SummaryA satisfactory analysis of the well‐known Hangman Paradox is not known to us. Two theses:1. The logical solution of the Hangman Paradox is easy and disappointing.2. The origins of the paradox are manifold and inexhaustible. We analyse particularly perspicuous tuneless version of the paradox due to Hollis .In a sequel which is to appear in Dialectica we analyse two versions of the original Hangman Paradox. Vorbemerkung: Der zweite Autor verdankt Henri Lauener menschlich und philosophisch mehr als dieser Artikel zeigen wird. (...) Es ist mir selten oder nie gelungen, Henri Lauener für eine meiner philosophischen Positionen zu pewinnen, aber ich glaube mich darin mit ihm einig, dass es sich lohnt, Formalismen ernst zu nehmen, um ihre Grenzen zu erkennen. (shrink)

The Hangman Paradox has a simple solution. The amazing refutation of the judge's decree rests on the axiom of knowledge-conservation. This axiom is false under unfavourable conditions. You can have a perfect piece of knowledge in the ordinary sense, i.e. a true justified conviction, and yet be unable to conserve it. More interesting than its solution is the element of self-reference, connecting the Hangman via Moore's Paradox and Buridan's Epistemic Paradox with the Liar. This one, I think, has also a (...) natural solution, but less simple. The basic idea is given here, but the technical treatment goes far beyond this paper. It requires a strong, but conservative, extension of classical and three-valued logic to a six-valued logic with infinitely many levels of reflection. (shrink)

A non-classical logic is proposed that extends classical logic and set theory as conservatively as possible with respect to three domains: the logic of natural language, the logcal foundations of mathematics, and the logical-philosophical paradoxes. A universal mechanics of consciousness connects these domains, and its best witness is the liar paradox. Its solution rests formally on a subject-object partition, mentally arising and disappearing perpetually. All deep paradoxes are paradoxes of consciousness. There are two kinds, solvable ones and unsolvable ones. The (...) solvable ones disappear by proper partitions, the unsolvable ones arise by inevitably improper partitions enforced by the natural worldview. The categorial distinctions of subject and object, certainty and truth, consciousness and being, inner freedom and outer constraint, psyche and physis, mental practice and formal theory indicate an immemorial mystical monism of consciousness without which mathematical Platonism could not survive. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die dreiwertige Logik der Sprache" verfügbar.

A direct path that has been missed for 100 years leads from the oldest paradoxes straight to mysticism, via (the concept of) logical and mathematical truth, since the purely formal truth is an absolutely univocal, absolutely timeless and absolutely unbounded reference. I present three theses in passing: (1) logicians fail to fully appreciate the basic mathematical idea of truth and consequently push the semantic paradoxes aside. Otherwise they would have come to adopt the reflexive logic LR* right after Cantor (more (...) on this briefly in Sect. 4. For a more precise elaboration see my Logik der Unbestimmtheiten und Paradoxien (Blau 2008)). (2) Mathematicians fail to fully appreciate the basic mathematical concept of number and push Zeno’s paradoxes aside. Otherwise they would have come to adopt linear arithmetic ${\mathbb{L}^{*}}$ right after Cantor (more on this briefly in Sects. 1 and 5, for further elaboration see my planned Grundparadoxien und grenzenlose Arithmetik. The technical parts are complete, yet philosophically it is as incomplete as Sect. 6). (3) Philosophers fail to fully appreciate the paradox of subject and object and push the Darwinian argument for Cartesian (mind–body)-interaction aside, otherwise they would have been en route towards mysticism since Darwin’s times (more on this in Sect. 6, for a little more precise elaboration see Blau in Die Logik der Unbestimmtheiten und Paradoxien. Synchron Publishers, Heidelberg, 2008, Ch. 1.5). (shrink)

Schlusslogische Letztbegründung is a collection of essays in honor of Kurt Walter Zeidler. Mr. Zeidler is a distinguished Kant- and Neo-Kantian-scholar who has reconstructed Kant's concept of transcendental logic in connection with the logic of the concept of Hegel and the logic of symbolization of Peirce. (cf. Zeidler: Grundriss der transzendentalen Logik, 3rd ed., Wien 2017) He has most notably inquired intensively into the relation of transcendental logic to philosophy of science (cf. Zeidler: Prolegomena zur Wissenschaftstheorie, Wien 2000) and to (...) phenomenology (cf. Zeidler: Vermittlungen. Zum antiken und neueren Idealismus, Wien 2016). He has also published several studies on Neo-Kantianism (cf. Zeidler: Provokationen. Zu Problemen des Neukantianismus, Wien 2018). This is refelected in the collection of essays by distinguished scholars who discuss and critically examine Zeidler's work. It includes contributions by Steinar Mathisen (Oslo), Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Vienna), Werner Flach (Lichtenau), Thomas Knoppe (Straberg), Geert Edel (Wyk/Föhr), Martin Bunte (Münster), Reinhard Hiltscher (Dresden), Walter Tydecks (Bensheim), Christian Krijnen (Amsterdam), Hartwig Wiedebach (Zürich), Max Gottschlich (Linz), Thomas Sören Hoffmann (Hagen), Rudolf Meer (Kaliningrad), Hans-Jürgen Müller (Frankfurt am Main), Robert König (Vienna), Ulrich Blau (Marburg), Karen Gloy (Luzern/Munich), Reinhold Breil (Aachen), Erhard Oeser (Vienna), Hans-Dieter Klein (Vienna), Hans Martin Dober (Tübingen), Kurt Walter Zeidler (Vienna) and Lois Marie Rendl (Vienna). (shrink)

What may we believe? What ought we to do? These two questions, which are intended as a subtle contemporary version of the questions that concerned Kant, set the parameters of the diverse activities of the Eighth Triannual International Congress, GAP.8, of the German Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (Society for Analytic Philosophy, GAP), held at the University of Konstanz at September 17–20, 2012. These questions remain central systematic questions of theoretical and practical philosophy.The six articles collected here are the main papers (...) presented at that congress. They can be divided into two groups. First, there are Peter M. S. Hacker’s opening lecture, Ulrich Blau’s Erkenntnis lecture which was sponsored by Springer Publishers, and Roy Sorensen’s closing lecture. Second, there are three papers which are all connected to the author’s symposium held in honour of Rüdiger Bittner, who received the 2012 Frege-Prize of the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie for a distinguis. (shrink)

In this essay an epistemic solution to the Bald Man Paradox is suggested. Pre- supposing classical logic and minimal additional premises it is shown that there is a sharp border for baldness. In the course of that it is argued that the same argument can be given regarding alternative many-valued logics. Following this we formulate a plausible principle of imperfect soritical knowledge, with the aid of which it is shown that the concrete value of the sharp border is un- known. (...) The proposed solution of the Bald Man Paradox will then be compared with Williamson's solution to the Sorites Paradox. In the end it is argued that the tolerance principle derives its plausibility from an ambiguity of the word "false". To this end it is shown that there is an equivalent formulation of the tolerance principle in Ulrich Blau's three-valued logic which is consistent with the existence of a sharp border. (shrink)

Diese Festschrift umfasst 22 nationale und internationale Beiträge zu Ehren des Jubilars, darunter von solch renommierten Autoren wie Werner Flach, Christian Krijnen, Ulrich Blau, Erhard Oeser, Hans-Dieter Klein, um nur diese zu nennen. – Sie enthält ferner eine Stellungnahme von K. W. Zeidler, wo dieser im Dialog mit den Beiträgern jeweilige kritische Punkte seiner Schlusslogischen Letztbegründung klar zu stellen sich bemüht. – Ein Siglen- und Abkürzungsverzeichnis sowie eine Bibliographie des Jubilars runden die Ausgabe ab. Kurt Walter Zeidler darf (...) als einer jener selten gewordenen Denker gelten, die in unermüdlichem Reflexionseinsatz seit Jahrzehnten sich für die seit längerem in Gefahr geratene klassische Philosophie auf einem ihrer Hochplateaus, der Transzendentalphilosophie, genauer noch: deren postneukantianischer Erscheinungsform einsetzen, dies im lebendigen Wechselgespräch mit einer Reihe von Meisterdenkern von Platon und Aristoteles an über Leibniz, die neuzeitliche Aufklärung hin zu Kant, dann über Fichte, Hegel, Schelling zu ausgewählten Neukantianern sowie z. T. auch polemisch zu den ‚Modernen‘ und dem neo-nominalistischen Zeitgeist weithin. – Die Position Zeidlers dem allen gegenüber ist im Grunde sehr einfach zu kennzeichnen: Es ist ein Denken einer ihre eigene Geschichte in ihren ‚großen‘ Gestalten einbeziehenden Vernunft, die in ihrem Prinzipien-Selbst als theoretischer wie praktischer Erst- und Gesamtgrund menschliche Würde wie auch diesheitliche Ganzheit zu fundieren und zu garantieren vermag. – Zeidler darf in diesem Panorama mit Fug und Recht als eine Art Leuchtturm im rasch wechselnden Gewölk modernen und nachmodernen Gedankenlebens erscheinen. (shrink)

Ein Gespenst geht um in den Wissenschaften - das Gespenst des Gedankenexperiments. Gedankenexperimente verheißen Erkenntnisgewinn ohne empirische Arbeit - was vor dem Selbstverständnis der modernen Naturwissenschaften jedoch einer Unmöglichkeit gleichkommt. Und doch zieht sich das Forschen mit Gedankenexperimenten wie ein roter Faden durch die lange Tradition in den empirischen Wissenschaften von ihren Anfängen bei Stevin, Galilei und Newton bis heute.

Emile Borel regards the Banach-Tarski Paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the Axiom of Choice. Peter Forrest instead blames the assumption that physical space has a similar structure as the real numbers. This paper argues that Banach and Tarski's result is not paradoxical and that it merely illustrates a surprising feature of the continuum: dividing a spatial region into disjoint pieces need not preserve volume.

Many philosophers believe there to be a fundamental difference between the present and past and future times, but they tend to disagree amongst themselves about what this difference is. Some think that the present is singled out by consciousness, while others believe that it marks the position to which the flow of time has advanced. According to presentism, the current moment is ontologically privileged: nothing exists that is not present. My aim in this chapter is to argue that this particular (...) attempt at distinguishing the present from other times is unsuccessful. (shrink)

This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.

When people suffer they always suffer as a whole human being. The emotional, cognitive and spiritual suffering of human beings cannot be completely separated from all other kinds of suffering, such as from harmful natural, ecological, political, economic and social conditions. In reality they interact with each other and influence each other. Human beings do not only suffer from somatic illnesses, physical pain, and the lack of decent opportunities to satisfy their basic vital, social and emotional needs. They also suffer (...) when they are not able to experience and grasp any meaning of life even if such suffering is not quite as obvious as most forms of physical, social and emotional suffering. Suffering from the lack for the sense of the meaning of life is a special form of emotional, cognitive, and spiritual suffering. Although all human beings share the same basic human need for some meaning of life, the fulfilment of this need is highly individual and personal. Although all forms of human suffering can be a challenge to the meaning of life, the personal conditions of suffering usually are a stronger challenge for the meaning of life. Among the personal conditions of human suffering, the Grenzsituationen cannot be cancelled or raised at all, but only accepted and coped with as existential aspects of the conditio humana. According to Karl Jaspers these are: death, suffering, struggling, guilt, and failing. The challenge for human beings to cope with these Grenzsituationen is a way to move from the mere Being-there to true human Existence. (shrink)

Successful transitions to a sustainable bioeconomy require novel technologies, processes, and practices as well as a general agreement about the overarching normative direction of innovation. Both requirements necessarily involve collective action by those individuals who purchase, use, and co-produce novelties: the consumers. Based on theoretical considerations borrowed from evolutionary innovation economics and consumer social responsibility, we explore to what extent consumers’ scope of action is addressed in the scientific bioeconomy literature. We do so by systematically reviewing bioeconomy-related publications according to (...) the extent to which consumers are regarded as passive vs. active, and different domains of consumer responsibility. We find all aspects of active consumption considered to varying degrees but observe little interconnection between domains. In sum, our paper contributes to the bioeconomy literature by developing a novel coding scheme that allows us to pinpoint different aspects of consumer activity, which have been considered in a rather isolated and undifferentiated manner. Combined with our theoretical considerations, the results of our review reveal a central research gap which should be taken up in future empirical and conceptual bioeconomy research. The system-spanning nature of a sustainable bioeconomy demands an equally holistic exploration of the consumers’ prospective and shared responsibility for contributing to its coming of age, ranging from the procurement of information on bio-based products and services to their disposal. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to show that the structuralist approachprovides a powerful framework for the analysis of certain holistic phenomena in empirical theories.We focus on two aspects of holism. The first refers to the involvement of comprehensive complexes of hypothesesin the theoretical treatment of systems regarded in isolation. By contrast, the second refers to thecorrelation between the theoretical descriptions of different systems. It is demonstrated how these two aspectscan be analysed by making use of the structuralist notion of (...) theory-nets, and how they are reflected by a refinedversion of the Ramsey sentence. Furthermore, it is argued that there exists a tight correlation between theoccurrence of these two holistic phenomena, a specific form of underdetermination of terms which occur in thefundamental principles of an empirical theory, and the shaping of the theory's protective belt. After having dealtwith these questions in abstracto, the relevance of these considerations for a better understanding of the dynamicsof empirical theories is demonstrated in a concrete case study. It refers to the role holistic phenomenaplayed in the investigation of the anomalous advance of Mercury's perihelion and in the various attempts to eliminate this anomaly. (shrink)

Kant wird normalerweise zu den 'doktrinären' Begründern des rein-parlamentarischen Demokratiemodells gerechnet; schließlich habe er, nicht zuletzt veranlaßt durch den Jakobiner-Terror, die reine Demokratie als Despotie erkannt und im Gegenzug allein die repräsentative Demokratie als mit den Freiheitsrechten vereinbar gewertet. Diese populäre Ansicht bezweifelt Ulrich Thiele in der vorliegenden Veröffentlichung. Er zeigt auf, daß Kant, von Rousseau inspiriert, eine mehrdimensionale Theorie der demokratischen Gesetzgebung entworfen hat, die sowohl parlamentarische als auch plebiszitäre Verfahren zu ihrem Recht kommen läßt.Wenn Kant sagt, die (...) Demokratie »im eigentlichen Verstande des Worts [sei] notwendig ein Despotism«, so ist, wie schon bei Rousseau, das Modell der griechischen Antike gemeint, und es soll zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, daß eine freiheitsrechtliche Demokratie unabdingbar auf strikte Gewaltenteilung angewiesen sei. Die häufig zitierte Formel von der 'despotischen Demokratie' richtet sich demnach nicht gegen Plebiszite, sondern gegen gewaltenverschmelzende Verfassungen.Wo sich Kant dagegen zugunsten der repräsentativdemokratischen Gesetzgebung ausspricht, geschieht dies durchweg unter Hinweis auf Zweckmäßigkeitserwägungen, nicht aber in der Form eines kategorischen praktischen Urteils. Dieser Befund bestätigt sich, wenn man die Kantische Verwendung der Begriffe Staatsform, Regierungsform und Regierungsart näher untersucht. Nicht die unmittelbare Volksgesetzgebung, sondern allein die demokratische Regierungsform widerspricht der republikanischen, d. h. rechtsstaatlichen Regierungsart, weil dort, wo das Volk die exekutive Gewalt (im weiteren Sinne) ausübe, jeder individuelle Rechtsschutz untergraben werde. Die Anwendung staatlichen Zwanges hinge nämlich nicht von Gesetzen, sondern von zufälligen Mehrheitsentscheidungen ab. (shrink)

Although the present paper looks upon the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics as a calculus of correlations, it goes beyond a purely operationalist interpretation. Having established the consistency of the correlations with the existence of their correlata, and having justified the distinction between a domain in which outcome-indicating events occur and a domain whose properties only exist if their existence is indicated by such events, it explains the difference between the two domains as essentially the difference between the manifested world (...) and its manifestation. A single, intrinsically undifferentiated Being manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations. This atemporal process implies a new kind of causality and sheds new light on the mysterious nonlocality of quantum mechanics. Unlike other realist interpretations, which proceed from an evolving-states formulation, the present interpretation proceeds from Feynman’s formulation of the theory, and it introduces a new interpretive principle, replacing the collapse postulate and the eigenvalue–eigenstate link of evolving-states formulations. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between regions of space, this principle implies that the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between things, it warrants the claim that, intrinsically, all fundamental particles are identical in the strong sense of numerical identical. They are the aforementioned intrinsically undifferentiated Being, which manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations. (shrink)

Does a world that contains chemistry entail the validity of both the standard model of elementary particle physics and general relativity, at least as effective theories? This article shows that the answer may very well be affirmative. It further suggests that the very existence of stable, spatially extended material objects, if not the very existence of the physical world, may require the validity of these theories.

Several errors in Stapp's interpretation of quantum mechanics and its application to mental causation (Henry P. Stapp, “Quantum theory and the role of mind in nature,” Foundations of Physics 31, 1465–1499 (2001)) are pointed out. An interpretation of (standard) quantum mechanics that avoids these errors is presented.

ABSTRACT Even though fatalism has been an intermittent topic of philosophy since Greek antiquity, this paper argues that fate ought to be of little concern to metaphysicians. Fatalism is neither an interesting metaphysical thesis in its own right, nor can it be identified with theses that are, such as realism about the future or determinism.

Instead of accepting instants of time as metaphysically basic entities, many philosophers regard them as abstractions from something else. There is the Russell-Whitehead view that times are maximal classes of simultaneous events; the linguistic ersatzer's proposal that times are maximally consistent sets of sentences or propositions; and the view that times are made up of temporal parts of material objects. This paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of these various proposals and concludes in favor of a particular version of linguistic (...) ersatzism about time. (shrink)

With the rigorous development of modal logic in the first half of the twentieth century, it became custom amongst philosophers to characterize different views about necessity and possibility in terms of rival axiomatic systems for the modal operators ‘ ’ (‘possibly’) and ‘ ’ (‘necessarily’). From the late 1950s onwards, Arthur Prior began to argue that temporal distinctions ought to be given a similar treatment, in terms of axiomatic systems for sentential tense operators, such as ‘P’ (‘it was the case (...) that’) and ‘F’ (‘it will be the case that’).1 My aim here is to give a brief survey of the extent to which time can be treated on the model of modality. I shall not try to address the further question of whether such ‘modal’ accounts of time are to be preferred over ‘spatial’ accounts that treat times more like places. (shrink)

In a recent article, O. Ulfbeck and A. Bohr [Found. Phys. 31, 757 (2001)] have stressed the genuine fortuitousness of detector clicks, which has also been pointed out, in different terms, by the present author [Am. J. Phys. 68, 728 (2000)]. In spite of this basic agreement, the present article raises objections to the presuppositions and conclusions of Ulfbeck and Bohr, in particular their rejection of the terminology of indefinite variables, their identification of reality with “the world of experience,” their (...) identification of experience with what takes place “on the spacetime scene,” and the claim that their interpretation of quantum mechanics is “entirely liberated” from classical notions. An alternative way of making sense of a world of uncaused clicks is presented. This does not invoke experience but deals with a free-standing reality, is not fettered by classical conceptions of space and time but introduces adequate ways of thinking about the spatiotemporal aspects of the quantum world, and does not reject indefinite variables but clarifies the implications of their existence. (shrink)

Michael Dummett claims that the classical model of time as a continuum of instants has to be rejected. In his view, “it allows as possibilities what reason rules out, and leaves it to the contingent laws of physics to rule out what a good model of physical reality would not even be able to describe.” This paper argues otherwise.

A perennial question in the philosophy of time concerns the relation between the objective “physical time” that features in empirical theories of motion and the subjective “human time” in which our own experiences unfold. This article is about one facet of this broader question: whether the phenomenon of consciousness allows us to make a principled distinction between the present and other times. A number of authors have argued that, without conscious observers, there would be no distinctions of past, present, and (...) future. This paper defends the opposing thesis that there is no interesting connection between consciousness and presentness. (shrink)

Because of the intellectual attraction of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, its conccpts are often borrowed to conceptualized evolutionary change also in non-biological domains. However, a heuristic strategy like that is problematic. An attempt is therefore made to identify generic features of evolution which transcend domain-specific characteristics. Epistemological, conccptual, and methodological implications are discussed, and the ontological question is raised how non-biological evolutionary theories can be accommodated within the Darwinian world view of modern sciences.

In seiner ‘Existenzerhellung der Freiheit’ reflektiert Jaspers, das Problemfeld der Freiheit in einem Kontrast zu den Begriffen, Phänomenen und Bedingungen der Unfreiheit und der Grenzen der Freiheit. Dem Problemfeld der Freiheit kann man im Denken und Handeln nur dann gerecht werden, wenn man nicht nur zwischen den verschiedenen Begriffen und Phänomenen der Freiheit unterscheidet, sondern auch zwischen den verschiedenen Begriffen und Phänomenen von Grenzen der Freiheit, wie z.B. durch die allgemeine Naturgesetzlichkeit und die menschliche Natur, durch besondere Bedingungen in Natur, (...) Kultur und Gesellschaft, durch gesundheitliches Befinden und individuelle Persönlichkeit, durch situative Begrenzungen, normative Forderungen und konkrete Grenzsituationen, wie z.B. von Leiden, Kampf, Schuld, Wagnis und Tod zeigen. Jaspers hat sich zum Problemfeld der Freiheit sowohl in seiner Allgemeinen Psychopathologie, in seinen pathographischen Untersuchungen, in seiner Psychologie der Weltanschauung und in einigen seiner philosophischen Schriften geäußert. Im zweiten Band seines frühen Hauptwerkes Philosophie mit dem Titel Existenzerhellung hat er jedoch eine umfassende Abhandlung zu dem komplexen Problemfeld der Freiheit verfasst. Dort behandelt Jaspers fast alle wesentlichen Begriffe und Phänomene der Freiheit bis hin zu seiner Konzeption einer existenziellen Freiheit. Jaspers geht anfangs von einem unbestimmten Begriff der Freiheit aus, dem kein bestimmtes Phänomen entspricht und der deswegen nur Illusionen erzeugen und einem ideologischem Denken dienen kann. Dann aber unterscheidet Jaspers zwischen verschiedenen Begriffen und Phänomenen der Freiheit. Dabei scheint er nicht nur wie die meisten zeitgenössischen Philosophen an Locke und Hume, Kant und Brentano, Wilhelm von Humboldt und John Stuart Mill anzuknüpfen, sondern auch an die Konzeptionen des Selbstbewusstseins bei Hegel, Fichte und Schelling. Da sich Jaspers nicht zuletzt auch mit den Schriften von Kierkegaard und Nietzsche auseinandergesetzt hat, gelangt er zu einer besonders umfangreichen und differenzierten Diskussion des ganzen Problemfeldes der Freiheit in der Moderne. Jaspers hat jedoch nicht nur verschiedene Freiheitsbegriffe und -phänomene unterschieden, sondern er hat auch zu den überlieferten Denkweisen im Form einer existenzphilosophischen Erhellung der Freiheit Stellung genommen. Dabei hat Jaspers’ Stellungnahme anders als viele zeitgenössische Beiträge über Freiheit und Determinimus den deutlichen und bewahrenswerten Vorzug, dass sie die unverfügbare und irreduzible Subjektivität der Willensfreiheit anerkennt. Damit knüpft Jaspers an Kants Einsicht an, dass der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens und ihrer praktischen Wirksamkeit immer nur die subjektive Evidenz inneren Erlebens zukommen kann. Dies unterscheidet sie von der Wahl- und Handlungsfreiheit, die man auch in konkreten Handlungssituationen objektiv feststellen kann. Der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens kommt damit weder die Objektivität empirischer Erkenntnis noch metaphysische Notwendigkeit zu. Die subjektive Evidenz des Erlebens eines freien Willens spricht nach Jaspers jedoch auch gegen einen weltanschaulichen, methodischen oder metaphysischen Determinismus, der sie aufgrund seiner Annahme einer kausal geschlossenen Wirklichkeit leichtfertig für eine bloße Illusion hält. Eine deterministische Weltanschauung oder Philosophie kann der condition humaine zumindest dann nicht gerecht werden, wenn sie die evidente Subjektivität eines freien Willens nicht auf eine plausible Art und Weise integriert. Jaspers’ wird der potentiellen Freiheit des menschlichen Willens dadurch gerecht, dass er ihre unverfügbare und irreduzible Subjektivität versteht und akzeptiert und erst gar nicht den abwegigen Versuch macht, sie durch eine objektivierende Einstellung zu objektivieren, wissenschaftlich zu erklären oder gar zu beweisen. (shrink)