Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 216 Seiten: 281-296.

Barcelona has become one of the most touristic cities in the world, with more than 18 million visitors per year, coming to a city with only 1.7 million inhabitants. The model of tourism is depredatory, destroying old neighborhoods and pushing Catalans out of the city. At the same time, people from the Global South come to the city, but in more precarious conditions. They find a city that does not welcome them and that puts them in the worst conditions. I (...) want to focus on two movies that present Barcelona as an ill city. On the one hand, we have Woody Allen’s Vicky, Cristina, Barcelona, a movie that shows the upper-class American tourism in a European city. On the other hand, Alejandro González Iñárritu’s Biutiful, also starred by Javier Bardem, shows us another story about Barcelona. This is a movie that pays attention to the bottom of the well, Spanish lower-class workers struggling shoulder to shoulder with lower class migrants, people who will never enjoy the life that Allen`s characters have. In this paper I want to show how film can represent illness in different ways. To do so, I first explain, very briefly, the Barcelona model, a model of inclusive, modern city that Vicky and Cristina enjoy. But, this model insofar as it includes people, it excludes them. I will show the construction of the City from 1888 to 1992/2004 and how it has created spaces of inclusion and exclusion. In the second part, I will analyze the right to housing and the housing crisis that is currently affecting the city. In this part, I want to focus both in the crisis and in the social mobilization that it has brought about. After constructing this context, I will analyze the two movies, as instruments to show/hide the diseases of the city. (shrink)

This paper presents a comprehensive study of argumentation frameworks with necessities (AFNs), a bipolar extension of Dung Abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) where the support relation captures a positive interaction between arguments having the meaning of necessity: the acceptance of an argument may require the acceptance of other argument(s). The paper discusses new main acceptability semantics for AFNs and their characterization both by a direct approach and a labelling approach. It examines the relationship between AFNs and Dung AFs and shows the (...) gain provided by the former in terms of concision. Finally, the paper shows how to represent an AFN as a normal logic program (LP) and vice versa and in both cases establishes a one-to-one correspondence between extensions under the main acceptability semantics (except for semi-stable semantics where the correspondence is not completely full) of an AFN and particular cases of 3-valued stable models of normal LPs. (shrink)

Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A (...) corollary upshot of the article is that whether hallucinations are possible or not is still an open empirical question. (shrink)

Some recently popular accounts of perception account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in terms of the qualities of objects. My concern in this paper is with naturalistic versions of such a phenomenal externalist view. Focusing on visual spatial perception, I argue that naturalistic phenomenal externalism conflicts with a number of scientific facts about the geometrical characteristics of visual spatial experience.

This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to this view.

Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. This paper proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity that grounds it in experiences of lawlike regularities. The paper offers a novel account of the connection between (...) phenomenology and intentionality. It also sheds some light on one of the central themes in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of (...) freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent. (shrink)

Despite the gaining popularity of non-representationalist approaches to cognition, it is still a widespread assumption in contemporary cognitive science that the explanatory reach of representation-eschewing approaches is substantially limited. Nowadays, many working in the field accept that we do not need to invoke internal representations for the explanation of online forms of cognition. However, when it comes to explaining higher, offline forms of cognition, it is widely believed that we must fall back on internal-representation-invoking theories. In this paper, I want (...) to argue that, contrary to popular belief, we don’t yet have any compelling reason for assuming that non-representationalist theories are, as a matter of necessity, limited in scope. I will show that Clark and Toribio’s influential argument in terms of ‘representation-hungry’ cognition is, for various reasons, flawed. On closer inspection, we’ll see that the argument from representation-hunger is, on the one hand, built on an inconsistent notion of representation and, on the other hand, on a conflation of the explanandum with the explanans. I will suggest that, on closer inspection, the ARH seems to be getting its appeal mainly from the unscientific principle that “like causes like”. (shrink)

Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness is a widely used framework for studying the evolution of social behavior, but controversy surrounds its status. Hamilton originally derived his famous rb > c rule for the spread of a social gene by assuming additivity of costs and benefits. However, it has recently been argued that the additivity assumption can be dispensed with, so long as the −c and b terms are suitably defined, as partial regression coefficients. I argue that this way of generalizing (...) Hamilton’s rule to the nonadditive case, while formally correct, faces conceptual problems. (shrink)

Resilience may be referred to as the capacity for positive adaptation and to quickly recover from difficulties and significant adversity. After examining operational definitions of related concepts, the article discusses resilience building exercises for functional fitness at the individual soldier level, to include among others, self-monitoring, self-evaluation, self-reinforcement, emotional regulation exercises, mindfulness training, relaxation and grounding exercises and importance of maintaining discipline and routine in the military. Using an acronym CARRIES, the article examines efforts to enhance resilience building through empirically (...) validated cognitive, behavioural and intrapersonal skills originating from best practices learned in the military. (shrink)

It is common to hold that our conscious experiences at a single moment are often unified. But when consciousness is unified, what are the fundamental facts in virtue of which it is unified? On some accounts of the unity of consciousness, the most fundamental fact that grounds unity is a form of singularity or oneness. These accounts are similar to Newtonian views of space according to which the most fundamental fact that grounds relations of co-spatiality between various points (or regions) (...) of a space is the fact that these points (or regions) are parts of the same single space. In this paper, I sketch and defend an alternative account of unity of consciousness. Very roughly, the view holds that experiences are unified when they are connected in the right way. In this respect, the view is analogous to Leibnizian views of space according to which the oneness of space emerges from certain conditions over spatial relations. The Leibnizian alternative has significant implications for our understanding of the metaphysics of conscious experience, the cognitive architecture of the mind and our assessment of the conditions under which unity of consciousness breaks. (shrink)

Despite the growing popularity of nonrepresentationalist approaches to cognition, and especially of those coming from the enactivist corner, positing internal representations is still the order of the day in mainstream cognitive science. Indeed, the idea that we have to invoke internal content-carrying, thing-like entities to account for the workings of mind and cognition proves to be particularly resilient. In this paper, my aim is to explain at least partially where this resilience of the reified notion of representation comes from. What (...) I want to show is that, crucially, positing inner representations isn’t so much warranted by the scientific practice itself – as is commonly held – but much more motivated by nonscientific and pre-theoretical elements that largely stem from, what I will call, linguistic contingencies. Otherwise put, much of what makes the reified notion of representation an attractive posit can be explained, not by the science, but by the way we, including cognitive scientists, speak. What I want to do here, then, is first, rehearse what reification means in the context of representationalism and, second, specify which linguistic contingencies can account for why the idea of positing representations remains for many not only a viable option, but an indispensability for anyone interested in explanations of mind and cognition. (shrink)

This paper aims to describe and present, as approach, the research and intellectual process that develops Heidegger his first lessons in Fribourg, The idea of philosophy and the problem of worldview, in which attempts to set up some idea of philosophy as the original science. At the same time, this paper is intended as a contribution to the dissemination and knowledge of Heidegger’s intellectual stage, which in my opinion, allow a deeper and a comprehensive set of understanding his work and (...) thought. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of internet filtering, and its impact on marginalized groups including non‐governmental organizations, female activists, ethnic, and religious minorities, the younger generation and the increase of the digital divide in Iran.Design/methodology/approachThe paper raises two main questions: to what extent do information and communications technologies and in particular, the internet, promote freedom of speech, and gender equality in Iran? What is the impact of state censorship and ICT filtering on these activities? To (...) answer these research questions, the author uses narratives of the internet's usage along with a comparison study with other Middle Eastern countries to analyze the impact of ICTs on citizen's freedom of expression.FindingsThe paper argues that restrictions imposed on ICT tools and services by the Government of Iran which has been claimed to protect country's national security against the corruption and immorality imposed by Western countries not only affect the expansion of ICTs negatively but also civil liberties – thus increasing the digital divide internally, regionally, as well as on a global scale.Research limitations/implicationsAlbeit this research is limited to the case study of Iran, the author believes that lessens learned from the Iran's case study can be applied to other Islamic countries and in particular countries located in the Middle East region.Practical implicationsICT tools and services such as the internet and short message service are effective emancipatory media for citizens' participation and mobilization in democratic processes.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the existing knowledge and understanding of the impact of ICTs on freedom and democracy. (shrink)

In _Ibn Taymiyya and the Attributes of God_, Farid Suleiman offers a comprehensive study of Ibn Taymiyya’s views on God and His attributes, contextualizing his position within the century-old debates on this fraught theological issue.

If all things and events, including human actions, are predetermined by God since pre-eternity, then what space is left for human freedom of will, and hence, for moral responsibility? In the beginning of the 14th century, a non-Muslim scholar, probably of Jewish faith, confronted several Muslim scholars from Damascus and Cairo with precisely this question in versified form. Among them is the well-known Ḥanbalī theologian and jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who is said to have responded instantly with a 184-verse (...) poem (of which 125 verses are extant). This article provides an analysis of Ibn Taymiyya’s stance on the question of how it can be said that God is just in predetermining and judging human actions and compares it to that of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī. The article ends with the first full translation of the versified question and Ibn Taymiyya’s response into a European language. Both thinkers depart from similar positions, insofar as both deny human free will. However, while Ibn Taymiyya tries to show that the fact that God will hold human beings accountable for their predetermined actions does not go against our inborn sense of justice, ar-Rāzī adduces that fact as part of his strategy to show that God’s actions cannot be subject to rational moral assessment, as they would otherwise have to be declared as senseless and even harmful. (shrink)

opinionated review of some of the recent work on the phenomenal unity of consciousness.

The goal of this paper is to raise a few questions about Bayne s mereological account of the unity of consciousness. In Section 1, I raise a few clarificatory questions about the account and the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. In Sections 2 and 3, I offer an alternative view of unity of consciousness and contrast it with Bayne's view. I call this view the connectivity account. These sections prepare the ground for the main question of this article: why (...) should we prefer Bayne's mereological view to the connectivity view? (shrink)

An important conceptual shift can be discerned within contemporary philosophy of perception. Whereas proponents of the idea that perceptual experience is contentful used to relate perceptual content to truth conditions, authors nowadays prefer to think of perception as evaluable for accuracy. This transition from truth to accuracy becomes particularly clear in the influential work of Susanna Siegel. Importantly, Siegel actually provides an extensive argument for this shift. Yet this article argues that this transition from truth to accuracy conditions is ill‐motivated, (...) confused and pernicious for the so‐called Content View, the view that all experience has truth or accuracy evaluable content. (shrink)

It is hypothesized that iron from biological tissues, liberated during decay, may have played a role in inhibiting loss of anatomical information during fossilization of extinct organisms. Most tissues in the animal kingdom contain iron in different forms. A widely distributed iron‐bearing molecule is ferritin, a globular protein that contains iron crystallites in the form of ferrihydrite minerals. Iron concentrations in ferritin are high and ferrihydrites are extremely reactive. When ancient animals are decaying on the sea floor under anoxic environmental (...) conditions, ferrihydrites may initialize the selective replication of some tissues in pyrite FeS2. This model explains why some labile tissues are preserved, while other more resistant structures decay and are absent in many fossils. A major implication of this hypothesis is that structures described as brains in Cambrian arthropods are not fossilization artifacts, but are instead a source of information on anatomical evolution at the dawn of complex animal life. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page W4-W6.

Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors such as the beliefs, desires, goals, and the expectations (...) of the perceiver. Proponents of the encapsulation thesis, however, often argue that, when correctly interpreted, these psychological findings are compatible with the thesis. In our view, the debate over the significance and the correct interpretation of these psychological findings has reached an impasse. We hold that this impasse is due to the methodological limitations over psychophysical experiments, and it is very unlikely that such experiments, on their own, could yield results that would settle the debate. After defending this claim, we argue that integrating data from cognitive neuroscience resolves the debate in favor of those who deny the encapsulation thesis. (shrink)

Hox proteins are part of the conserved superfamily of homeodomain‐containing transcription factors and play fundamental roles in shaping animal body plans in development and evolution. However, molecular mechanisms underlying their diverse and specific biological functions remain largely enigmatic. Here, we have analyzed Hox sequences from the main evolutionary branches of the Bilateria group. We have found that four classes of Hox protein signatures exist, which together provide sufficient support to explain how different Hox proteins differ in their control and function. (...) The homeodomain and its surrounding sequences accumulate nearly all signatures, constituting an extended module where most of the information distinguishing Hox proteins is concentrated. Only a small fraction of these signatures has been investigated at the functional level, but these show that approaches relying on Hox protein alterations still have a large potential for deciphering molecular mechanisms of Hox differential control. (shrink)

The author examines the fanatical type of mentality in its secular and religious forms based on the analysis of the works of Gabriel Marcel and Karen Armstrong. The origins of the phenomenon of fanaticism are found in the basic foundations of Modern culture as the time of the replacement of myth by logos (Armstrong) and the domination of the abstract spirit (Marcel). The understanding of the foundations of fanaticism as a broad phenomenon undertaken by the French philosopher and the British (...) religious scholar is associated with interpretations of the concept of the transcendent. Although the socio-spiritual situation in which Marcel and Armstrong work is different, their conclusions generally coincide and become especially relevant today, when the world is on the verge of a new world war. The author briefly formulates definitions of some basic categories of G. Marcel's philosophy - "philosophical experience", "first reflection", "second reflection", "fanaticized consciousness", "disparity", "abstraction", "abstract spirit", "collective violence", "property", "being", "ideologue", "intersubjectivity", "identity", etc. Gabriel Marcel's reflection on the fundamental difference between a true believer and a religious fanatic is discussed, despite the fact that both are spoken on behalf of absolute values. The will to refuse to "question" the object of one's faith presupposes immunity to the arguments of critical thinking, which by definition would be intended to act as a kind of antidote to fanaticism as a special type of radical consciousness. The basis of fanaticism turns out to be insensitivity to what is the fanatic's idefix, while modern fanatics, in contrast to the ordinary idea of them, are often well-educated people. This is a decentered consciousness dominated by "carnal thought". Such an idea may be called the idea of equality or justice, but it is not actually a thought born from experience and sympathy for people. (shrink)

Einleitung -- al-Fārābī -- Nizām al-Mulik -- Ibn Taymiyya -- Ibn Khaldūn -- Afghānī, ʻAbduh, Riḍā und ʻAbd al-Rāziq -- Muḥammad Iqbāl -- Esad Bey -- Ḥasan al-Bannā -- Sayyid Quṭb -- Muḥammad Asad -- Khomeini -- Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zaid -- Elijah Muḥammad -- Qaraḍāwī.

Such obvious truth must be made even more obvious, and this is exactly what Samir Selmanovic is doing for all of us and for the future of humanity.

Here, for the first time, development studies encounters the set of ideas popularly known as 'Chaos Theory'. Samir Rihani applies to the processes of economic development, ideas from complex adaptive systems like uncertainty, complexity, and unpredictability. Rihani examines various aspects of the development process - including the World Bank, debt, and the struggle against poverty - and demonstrates the limitations of fundamentally linear thinking in an essentially non-linear world.

The complex world of thought and sensitivity in the sphere of contemporary art has entailed the revision and exclusion of disciplines aimed at providing a model to explain and conceptualize reality. Art history, as one such discipline, has had many of its contributions questioned from Gombrich’s epistemological reformulation to the postmodern discourses, which extol the death of the author, the post-structuralist idea of tradition as a textual phenomenon, and the declaration of the death of history as a consequence of the (...) hybridization of disciplines and of other bran- ches of human knowledge. Nevertheless, it can be demonstrated that proposals as those by Julius von Schlosser and Giulio Carlo Argan enclose reflections and methodological aspects which can help us face the task of understanding and visualizing the mediating role of historians in the culture of sensitivity, and the art modulations that have resulted from the blows of history and that, in turn, have shaped both art and art history into what they are or can be to us today. (shrink)

We propose a new relevance sensitive model for representing and revising belief structures, which relies on a notion of partial language splitting and tolerates some amount of inconsistency while retaining classical logic. The model preserves an agent's ability to answer queries in a coherent way using Belnap's four-valued logic. Axioms analogous to the AGM axioms hold for this new model. The distinction between implicit and explicit beliefs is represented and psychologically plausible, computationally tractable procedures for query answering and belief..

Several authors have recently suggested that classic psychedelics might be safe and effective agents of moral enhancement. This raises the question: can we learn anything interesting about the nature of moral experience from a close examination of transformative psychedelic experiences? The interdisciplinary enterprise of philosophical psychopathology attempts to learn about the structure and function of the “ordinary” mind by studying the radically altered mind. By analogy, in this chapter we argue that we can gain knowledge about the everyday moral life (...) by studying extraordinary experiences of altered moral cognition and experience. We focus on a specific class of cases: experiences of forgiveness induced by psychedelics. We argue that close attention to such experiences reveals the importance of thought/emotion coherence and dissonance in the moral life and vindicates some heterodox ideas about moral phenomenology and psychology. (shrink)

The separation of Avicenna between Essence and Existence influenced logic and Arab and Muslim logicians in the Middle Ages among them Ibn al-Nafīs (1208-1288). Under this influence he contributed to the development of logic and especially the theory of the universal term. By means of the consequences of this analysis:-It has become possible to make a distinction between abstract concepts and formal concepts independent of any sensible reality, and hence the questioning of Aristotelian categories, that is to say the ability (...) to conceive for Ibn al-Nafīs like Avicenna, subjects and predicates which are not necessarily words expressing or belonging to one of the Aristotelian categories.-The analysis of the universal proposition as a conditional proposition, which made easier the distinction between absolute proposition which has no existential implication, and the other which differ from the first by an affirmation of explicit existence. (shrink)

This is a major work of Islamic mysticism by the great thirteenth-century Persian poet, Farid al-Din Attar. Translated by A J Arberry, Attar’s work and thought is set in perspective in a substantial introduction.

Contrairement à l’ironie polémique et insidieuse des Sophistes, celle de Socrate est plutôt interrogeante, désirante et ex-centrique, toujours en quête de connaissance vraie. Le fameux «je sais que je ne sais rien» devient chez lui un outil de défigement de la pensée prisonnière des «systèmes compacts», mais, aussi le meilleur remède contre les pseudo-vérités religieuses et idéologiques.