A determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):359-385 (2013)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy have typically taken this to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative account, MI involves its being determinate that an indeterminate state of affairs obtains. I more specifically suggest that MI involves an object's having a determinable property, but not having any unique determinate of that determinable. I motivate the needed extension of the traditional understanding of determinables, then argue that a determinable-based account of MI accommodates, in illuminating fashion, both ‘glutty’ and ‘gappy’ cases of MI, while satisfactorily treating concerns about MI stemming from Evans’ argument and the problem of the many.

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Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

Fundamental Nomic Vagueness.Eddy Keming Chen - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (1):1-49.
Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy.Claudio Calosi & Jessica Wilson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2599–2627.
Quantum indeterminacy.Claudio Calosi & Cristian Mariani - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (4):e12731.
Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment.Claudio Calosi & Jessica Wilson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3291-3317.
Modeling Mental Qualities.Andrew Y. Lee - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):263-209.

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References found in this work

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Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.

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