truthlikeness of its results. Even though they do not exhaust the problem area of scientific change, together they constitute a step in the direction which I find most promising in the defence of critical scientific realism. * Chapter 1 appeared originally in Finnish as the opening article of a new journal Tiede 2000 - a Finnish counterpart to journals such as Science and Scientific American. This explains its programmatic character. It tries to give a compact answer to the question 'What is science?', and serves therefore as an introduction to the problem area of the later chapters. Chapter 2 is a revised translation of my inaugural lecture for the chair of Theoretical Philosophy in the University of Helsinki on April 8, 1981. It appeared in Finnish inParnasso 31, pp. (shrink)

In some languages every statement must contain a specification of the type of evidence on which it is based: for example, whether the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learnt it from someone else. This grammatical reference to information source is called 'evidentiality', and is one of the least described grammatical categories. Evidentiality systems differ in how complex they are: some distinguish just two terms (eyewitness and noneyewitness, or reported and everything else), while (...) others have six or even more terms. Evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a subcategory of epistemic or some other modality, nor of tense-aspect. Every language has some way of referring to the source of information, but not every language has grammatical evidentiality. In English expressions such as I guess, they say, I hear that, the alleged are not obligatory and do not constitute a grammatical system. Similar expressions in other languages may provide historical sources for evidentials. True evidentials, by contrast, form a grammatical system. In the North Arawak language Tariana an expression such as "the dog bit the man" must be augmented by a grammatical suffix indicating whether the event was seen, or heard, or assumed, or reported. This book provides the first exhaustive cross-linguistic typological study of how languages deal with the marking of information source. Examples are drawn from over 500 languages from all over the world, several of them based on the author's original fieldwork. Professor Aikhenvald also considers the role evidentiality plays in human cognition, and the ways in which evidentiality influences human perception of the world.. This is an important book on an intriguing subject. It will interest anthropologists, cognitive psychologists and philosophers, as well as linguists. (shrink)

An account of desire as a species of belief may owe its appeal to the details of its proposal as to precisely what sort of beliefs desires are to be identified with, and its downfall may be due to those details it does provide. For example, it may be proposed that the desire that α is in fact the belief that it ought to be that α, or is morally good or desirable that it should be the case that α. (...) Here the appeal might be that of forging a link between the holding of a moral belief and the acknowledgment that one has a reason for acting a certain way; and the shortcoming of the suggestion is its evident implausibility: even if the ‘necessity’ direction could be established, having a desire hardly seems sufficient for the holding of any such belief. Again: it might be proposed, perhaps simply to bring some order into the realm of propositional attitudes by reducing some to others, that the belief with which we should identify a’s desire that α is a’s belief that he will or would be happy if α. This proposed identification can be seen to be incorrect by consideration of examples such as the following, due to J. Gosling. An aging and ailing parent might forego numerous pleasures in order that his children should reap the benefits of his saving and have a good start in life – perhaps by receiving an expensive education – after his impending death. Oearly he may want that they should so benefit even if he does not believe in an after-death existence in which he might come to know of, and so take pleasure in, his children’s subsequent well-being. So his wanting that they should prosper cannot consist in his believing that he will be happy if/when they do, since he has no expectation of even being in existence in that eventuality. As Gosling puts it, there is a clear difference between thinking that something’s coming about will bring one pleasure, on the one hand, and viewing the prospect of its coming about with pleasure, on the other. (shrink)

Slavoj Zizek has been called "an academic rock star" and "the wild man of theory"; his writing mixes astonishing erudition and references to pop culture in order to dissect current intellectual pieties. In The Puppet and the Dwarf he offers a close reading of today's religious constellation from the viewpoint of Lacanian psychoanalysis. He critically confronts both predominant versions of today's spirituality--New Age gnosticism and deconstructionist-Levinasian Judaism--and then tries to redeem the "materialist" kernel of Christianity. His reading of Christianity is (...) explicitly political, discerning in the Pauline community of believers the first version of a revolutionary collective. Since today even advocates of Enlightenment like Jurgen Habermas acknowledge that a religious vision is needed to ground our ethical and political stance in a "postsecular" age, this book--with a stance that is clearly materialist and at the same time indebted to the core of the Christian legacy--is certain to stir controversy. (shrink)

This paper attempts to define Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) more precisely than usual, and to produce the beginnings of a philosophy of this topical and somewhat novel branch of statistics. A data set is, roughly speaking, a collection of k-tuples for some k. In both descriptive statistics and in EDA, these k-tuples, or functions of them, are represented in a manner matched to human and computer abilities with a view to finding patterns that are not "kinkera". A kinkus is a (...) pattern that has a negligible probability of being even partly potentially explicable. A potentially explicable pattern is one for which there probably exists a hypothesis of adequate "explicativity", which is another technical probabilistic concept. A pattern can be judged to be probably potentially explicable even if we cannot find an explanation. The theory of probability understood here is one of partially ordered (interval-valued), subjective (personal) probabilities. Among other topics relevant to a philosophy of EDA are the "reduction" of data; Francis Bacon's philosophy of science; the automatic formulation of hypotheses; successive deepening of hypotheses; neurophysiology; and rationality of type II. (shrink)

An account of desire as a species of belief may owe its appeal to the details of its proposal as to precisely what sort of beliefs desires are to be identified with, and its downfall may be due to those details it does provide. For example, it may be proposed that the desire that α is in fact the belief that it ought to be that α, or is morally good or desirable that it should be the case that α. (...) Here the appeal might be that of forging a link between the holding of a moral belief and the acknowledgment that one has a reason for acting a certain way; and the shortcoming of the suggestion is its evident implausibility: even if the ‘necessity’ direction could be established, having a desire hardly seems sufficient for the holding of any such belief. Again: it might be proposed, perhaps simply to bring some order into the realm of propositional attitudes by reducing some to others, that the belief with which we should identify a’s desire that α is a’s belief that he will or would be happy if α. This proposed identification can be seen to be incorrect by consideration of examples such as the following, due to J. Gosling. An aging and ailing parent might forego numerous pleasures in order that his children should reap the benefits of his saving and have a good start in life – perhaps by receiving an expensive education – after his impending death. Oearly he may want that they should so benefit even if he does not believe in an after-death existence in which he might come to know of, and so take pleasure in, his children’s subsequent well-being. So his wanting that they should prosper cannot consist in his believing that he will be happy if/when they do, since he has no expectation of even being in existence in that eventuality. As Gosling puts it, there is a clear difference between thinking that something’s coming about will bring one pleasure, on the one hand, and viewing the prospect of its coming about with pleasure, on the other. (shrink)

Abstract.In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a (...) larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time. (shrink)

Introduction Hundreds of thousands of premature neonates born in low-income countries are implicitly denied treatment each year. Studies from India show that treatment is rationed even for neonates born at 32 gestational age weeks (GAW), and multiple external factors influence treatment decisions. Is withholding of life-saving treatment for children born between 28 and 32 GAW acceptable from an ethical perspective? Method A seven-step impartial ethical analysis, including outcome analysis of four accepted priority criteria: severity of disease, treatment effect, cost effectiveness (...) and evidence for neonates born at 28 and 32 GAW. Results The ethical analysis sketches out two possibilities: (a) It is not ethically permissible to limit treatment to neonates below 32 GAW when assigning high weight to health maximisation and overall health equality. Neonates below 32 GAW score high on severity of disease and efficiency and cost-effectiveness of treatment if one gives full weight to early years of a newborn life. It is in the child's best interest to be treated. (b) It can be considered ethically permissible if high weight is assigned to reducing inequality of welfare and maximising overall welfare and/or not granting full weight to early years of newborns is considered acceptable. From an equity-motivated health and welfare perspective, we would not accept (b), as it relies on accepting the lack of proper welfare policies for the poor and disabled in India. Conclusion Explicit priority processes in India for financing neonatal care are needed. If premature neonates are perceived as worth less than other patient groups, the reasons should be explored among a broad range of stakeholders. (shrink)

This paper argues for a completely universal scepticism, according to which no beliefs at all are justified to the least degree. The argument starts with a version of the Agrippan trilemma, according to which, if we accept that a belief is justified, we must choose between foundationalism, coherentism of a particular sort, and an infinite regress of justified beliefs. Each of these theories is given a careful specification in terms of the relationship of “justifiedness in p depending on justifiedness in (...) q”. It is then argued that no beliefs – not even beliefs about phenomenal experiences – are foundational in the required way. Both coherentism and infinitism are untenable, since, since they face various objections, most significantly the objection that acceptance of either would commit one to allowing that all beliefs were justified. Because the three possible accounts of justificational structure all fail radically, it is concluded that no beliefs are justified. (shrink)

Groups and other sorts of collective entities are frequently said to believe things. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, for instance, was asked by reporters at White House press conferences whether the Trump administration ‘believes in climate change’ or ‘believes that slavery is wrong’. Similarly, it is said on the website of the Aclu of Illinois that the organization ‘firmly believes that rights should not be limited based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity’. A widespread philosophical view is that belief on (...) the part of a group’s members is neither necessary nor sufficient for group belief. In other words, groups are said to be able to believe that p even when not a single individual member of the group believes that p. In this paper, I challenge this view by focusing on two phenomena that have been entirely ignored in the literature: group lies and group bullshit. I show that when group belief is understood in terms of actions over which group members have voluntarily control, as is standardly thought, paradigmatic instances of a group lying or bullshitting end up counting as a group believing. Thus we need to look elsewhere for an adequate account of group belief. (shrink)

Socrates' analogy between the city and the soul in the Republic is a crucial part of the dialogue, since it forms the basis for the interlocutors' definition of justice. Critics allege that there are structural inconsistencies between the city and the soul, and that even if they were somehow structurally analogous, they are nevertheless different. Why, then, would one expect that justice in one would be enlightening for the discovery of justice in the other? This paper examines the passages in (...) which the analogy is developed and finds that Socrates' claims regarding similarities between the city and the soul are not as far-fetched as critics assert. Criticisms of the analogy are shown to be misunderstandings arising from an unwillingness to accept the political implications of Socrates' plan. Ultimately, the analogy rests on important structural similarities between the city and the soul, and is a powerful tool towards an understanding of the individual, of the city and of justice. (shrink)

International migration is increasing not only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of the global population. In 2019, international migrants made up 3.5 per cent of the global population, compared to 2.8 per cent in the year 2000. Over the past two decades, a philosophical literature has emerged to investigate what justice requires with respect to these vast migrant flows. My article criticizes much of this philosophical work. Building on the work of Charles Mills, I argue that the (...) terms in which many Anglo-American philosophers presently debate migration justice neglect and even obscure consideration of the ways in which current migration flows may be shaped by Euro-American colonialism and neo-colonialism. Such exclusions produce systematic biases in much of our philosophical literature. To develop less biased understandings of migration justice, I propose that Anglo-American philosophers should revise our methods and our conceptual frameworks to enable exploring the possible extent and ethical implications of colonial and neo-colonial influence. This is one part of the much larger task of decolonizing our political philosophy. (shrink)

L. Vervoort claims to have found a model which “can violate the Bell inequality and reproduce the quantum statistics, even if it is based on local dynamics only”. This claim is false. The proposed model contains global elements. The physics behind the model is local, but would not allow the explanation of violations of Bell inequalities for space-like separated events, if superluminal causal influences are forbidden. To use it for this purpose, one has to introduce a preferred frame where information (...) can be send faster than light. As a cause of the misunderstanding we identify the unfortunate convention to use “local” as a synonym for Einstein-local, so that theories which are local in every physically relevant sense have to be named “non-local”, and argue that this convention should be abandoned. (shrink)

“Late” Platonic dialogues are usually characterized as proposing a “scientific” understanding of philosophy, where “neutrality” is seen favorably, and being concerned with the honor of things and/or their utility for humans is considered an attitude that should be overcome through dialectical training. One dialogue that speaks strongly in favor of this reading is the Sophist, in which the stance of neutrality is explicitly endorsed in 227b-c. This paper will propose a reading of the Sophist showing that this common view of (...) late Plato is misleading. It will argue for three things. First, 227b-c, when contextually understood, actually shows the limitation of being neutral. Second, that limitation compels the interlocutors in the rest of the conversation to pursue a non-neutral way of philosophizing about the sophist, contrary to the advice put forward in 227b-c. Finally, the non-neutral definition of the sophist that concludes the dialogue does not signal Plato’s preference for a non-neutral conception of philosophical knowledge either. A careful consideration of the dramatic ending suggests that he has reservations about it no less than he does about a neutral conception. The fact that both these conceptions had limitations perhaps explains why Plato, even in his late years, did not turn to the treatise format but remained within the dialogue: only in this form is it possible to retain both in philosophical logos. (shrink)

The paper examines representative cases of ``dishonest'' voting. In all but one case the claim that ``strategic voting'' is ``dishonest'' is refuted. In all cases the effects of ``misrepresentation'' need never harm any majority. Indeed majorities may benefit from ``strategy'' (in non-cycle cases too). In fact democracy demands ``strategy''. Although the universal value of the choice set is disputed even in the one recalcitrant case, the result is, after all, an element in the ``honest'' choice set.

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each theory can (...) profit by borrowing elements from the other. Comesana concentrates on reliabilism’s problems and how it might be improved by infusions from evidentialism. This paper follows a similar tack. My emphasis, however, is the reverse of Comesana’s. I highlight problems for evidentialism and show how it could benefit by incorporating reliabilist themes. I am not sanguine that evidentialists will see it my way. They might even view my proposals as an insidious attempt to convert evidentialists to reliabilism. Well, I won’t debate the best way to formulate this paper’s recipe. At any rate, it began with the idea (which anteceded my reading of Comesana) of creating a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism. It retains significant strands of that idea, although the synthesis theme does not pervade the entire paper. What is mentalist evidentialism? Its original formulation was succinct. (shrink)

Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, -and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Although polygyny is mubah (permissible) in Islamic law, it is not an absolute right that every man can use arbitrarily. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny has been attributed (...) to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintnance. However, the observance of these conditions that is left to the mercy of men leads to the exploitation of the right for practicing to polygyny and victimization of the first spouse. Therefore, inserting some restrictions for using this right has come to the agenda from time to time in Islamic legal history. The first legal arrangements concerning the restriction of the polygyny (taaddud al-zawjāt) in the history of Islamic law were indirectly made with the Family Law Decree of 1917 which was prepared in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. Among the late Islamic jurists, the issue of the limitation of polygyny by public authority in Islamic law continues to be discussed. The civil laws of contemporary Muslim countries contain different regulations on the issue. In this article, the restriction of polygyny by the public authority in Islamic family law will be focused on.Summary: Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Thus, relevant verses in the Qur’an (al-Nisa 4/3, 129) and the Prophet’s own practice (al-Ahzab 33/50, 51, 59 al-Tahrim 66 / 3-5) show that it is legitimate for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in Islamic law. Although polygyny is legally permissible (mubah) in Islamic law it is not an absolute right that every man can arbitrarily use. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny has been attributed to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintenance. On the other hand, there may be some exceptional circumstances permitting polygyny in Islamic law. For example, when female population is much more than male in the society and when a, woman is can not fulfill her family duties due to her cureless illness, polygyny is permitted in Islamic law.As it can be understood from the explanations above, polygyny in Islamic law is not a general and mandatory provision that should be applied by every man who has legal capacity to marry. On the contrary, it is an exceptional provision that is justified if there are certain conditions and justifications. According to this; polygyny is a moral and legal institution that is made up of mutual consent based on individual and social conditions and needs in Islamic law. Therefore, men do not have to marry a second woman on their current wives, as well as women have the right to say “no” to marry a married man as a second wife.When the conditions and rationales indicated in the relevant verses and doctrine are evaluated together, it can be said that in order to be able to legitimize the polygyny in Islamic law, there must be three basic conditions:(1) Observing justice among spouses, (2) Having sufficient financial power to provide maintenance for spouses, (3) Existence of individual or social need or necessity.Therefore, in order to prevent the exploitation of polygyny, which is justified under certain conditions and justifications in Islamic law, the above-mentioned conditions must be fulfilled. Otherwise, polygyny can cause some problems, unrest and injustice for individual, family and society. Hence, in the presence of certain conditions and justifications, polygyny accepted in Islamic law as a moral and legal institution aiming the elimination of individual and social arbitration.Although the legitimacy of polygyny in Islamic law depends on the existence of certain conditions and special circumstances, it is a known fact that they are not always observed in practice. It can be said that the right of polygyny is a subject of abuse in practice. Therefore, the limitation of polygyny by the public authority has come to the fore in Islamic legal history. Today, control of the public authority and inserting some restrictions of polygyny continue to be discussed among the Islamic jurists. In the past, it is possible to say that the control of the exercising of this right has been done relatively by society (social environment). However, nowadays, since the society cannot perform the control mechanism, it is brought up by the state (public authority) on behalf of the society.Among the contemporary Islamic jurists regarding the supervision or limitation of polygyny by the public authority; there are two approaches: “those who accept” and “those who do not accept” such restrictions.Islamic jurists, who accept that public authority is allowed to intervene in polygyny, grounded their views on two perspectives: The first is that the polygyny is legally permissible and the public authority has the authority to limit the permissible (mubah) in Islamic law. The second is that polygyny is restricted with the conditions in the Qur’anic verses such as “husband’s observation supervision of justice among his wives” and “having the power for ensuring the livelihood (nafaqa) of his wives” and it is more appropriate for the benefit of society and the purpose of the legislator (Shari’) to be subject to the control of the public authority whether these conditions are present or not. Islamic jurists, who do not agree that the public authority has the right to intervene in polygyny grounded their views on two perspectives as well: First, polygyny is a legitimate right mentioned in the verses in Islamic law and there is no definite proof that this can be prohibited or restricted by the public authority. Secondly, it is contrary to the verses to prohibit or limit the right that the Qur’an makes legitimate (free).Thus, it is possible to say that the opinion which accepts that the public authority has to limit polygyny is more accurate in terms today’s social conditions. Namely, polygyny is linked to two basic conditions: ”husband’s observance of justice among his wives and having the power to provide maintenance for his wives. Therefore, supervision of the public authority on checking the existence of these conditions is more appropriate for the purpose of the legislator (Shari legitimizing polygyny and social benefit.In fact, the Ottoman Family Law Decree of 1917 indirectly limited the right of the husband to marry more than one woman, giving the woman right to stipulate a condition in her marriage contract that her husband not to marry a second woman. In the 1924 Draft of Family Law Decree, which was prepared after the repeal of the Family Law Decree of 1917, but not enacted, it was proposed that the application of polygyny should be presented to the approval judge.In today’-s Muslim countries, there are three different practices: namely “completely prohibiting polygyny”, ”releasing polygyny” and “giving the court the right to monitor the existence of necessary conditions “. In countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Indonesia, Malaysia (and Pakistan), the validity of polygyny depends on the permission and supervision of the judiciary. Some of these countries which have accepted judicial review have given the judicial control for the requirement of justice, some of them the conditions of justice and maintenance some of them for the conditions of justice, maintenance and a legitimate justification.In sum, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant verses, polygyny in Islamic law is legitimately permissible (mubah). However, the public authority has the right and authority to limit the mubah in Islamic law in the case of the elimination of damage and the necessity of the public interest. On the other hand, the public authority has the right and authority to enact the law in Islamic law by preferring one of the existing ijtihads that meet the needs of the society and conforms to the conditions of the age.According to this, when the public authority made a statutory regulation that links the use of right of polygyny to the permission of the judge, this regulation is binding on society.Therefore, in the event of such a legal arrangement, it is possible for the public authority to allow the men who comply with the conditions and not to allow the ones who are not to comply with the conditions after conducting the necessary investigation. As a matter of fact, now Family Laws of many Muslim countries now include such legal arrangements. It is also worth mentioning here that there may be a necessity for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in terms of social benefits, when the population of male and female in a society is excessively disproportionate. In such circumstances, it is also possible that the public authority encourages, or even mandates, the marriage of men who have fulfilled the conditions to more than one woman. (shrink)

Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences contains a series of explorations of the different ways in which the social sciences have interacted with the natural sciences. Usually, such interactions are considered to go only `one way': from the natural to the social sciences. But there are several important essays in this volume which show how developments in the social sciences have affected the natural sciences - even the `hard' science of physics. Other essays deal with various types of interaction since (...) the Scientific Revolution. In his general introductory chapter, Cohen sets some general themes concerning analogies and homologies and the use of metaphors, drawing specific examples from the use of concepts of physics by marginalist economists and of developments in the life sciences by organismic sociologists. The remaining chapters, which explore the different ways in which the social sciences and the natural sciences have actually interacted, are written by leaders in the field of history of science, drawn from a wide range of countries and disciplines. The book will be of great interest to all historians of science, philosophers interested in questions of methodology, economists and sociologists, and all social scientists concerned with the history of their subject and its foundations. (shrink)

Although the family is the safest environment for each member, sometimes violence and abuse can come from the family members. Violence causes family relationships to deteriorate as in all other relationships among people. Sibling violence, as a form of domestic violence, can sometimes have dire consequences that can result in family breakup, death or long-term loss of one of the siblings. In this study, sibling violence, which has the potential to harm family relations in such a way, will be discussed (...) in the context of two stories in the Qurʾān. It is aimed to contribute to other disciplines that study on this subject by examining the attitude of Islam against this violence, which affects the family, and the solutions of the Qur’ān to sibling violence. These stories in the Qur’ān are the story of Prophet Adam’s two sons who narrate an incident of violence that result in the brother killing his brother, and the story of Prophet Joseph and his brothers who narrate the sibling violence resulting in long-term loss. Both stories provide clues to the prevention of violence in the light of the causes of sibling violence and the behavior of the victim sibling in the development of events. In addition, because of the fact that these stories have taken place in the family of the prophets, they give people the message that sibling violence can happen in any family.Summary: Because of the social nature of the mankind, it must live in structured societies. Family is the medium for him where he is born, raised, socializes and prepares for his future life. It is normal sentiments of love, mercy and tolerance which dominate in a family. But despite this, it is possible for a family member to be a transgressor against another family member’s rights. Emotions like jealousy and hostility can cause violence between siblings. Psychologists generally attribute the source of this kind of violence to the parents’ failure to show equal love and affection to all children. While this is an important cause for violence among the siblings, craving for attention and acceptance from society, trying to achieve material and sensual superiority and desire for social success can incite feelings of envy among the siblings. While feelings of jealousy is unproblematic when its intensity can be considered normal, it can cause psychological imbalance if it increases to the level beyond manageable limits. If the latter case occurs, this produces a state of mind where a sibling becomes capable of committing every act of transgression to another sibling, which is the most important cause for the violence among siblings.Archetypical stories of Cain and Abel, and Prophet Joseph in the Qur’ān provide some clues pertaining to recognition and prevention of violence among the siblings. In these two parables, the real reason for envy does not lie in the other sibling. According to the Qur’ān, the true reason for this envy is attributed exclusively to the transgressor. In the parable of Cain and Abel, source of the problem between the siblings is the sacrificial offering to Allah. While the offering of Abel was accepted, Cain’s was not. Cain felt jealous and threatened his brother with death. Facing with his brother’s threat, Abel stayed firm and peaceful, said to his brother that if he were to attack him, he will not retaliate even for self-defence. He reminded Cain that his envy and anger was not due to him, Abel. Abel reminded Cain that the act that Cain was contemplating was a great sin in Allah’s eyes and that it is punishable by eternal hellfire. Cain, despite these warnings, went on to implement his intention of murder successfully.When we inspect the parable we can see that Abel was free from any guilt on his part for his brother’s envy which is the source of his transgression. His sacrifice was accepted because Abel was among the pious and this doesn’t harm or effect negatively Cain in anyway. Therefore the main cause for the jealousy of Cain is his unworthiness in the eyes of Allah, in reality, the reason is solely Cain himself. Therefore it is totally unfair when Cain put the blame on his brother Abel. By the way of this example, the Qur’ān reminds mankind not to blame others for his problems and to take responsibility. Envy, which is the main reason for violence among siblings, will cloud judgment and prevent clear thinking. In the parable of Cain and Abel, the Qur’ān recommends not to taunt the already jealous sibling by way of words and actions and instead, encourages warning against the grave consequences of evil intentions both in this world and in the hereafter. In the parable of Prophet Joseph, because of jealousy of their father from Joseph, bigger brothers of Joseph planned to kill him but they give up on the idea of killing him and instead they dumped him in a well. Later on in the parable, some merchant finds Joseph and brings him to Egypt. There, Joseph becomes a high ranking statesman and meets with his older brothers. Because of the famine, older brothers are in need of Joseph for food and asks him for it, without knowing that the person they are asking from is their little brother, Joseph. Although Joseph faces with his brothers on a superior position his behavior exemplifies the best course of action to end violence among the siblings. In order to remove animosity and callousness from his brothers’ heart, the gradual plan that Joseph had implemented is a great example for healing the wounds that violence among the siblings can cause. It is unreasonable to expect all the animosity and jealousy that brothers of Joseph held for years to go away completely in a moment. Prophet Joseph did not remind his brothers of their crime, on the contrary he was very generous to them. He brought their father and their brother Benjamin to Egypt and in front of them Prophet Joseph forgave his older brothers for the crimes they had committed against him. In this way, Prophet Joseph prevented his brothers potentially denying every transgression they did if he were to confront them in their first meeting, and made them ready to accept their evil deeds.Parables of Cain and Abel and Prophet Joseph are important for recognizing that envy can destroy the mercy that the siblings innately have for each other. It is understood from the parables that envy must be controlled and violence can’t be realized under any circumstances. It is clear from these parables that violence is never a solution for the jealousy among the siblings. A positive and viable solution would be for Cain to seek Allah’s approval instead of killing Abel and for brothers of Joseph this would be to earn their father’s love and respect. Introspection and analysis regarding possible reasons for jealousy and trying to resolve them and striving to be a better human, sibling, or child is a solution prescribed by the Qur’ān. Also, importance of speaking in a soft tone with the person who is experiencing intense jealousy, avoiding provocative language and behavior and trying every possible way to set this person straight is emphasized. The Qur’ān reminds us through these two parables that the human nature is prone to evil suggestions from the satan and for this reason humans need generous and benevolent help from others in order to clear themselves from these evil temptations. (shrink)

An agent who takes his own life acts in violation of the moral law, according to Kant; suicide, and, by extension, assisted suicide are therefore wrong. By a similar argument, and with a few important exceptions, killing is wrong; implicitly, then, voluntary euthanasia is also wrong. Kant's conclusions are uncompelling and his argument in these matters is undermined on considering other areas of his thought. Kant, in forbidding suicide and euthanasia, is conflating respect for persons and respect for people, and (...) assuming that, in killing a person (either oneself or another), we are thereby undermining personhood. But an argument along these lines is faulty according to Kant's own standards. There is no reason why Kantians have to accept that self-killing and euthanasia are contrary to the moral law. Even if some Kantians adhere to this doctrine, others can reject it. (shrink)

Cheating in higher education is a significant problem. The study aims to determine nursing students’ attitudes and opinions toward cheating in exams. The type of research is descriptive. The research data were collected in the classroom environment of 716 students in day and evening education programs. The research data were collected using socio-demographic characteristics form, and the Copying Attitude Scale. Descriptive statistics, t-tests, and variance analysis were used for data analyses. The most common method of cheating was receiving answers by (...) talking to the friend sitting next to the student. The rate of cheating was high in both the day and evening education students. The students reported that most of the cheating occurred in final exams and high-credit major courses. Learning type (day/evening education programs) is not effective in cheating. High-credit major courses have increased the fear of failing the course. The most important reason for cheating in exams was the fear of failing a course. (shrink)

The first of John Henry Newman’s Oxford University Sermons is often neglected as an integral part of this collection. Yet Newman considered these individual sermons as a unit. There is an important theme that runs unchanged from the first to the last of these Sermons: the primacy of faith over human reason. The main burden of his first Sermon is the need for its hearers to return to their “early, religious training.” Although the worth of human reason is much amplified (...) in his last Sermon, even there faith remains paramount. Newman depicted faith in his fifteenth Sermon as the chief form of human knowledge, as the bedrock and the guarantor of every other form of human knowledge: the one thing necessary is the childlike “obedience of Faith.”. (shrink)

The history of human culture records diverse notions about possible forms of existence of the soul or analogous substances after the disintegration of the corporeal shell. Even where investigators of primitive cultures conclude that some community is at such a low level of development that it has elaborated no ideas concerning the existence of gods, demons, spirits, and so forth—even there, a cautious attitude toward such evidence is necessary. Actually, the conviction that "savages" do not have such beliefs may be (...) less a reflection of the real state of affairs than, let us say, the reluctance of members of that community to familiarize Europeans with elements of their culture that bear on spheres of life activity that are most meaningful for the tribe. Thus the anthropologist W.R. Trevathan mentions particular difficulties arising from attempts to study the actions and rituals associated with the birth of a child . Even where there is a friendly attitude toward the investigator, there still remain spheres of life to which representatives of the tribe were reluctant to allow Europeans access. For example, there is the well-known case where one anthropologist, who had lost hope of "officially" learning about the character of the rituals accompanying the birth of an infant, attempted to sneak a look at what was happening in the hut. This curiosity almost cost him his life, despite the recent goodwill of his host. (shrink)

Polanyi's and Popper's defenses of the status quo in science are explored and criticized. According to Polanyi, science resembles a hierarchical and tradition-oriented republic and is necessarily conservative; according to Popper's political philosophy the best republic is social democratic and reformist. By either philosopher's lights science is not a model republic; yet each claims it to be so. Both authors are inconsistent in failing to apply their own ideals. Both underplay the extent to which science depends upon the wider society; (...) and neither makes sufficient allowance for the ways it can disrupt the social order. Polanyi even demands extraterritorial exemption for science from the scrutiny of incompetent outsiders. In their different ways, each minimizes the problems of institutionalized science and fails to consider the value, even the long-term necessity, for science of democratic criticism and control. Transnational control of science is an open challenge for democratic polities. (shrink)

In the heroic chronicle of Russia's revolutionary movement, the Decembrists - representatives of the first stage of that movement - hold a special place. The boldness of the initiative they displayed, the self-sacrifice of the heroes who rose in struggle against the autocracy, the at least partly conscious intention of creating - albeit at the price of their own lives! - a historic precedent: all this compels one to look closely at the moral content of their activity. The significance of (...) the moral factor in the historical experience of Decembrism is determined by yet another noteworthy circumstance: the finest members of the nobility were rising against the privileges of their own class. This feature was noted by Herzen when he wrote that this movement included members of the wealthiest and most famous noble families of Russia, and that "Pestel' proposed to them that they seek, even at the cost of their lives, the expropriation of their own estates.". (shrink)

Refusal of organ donation is common, and becoming more frequent. In Australia refusal by families occurred in 56% of cases in 1995 in New South Wales, and had risen to 82% in 1999, becoming the most important determinant of the country's very low organ donation rate .Leading causes of refusal, identified in many studies, include the lack of understanding by families of brain death and its implications, and subsequent reluctance to relegate the body to purely instrumental status. It is an (...) interesting paradox that surveys of the public continue to show considerable support for organ donation programmes—in theory we will, in practice we won't .In this paper we propose that the Australian community may, for good reason, distrust the concept of and criteria for “whole brain death”, and the equation of this new concept with death of the human being. We suggest that irreversible loss of circulation should be reinstated as the major defining characteristic of death, but that brain-dead, heart-beating entities remain suitable organ donors despite being alive by this criterion. This presents a major challenge to the “dead donor rule”, and would require review of current transplantation legislation. Brain dead entities are suitable donors because of irreversible loss of personhood, accurately and robustly defined by the current brain stem criteria."Even the dead are not terminally ill any more.". (shrink)

In his monumental 1687 work, _Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica_, known familiarly as the _Principia_, Isaac Newton laid out in mathematical terms the principles of time, force, and motion that have guided the development of modern physical science. Even after more than three centuries and the revolutions of Einsteinian relativity and quantum mechanics, Newtonian physics continues to account for many of the phenomena of the observed world, and Newtonian celestial dynamics is used to determine the orbits of our space vehicles. This (...) authoritative, modern translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, the first in more than 285 years, is based on the 1726 edition, the final revised version approved by Newton; it includes extracts from the earlier editions, corrects errors found in earlier versions, and replaces archaic English with contemporary prose and up-to-date mathematical forms. Newton's principles describe acceleration, deceleration, and inertial movement; fluid dynamics; and the motions of the earth, moon, planets, and comets. A great work in itself, the _Principia_ also revolutionized the methods of scientific investigation. It set forth the fundamental three laws of motion and the law of universal gravity, the physical principles that account for the Copernican system of the world as emended by Kepler, thus effectively ending controversy concerning the Copernican planetary system. The illuminating Guide to Newton's _Principia_ by I. Bernard Cohen makes this preeminent work truly accessible for today's scientists, scholars, and students. (shrink)

In his monumental 1687 work, _Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica_, known familiarly as the _Principia_, Isaac Newton laid out in mathematical terms the principles of time, force, and motion that have guided the development of modern physical science. Even after more than three centuries and the revolutions of Einsteinian relativity and quantum mechanics, Newtonian physics continues to account for many of the phenomena of the observed world, and Newtonian celestial dynamics is used to determine the orbits of our space vehicles. This (...) authoritative, modern translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, the first in more than 285 years, is based on the 1726 edition, the final revised version approved by Newton; it includes extracts from the earlier editions, corrects errors found in earlier versions, and replaces archaic English with contemporary prose and up-to-date mathematical forms. Newton's principles describe acceleration, deceleration, and inertial movement; fluid dynamics; and the motions of the earth, moon, planets, and comets. A great work in itself, the _Principia_ also revolutionized the methods of scientific investigation. It set forth the fundamental three laws of motion and the law of universal gravity, the physical principles that account for the Copernican system of the world as emended by Kepler, thus effectively ending controversy concerning the Copernican planetary system. The translation-only edition of this preeminent work is truly accessible for today's scientists, scholars, and students. (shrink)

Jacques Maritain's An Introduction to Philosophy was first published in 1931. Since then, this book has stood the test of time as a clear guide to what philosophy is and how to philosophize. Inspired by the Thomistic Revival called for by Leo XIII, Maritain relies heavily on Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to shape a philosophy that, far from sectarian theology in disguise, is driven by reason and engages the modern world. Re-released as part of the Sheed & Ward Classic (...) series, An Introduction to Philosophy is sure to enliven the minds of students and general readers for years to come. From the new introduction by Ralph McInerny: You are about to read a magnificent introduction not only to a kind of philosophy but to philosophizing itself. Jacques Maritain was a relatively young man when he wrote this book, but his effort is one that attracts any philosopher more and more as he grows older. However odd and unusual what he says becomes, the philosopher yearns to show how even the most abstruse claims can be put into relation with what the reader already knows. That, in its essence, is what teaching is. In this book, the reader will find a wise and certain guide into philosophizing as such. And, in the end, he will find that what he reads is really only a refinement and development of what he and everybody else already knew. (shrink)

In his justifiedly famous paper, “Elusive Knowledge” (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74:4, 1996), David Lewis presents a contextualist account of knowledge, which, like other contextualist accounts, depicts sceptical claims as involving application of a higher standard of knowledge than is applied in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. On Lewis’ account, the sceptic’s denials and the everyday ascriptions are made in different contexts, which allows them both to be true. His account gives detailed specification of how contexts are to be determined. My (...) paper points out that this view is unattractive to the sceptic, since it makes scepticism, even if true, completely disconnected from and irrelevant to the rest of our cognitive discourse. After arguing that the sceptic’s own ascriptions of knowledge (made outside the philosophy seminar room) can be explained in non-contextualist ways, I expound and criticise Lewis’ analysis of knowledge, taking up in particular a central component of his account, the “Rule of Attention”. In the central part of the paper I argue that the reasons given for the inclusion of the rule are all inadequate, and also that there are positive reasons for rejecting it. The final section of the paper argues that the excision of the Rule of Attention removed would leave Lewis’ account subject to serious counter- examples. (shrink)

Confucianism conceives of persons as being necessarily interdependent, defining personhood in terms of the various roles one embodies and that are established by the relationships basic to one's life. By way of contrast, the Western philosophical tradition has predominantly defined persons in terms of intrinsic characteristics not thought to depend on others. This more strictly and explicitly individualistic concept of personhood contrasts with the Confucian idea that one becomes a person because of others; where one is never a person independently (...) or in and of oneself but develops into one only in community. This article surveys some differences between Confucian and Western ideas of self and their connection to ethics mainly in light of the relational self of the Confucian Analects and Mencius . A Philosophy Compass article called Confucianism and Ethics in the Western Philosophical Tradition II: A Comparative Analysis of Personhood will follow, that examines how the more individualistic way of conceiving of personhood in the West has had moral and political implications that differ, and even conflict, with those of Confucianism. (shrink)

In one sense, all academic thoughts are human ideas, and all cultures are productions of man. Therefore, the spirit of all human cultures is always humanistic. To discuss any kind of academic thoughts is to discuss the ideas of man. Speaking in this way, however, we cannot reveal and illuminate the meaning of such terms as "humanistic thought" or "humanistic spirit" because of the lack of contradistinctions. We must then say that, in addition to humanistic thought or spirit, there are (...) also human thoughts or spirit which are nonhumanistic, super-humanistic, subhumanistic, and even antihumanistic. (shrink)

The laws of social development are objective in content and, in contrast to the laws of nature, are manifested and function only through the activity of human beings. The development of all spheres of human activity, in turn, cannot be conceived of as independent of the will, consciousness, moods and beliefs, propensities and preferences of human beings, nor as independent of the effectiveness of forms of social organization, etc. The social specificity of laws of social development in turn defines another (...) feature of these laws, namely, their statistical nature. History and social practice persuasively demonstrate that the laws of social development in turn defines another feature of these laws, namely, their statistical nature. History and social practice persuasively demonstrate that the laws of social development, functioning either in all socioeconomic formations or in only some of them , or laws operating within only one of these formations are of a statistical nature. Even when the conditions of life of societies within a particular socioeconomic formation are the same, the results of the operation of any law of social development are never absolutely identical. This is graphically evident in an analysis of the operation of the law of surplus value, the laws of class struggle, or the law of social revolution, especially its operation under the conditions of the contemporary world revolutionary process. We need only point out the variety of nuances in the ultimate results of the operation of the law of social revolution after the Second World War, when socialist countries and countries with a socialist orientation emerged. (shrink)

The following intellectual as opposed to practical reasons for all anthropologists doing fieldwork are examined: fieldwork: (1) records dying societies, (2) corrects ethnocentric bias, (3) helps put customs in their true context, (4) helps get the "feel" of a place, (5) helps to get to understand a society from the inside, (6) enables appreciation of what translating one culture into terms of another involves, (7) makes one a changed man, (8) provides the observational, factual basis for generalizations. None of these (...) is found sufficient to make fieldwork imperative for all anthropologists, although they are quite sufficient to allow that it is imperative for anthropology as a whole that fieldwork in some form by some people continue. In place of the view of fieldwork as an essential preparation for doing anthropology, an alternative role for it is explored: namely as a testing procedure. The implications of this--that the study of problems and the articulation of theories can usefully proceed prior to or even independently of fieldwork--are drawn out, and a new institution of selective fieldwork is proposed. (shrink)

We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of (...) moral judgment in adulthood and to some extent in childhood and adolescence. Combined with rigorous evidence from psychology and careful philosophical analysis, neuroscientific evidence can even help shed light on the extent of moral knowledge and on ways to promote healthy moral development. (shrink)

The scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah, who are united in the view that sin will not nullify faith and other good deeds, dissented from opinion on the status of the deeds of the person who converted to Islam after his apostasy, in the first Muslim period. In general, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs argued that those deeds would be in vain with direct apostasy, while Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs also stipulated death for this purpose, and claimed that a person's previous deeds would not be lost with apostasy alone. (...) Comprehensive interpretations on this issue have found a place for itself mostly in tafsir rather than disciplines such as kalam, fiqh and usûl. Here, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs grounds on verse 5/5 of the Surah al-Ma’idah, which only mentions that deeds will be in vain through apostasy; Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs is based on verse 2/217 of Surah al-Baqarah, which connects this futility to death as apostasy. The parties made different inferences against each other over the relevant verses and gave various answers. The most fundamental point of disagreement among these was the question of whether the first verse, which is muṭlaq in terms of usūl, should be attributed to the second verse, which is in the position of muqayyad. While Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs objected to this process with the thought that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad were not met in the relevant verses, Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, which took a more flexible stance on this issue, approved this attributing process within the framework of the conditions and accordingly reached their relevant views. When the parties evaluated the relevant verses, they made their explanations mostly in the explanation of the 2/217 verse of the Surah Baqarah, which is prior to the arrangement and is in the position of a muqayyad. Since Shāfiʽī/Ash'arī scholars are already based on the relevant verse, it is quite understandable that the place where they examine the subject is the interpretation of this divine word. Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, on the other hand, examined the issue here in order to respond to the meaning attributed to the verse by Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs. Shafi'i/Ash'aris based their judgments on one of the two verses, Surah Baqara, 2/217, as a requirement of attributing mutlaq to the muqayyad, and in fact, accepted a single verse as a criterion. On the other hand, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, made separate judgments from both of them, claiming that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad, were not fulfilled in the two related verses. In this context, they concluded from the first verse that death as apostasy necessitates eternal disappointment, and from the second verse, apostasy absolutely wastes deeds. Here, the most typical result of the separation between the two sects emerges as to whether a person will repeat the pilgrimage, for example, he performed while he was a Muslim when he returns to Islam after apostasy. While the Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, who thought that deeds will be wasted only by death due to apostasy, did not consider it necessary to go on pilgrimage again, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, who thought that deeds will be lost directly with apostasy even if death does not occur, held the person responsible for pilgrimage. In this study, it will be tried to explain the basic intellectual framework of the view advocated by the parties and the background of what kind of criticism they brought to their opponents. (shrink)

We all think we know the difference between past and future, but philosophers and scientists have never been entirely successful in putting their finger on this difference. The problem is complicated by the fact that there are at least two quite distinct ways of considering time, and that the difference between the future and the past depends on which way we adopt. These ways are two distinct views of the changes that occur in the world. Briefly, the first view sees (...) past, present and future changes. and the second view sees changes at particular dates and times. This distinction has been the subject of numerous discussions since then. It is still not clear to us which view of time is the better: we do not really know which is the more fundamental, and even whether either of these approaches is strictly consistent in the first place. (shrink)

In the English-speaking world conceptual analysis was seen for some years as the principal method of philosophizing and at times was even taken as equivalent to philosophy itself. In recent years it has come under attack as socially conservative and intellectually barren. It is my view that in many ways conceptual analysis was beneficial to philosophy: in its concern for clarity and precision it reminded us of much which philosophers must never forget. I would hope, however, that we are now (...) in a position to see it more as a tool of philosophy than as a substitute for it. (shrink)