Ulysse n'est pas un héros comme les autres. On peut considérer que son voyage retour est un voyage initiatique, et comparer les douze épreuves qu'il subit aux douze travaux d'Héraclès. Mais la comparaison s'arrête là, et nous découvrons qu'Ulysse est d'abord un homme qui refuse l'immortalité qui lui est offerte. Homère aurai-il voulu dépeindre un homme nouveau, une sorte de surhomme?

Les mots nous trompent. Ils ne sont pas l'exacte représentation des objets qu'ils remplacent. Que dire de tout ce qui est intuitif? La vérité ne peut pas se confondre avec le comment de la vie. La mort est un mot qu'il faut reconsidérer, de même que le silence souvent préférable au cri. Entre l'homme et l'Absolu se situent les autres et le moi oublie trop que ce sont les mots qui l'ont construit.

Depuis des millénaires l'homme est à la recherche de ses origines. Hésiode montre que l'ordre doit remplacer le chaos et sa Théogonie est une première analyse d'un changement nécessaire. Zeus fait la guerre contre les manifestations du Chaos afin d'imposer sa propre conception de l'ordre ce qui revient à opposer l'intelligence et la Ruse à la Matière. Or, la prise de pouvoir par Zeus n'est que la preuve de ce que les mortels doivent entreprendre pour dominer leur vie, se conduire (...) en héros et mourir glorieusement. Ce dépassement de soi, organisé et encouragé, n'est qu'un choix humain projeté dans l'absolu du divin. Zeus apporte la justesse d'une solution au problème que pose l'existence. (shrink)

Depuis des millénaires, surtout depuis l'avènement de l'écriture, l'homme connaît la vie à travers des mots et des idées qui l'interprètent et lui renvoient une image faussée de lui- même. Nous oublions que l'homme n'existerait pas s'il n'était pas préalablement de la matière. Les idées ne sont qu'une sécrétion de son cerveau et si Socrate craignait de perdre la vue en regardant le monde, nous avons perdu le sens du réel en reniant notre corps. Est-il possible de lui permettre de (...) se faire entendre? Redonner la parole à la matière que notre forme manifeste est encore possible, même si cela dérange ceux qui ont pris le pouvoir à l'aide de la pensée, que ce soit sur le plan politique ou le plan religieux. L'expérience montre que c'est faisable. (shrink)

A cursory review of the philosophy of sport readily reveals that it is dominated by Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophical milieux, in the departments of philosophy and kinesiology, the centers of bioethics, and the faculties of health around the world. In France, however, with the exception of a few researchers working in the philosophy or sport, and within an analytical paradigm, the development of the subject has gone almost unnoticed. By contrast, the discipline of history of sport clearly moved away from philosophy (...) in France with the establishment of a separate field of study based on the Anglo-Saxon model from the work pioneer of Pierre Arnaud developed by Thierry Terret and other sports historians. Nevertheless, in French universities, faculties of philosophy have not been open to research in the philosophy of the body. The philosophy of sport is not taught as such in French Universities even if our generation pursues ways opened by Jacques Ulmann, Bernard Jeu, Bernard Guillemain, Michel Bernard, Jean-Michel Berthelot, Gilbert Andrieu, Bertrand During, André Rauch, Marie-Hélène Brousse, Françoise Labridy, and Georges Vigarello, among others, through their reflections on the philosophy of the body. This article discusses the influence of some of these authors, and especially of Georges Gusdorf, Michel Foucault, and Georges Snyders on the nature and prospects for the philosophy of sport in France. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de montrer comment un crime de masse tel que le génocide entraîne des répercussions psychiques sur plusieurs générations, ce que l’on peut considérer comme une catastrophe de la filiation. Comment s’inscrire dans un lien de filiation pour écrire son propre roman des origines lorsque l’horreur vécue musèle à jamais la vie de la mémoire, de la parole et de la transmission? C’est à travers la médiation projective de la libre réalisation de l’arbre généalogique que l’article tentera (...) d’explorer ces questions par une étude de cas. Dans l’espace intermédiaire de la rencontre, tout en respectant les aménagements défensifs du sujet, le travail de perlaboration se rend possible. L’article montre comment la dimension médiatrice et projective du dispositif se met au service du travail d’historicisation et de remémoration de l’histoire familiale et collective chez un descendant d’un survivant de la Shoah. (shrink)

In Neither Beast Nor God, Gilbert Meilaender elaborates the philosophical, social, theological, and political implications of the question of dignity, and ...

I have been supposing that for the theory of reasoning, explicit belief is an all-or-nothing matter, I have assumed that, as far as principles of reasoning are concerned, one either believes something explicitly or one does not; in other words an appropriate "representation" is either in one's "memory" or not. The principles of reasoning are principles for modifying such all-or-nothing representations. This is not to deny that in some ways belief is a matter of degree. For one thing implicit belief (...) is certainly a matter of degree, since it is a matter of how easily and automatically one can infer something from what one believes explicitly. Furthermore, explicit belief is a matter of degree in the sense that one believes some things more strongly than others. Sometimes one is only somewhat inclined to believe something, sometimes one is not sure what to believe, sometimes one is inclined to disbelieve something, sometimes one is quite confident something is not so, and so forth. (shrink)

La déshumanisation à l’œuvre dans le projet génocidaire et l’héritage d’un tel événement traumatique entraîne une catastrophe de la transmission et de la filiation. S’ensuit une impasse des processus d’identification et de différenciation sur plusieurs générations. Dans cette contribution, on interroge la nature des obstacles entravant le processus de deuil, de séparation et l’investissement de la vie après une catastrophe sociale. Il s’agit pour cela de rendre compte du travail de subjectivation nécessaire à l’appropriation de sa propre histoire et de (...) celle de sa propre famille de manière à pouvoir engager un processus de séparation/différenciation. À travers une étude de cas, l’article montre la pertinence d’une rencontre clinique « médiatisée » pour la compréhension et la perlaboration du vécu traumatique d’une famille survivante qui vit entre-soi. Nous discuterons, en particulier, l’apport de la photographie comme une première tentative de figuration des affects et de mise au travail des processus intermédiaires garants de leur symbolisation. (shrink)

In _Reliable Reasoning_, Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni -- a philosopher and an engineer -- argue that philosophy and cognitive science can benefit from statistical learning theory, the theory that lies behind recent advances in machine learning. The philosophical problem of induction, for example, is in part about the reliability of inductive reasoning, where the reliability of a method is measured by its statistically expected percentage of errors -- a central topic in SLT. After discussing philosophical attempts to evade (...) the problem of induction, Harman and Kulkarni provide an admirably clear account of the basic framework of SLT and its implications for inductive reasoning. They explain the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension of a set of hypotheses and distinguish two kinds of inductive reasoning. The authors discuss various topics in machine learning, including nearest-neighbor methods, neural networks, and support vector machines. Finally, they describe transductive reasoning and suggest possible new models of human reasoning suggested by developments in SLT. (shrink)

While new generations of implantable brain computer interface devices are being developed, evidence in the literature about their impact on the patient experience is lagging. In this article, we address this knowledge gap by analysing data from the first-in-human clinical trial to study patients with implanted BCI advisory devices. We explored perceptions of self-change across six patients who volunteered to be implanted with artificially intelligent BCI devices. We used qualitative methodological tools grounded in phenomenology to conduct in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Results (...) show that, on the one hand, BCIs can positively increase a sense of the self and control; on the other hand, they can induce radical distress, feelings of loss of control, and a rupture of patient identity. We conclude by offering suggestions for the proactive creation of preparedness protocols specific to intelligent—predictive and advisory—BCI technologies essential to prevent potential iatrogenic harms. (shrink)

According to moral relativism, there is not a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matter—relative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. It is useful to compare moral relativism to other relativisms. One (...) possible comparison is with motion relativism. There is no such thing as absolute motion or absolute rest. Whether something is moving or at rest is relative to a spatio-temporal frame of reference. Something may be at rest in one frame of reference and moving in another. There is no such thing as absolute motion and absolute rest, but we can make do with relative motion and rest. Similarly, moral relativism is the view that, although there is no such thing as absolute right and wrong, we can make do with relative right and wrong. (shrink)

Reflecting upon some problems of the moral life, Gilbert Meilaender considers their difficulties within a vision that accentuates not only the limits, but also the promise, of the Christian story. Created by God as finite beings, we make particular attachments. Redeemed by God for a community transcending nature and history, our love always carries us beyond the special bonds of time and place. We live, therefore, with a sense of permanent tension. If this tension heightens our sense of the (...) perplexities of life, it should not free us from the obligation to probe, clarify, and resolve some of those difficulties. The author holds that theological ethics must clarify the direction for growth and development within the Christian life. He undertakes such analysis, emphasizing throughout the limits of the human condition, the importance of our nature as embodied persons, and the danger and pretension in some of our attempts to take control of and master human life. This Christian vision is developed in chapters that explore a range of moral problems, such as abortion, artificial reproduction, euthanasia, care for defective infants, provision of artificial nutrition and hydration, and marital and political community. These are throughout, however, _theological_ explorations. Taken together they illumine not only particular problems of the moral life but a vision of life—classically Christian in its conception, humane in its care for particular bonds of attachment, and modest in its recognition of moral limits on our ability to seek the good. Meilaender has developed a broad recognition both among scholars and students of ethics and among interested general readers. He has the capacity to throw fresh angles of vision on complex problems so as to help both the sophisticated and the uninitiated reader to think more penetratingly about moral questions. (shrink)

Theories of adverbial modification can be roughly distinguished into two sorts. One kind of theory takes logical form to follow surface grammatical form. Adverbs are treated as unanalyzable logical operators that turn a predicate or sentence into a different predicate or sentence respectively. And new rules of logic are stated for these operators. -/- A different kind of theory does not suppose that logical form must parallel surface grammatical form. It allows that logical form may have more to do with (...) deeper structures that might be studied in transformational grammar. Adverbs are treated as surface forms of the underlying predicates represented by corresponding adjectives and verbs. 'Slowly' is derived from 'slow'; 'intentionally' from 'intentional' or 'intend'; etc. And new rules of logic are avoided where they can be. -/- In this paper I attempt to state some of the advantages of the second sort of theory. My procedure will be this. First, I will try to say in outline what theories of logical form are. Then I will state five principles for evaluating such theories. Next, I will sketch the sorts of analyses acceptance of principles (1)-(5) leads to. In particular I will talk about adverbial phrases (e.g. locatives) that are best analyzed in terms of implicit references to events, relative modifiers (like 'large') which relate something to a comparison class, and 'that' clauses taken as names of propositions. By appealing to principles (1)-(5) I will defend these analyses against certain others, one that appeals to many logical operators, a second that treats all sentences as names of propositions, and a third that sees implicit reference to possible worlds in the language being analyzed. Finally, I will offer a pragmatic defense of my approach in terms of principles (1)-(5) as against a different approach that appeals to possible world semantics. (shrink)

If morality concerns the question how to live then can it be a science? Can there be a science of how to live? Hilary Putnam who poses this question answers it thus:1 logically impossible. But, he reassures us, . In the meantime moral reasoning must engage . This is developed through in literature. If the computer takes over, of course, then . So too, he says, may science, not because redundant but because complete in its explanatory and predictive power.

In this article Gilbert Meilaender responds to nine scholars whose papers analyze and interact with a variety of theological and ethical themes that emerge in his writing. Among those themes are the moral limits grounded in our embodied nature, the freedom to transcend those limits, the perfection of that nature by divine grace, the relation between political progress toward a common good and the kingdom of God, the place of religious beliefs in public discourse within a liberal democratic society, (...) the meaning and scope of our responsibility to care for human persons at the beginning and end of life, and the meaning of our creaturely longing to rest in God. (shrink)

I begin by summarizing the first two chapters of (Harman 1986). The first chapter stresses the importance of not confusing inference with implication and of not confusing reasoning with the sort of argument studied in deductive logic. Inference and reasoning are psychological events or processes that can be done more or less well. The sort of implication and argument studied in deductive logic have to do with relations among propositions and with structures of propositions distinguished into premises, intermediate steps, and (...) conclusion. Deductive logic is not a particular psychological subject and is not a particularly normative subject, although one might attempt to develop a logic of belief or a deontic logic, for example. (shrink)

An attempt to analyse what it is for belief to be based on reasons becomes involved with questions about the goodness of reasons and the gettier examples. intuitions about knowledge and the "gettier effect" can be used to decide when reasoning has occurred and what reasoning there has been. explanation by reasons is not deterministic.

ABSTRACT What kind of threat does terrorism pose to a community? Two models of terrorism are introduced. The Unjust War model views terrorism as an attack on the innocent, but thereby misidentifies its criminal character. The Political Crime model regards it as violence for political ends, by‐passing democratic channels. This misconstrues the terrorist's aim of waging war against a state whose legitimacy he contests. Associated with the models of terrorism are two conceptions of community, the Communitarian and the Hobbesian, respectively. (...) While the Communitarian conception sees the community as independent of the state, the Hobbesian identifies them, thus assimilating an attack on the state to a threat to the community. The Hobbesian conception, however, even when amplified by democratic theory, provides inadequate resources to rebut a challenge to the state's legitimacy, in particular one concerning territorial boundaries. Arguments for permitting secession are discussed. The Communitarian conception may be able to ground legitimacy claims; but it may also justify some terrorist campaigns as needed to preserve communities. (shrink)

What is systematic in philosophy is its description of the world we inhabit. , said Whitehead, . We need not accept Whitehead's comparison of with the systemof naturalsciences to take his point. The philosophical description of the world issystematic since may delude us; , that is, in lying outside ; we lack a conviction that they have an application to any element of our experience, which the members of a system possess, according to Whitehead, in characterizing every element. What is (...) the nature of this system of description? (shrink)

BonJour offers two main reasons for supposing that there is such a thing as rational insight into necessity. First, he says there are many examples in which it clearly seems that one has such insight. Second, he argues that any epistemology denying the existence of rational insight into necessity is committed to a narrow skepticism. After commenting about possible frameworks for epistemological justification, I argue against these two claims in reverse order.