Shadow of the Other is a discussion of how the individual has two sorts of relationships with an "other"--other individuals. The first regards the other as a s work apart is her brilliant utilization of a systematic dialectical approach to her subject, always maintaining the delicate balance between opposing tensions: masculinity and femininity, subjectivity and objectivity, passivity and activity, love and aggression, fantasy and reality, modernism and postmodernism, the intrapsychic and the intersubjective. Benjamin s work apart is her brilliant utilization (...) of a systematic dialectical approach to her subject, always maintaining the delicate balance between opposing other as a mental repository fo unwanted characteristics cast from the self. Jessica benjamin shows the implications of this dual relationship for male/female hierarchy and offers a possibility for balancing the two. This book continues the author's well-known explorations of the themes of intersubjectivity and gender, taking up issues at the forefront of contemporary debates in feminist theory and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.3 (2000) 286-290 [Access article in PDF] Letter to Lester Olson Jessica Benjamin Dear Lester Olson,I regret not having responded sooner to your communication. This is a matter of considerable importance to me, but you might imagine that it is difficult to read an analysis of events in which I was so involved that takes so little account of my/our point of view. Let me (...) add, after reading your response, that I do recognize that this is through no fault of your own, and as you indicated to me later, you assiduously strove to get more information. I believe it was Alfred Kazin who (I've heard) said that the movements of today make the dissertations of tomorrow. Since that is always a difficulty, I am sure that my experience is not singular. Unfortunately, in my view, the decontextualization of Audre Lorde's speech at that conference can serve to perpetuate the misunderstanding that underlay the destructive polarization that occurred at that time. To accept her view that the event was organized with no effort to include women of color by oblivious, racist white women is surely not what happened. In fact, the estrangement between white and black women at the time of the "Second Sex Conference" had much deeper causes (the enduring structures of racism in our country) for which I believe no individual could be held responsible.First, let me clarify an important fact. While we organizers of the conference invited numerous black and third world women to participate, we were consistently declined. For instance, Mary Helen Washington said she did not want to speak to an audience of only white women, and it was her experience that only white women came to feminist conferences. Indeed, at the time Michele Wallace, who probably would have been interested had she been available, was vociferously complaining about the lack of interest, indeed the rejection of feminism, among black women. Audre Lorde herself, one of our consultants, had been apprised of the participants for months and never named anyone who could participate. Similarly, Robin [End Page 286] Morgan had been consulted and had offered no suggestions of black participants. Yet ten days before the conference her young black protégé at Ms., Susan McHenry, appeared with a series of demands, including a list of black women she wished to see invited to the conference. Although I had met with Robin Morgan months before, she had never told me of Susan McHenry or proposed her as a participant, rather her interest had been focused on what would become the anti-pornography movement, similar to the interests of Kathy Barry who wrote about female sexual slaves. At the conference, Susan McHenry did speak; she expressed her indignation and outrage, and suggested that the entire conference was a racist gathering that should change direction and consider only the issue of racial exclusion.It is certainly true that the organizers were distressed by the same issue prior to the conference. After nearly a year of organizing, soliciting, and publishing open calls for participation, we were absolutely desperate to find participants who would reflect racial and ethnic groups other than white middle class. But in 1979 the institution of women's studies looked very different than it does now--feminism was a political movement not an academic institution, and only a few women in any university had become interested in it. And that does not even begin to address how few women, let alone black women, were in the universities in 1979!A second important point is that Audre Lorde was not speaking to an audience who disagreed with her; she was speaking to an audience who were already inflamed because they felt that certain identities had been left out of the conference. Despite the fact that it was an open conference, based on an open invitation--we had drawn scores of women to give workshops and papers whom we had never heard of--and despite the fact that we had organized the conference to address differences among women, the audience consisted of many women ready to protest... (shrink)

Necro-advertising refers to the use of deceased celebrities in advertising. This practice offers unique advantages to brands that seek to benefit from positive associations with timeless celebrities at a more affordable cost than celebrity endorsement. Nevertheless, how consumers actually respond to the use of deceased celebrities in advertising remains under-theorized. This research is the first to empirically examine consumers’ ethical judgments about necro-advertising practices. In particular, drawing from the signaling theory, it demonstrates the impact of consumer inferences about the existence (...) of a legal agreement for using deceased celebrities’ images on brand ethicality. The results of two experimental studies show that a low-equity brand is more likely to be perceived as unethical when using necro-advertising since consumers have limited knowledge about these brands. Conversely, our findings confirm how a high level of equity prevents from the aforementioned adverse effects since these brands’ assets send a credible signal about their capability to get approval from a deceased celebrity’s estate for the use of its image. While deepening current knowledge on the perceived ethicality of necro-advertising practices, this research uncovers the moderating effect of equity on consumer inferences about brand ethicality. The results also suggest managerial caveats and guidelines for low-equity brands. In particular, while necro-advertising may have a negative impact on the perceived ethicality of low-equity brands, disclosing a statement about a contractual engagement with the deceased celebrity’s estate can mitigate this negative effect by providing an unequivocal signal that the brand is acting ethically. (shrink)

This volume presents the concept of Ecoscape as spatial interrelations, or spatially patterned processes, that are constitutive of an environment_an ecosystem. Contributors investigate environmental issues concerning the human impact on geohistory, food distribution, genetically modified biota, waste management, scientific mapping, and the rethinking of human identity.

"Der Text ist ein Wald, in dem der Leser der Jäger ist" notierte Benjamin für sein Passagen-Projekt. Das Buch erschließt Benjamins Arbeitsweise erstmals ausgehend von seiner eigenen Lektürepraxis. Als lesender Jäger und Sammler durchforstete Benjamin Texte von Goethe, Marx, Kafka, Freud und vielen weiteren Autoren. Angesichts der Heterogenität seiner Quellen ist erstaunlich, dass sich in der Art seiner Lektüre methodische Eigenheiten wiederholen. Burkhardt Lindner hat diesen Zugriff auf andere Autoren als Entwendung beschrieben, mit der Benjamin "den fremden Text sich anverwandelt (...) oder abstößt und damit in die eigenen Denkerfahrungen einsenkt". Der Band erkundet verschiedene Dimensionen dieses Verfahrens und schärft den Begriff der Entwendung durch Einzelanalysen. So werden Denk- und Schreibweisen sichtbar, die bislang nicht als ein von Benjamin werkübergreifend angewendetes Verfahren aufgearbeitet wurden. "The reader is the hunter in the forest of the text" (Benjamin, Arcades Project). As a reading hunter Benjamin trawled through texts by Marx, Kafka, Freud, and many more. For the first time, the volume Entwendungen. Walter Benjamin und seine Quellen scrutinizes Benjamin ́s method based on his particular reading practice. The volume investigates the various angles of this practice, sharpens the notion of "Entwendung" by means of single case studies. It uncovers ways of thinking and writing that have not been identified as a method traversing the entirety of Benjamin ́s oeuvre. (shrink)

Feminists continue to express concerns over the legalization of physician-assisted death. Some worry that women are more likely than men to request PAD due to societal stereotypes and the pressures put on women to be self-sacrificing. Others worry that women will have their requests ignored more often than men because women’s voices are traditionally silenced or disregarded in western culture. Rather than join in the above argument of speculating which way women may be marginalized, I accept PAD as potentially dangerous (...) and offer a solution in order to avoid the risks of injustice associated with PAD. I reframe the concerns as epistemological worries, and ultimately, I turn to Benjamin McMyler’s virtue epistemology as a way to avoid testimonial injustice in requests for life hastening medication, suggesting that the injustice comes from a narrow and individualistic perception of knowledge, and injustice can be avoided if we understand testimonial knowledge to be both cognitive and social. (shrink)

Ensayo bibliográfico de la obra de Manuel Barrios Casares, _La vida como ensayo y otros ensayos. Kundera, Benjamin, Ortega_ (Sevilla, Athenaica Ediciones, 2022).

This article demonstrates how Adorno and Horkheimer’s turn to psychoanalytic concepts like sublimation and intra-psychic conflict strengthened critical theory. The piecemeal collective psychology they produced was used to understand fascism and anti-Semitism. But the full significance of these psychoanalytic explanations was concealed by Adorno, who elsewhere denied the possibility of psychology proper after the death of the individual. Adorno and Horkheimer’s underhanded borrowing from psychoanalysis for social analysis had the effect of filtering collective psychology through the lens of regression. To (...) amend this, the article analyzes psychoanalytic explanations from an interpretive perspective, building upon Jessica Benjamin’s psychoanalytic feminism, to contest the tactics of immanent criticism and to revitalize the project of a less dystopic collective psychology. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende discutir e refletir sobre as contribuições da chamada Teoria Crítica da Sociedade para o campo da educação em tempos de crescente desenvolvimento tecnológico. Para tanto, voltamos o olhar para as obras de três autores expoentes da Teoria Crítica: Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno e Herbert Marcuse, destacando as reflexões e análises desses autores e utilizando-as como subsídio no campo educativo. A educação autorreflexiva e autocrítica é pensada em seu potencial para a superação das condições de dominação (...) que permanecem em nossa sociedade, cada vez mais tecnificada e pretensamente democrática. Desse modo, pensar a práxis educativa se afigura como algo urgente e necessário para que se rompa com certas condições que mantêm nosso potencial à barbárie. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.3 (2000) 291-293 [Access article in PDF] A Reply to Jessica Benjamin Lester C. Olson I am grateful to Jessica Benjamin for making the time to write a letter concerning her experiences in 1979 at "The Second Sex Conference," where Audre Lorde delivered her speech "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House." The letter arrived on 4 March 2000, after I had (...) sent the final version of the essay on Lorde's speech to Philosophy and Rhetoric. Although the editor indicated that, despite the late date, it would be possible for me to revise the essay to account for Ms. Benjamin's statement, I instead asked the editor to publish the statement as a comment after the essay, because of the historical value of her firsthand experiences and understandings of the conference, and because her letter provides an opportunity to engage in a dialogue called for in the conclusion of my essay. In addition, the letter gives additional information about context, which impacts any interpretation of Lorde's speech. As such, it becomes an occasion to reflect on interpreting rhetorical texts in historical contexts.As a rhetorical critic, I have been working, periodically, on understanding the rhetoric of Lorde's speech for about three years now. During September 1997, I wrote to several scholar-activists who were well positioned to know about the audiences at the conference and whether there were audio or video recordings of the speech. I was anxious to secure a recording because I knew from my earlier experience in researching Lorde's other speeches that, at times, she revised the texts for printed versions of them. Except for archivists at New York University, nobody replied to my letters. In the meantime, I presented preliminary drafts of my interpretation of Lorde's speech at conferences of the National Communication Association--one paper analyzing the speech itself and a second on later critical commentaries on it. In addition, in undergraduate classes on rhetorical criticism, I used the speech as a sustained example during class discussions on doing rhetorical criticism. In addition to reading Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949) because its publication was the basis for the entire [End Page 291] conference, I read some conference participants' later publications based on their conference papers. Having secured a formal acceptance of my essay, I decided to send a penultimate copy of it to the scholar-activists to whom I had written in 1997, hoping that it might elicit some replies. Two people sent letters during the last couple of months, one so brief that it would not have affected my interpretation of Lorde's speech. Ms. Benjamin's letter, however, mattered to me--both because of its historical importance in its own right and because of the ramifications it has for interpretations in the essay.My immediate response to the first paragraph of Ms. Benjamin's letter was defensiveness. It disturbed me to realize that Ms. Benjamin had experienced my essay as perpetuating the divisiveness and polarization at the time and as marginalizing her experiences. My intentions were not to continue a destructive practice, but rather to examine Lorde's rhetoric to identify pitfalls in coalition politics across multiple differences (both within and among social groups) to mitigate them to the extent possible. Subsequently, I realized that my own defensiveness exemplified one such pitfall. By asking the editor to publish Ms. Benjamin's letter, I could perhaps model a dialogue approach, which I had called for in the essay's conclusion; rectify in some measure the marginalization of Ms. Benjamin's account; and provide readers with additional information for their active reinterpreting of the speech, essay, and letter.Further, based upon Ms. Benjamin's letter, some aspects of the rhetorical context may merit attention in revising my essay. The comments about the organizer's efforts to include a range of social groups and about the resistance to those efforts deserve mention, because becoming audience members was already a rhetorical effect. If, as one black feminist suggested to Ms. Benjamin, "only white women" came to feminist... (shrink)

ExcerptFrom the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, a series of critical remarks were traded between the historian and cultural critic Christopher Lasch and the psychoanalyst and feminist philosopher Jessica Benjamin. Researchers describe that exchange as involving competing perceptions of psychoanalysis, but the debate also covered mismatching approaches to critical theory and, more widely, to the ideals befitting a free polity. Lasch’s appeal to the traditions of the American past faced off against Benjamin’s advocacy of a substantial social change whose (...) fundamental step was challenging the patriarchy.1 The ideas that each of the two authors put forth are often cited for reproaching the worldview associated with the other. Supportive scholars credit Benjamin with working psychoanalysis into a feminist perspective that questions traditional gender roles and the social order based on them, an order to which Lasch seemed committed.2 On the other hand, critics of the psychoanalytic turn to which Benjamin was central echo Lasch when arguing that the resulting relational theory marginalizes personal responsibility and belittles the significance of individual conscience.3. (shrink)

In this article I explore love's relation to gendered power asymmetries by comparing Anna Jónasdóttir's, Jessica Benjamin's and Teresa Brennan's respective theorizations of this theme. Despite the considerable differences between these feminist frameworks, they can all be read in terms of what I call the figure of the Dominant and its Constitutive Other. This refers to the contradictory relation whereby the powerful and ‘independent’ existence of the one is premised on that which is other to it, as well as (...) on the denial and obscuring of this constitutive dependence. Via a dialogue with critical realist and metaReal themes I move from a concern with how the feminine ‘Other’ tacitly constitutes the masculine Dominant through practices of love, to thematizing the basic stratum of being as the constitutive Other of the oppressive economy of love. The structure of the self emerges as a central organizing principle in the oppressive relations considered, and the article explores what might be a non-violent mode.. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis essay examines Freud's construction of a mythical moment during early childhood, in which differences between male and female sexual identities are said to originate. It focuses on the way in which Freud divides fear and envy between the sexes, allocating the emotion of fear to men, and that of envy to women. On the one hand, the problems of this construction are pointed out, but on the other hand, it is shown that even a much-maligned myth may still (...) provide food for thought.Then, four critiques of Freud which have been articulated by prominent feminist psychoanalysts – Karen Horney, Nancy Chodorow, Luce Irigaray, and Jessica Benjamin – are presented, as well as the alternative visions of sexual identities which these thinkers have developed. The basic metaphors or economies guiding these visions of sexual difference are appraised in terms of their breadth and depth, with particular reference to their ability to acknowledge and integrate the presence of fear and envy as passions which are evoked but also repressed in the face of sexual difference.From this angle, the contributions of Nancy Chodorow and Luce Irigaray are found to be more limited than those of Karen Horney and Jessica Benjamin, since the former two theorists allocate fear primarily or exclusively to men, as Freud has done, while they remain completely silent on envy. Differences in the scope or reach of the four feminist approaches are explained as a result of the theorists' differing perceptions of the social, political, and cultural position of women in patriarchal society. (shrink)

Jessica Dubow’s In Exile – working through Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig – reads Judaic thought from the Exodus as exile. With Rosenzweig, she understands this as pitting the (Judaic) singular of faith against the (Greek) universal of reason. This ‘bad universal’ was Hegel’s state, which Dubow also sees as Carl Schmitt’s state. Dubow sees this as it were universal of dominance in today’s Israeli state, against which she pits the singular of exilic thought.

It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation— ‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, be ‘metaphysically dependent on’, or be ‘nothing over and above’ some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether (...) Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence—for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on—which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy have typically taken this to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative account, MI involves its being determinate that an indeterminate state of affairs obtains. I more specifically suggest that MI involves an object's having a determinable (...) property, but not having any unique determinate of that determinable. I motivate the needed extension of the traditional understanding of determinables, then argue that a determinable-based account of MI accommodates, in illuminating fashion, both ‘glutty’ and ‘gappy’ cases of MI, while satisfactorily treating concerns about MI stemming from Evans’ argument and the problem of the many. (shrink)

I problematize Grounding-based formulations of physicalism. More specifically, I argue, first, that motivations for adopting a Grounding-based formulation of physicalism are unsound; second, that a Grounding-based formulation lacks illuminating content, and that attempts to imbue Grounding with content by taking it to be a strict partial order are unuseful and problematic ; third, that conceptions of Grounding as constitutively connected to metaphysical explanation conflate metaphysics and epistemology, are ultimately either circular or self-undermining, and controversially assume that physical dependence is incompatible (...) with explanatory gaps; fourth, that in order to appropriately distinguish physicalism from strong emergentism, a Grounding-based formulation must introduce one and likely two primitives in addition to Grounding; and fifth, that understanding physical dependence in terms of Grounding gives rise to ‘spandrel’ questions, including, e.g., “What Grounds Grounding?”, which arise only due to the overly abstract nature of Grounding. (shrink)

Some claim that Non-reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees of freedom needed (...) to characterize certain special science entities, and those needed to characterize their composing physical entities; these correspond to what I call ‘reductions’, ‘restrictions’, and ‘eliminations’ in degrees of freedom. I then argue that eliminations in degrees of freedom, in particular—when strictly fewer degrees of freedom are required to characterize certain special science entities than are required to characterize their composing physical entities—provide a basis for making sense of how certain special science entities can be both physically acceptable and ontologically irreducible to physical entities. (shrink)

Most people have a clear sense of what they mean by disability, and have little trouble identifying conditions they consider disabling. Yet providing a clear and consistent definition of disability is far from straightforward. Standardly, disability is understood as the restriction in our abilities to perform tasks, as a result of an impairment of normal physical or cognitive human functioning. However, which inabilities matter? We are all restricted by our bodies, and are all incapable of performing some tasks, but most (...) of these inabilities are not considered disabilities. If, then, we are to avoid the category of disability becoming overly broad—and thus politically and practically useless—we need some way of picking out the specific inabilities that are disabling. I argue that our answer should be informed by an account of the opportunities individuals are entitled to be able to perform as a matter of justice. Thus, to be disabled is to have these opportunities restricted, and not to deviate from the species norm or lack any ability that might improve our well-being. (shrink)

Self-control is integral to successful human agency. Without it we cannot extend our agency across time and secure central social, moral, and personal goods. But self-control is not a unitary capacity. In the first part of this paper we provide a taxonomy of self-control and trace its connections to agency and the self. In part two, we turn our attention to the external conditions that support successful agency and the exercise of self-control. We argue that what we call moral security (...) is a critical foundation for agency. Parts three and four explore what happens to agency when moral security is lacking, as in the case of those subject to racism, and those living in poverty. The disadvantages suffered by those who are poor, in a racial minority or other oppressed group, or suffering mental illness or addiction, are often attributed to a lack of individual self-control or personal responsibility. In particular, members of these groups are often seen as irresponsibly focused on short-term pleasures over long-term good, a view underwritten by particular psychological theories of self-control. We explore how narratives about racism and poverty undermine moral security, and limit and distort the possibility of synchronic and diachronic self-control. Where moral security is undermined, the connection between self-control and diachronic goods often fails to obtain and agency contracts accordingly. We close with some preliminary reflections on the implications for responsibility. (shrink)

Research groups around the world are currently busy trying to invent new life in the laboratory, looking for extraterrestrial life, or making machines increasingly more life-like. In the case of astrobiology, any newly discovered life would likely be very old, but when discovered it would be new to us. In the case of synthetic organic life or life-like machines, humans will have invented life that did not exist before. Together, these endeavors amount to what we call the emerging plurality of (...) lives because we see a future where we are surrounded by, and interact with, life of many different origins, as well as entities that we have not traditionally seen as being alive. In the future these entities will likely possess properties that we so far have only associated with living beings, thereby transcending and perhaps blurring the borders between life and non-life. (shrink)

These comments are part of a book symposium on Karen Bennett's book, _Making Things Up_.

In this essay we argue against preventing people from amassing extreme wealth via increased taxation. The first argument in favor of such a proposal, recently advanced by Ingrid Robeyns (2018), states that billionaires’ resources would be better spent addressing morally important goals such as meeting disadvantaged people’s needs and solving collective action problems. In response to this claim, we argue that billionaires are typically in a better position to benefit the poor and to solve collective action problems than public officials. (...) The second argument in favor of preventing extreme wealth accumulation, advanced by Robeyns and Robert Reich (2018), states that billionaires have an inappropriate amount of influence in public life, which undermines political equality. We argue that corporate leaders tend to be more accountable to their fellow citizens than public officials. We then consider and criticize the objection that billionaires’ success is typically a result of public investment, which entitles public officials to enforce taxes that demand a return on the public investment. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 24 Seat belt mandates seem like a paradigmatic case of justified paternalism. Even those who generally object to paternalism often concede that seat belt laws are justified. Against this near-consensus in favor of mandates, I argue that seat belt laws are unjust and public officials should not enforce them. The most plausible exceptions to a principle of anti-paternalism do not justify seat belt mandates. Some argue that seat belt mandates are not paternalistic because unbelted riders are (...) not fully autonomous. Others claim that the decision to ride unbelted harms other people. Yet these attempts to defend seat belt mandates on non-paternalistic grounds cannot overcome the case against seat belt mandates. I therefore conclude that _even_ seat belt mandates are unjust. With this comprehensive case against seat belt mandates, I demonstrate the more general difficulties in justifying any form of coercive paternalism. (shrink)

The computer revolution has had an enormous effect on all aspects of the practice of medicine, yet little thought has been given to the role of social media in identifying treatment choices for incompetent patients. We are currently living in the ?Internet age? and many people have integrated social media into all aspects of their lives. As use becomes more prevalent, and as users age, social media are more likely to be viewed as a source of information regarding medical care (...) preferences. This article explores the ethical and legal issues raised by the use of social media in surrogate decision making. (shrink)

Friedrich Hayek’s account of “spontaneous order” has generated increasing interest in recent decades. His argument for the superiority of the market in distributing knowledge without the need for central oversight has appealed to progressive democratic theorists, who are wary of the hubris of state planning and attracted to possibilities for self-organization, and to Foucaultians, who have long counseled political theory to cut off the King’s head. A spontaneous social order, organized by an invisible hand, would appear to dispense with arbitrary (...) power and foster creativity and individual liberty. This article challenges this view by highlighting the centrality of submission to Hayek’s account of spontaneous order. It shows that Hayek struggles to obscure the providentialism underpinning the account of social order he derives from Adam Ferguson and the Scottish Enlightenment. Nonetheless, his own account of spontaneous order relies on faith in the workings of the market, and submission to unintelligible market forces. (shrink)

I argue that it is permissible for pregnant women to expose their unborn children to risks and injury. I begin with the premise that abortion is permissible. If so, then just as a pregnant woman may permissibly prevent an unborn child from experiencing any future wellbeing, she also may permissibly provide her child relatively poorer prospects for wellbeing. Therefore, it is permissible for pregnant women to take risks and cause prenatal injury. This argument has revisionary implications for policies that prevent (...) medical research and drug use during pregnancy. It also explains why moralistic criticism of pregnant women is unwarranted. (shrink)

Every paper in this collection is worth reading, for one reason or another. Still, due to certain problematic metametaphysical presuppositions most of these discussions miss the deeper mark, on the pessimist as well as the optimist side. My reasons for thinking this come from considering how best to answer three metametaphysical questions. First, why be pessimistic about metaphysics – why be Carnapian in a post-positivist age? There is, I’ll suggest, a post-positivist strategy for reviving Carnapian pessimism, but it is almost (...) entirely neglected here; and the motivations that pessimists offer instead are not compelling. Second, why think that the best way to approach metametaphysical questions is by attention to features of language, and in particular to quantifier semantics, in ordinary or ontological language(s)? Here again we are offered little motivation for this supposition, which, notwithstanding its acceptance by nearly all contributors, faces clear difficulties. Third, granting that quantification is somehow bound up with first-order questions about what exists, what is the nature of this connection, and what are the associated implications for metametaphysics? Here I find the accounts of the connection on offer implausible, especially as compared to an alternative that makes better sense of metaphysical practice and disagreement. The moral following consideration of these questions is that real progress in metametaphysics is likely to occur less by attention to semantic issues pertaining to representation, translation and quantification and more to non-semantic issues pertaining to epistemology and metaphysical determinacy. (shrink)

The actions performed by individuals, as consumers and citizens, have aggregate negative consequences for the environment. The question asked in this paper is to what extent it is reasonable to hold individuals and institutions responsible for environmental problems. A distinction is made between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. Previously, individuals were not seen as being responsible for environmental problems, but an idea that is now sometimes implicitly or explicitly embraced in the public debate on environmental problems is that individuals are appropriate (...) targets for blame when they perform actions that are harmful to the environment. This idea is criticized in this paper. It is argued that instead of blaming individuals for performing actions that are not environmentally friendly we should ascribe forward-looking responsibility to individuals, a notion that focuses more on capacity and resources than causation and blameworthiness. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that a great share of forward-looking responsibility should also be ascribed to institutional agents, primarily governments and corporations. The urge to ascribe forward-looking responsibility to institutional agents is motivated by the efficiency aim of responsibility distributions. Simply put, if responsibility is ascribed to governments and corporations there is a better chance of creating a society in which the opportunities to act in an environmentally friendly way increase. (shrink)

I årtusenden har människan försökt definiera livet – hur levande djur och växter skiljer sig från död materia. Problemet är dock att livet är mångfacetterat, och varje regel har sitt undantag. Vi försöker möta kommande utmaningar med nya livsformer, genom att lyfta fram en ny definition av liv.

In this essay, I argue that prescription drug laws violate patients' rights to self-medication. Patients have rights to self-medication for the same reasons they have rights to refuse medical treatment according to the doctrine of informed consent (DIC). Since we should accept the DIC, we ought to reject paternalistic prohibitions of prescription drugs and respect the right of self-medication. In section 1, I frame the puzzle of self-medication; why don't the same considerations that tell in favour of informed consent also (...) justify a right of self-medication? In section 2, I show that the prescription drug system was historically motivated by paternalism. In section 3, I outline the justifications for the DIC in more detail. I show that consequentialist, epistemic, and deontic considerations justify the DIC. In sections 4–6, I argue that these considerations also justify rights of self-medication. I then propose that rights of self-medication require non-prohibitive prescription policies in section 7. I consider two objections in sections 8 and 9: that patients ought not to make medically risky or deadly decisions, and that unrestricted access to prescription-grade pharmaceuticals would result in widespread misuse and abuse. Section 10 concludes. (shrink)

An ICU and Palliative Care specialist featured in the Netflix documentary Extremis offers a framework for a better way to exit life that will change our medical culture at the deepest level In medical school, no one teaches you how to let a patient die. Jessica Zitter became a doctor because she wanted to be a hero. She elected to specialize in critical care--to become an ICU physician--and imagined herself swooping in to rescue patients from the brink of death. (...) But then during her first code she found herself cracking the ribs of a patient so old and frail it was unimaginable he would ever come back to life. She began to question her choice. Extreme Measures charts Zitter's journey from wanting to be one kind of hero to becoming another--a doctor who prioritizes the patient's values and preferences in an environment where the default choice is the extreme use of technology. In our current medical culture, the old and the ill are put on what she terms the End-of-Life Conveyor belt. They are intubated, catheterized, and even shelved away in care facilities to suffer their final days alone, confused, and often in pain. In her work Zitter has learned what patients fear more than death itself : the prospect of dying badly. She builds bridges between patients and caregivers, formulates plans to allay patients' pain and anxiety, and enlists the support of loved ones so that life can end well, even beautifully. Filled with rich patient stories that make a compelling medical narrative, Extreme Measures enlarges the national conversation as it thoughtfully and compassionately examines an experience that defines being human. (shrink)

_Offers a striking new reading of Agamben’s political thought and its implications for political action in the present._.

Recent arguments for the basic status of economic liberty can be deployed to show that all liberty is basic. The argument for the basic status of all liberty is as follows. First, John Tomasi’s defense of basic economic liberties is successful. Economic freedom can be further defended against powerful high liberal objections, which libertarians including Tomasi have so far overlooked. Yet arguments for basic economic freedom raise a puzzle about the distinction between basic and non-basic liberties. The same reasons that (...) economic liberties and the traditionally defined list of basic liberties are basic can also be given for all other liberties. Therefore, high liberals and Rawlsian libertarians ought to accept almost all other liberties as basic, even liberties that may strike us as trivial, silly, or unimportant. This claim has revisionary implications for high liberalism. Namely, liberals should endorse strong institutional protections for almost all liberties, even at the expense of other social values. (shrink)