Cycling in traffic requires a combination of motor and perceptual skills while interacting with a dynamic and fast-changing environment. The inferior perceptual-motor skills in individuals with developmental coordination disorder may put them at a higher risk for accidents. A key skill to navigate in traffic is to quickly detect hazardous situations. This perceptual-cognitive skill was investigated in young adults with DCD using simulated traffic situations in a hazard perception test in cycling. Nine individuals with DCD and nine typically developing individuals (...) participated in the study and completed the test while their gaze was tracked using a remote eye tracking device. A questionnaire was used to determine cycling experience and the perception of cycling and anticipation skill in traffic. Despite a longer period to master the motor skill of cycling, individuals with DCD reported to be able to safely cycle in traffic around the same age as TD young adults. In the hazard perception test, individuals with DCD fixated the hazards later, less frequently and for a shorter duration than the TD participants, however, the participants with DCD did not wait longer to react to the hazard than the TD participants. Interestingly, individuals with DCD rated the traffic situations in the test as significantly more dangerous than the TD participants. In conclusion, the differences exposed in the hazard perception test may imply an increased risk of accidents in individuals with DCD. In further research and practice it is recommended that both the motor and the perceptual aspects of cycling are addressed. (shrink)

Pragmatic genealogies seek to explain ideas by regarding them, primarily, not as answers to philosophical questions, but as practical solutions to practical problems. Here I argue that pragmatic genealogies can inform the formation of philosophical canons. But the rationale for resorting to genealogy in this connection is not the familiar one that genealogy renders the concepts of the present intelligible by relating them to the concerns of the past—the claim is rather the reverse one, that genealogy renders the concepts of (...) the past intelligible by relating them to the concerns of the present: past thinkers can be made to speak to us by revealing how their ideas tie in with our concerns, in the sense of helping us to remedy practical problems we still face in some form. (shrink)

Philosophy strives to give us a firmer hold on our concepts. But what about their hold on us? Why place ourselves under the sway of a concept and grant it the authority to shape our thought and conduct? Another conceptualization would carry different implications. What makes one way of thinking better than another? This book develops a framework for concept appraisal. Its guiding idea is that to question the authority of concepts is to ask for reasons of a special kind: (...) reasons for concept use, which tell us which concepts to adopt, adhere to, or abandon, thereby shoring up—or undercutting—the reasons for action and belief that guide our deliberations. Traditionally, reasons for concept use have been sought either in timeless rational foundations or in concepts’ inherent virtues, such as precision and consistency. Against this, the book advances two main claims: that we find reasons for concept use in the conceptual needs we discover when we critically distance ourselves from a concept by viewing it from the autoethnographic stance; and that sometimes, concepts that conflict, or exhibit other vices such as vagueness or superficiality, are just what we need. By considering not what concepts are absolutely best, but what concepts we now need, we can reconcile ourselves to the contingency of our concepts, determine the proper place of efforts to tidy up thought, and adjudicate between competing conceptions of things,—even things as contested as liberty or free will. A needs-based approach separates helpful clarification from hobbling tidy-mindedness, and authoritative definition from conceptual gerrymandering. (shrink)

Far from being indiscriminately critical of the ideas he associated with the morality system, Bernard Williams offered vindicatory explanations of its crucial building blocks, such as the moral/non-moral distinction, the idea of obligation, the voluntary/involuntary distinction, and the practice of blame. The rationale for these concessive moves, I argue, is that understanding what these ideas do for us when they are not in the service of the system is just as important to leading us out of the system as the (...) critique of that system. I then show how regarding the aspiration to shelter life from luck as the system’s organizing ambition explains why the system elaborates and combines these building blocks in the way it does. Finally, I argue that the ultimate problem with the resulting construction is its frictionless purity. It robs valuable concepts of their grip on the world we live in, and, by insisting on purity from contingency, threatens to issue in nihilism about value and scepticism about agency. (shrink)

This chapter argues that several aspects of Bernard Williams’s style, methodology, and metaphilosophy can be read as evolving dialectically out of Wittgenstein’s own. After considering Wittgenstein as a stylistic influence on Williams, especially as regards ideals of clarity, precision, and depth, Williams’s methodological debt to Wittgenstein is examined, in particular his anthropological interest in thick concepts and their point. The chapter then turns to Williams’s explicit association, in the 1990s, with a certain form of Wittgensteinianism, which he called ‘Left Wittgensteinianism’. (...) It is shown how this is not a sudden conversion, but the direct product of Williams’s longstanding critical engagement with Wittgenstein’s methodology and metaphilosophy: Williams arrives at this position by envisaging a Wittgensteinianism that thinks in concrete sociohistorical terms, embraces genuine explanation, and relinquishes its insistence on the purity of philosophy. When properly understood, moreover, this critique turns out to be continuous with Williams’s advocacy of a conception of philosophy as a humanistic discipline. Finally, it is shown that Williams inherits from Wittgenstein a certain understanding of how philosophy can help us to live, in particular the therapeutic ambition to liberate us from distortions in our self-understanding by assembling reminders. (shrink)

In recent decades, many researchers set out to draw links between Western anarchism and ancient Chinese Daoism. The present work aims at adding to this ongoing debate by answering the question of whether the Guodian _Laozi_’s 郭店老子 sayings can be labelled as “anarchism.” It defends the claim that the text endorses a unique kind of anarchist theory based on a distinctive theory of political authority grounded in Daoist moral commitments. To do so, this essay first offers an overview of the (...) scholarly debate surrounding this topic. Second, it provides an account of the necessary and sufficient feature any theory must secure in order to be argued to be anarchist, as well as a framework that underlines potential differences between various anarchist theories. Third, a rigorous textual analysis of the Guodian Laozi is conducted to extrapolate its political advice, before analyzing it in light of the anarchist framework mentioned above. This essay concludes with an assessment of several objections that may be raised against its claims. (shrink)

Qu'entendons-nous par "bonheur"? Dépend-il de nos gènes, de la chance, de notre sensibilité? Est-ce un état durable ou une suite de plaisirs fugaces? N'est-il que subjectif? Faut-il le rechercher? Peut-on le cultiver? Souffrance et bonheur peuvent-ils coexister? Pour tenter de répondre à ces questions, Frédéric Lenoir propose un voyage philosophique, joyeux et plein de saveurs. Une promenade stimulante en compagnie des grands sages d'Orient et d'Occident. Où l'on traversera le jardin des plaisirs avec Epicure. Où l'on entendra raisonner le (...) rire de Montaigne et de Tchouang-tseu. Où l'on croisera le sourire paisible du Bouddha et d'Epictète. Où l'on goûtera à la joie de Spinoza et d'Etty Hillesum. Un cheminement vivant, ponctué d'exemples concrets et des dernières découvertes des neurosciences, pour nous aider à vivre mieux. (shrink)

Buddhism was not really known in the West until a little more than 150 years ago. Although since the thirteenth century there had been numerous contacts with local Buddhist traditions, the travellers and missionaries of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had not yet brought to light the history of Buddhism and its unity across this immense diversity of worship and doctrine, disseminated through most of the countries of Asia. Of course, since the seventeenth century some Europeans had guessed at (...) the Indian origin of the Buddha and they succeeded in pinning down his historical existence after a fashion. In 1691 and 1693 Simon de la Loubère, Louis XIV's envoy at the court of the king of Siam, published remarkable research which established the possibility of a link between the different regions of Siam, Ceylon, Japan and China and conjured up the possible existence of a single founder long before Christ. But this far too isolated knowledge had scarcely any impact in Europe. It was only with the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784 that orientalism was to enjoy a rapid and decisive expansion. The word ‘Buddhism’ appeared from the 1820s onwards, and with it the first conceptualization of a tree with many branchings. But it was not until the publication, in 1844, of Eugène Burnouf's magisterial Introduction l'histoire du buddhisme indien, that more detailed knowledge became available, thanks to a critical scrutiny of the most varied sources. The works of the French scholar and of other pioneers in Buddhist studies - mainly Alexander Csoma de Koros and Edmond Foucaux on Tibet, Jean-Pierre Abel-Remusat and Stanislas Julien on China, Christian Lassen and Spence Hardy on Ceylon - were to give rise to a tremendous craze for Buddhism in Europe. Since then there has been no break in the successive waves disseminating it right up to the present day, when the majority of Western countries appear to be so receptive to the message of the Buddha that for some years the media have been insistently questioning the reasons for this ‘Buddhist wave’. (shrink)

Practical and conceptual, the Responsible Research and Innovation set of books contributes to the clarification of this new requirement for all sciences and technological innovation. It covers the multiple and international responsibilities, by using various philosophical resources, mostly discussing the following topics: ethics, contingency, normative economy, freedom, corporate social responsibility (CSR), participative technological evaluation, sustainable development, geoengineering, the precautionary principle, standards, interdisciplinarity, and climate management. The ethics of efficiency must be considered with regard to the logic of action or to (...) economic, political, legal or scientific systems. This book presents a question on the central theme of responsible research and innovation (RRI), which has an ethical influence on effective logics. The issue is to question the opportunity and modularities of an ethical effective influence on the logics of efficiency of research and innovation. From the distinction of efficiency and effectiveness, lies the problem of efficacy, the ethical accord between the two. Thus appears the possibility of taking effective responsibility with respect to systematic injustices potentially linked to this efficiency. This book proposes categories to understand the ethical implications of research and innovation processes, under the aspect of their efficacy. (shrink)

Un ensemble de renouvellements paradigmatiques profonds ont marqué le champ académique depuis une vingtaine d'années. Comment les Sciences du sport ont-elles fait face à ces innovations épistémologiques? Les ont-elles prises en compte ou négligées? Suivant quelles modalités? Peut-on distinguer des appropriations qui seraient, suivant les cas, rhétoriques, métaphoriques, abusives, fécondes voire créatives? La mise en oeuvre des programmes innovants par les STAPS enrichit-elle en retour les espaces académiques qui les avaient originellement produits? Comment les traditions théoriques réagissent-elles à l'introduction des (...) points de vue novateurs? Suivant quelles voies se réalise la cohabitation entre traditions et innovations? Epistémologues et chercheurs, au moyen d'études de cas et de mises en perspectives transversales, croisent leurs regards pour éclairer ces problématiques complémentaires. Celles-ci permettent enfin d'interroger l'identité, épistémique et sociale, du champ STAPS. (shrink)

A brief history of the relations between humans and animals -- Out of sight, out of mind -- Everybody loses: the effects of industrial breeding and meat eating on poverty, the environment and health -- The real face of industrial animal breeding -- Sorry excuses -- The continuum of life -- The mass killing of animals--genocide versus zoocide -- A little side trip into the realm of moral judgment -- The dilemma of animal experimentation -- Illegal trade in wildlife -- (...) Animals as objects of entertainment -- Animal rights, human obligations -- An appeal to reason and to human kindness. (shrink)

Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? This book presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts (...) across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-nature stories of David Hume and the early genealogies of Friedrich Nietzsche to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, the book offers a systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us determine whether and when our ideas are worth having. (shrink)

This paper situates Wittgenstein in what is known as the causalism/anti-causalism debate in the philosophy of mind and action and reconstructs his arguments to the effect that reasons are not a species of causes. On the one hand, the paper aims to reinvigorate the question of what these arguments are by offering a historical sketch of the debate showing that Wittgenstein's arguments were overshadowed by those of the people he influenced, and that he came to be seen as an anti-causalist (...) for reasons that are in large part extraneous to his thought. On the other hand, the paper aims to recover the arguments scattered in Wittgenstein's own writings by detailing and defending three lines of argument distinguishing reasons from causes. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein's arguments differ from those of his immediate successors; that he anticipates current anti-psychologistic trends; and that he is perhaps closer to Davidson than historical dialectics suggest. (shrink)

Plotin (205-270) est le premier des philosophes néoplatoniciens aussi bien d'un point de vue chronologique que par son importance. Auteur de 54 traités regroupés en six Ennéades ("neuvaines"), il consacra l'un d'eux, le traité 16 (Ennéade I, 9), très bref, à la question du suicide. Dans cet ouvrage Plotin se demande si et quand le suicide peut être un choix légitime. Le commentaire qui accompagne la traduction de ce traité s'efforce de l'éclairer même pour un lecteur qui ne connaîtrait rien (...) de la pensée de son auteur, et de déployer les différentes problématiques, issues de la pensée antique et en particulier platonicienne et stoïcienne, dans lesquelles s'inscrit l'analyse de Plotin."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Who would have thought twenty-five years ago that the term “bioethics,” a neologism coined by an American biologist, would have met with such success, becoming one of the cornerstones of philosophical and juridical reflection at the end of the twentieth century? For it was in 1970 that the biologist and oncologist Van Rensalear Potter published his book, Bioethics, Science of Survival.

In response to a mandate conferred on the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of UNESCO in November 1993, the IBC has drafted a "universal declaration on the human genome and human rights," which will be considered by the General Conference of UNESCO in November 1997. This article discusses the development of the document and provides the text of the "revised preliminary draft" of the declaration.

Winner of the Moonbeam Children's Animals/Pets Non-Fiction Gold Medal! A story about the fundamental connection between animals and people and how we can treat all of Earth's creatures with compassion and empathy. Furry polar bears, playful sea otters, slow sloths, prickly porcupines, and slimy snakes are just a few of the many animals we share our world with. And even though we might not look the same or have the same needs as our animal neighbors, we have more in common (...) with them than we might think. Our Animal Neighbors introduces children to the importance of treating all animals with the care and compassion they deserve. We all want to experience love, safety, and respect and this book is the first step to instilling those values at an early age. This planet is our home, and we should all be free to live a prosperous life regardless of whether we have hands, hooves, scales, or fur. “A serious message delivered with humor, simplicity, and charm makes this book an excellent purchase for families that value open-ended discussions. Also a good resource for classrooms and libraries that welcome diverse opinions and points of view.”—School Library Journal. (shrink)

In hoeverre kan een literair werk bijdragen tot de ethische ontwikkeling van zijn lezers, of juist niet? Behalve een genuanceerd antwoord op deze vraag, wil dit boek premissen bieden voor een methode om de ethische inslag van een literair werk aan het licht te brengen. Dat de romans van de Nederlandse schrijver Frans Kellendonk (1951-1990) een goede casus vormen om dieper op deze problematiek in te gaan, ligt voor de hand. Kellendonk staat immers bekend als een van de meest controversiële (...) Nederlandse auteurs van het einde van de twintigste eeuw. Vandaag wordt hij vooral beschouwd als een soort profeet van het hedendaagse scepticisme omtrent de multiculturele samenleving. Zijn laatste roman, 'Mystiek lichaam' (1986), zorgde bijvoorbeeld voor een geruchtmakende ideologische rel, terwijl er volgens sommige critici geen vuiltje aan de lucht was. Kellendonks romans stellen de eenduidige lectuur ervan steevast op de proef. - [provided by publisher]. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is thought to face an ‘implementation challenge’: the challenge of securing uptake of engineered concepts. But is the fact that implementation is challenging really a defect to be overcome? What kind of picture of political life would be implied by making engineering easy to implement? We contend that the ambition to obviate the implementation challenge goes against the very idea of liberal democratic politics. On the picture we draw, the implementation challenge can be overcome by institutionalizing control over (...) conceptual uptake, and there are contexts—such as professions that depend on coordinated conceptual innovation—in which there are good reasons to institutionalize control in this fashion. But the liberal fear of this power to control conceptual uptake ending up in the wrong hands, combined with the democratic demand for freedom of thought as a precondition of genuine consent, yields a liberal democratic rationale for keeping implementation challenging. (shrink)

Knowledge of the structure of ancestral genomes provides the basis of a new framework to better represent and interpret results from genomic and evolutionary studies. Because these ancestors lived tens of hundreds of million years ago, this knowledge will inevitably take the form of abstract representations, reconstructed on the basis both of experimental evidence collected on extant genomes and of our understanding of evolutionary processes. This is the field of Paleogenomics, a young discipline that is providing an increasingly precise picture (...) of our ancestral vertebrate genomes based on cytogenetic data, genome sequences and new algorithmic developments. Many recent studies have focused on the ancestral placental mammal and teleost fish genomes, although the outlines of even more distant pre‐vertebrate ancestors are being reported. BioEssays 30:122–134, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Recent reasoning accounts suggest that people can process elementary logical principles intuitively. These controversial “logical intuitions” are believed to result from a learning process in which developing reasoners automatize their application. To verify this automatization hypothesis, we contrasted the reasoning performance of younger (7th grade) and older (12th grade) reasoners with a two-response paradigm. Participants initially responded with the first intuitive response that came to mind and subsequently were allowed to deliberate on classic “bias” problems (base-rate problems and syllogisms). Results (...) showed that in addition to showing less deliberate correction of an initial erroneous response, younger reasoners were specifically less likely to generate the correct response from the outset. The findings lend credence to the role of a developmental automatization process and indicate that developmental improvements in reasoning accuracy are at least partially driven by an improvement in the accuracy of our intuitions. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify a central problem for conceptual engineering: the problem of showing concept-users why they should recognise the authority of the concepts advocated by engineers. I argue that this authority problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to the increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues of engineered concepts. Outside contexts in which we anyway already aim to realise theoretical virtues, solving the authority problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of (...) concepts. But this then presents us with the problem of how to specify a concept’s function. I argue that extant solutions to this function specification problem are unsatisfactory for engineering purposes, because the functions they identify fail to reliably bestow authority on concepts, and hence fail to solve the authority problem. What is required is an authoritative notion of conceptual function: an account of the functions of concepts which simultaneously shows why concepts fulfilling such functions should be recognised as having authority. I offer an account that meets this combination of demands by specifying the functions of concepts in terms of how they tie in with our present concerns. (shrink)

Bernard Williams thought that philosophy should address real human concerns felt beyond academic philosophy. But what wider concerns are addressed by Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, a book he introduces as being ‘principally about how things are in moral philosophy’? In this article, we argue that Williams responded to the concerns of his day indirectly, refraining from explicitly claiming wider cultural relevance, but hinting at it in the pair of epigraphs that opens the main text. This was Williams’s solution (...) to what he perceived as the stylistic problem of how to pursue philosophy as cultural critique. Taking the epigraphs as interpretative keys to the wider resonances of the book, we show how they reveal Williams’s philosophical concerns – with the primacy of character over method, the obligation to follow orders, and the possibility of combining truth, truthfulness, and a meaningful life in a disillusioned world – to be recognisably rooted in the cultural concerns of post-war Britain. In the light of its epigraphs, the book emerges as the critique of a philosophical tradition’s inadequacies to the special difficulties of its cultural moment. (shrink)

Bernard Williams articulated his later political philosophy notably in response to Ronald Dworkin, who, striving for coherence or integrity among our political concepts, sought to immunize the concepts of liberty and equality against conflict. Williams, doubtful that we either could or should eliminate the conflict, resisted the pursuit of conceptual integrity. Here, I reconstruct this Dworkin–Williams debate with an eye to drawing out ideas of ongoing philosophical and political importance. The debate not only exemplifies Williams's political realism and its connection (...) to his critique of the morality system. It also illustrates the virtues and hazards of contemporary efforts to ameliorate or engineer our concepts; it indicates what political philosophy might look to in appraising political concepts; it adverts to the different needs these concepts have to meet if they are to sustain a politics of pluralism, deal with polarization, and secure the consent of those who end up on the losing side of political decisions; and it presents us with two starkly contrasting conceptions of politics itself, of the place of political values within it, and of our prospects of reducing the uncomfortably conflictual character of those values through philosophy. (shrink)

Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have?? To answer this question, I compare the method of pragmatic genealogy advocated by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker—a method whose singular combination of fictionalising and historicising has met with suspicion—with the simpler method of paradigm-based explanation. Fricker herself has recently moved towards paradigm-based explanation, arguing that it is (...) a more perspicuous way of reaping the same explanatory pay-off as pragmatic genealogy while dispensing with its fictionalising and historicising. My aim is to determine when and why the reverse movement from paradigm-based explanation to pragmatic genealogy remains warranted. I argue that the fictionalising and historicising of pragmatic genealogy is well motivated, and I outline three ways in which the method earns its keep: by successfully handling historically inflected practices which paradigm-based explanation cannot handle; by revealing and arguing for connections to generic needs we might otherwise miss; and by providing comprehensive views of practices that place and relate the respects in which they serve both generic and local needs. (shrink)

Cernée par la tentation autoritaire, la démocratie paraît fragilisée. Brandie comme un étendard, la promesse d'un? gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple, pour le peuple - n'a, semble-t-il, pas été véritablement tenue. La classe politique paraît souvent plus soucieuse de sa propre survie que du bien commun, la démocratie représentative ne serait-elle qu'un leurre? Partout dans le monde, de nouveaux mouvements citoyens cherchent à mettre en oeuvre une démocratie horizontale. En déconstruisant les mécanismes et les croyances qui régissent notre vision (...) du pouvoir, ce texte propose de refonder rigoureusement le concept de démocratie réelle."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Désirer vivre, ce n'est pas simplement être en vie. C'est nous laisser entraîner par l'élan vital qui nous conduit à créer, à aimer, à nous dépasser. C'est cultiver la puissance du désir qui est le moteur de nos existences. Pourtant, au quotidien, nous ressentons de nombreuses limitations - 'Je ne suis pas capable', 'C'est trop risqué', 'Ce n'est pas pour toi' - qui nous inhibent. Nous sommes souvent aussi prisonniers des pulsions de notre cerveau primaire, le striatum, et de la (...) propagande consumériste qui nous poussent à acquérir toujours plus. Comment cultiver la force du désir sans tomber dans le piège de l'insatisfaction permanente ou du mimétisme social? Comment développer notre puissance vitale sans nous autocensurer? Comment apprendre à orienter nos désirs vers des choses, des activités ou des personnes qui nous font grandir et nous mettent dans la joie? De Platon à René Girard en passant par Bouddha, Aristote, Épicure, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Jung ou Bergson, Frédéric Lenoir revisite les grands penseurs du désir pour nous proposer un livre lucide et vibrant, au cœur de nos problématiques les plus actuelles. Un ouvrage accessible à tous, qui aide non seulement à vivre, mais à vivre aux éclats"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Banni de la communauté juive à 23 ans pour hérésie, Baruch Spinoza décide de consacrer sa vie à la philosophie. Son objectif? Découvrir un bien véritable qui lui "procurerait pour l'éternité la jouissance d'une joie suprême et incessante". Au cours des vingt années qui lui restent à vivre, Spinoza édifie une oeuvre révolutionnaire. Comment cet homme a-t-il pu, en plein XVIIe siècle, être le précurseur des Lumières et de nos démocraties modernes? Le pionnier d'une lecture historique et critique de la (...) Bible? Le fondateur de la psychologie des profondeurs? L'initiateur de la philologie, de la sociologie et de l'éthologie? Et surtout, l'inventeur d'une philosophie fondée sur le désir et la joie, qui bouleverse notre conception de Dieu, de la morale et du bonheur? À bien des égards, Spinoza est non seulement très en avance sur son temps, mais aussi sur le nôtre. C'est ce que j'appelle le "miracle" Spinoza. Frédéric Lenoir raconte la vie édifiante de Spinoza que Goethe, Nietzsche, Freud ou Einstein considéraient comme le plus grand des philosophes. Il rend accessible sa pensée foisonnante et livre un traité philosophique d'émancipation, qui se lit presque comme un thriller tant on a envie de connaître l'étape suivante et d'atteindre la joie suprême. Une lecture qui donne une force et une énergie incroyables."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams sought to defend the value of truth by giving a vindicatory genealogy revealing its instrumental value. But what separates Williams’s instrumental vindication from the indirect utilitarianism of which he was a critic? And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history? In this paper, I propose to resolve these puzzles by reading Williams as a type of pragmatist and his genealogy (...) as a pragmatic genealogy. On this basis, I show just in what sense Williams’s genealogy can by itself yield reasons to cultivate a sense of the value of truth. Using various criticisms of Williams’s genealogical method as a foil, I then develop an understanding of pragmatic genealogy which reveals it to be uniquely suited to dealing with practices exhibiting what I call self-effacing functionality—practices that are functional only insofar as and because we do not engage in them for their functionality. I conclude with an assessment of the wider significance of Williams’s genealogy for his own oeuvre and for further genealogical inquiry. (shrink)

Première partie. De la question des mondes possibles aux présuppositions de la méta-éthique -- Deuxième partie. Différenciation logique et connaissance morale -- Troisième partie. Un paradigme pour penser les droits.

While Lee and Schwarz propose grounded procedures of separation as an explanation for physical cleansing in various domains (e.g., washing one's hands), we suggest that separation can also account for behavioral cleansing aimed at washing consciences and polishing reputations. We discuss this extension in terms of degrees of behavioral cleansing, motivations, and intentions behind cleansing, and social settings.

La 4e de couverture indique :"Farouche adversaire de l'absolutisme, défenseur de la tolérance religieuse, père fondateur du libéralisme, John Locke (1632-1704) est une figure canonique de l'histoire de la pensée politique européenne. Il a forgé son oeuvre au coeur même des batailles politiques qui agitaient l'Angleterre de la fin du XVII ème siècle et qui menèrent à la Glorieuse Révolution de 1688. Ce que l'on sait moins, c'est que Locke a également eu une très riche carrière coloniale au service de (...) l'expansion anglaise en Amérique. Sa philosophie constitue le moment inaugural d'une histoire au cours de laquelle allaient être inextricablement noués libéralisme et colonialisme, construction étatique et formation impériale. Elle révèle également les relations intimes qui ont uni épistémologie et politique depuis la découverte du Nouveau Monde. L'Amérique de John Locke entend mettre en évidence l'émergence d'une géopolitique de la connaissance avec laquelle nous sommes encore loin d'avoir fini.". (shrink)

This paper argues that Nietzsche is a critic of just the kind of genealogical debunking he is popularly associated with. We begin by showing that interpretations of Nietzsche which see him as engaging in genealogical debunking turn him into an advocate of nihilism, for on his own premises, any truthful genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most of his contemporaries deem objectionable origins and thus license global genealogical debunking. To escape nihilism and make room for naturalism (...) without indiscriminate subversion, we then argue, Nietzsche targets the way of thinking about values that permits genealogical debunking: far from trying to subvert values simply by uncovering their origins, Nietzsche is actively criticising genealogical debunking thus understood. Finally, we draw out the consequences of our reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision. (shrink)

Is the idea of the voluntary important? Those who think so tend to regard it as an idea that can be metaphysically deepened through a theory about voluntary action, while those who think it a superficial idea that cannot coherently be deepened tend to neglect it as unimportant. Parting company with both camps, I argue that the idea of the voluntary is at once important and superficial—it is an essentially superficial notion that performs important functions, but can only perform them (...) if we refrain from deepening it. After elaborating the contrast between superficial and deepened ideas of the voluntary, I identify the important functions that the superficial idea performs in relation to demands for fairness and freedom. I then suggest that theories trying to deepen the idea exemplify a problematic moralization of psychology—they warp psychological ideas to ensure that moral demands can be met. I offer a three-tier model of the problematic dynamics this creates, and show why the pressure to deepen the idea should be resisted. On this basis, I take stock of what an idea of the voluntary worth having should look like, and what residual tensions with moral ideas this leaves us with. (shrink)

If ethical reflection on which concepts to use has an avatar, it must be Nietzsche, who took more seriously than most the question of what concepts one should live by, and regarded many of our inherited concepts as deeply problematic. Moreover, his eschewal of traditional attempts to derive the one right set of concepts from timeless rational foundations renders his conceptual ethics strikingly modern, raising the prospect of a Nietzschean alternative to Wittgensteinian non-foundationalism. Yet Nietzsche appears to engage in two (...) seemingly contrary modes of concept evaluation: one looks to concepts’ effects, the other to what concepts express. I offer an account of the expressive character of concepts which unifies these two modes and accounts for Nietzsche’s seemingly bifurcating interests. His fundamental concern is with the effects concepts are likely to have going forward, and it is precisely this concern that motivates his preoccupation with what concepts express. He evaluates concepts by asking for whom they have a point, working back from a concept via the need it fills to the conditions that engender that need and thereby render the concept pointful. For a concept to be pointful is for it to serve the concerns of its users through its effects. But even when it is not pointful, a concept expresses the presuppositions of its pointfulness, which we can work back to by asking who would have need of such a concept. What emerges is a powerful approach to conceptual ethics that looks beyond the formal virtues and vices of concepts at the presuppositions we buy into by using them. (shrink)

A huge bestseller in Europe, Frederic Lenoir’s Happiness is an exciting journey that examines how history’s greatest philosophers and religious figures have answered life’s most fundamental question: What is happiness and how do I achieve it? From the ancient Greeks on—from Aristotle, Plato, and Chuang Tzu to the Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad; from Voltaire, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer to Kant, Freud, and even modern neuroscientists—Lenoir considers the idea that true and lasting happiness is indeed possible. In clear language, (...) class='Hi'>Lenoir concisely surveys what the greatest thinkers of all time have had to say on the subject, and, with charming prose, raises provocative questions: · Do we have a duty to be happy? · Is there a connection between individual and collective happiness? · Is happiness contagious? · Is there a difference between pleasure and happiness? · Can unhappiness and happiness coexist? · Does our happiness depend on our luck? Understanding how civilization’s best minds have answered those questions, Lenoir suggests, not only makes for a fascinating reading experience, but also provides a way for us to see us how happiness, that most elusive of feelings, is attainable in our own lives. (shrink)