First published in 1974, J.N. Findlay's classic work on Plato has now been re-issued.

With the late Author’s kind permission, the present text is published here in a somewhat abbreviated and modified translation that has been given appropriate subheadings and supplemented with an extensive bibliography. Its German original from 1996 has been translated into French and English. The purpose of the present translation is to make the Polish reader acquainted with the important and innovative account of Plato’s philosophy that has been put forward by the Tübingen School whose one of the most prominent co-founders (...) was Hans Joachim Krämer. While this text is devoted to Plato’s critique of writing, it also presents Plato’s agrapha dogmata as an important supplement to the written dialogues. A fuller overview of the major assumptions of this new interpretation is to be found in the recently published Gesammelte Ansätze zu Platon. (shrink)

About the relationship of the two traditions of Platonic interpretation the indirect and the direct traditions, the written dialogues and the unwritten doctrines.

This is a book about the relationship of the two traditions of Platonic interpretation -- the indirect and the direct traditions, the written dialogues and the unwritten doctrines. Kramer, who is the foremost proponent of the Tubingen School of interpretation, presents the unwritten doctrines as the crown of Plato's system and the key revealing it. Kramer unfolds the philosophical significance of the unwritten doctrines in their fullness. He demonstrates the hermeneutic fruitfulness of the (...) class='Hi'>unwritten doctrines when applied to the dialogues. He shows that the doctrines are a revival of the presocratic theory renovated and brought to a new plane through Socrates. In this way, Plato emerges as the creator of classical metaphysics. In the Third Part, Kramer compares the structure of Platonism, as construed by the Tubingen School, with current philosophical structures such as analytic philosophy, Hegel, phenomenology, and Heidegger. Of the five appendices, the most important presents English translations of the ancient testimonies on the unwritten doctrines. These include the "self-testimonies of Plato." There is also a bibliography on the problem of the unwritten doctrines. (shrink)

J.N. Findlay, distinguished scholar and acknowledged expert on Plato, argues persuasively for a new interpretation of the Platonic writings. He believes that Plato's Unwritten Doctrines were present in the background of all the great philosopher's mature written work. With the use of Aristotelian and other writings on these reported doctrines he demonstrates that they admit of an intelligible elucidation and they direct indispensable light upon the full meaning of the written Dialogues. The author emphasizes the valuable use (...) of Platonic notions and methods by the Neoplatonists and the Schoolmen as well as by such modern thinkers as Husserl and Russell. He also censures, as a great misinterpretation, the widespread Aristotelian view of Platonism as a two-world theory, and argues that, for Plato, the Ideas and their Principles alone have full reality, everything else being logically parasitic upon them. The work also includes two important Appendices, the first providing translations of the Aristotelian and other ancient material regarding Plato's oral teaching, the second criticizing and refuting the views of Harold F. Cherniss on the same material. (shrink)

J.N. Findlay, distinguished scholar and acknowledged expert on Plato, argues persuasively for a new interpretation of the Platonic writings. He believes that Plato's Unwritten Doctrines were present in the background of all the great philosopher's mature written work. With the use of Aristotelian and other writings on these reported doctrines he demonstrates that they admit of an intelligible elucidation and they direct indispensable light upon the full meaning of the written Dialogues. The author emphasizes the valuable use (...) of Platonic notions and methods by the Neoplatonists and the Schoolmen as well as by such modern thinkers as Husserl and Russell. He also censures, as a great misinterpretation, the widespread Aristotelian view of Platonism as a two-world theory, and argues that, for Plato, the Ideas and their Principles alone have full reality, everything else being logically parasitic upon them. The work also includes two important Appendices, the first providing translations of the Aristotelian and other ancient material regarding Plato's oral teaching, the second criticizing and refuting the views of Harold F. Cherniss on the same material. (shrink)

The pedagogic intention of this unusual book is to present a unified picture of the whole of Plato, taking his metaphysical position with a seriousness rare in Anglo-American Plato-scholarship. The substance of the work depends on three claims. First, eide are not postulated or secondary entities, alongside sensibles. For Findlay, it is the eide which are ultimately real; the proper characterization of the being of sensibles is as "parasitic" on the original entities, the eide. There is a gradation of being, (...) and eide rather than sensibles are the measure. Beneath the full reality of the eide lies the partial or relative non-being of sensibles, and then the absolute non-being which Findlay identifies with the chora of Timaeus 52b. Above the reality of eide are their principles: the One, and the Dyad. Second, Findlay claims that even from the earliest dialogues in which the eide are suggested, Plato envisioned but did not complete a program of mathematizing the eide, and of using this mathematicization to account for the relation between the principles of eide and the sensible instantiations of the eide. This program, Findlay says, had to do with establishing ratios between eide, but is not described further than this. Third, as an exegetic requirement, Findlay has stated that this Prinzipienlehre is fully consistent with, and elucidated and supported by, the reports of Aristotle and of his commentators, especially Syrianus. This is, of course, the "unwritten doctrine" to which the title of the book alludes. Perhaps the greatest value of the work is that it challenges the prevalent interpretative opinion, supported by Professor Cherniss’ "almost superhuman scholarship," that the Aristotelian reports are distortions of Plato, and thus to be discounted, while the "real Plato" is in the dialogues alone. (shrink)

To what extent can philosophy speak to and write about what is most fundamental to itself? This essay sorts through aspects of the problem of Plato's alleged "unwritten doctrine." The essay begins by moving back to Plato's teacher and the non-doctrinal investigations of Socrates, which are grounded in the positing of hypotheses and dialogic questioning. Following this move, the essay turns forward to Plotinus's later, more systematic presentations where the use of terms like “the one” and “the good” are (...) not only beyond being but “are” non-objects, unable to be intuited by the intellect. These terms serve as pointers to “what” can only be realized through the soul's blissful union with its non-objective source and ground. (shrink)

Cet article résume le contenu des doctrines non écrites attribuées à Platon ainsi que la démarche méthodique selon laquelle elles procèdent. Il atteste la présence de ces doctrines non écrites, notamment dans le Sophiste. L'article cherche à concilier entre elles la théorie des premiers principes et la métaphysique platonicienne, laquelle admet la transcendance théologique. En effet, en raison de la différence qui existe entre la Dyade du grand et du petit dans la sphère cosmologique et la Dyade dans (...) le domaine des Idées, le rôle de l'intellect démiurgique devient essentiel. Dès lors, réduire la métaphysique platonicienne à un système fondé sur la déduction, l'immanence et l'émanation est une position intenable. This article summarizes the content and the methodological proceedings of the unwritten doctrines ascribed to Plato, and documents their presence, which is to be found particularly in the Sophist. The article tries then to reconcile the first principles' theory with Platonic metaphysics, which admits the theological transcendency. It attempts to show that, because of the difference between the Dyad of great and small in the cosmological sphere and the Dyad of the ideal sphere, the role of the demiurgic Intellect becomes essential. This entails that the reduction of the Platonic metaphysics to a system based on deduction, immanence and emanation is untenable. (shrink)

The debate over Plato’s “ so called unwritten doctrines”, which he communicated only to a small circle of trusted disciples, has caused a stir among philosophers in recent decades. Rafael Ferber assumes a differentiated position in this controversy. He is convinced that the unwritten doctrines did exist, but that Plato, for reasons inherent in the process of gaining knowledge, was unable to communicate these doctrines even to his closest disciples. In this book, Ferber outlines the (...) discussion and summarizes the standpoints of greatest interest. Ever since Aristotle, we have known that Plato did not put his most important teachings into writing, but instead communicated them only orally to the inner circle of his disciples. While the extant dialogues merely pass down Plato’s “exoteric” doctrines, his most important “esoteric” insights were not meant for the general public. In the meantime, the contents and the significance of Plato’s “unwritten doctrines” have become the subject of debate in philosophical circles. Fifteen years ago, at the height of the controversy over the “unwritten doctrines”, Rafael Ferber entered the fray with a small book. He proposed that Plato was also unable to communicate the “unwritten doctrines” because the highest principles (i.e. the subject of the unwritten doctrines) cannot be known through logical operations due to an epistemological paradox. Ferber’s differentiated position met with great respect and acceptance, although in individual cases it was also rejected. Ferber’s new book again presents the text of 1991, but significantly expands on it through new perspectives and an outline of the discussion it triggered. In this book, the reader learns what is meant by Plato’s unwritten doctrines and what the controversy is all about. (shrink)

Since 1976, when Thomas A. Szlezák held his inaugural lecture as a private lecturer at the University of Zurich entitled "The Dialogue Form and Esotericism: On the Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogue the Phaedrus", the now-emeritus professor at Tübingen has advocated a particular interpretation of the Platonic dialogues and especially of the Phaedrus: namely, that what is referred to in the latter dialogue—without further explanation—as "more valuable" than what is set down in writing corresponds to Plato's "so called unwritten (...) doctrines", or for Szlezák, "unwritten... (shrink)

The paper offers a critical discussion of H. Happ's wide-ranging book entitled "Hyle. Studien zum aristotelischen Materiebegriff", Berlin 1971. While recognizing the importance of this contribution to Aristotelian scholarship I express some revervations to the approach adopted, which tends to make of Aristotle a continuator of the so-called unwritten doctrines by Plato.

At the centre of the monograph (1984, first edition) lies a detailed interpretation and critique of the idea of the Good in the Republic. The main thesis of the interpretation runs as follows: The idea of the Good functions as a third item between thinking and being. The main purpose of the monograph is to introduce the systematic problem of the third item via the historical problem of the idea of the Good. The second, enlarged edition (1989) gives a new (...) reconstruction of an "exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic" (H. Cherniss), that is, of the platonic theory of the ideal numbers and the two principles that were contained in the “so-called unwritten doctrines” (Aristotle). The final chapter gives new information on the reception of Plato's idea of the Good in P. Natorp and M. Heidegger. It also includes an updated bibliography. The third edition (2015) is a reprint of the second edition of 1989. Further remarks and an updated bibliography to 2005 are to be found in: - Ferber, Rafael (2005). Ist die Idee des Guten nicht transzendent oder ist sie es doch? Nochmals Platons ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ. In: Barbaric Damir: Platon über das Gute und die Gerechtigkeit / Plato on Goodness and Justice / Platone sul Bene e sulla Giustizia. Würzburg, 149-174. - Ferber, Rafael / Damschen, Gregor (2015). Is the Idea of the Good Beyond Being? Plato's "epekeinea tês ousias" Revisted (Republic, 6, 509b8-10). In: Nails, Debra; Harold, Tarrant; Kajava, Mika; Salmenkivi, Eero. Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato. Espoo, 197-203. (shrink)

At the centre of the monograph (1984, first edition) lies a detailed interpretation and critique of the idea of the Good in the Republic. The main thesis of the interpretation runs as follows: The idea of the Good functions as a third item between thinking and being. The main purpose of the monograph is to introduce the systematic problem of the third item via the historical problem of the idea of the Good. The second, enlarged edition (1989) gives a new (...) reconstruction of an "exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic" (H. Cherniss), that is, of the platonic theory of the ideal numbers and the two principles that were contained in the “so-called unwritten doctrines” (Aristotle). The final chapter gives new information on the reception of Plato's idea of the Good in P. Natorp and M. Heidegger. It also includes an updated bibliography. The third edition (2015) is a reprint of the second edition of 1989. Further remarks and an updated bibliography to 2005 are to be found in: - Ferber, Rafael (2005). Ist die Idee des Guten nicht transzendent oder ist sie es doch? Nochmals Platons ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ. In: Barbaric Damir: Platon über das Gute und die Gerechtigkeit / Plato on Goodness and Justice / Platone sul Bene e sulla Giustizia. Würzburg, 149-174. - Ferber, Rafael / Damschen, Gregor (2015). Is the Idea of the Good Beyond Being? Plato's "epekeinea tês ousias" Revisted (Republic, 6, 509b8-10). In: Nails, Debra; Harold, Tarrant; Kajava, Mika; Salmenkivi, Eero. Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato. Espoo, 197-203. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 121-122 [Access article in PDF] Harold Tarrant. Plato's First Interpreters. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 263. Cloth, $55.00. This is Tarrant's third book on the ancient Platonist tradition, following his Scepticism or Platonism? (1985) and Thrasyllan Platonism (1993). In those earlier volumes his focus was on the first centuries bc and ad. Here his scope is much (...) wider. Stating that "Platonic interpretation is today at a crossroads," he has written a book that explores "ancient attempts to wrestle with this corpus," with the ultimate objective "to encourage a fresh, almost primitive reading of Plato himself" (vii).He begins engagingly by confronting the ancients with questions any modern reader of Plato must ask: What kind of text is this? Are there doctrines here? Where do I look for Plato's doctrines? The second part of his book is a historical survey, taking us from Plato, the early Academy and Aristotle, through the Hellenistic and early Roman Imperial period, and concluding with the principal Neoplatonist interpreters. In the third and longest part, he focuses on the interpretation of specific dialogues, giving most space to the Gorgias and Theaetetus, but also dealing in particular detail with the Meno, Parmenides, and Philebus. Something is said about every dialogue, but Tarrant writes only briefly about such major works as the Republic and Timaeus. He explains his selectivity (not very convincingly) as due to his wish to "discuss issues of meta-interpretation, with emphasis on the period before Plotinus" (198).Taking his book as a whole, one realizes that few strands of modern interpretation were not prefigured to quite a large extent in antiquity. The two most obvious exceptions are the chronological and developmental approach (Early, Middle, and Late), at present under strong attack from some quarters, and the theological, numerological, and allegorical readings practiced by Neoplatonists. Plato's ancient interpreters were doctrinal unitarians, but they implicitly anticipated our tendency to distinguish "Socratic dialogues," which some of them called "gymnastic" and "inquisitive," from such "canonical" works as the Phaedo,Republic, Symposium, and Timaeus, to which they applied the labels "dogmatic" and "expository." And they recognized that both types of characteristics could be found in the same dialogue, as in the Meno and Theaetetus. Plato himself, they proposed, spoke primarily through the voices of Socrates, Timaeus, and the Eleatic and Athenian strangers; but other characters, such as Pausanias in the Symposium, or Protagoras in the dialogue of that name, utter thoughts with some philosophical value. In explaining difficult passages of one dialogue, they would typically refer to passages from other parts of the corpus. An especially intriguing instance is the strategy of the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus, who reads the Meno into the dialogue on which he is officially commenting.Ancient scholars, just like ourselves, asked questions about the unifying themes of complex dialogues. Hence the sub-titles given to certain works: "On the soul" for the Phaedo, and "On justice" for the Republic, etc. For Olympiodorus (whose commentary on the Gorgias Tarrant has recently co-edited [Leiden, 1998]), earlier interpreters have seriously erred by giving too limited an account of that dialogue's scope. It is not, he says, simply about rhetoric, nor about justice and injustice; nor is its theme the divine demiurge (as some Neoplatonists had strangely proposed, on the basis of the concluding myth). Rather, the subject of the Gorgias is "the ethical principles that lead to constitutional well-being" (125). [End Page 121] However, Olympiodorus's eminently "sensible" reading (as Tarrant calls it) is deeply embedded in the Neoplatonic contrast between the "purificatory virtues" of the Phaedo and the "constitutional virtues" of Republic4.Strong or weak scepticism, esotericism, unwritten doctrines, spurious versus genuine, a canon of central dialogues, dramatic considerations, and the philosophical importance or non-importance of the dialogues' prologues—all of these are interpretive approaches that Tarrant surveys in this immensely learned book, and all of them continue to resonate for us. Modern scholars, who emphasize the literary and philosophical unity of each dialogue, are walking... (shrink)

Studying Plato's "unwritten doctrines" in the light of his discussion of limit and unlimited in his dialogue Philebus. The essay raises also the question whether there is too much "atomism" in the usual presentation of Plato's Forms as individual absolute entities, rather than as themselves derived from a more fundamental limit/unlimited ontology.

This is a review of: Platon: Meisterdenker der Antike by Thomas Alexander Szlezåk (review).

This paper deals with the ontological genesis of the series point-line-plane-solid in Plato’s philosophy. The texts of the Dialogues concerning this subject are presented, and passages of the Unwritten Doctrines that we know from Aristotle and other sources are specially considered. Certain problems within this context, such as the postulation of indivisible Iines, or the relation between each of the dimensions and the figures that can be placed in them, are considered in detail.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Realm of Mimesis in Plato: Orality, Writing, and the Ontology of the Image by Mariangela EspositoDoug Al-MainiESPOSITO, Mariangela. The Realm of Mimesis in Plato: Orality, Writing, and the Ontology of the Image. Boston: Brill, 2023. xiv + 173 pp. Cloth, $143.00This manuscript grew out of the author’s original interest in Platonic aesthetics, itself developing into a more particularized examination of Plato’s account of beauty. Plato’s interest in (...) the arts is famously bound up in a broad criticism of their imitative nature; the relation between the original and the imitation, or the eidos and the eidolon, is the core topic of this book. When this binary nature of mimesis is emphasized, it is difficult not to see the two poles as opposed to each other, and indeed there are several passages in the Platonic corpus that tell us directly to value the eidos over the eidolon. “The critique of the arts, in general terms, is based on the assumption that they produce multiple, false, sensorial images (eidola ) that are far removed from the truth, while the truth is a process through which multiplicities are gathered together into an intellectual unity (eidos).” While this duality shows up in the dialogues in numerous ways, Esposito seeks to show a method that transcends it, a method that depends on the experience of [End Page 347] beauty. Beauty is the entity that allows for a transition from the sensual to the intellectual, a point Plato makes in both the Symposium and the Phaedrus, and thereby supports the view that the binary pair of image and original are not so discrete as we might originally believe.Esposito’s analysis of the relation between image and original is made concrete through its application to writing and speech. The book is divided into an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion that track the progress of our ascent to the eidos, with the first chapter devoted to Plato’s critique of writing, the second to the critique of speech, and the third to an analysis of how beauty facilitates going beyond their opposition. The main sources for the critique of writing are the Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter; Socrates in the Phaedrus explicitly declares writing to be an imitation of speech and the Seventh Letter supports this position. Esposito follows Derrida’s famous essay, Plato’s Pharmacy, stating, “In Derrida’s account of the Phaedrus, this is the main charge against the written word: first, it imitates the original, and then—its second crime—substitutes itself for the original.” The ability of the copy to substitute itself for the original shows a sensitivity on Derrida’s part to the kind of project that Esposito wants to engage in, and indeed a major theme of Derrida’s work was his use of the concept of the pharmakon as something that transgressed a boundary between seemingly discrete opposites; the term pharmakon could refer to either a poison or a cure. But Esposito claims that focusing on the opposition between speech and writing ensures that it will never be overcome, and so this criticism of writing (as an imitation) must be demoted in importance. Esposito therefore ultimately distances herself from Derrida and also spends time taking on the importance of the so-called Unwritten Doctrines, especially as outlined by the Tübingen School. The Tübingen School straightforwardly accepts the criticism of writing in comparison to speech and so develops a theory of unwritten doctrines that Plato would only transfer orally. Given her project of synthesizing the tension between writing and speech, it is unsurprising that Esposito would be hostile to the project of the Tübingen School, “which this work does not consider sustainable.”In the second chapter Esposito moves on to the critique of speech. Here the core of her analysis is given to the Sophist, which provides us with “the best ontological expression of the criticism of image making.” The wider criticism of the Sophist is centered on the observation that appearances are bound up with nonbeing itself; “the biggest challenge posed by the sophist and the main danger of the mimetic mechanism is revealed: both allow the pseudos... (shrink)

An interpretation of the “Parmenides” is proposed in base to the Plato’s “unwritten doctrines”. The greek author demonstrates in this dialogue that with the One only is impossible to think (hypothesis I), and this is why a principle of difference is required; that with the ontological conception of this difference neither, because contradictory conclusions would be followed (hypothesis II); and that without the One isimpossible to think, too (hypothesis III). These conclusions suggest the reader that the One is (...) necessary to think, but another or other principles must be searched to stablish a dialectic. Plato confirms this way the parenetic character of his dialogues respecting at the same time the selfconstrained taboo of the “unwritten doctrines” (he doesn’t mention the undefinite dyad). To come to these conclusions the author ofthis paper proposes a plan of the second part of this work, that divides it in three hypothesis, not in eight, like is usual today, and analyzes the categories that sustain the argumentatives subdivisions of each one of the hypotheses: the structure of all the hypotheses is the same. All this in critical discussion with the actual bibliography about the topics. (shrink)

An interpretation of the “Parmenides” is proposed in base to the Plato’s “unwritten doctrines”. The greek author demonstrates in this dialogue that with the One only is impossible to think (hypothesis I), and this is why a principle of difference is required; that with the ontological conception of this difference neither, because contradictory conclusions would be followed (hypothesis II); and that without the One isimpossible to think, too (hypothesis III). These conclusions suggest the reader that the One is (...) necessary to think, but another or other principles must be searched to stablish a dialectic. Plato confirms this way the parenetic character of his dialogues respecting at the same time the selfconstrained taboo of the “unwritten doctrines” (he doesn’t mention the undefinite dyad). To come to these conclusions the author ofthis paper proposes a plan of the second part of this work, that divides it in three hypothesis, not in eight, like is usual today, and analyzes the categories that sustain the argumentatives subdivisions of each one of the hypotheses: the structure of all the hypotheses is the same. All this in critical discussion with the actual bibliography about the topics. (shrink)

In this book Reale presents Plato and Aristotle. At the center of Reale’s interpretation of Plato is the fulcrum of the supersensible, the metaphysical discovery that Plato presented as a result of the Second Voyage. This discovery of the supersensible is, in Reale’s view, not only the fundamental phase of ancient thought, but it also constitutes a milestone on the path of western philosophy. Reale presents Plato in three different dimensions: the theoretic, the mystical-religious, and the political. Each of these (...) components takes on meaning from the Second Voyage. In addition, Reale has shown that only in the light of the Unwritten Doctrines handed down through the indirect tradition, do these three components, and the Second Voyage itself, acquire their full meaning, and only in this way is a unitary conception of Plato’s thought achieved. The interpretation of Aristotle that Reale proposes depends on his interpretation of Plato. Aristotle read without preconceptions is not the antithesis of Plato. Reale points out that Aristotle was unique among thinkers close to Plato, in being the one who developed, at least in part, his Second Voyage. The systematic-unitary interpretation of Aristotle which Reale has previously supported converges with the new systematic-unitary interpretation of Plato. Certain doctrinal positions which are usually reserved to treatments in monographs will be explored, because only in this way can the two distinctive traits of Aristotle’s thought emerge: the way in which he tries to overcome and confirm the Socratic-Platonic positions, and the way in which he formally creates the system of philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

The following hopes to bring Plato’s unwritten doctrines into proximity with Irigaray’s concept of the Two as found in works like To Be Two or I love to you. By focusing on the the indefinite Dyad, Plato's reported co-archai with the One, it will be evidenced that Platonism begins and ends with a One which is not One (a kind of Two). Further, in this Dyad's failure to be One, it ultimately comes to possess its own productive and (...) destructive power or, to use Irigaray's words, to love toward the Other in such a way as to produce or give birth to other others, real difference. Finally, Irigaray’s conception of the Two has dramatic social implications for her as a feminist, grounding a transformation of the political order of things. Due to this political import, the final section shifts to questioning whether Plato’s reported protological principles, the One and the indefinite Dyad, could perform a similar work. (shrink)

This volume of new essays by an international group of scholars examines the response of Hans-Georg Gadamer to Plato, especially to the Philebus. The book studies Gadamer's interpretative approach to the dialogues and unwritten doctrines of Plato. It also shows how, for Gadamer, reading Plato was intimately interconnected with formulating his own philosophical views. The volume also brings out how Gadamer influenced Donald Davidson in his reading of Plato and his philosophical thought. The volume thus explores a fascinating (...) case-study of the creative reception of Plato by two major twentieth-century philosophers, Gadamer and Davidson, while also clarifying Gadamer's relationship to Heidegger. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Plato, especially on the Philebus, and also to scholars of twentieth-century thought. (shrink)

At the centre of the monograph (1984, first edition) lies a detailed interpretation and critique of the idea of the Good in the Republic. The main thesis of the interpretation runs as follows: The idea of the Good functions as a third item between thinking and being. The main purpose of the monograph is to introduce the systematic problem of the third item via the historical problem of the idea of the Good. The second, enlarged edition (1989) gives a new (...) reconstruction of an "exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic" (H. Cherniss), that is, of the platonic theory of the ideal numbers and the two principles that were contained in the “so-called unwritten doctrines” (Aristotle). The final chapter gives new information on the reception of Plato's idea of the Good in P. Natorp and M. Heidegger. It also includes an updated bibliography. The third edition (2015) is a reprint of the second edition of 1989. Further remarks and an updated bibliography to 2005 are to be found in -/- Ferber, Rafael (2005). Ist die Idee des Guten nicht transzendent oder ist sie es doch? Nochmals Platons ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ. In: Barbaric Damir: Platon über das Gute und die Gerechtigkeit / Plato on Goodness and Justice / Platone sul Bene e sulla Giustizia. Würzburg, 149-174.:www.zora.uzh.ch/34098/. (shrink)

Mysticism, theurgy, non-philosophy: this text will experiment with the three in an attempt to perform a non-philosophical hijacking of so-called theurgy. I will experiment with a comparison between Iamblichus' theurgy, Laruelle's non-philosophy, and the notion of the Vision-in-One. I claim their point of convergence is their allegiances to the theory of the One, derived from Plato's Unwritten Doctrines. The ancient notion of the One is subject to a similar procedural gesture in both Iamblichus and Laruelle, namely, the procession (...) of the One from the noematic to the aesthetic realm. What connects them is their rejection of the theory that the soul's descension from the One to the visible realm represents a degeneration of the Nous. In a concept akin to the very idea of theurgy, Laruelle proposes his Vision-in-One, which is to think from the One rather than the One. The Vision-in-One is an attempt to materialize the disembodied fate of the noema against realistic skepticism. (shrink)

One of the main problems of Plato's unwritten doctrine has to do with whether his theory of principles has a strictly dualistic or rather a more monistic character. The thesis of this essay is that Plato combines monism and dualism in a particular fashion. Both the dialogues and the testimony of the unwritten doctrine reveal that in Plato's metaphysics the One is the genuinely absolute principle; Plato's second principle, the Many, is not a second absolute - otherwise it (...) would dissolve the very concept of the absolute. Instead, Plato conceives the principle of multiplicity itself as a unity, therefore as in some - in any event ineffable - way as being derived or having emanated from the absolute One. The One itself is wholly transcendent and thus ineffable, knowable neither by reason nor by intellective intuition. Nonetheless, being and knowledge are constituted by the coordination of the One and the Many, for which reason the latter is a principle. Hence, Plato's metaphysics combine a monistic ascent to the absolute with a dualistic derivation of being, a combination made necessary because the One transcends not only all being, but also all knowledge. (shrink)

Ever since Aristotle cryptically mentioned the λεγοµέυοις ἀγράφοις δόγµασιυ (Physics 209b) and proposed they differ significantly from the explicit statements in the published Platonic dialogues, these so-called unwritten doctrines were objects of speculation. Given Plato’s notorious distrust in unprepared readers and the uncontrollable vulnerability of published writings to all kinds of misunderstandings, the existence of esoteric teachings seems plausible. Like his most prominent ancient counterpart, Nietzsche displays severe reservations against hasty readers, too, and his usage of literary devices (...) and all kinds of masks, as well as his explicit advice to a “reader, how I deserve him” (EH “Books” 5), indicate .. (shrink)

Though Plato favors physical atoms in his Timaeus, they are not ultimate; he generates them from a formless energy-space plus mathematical patterns. On the other hand most interpreters read the Platonic Forms as ultimate intellectual atoms. I suggest that Plato refuses atomism on all levels, and the Forms themselves should be seen as generated from a combination of limit and unlimited, as we are told in the Philebus and as is hinted at in the reports on the "unwritten (...) class='Hi'>doctrines.". (shrink)

One of the main problems of Plato's unwritten doctrine has to do with whether his theory of principles has a strictly dualistic or rather a more monistic character. The thesis of this essay is that Plato combines monism and dualism in a particular fashion. Both the dialogues and the testimony of the unwritten doctrine reveal that in Plato's metaphysics the One is the genuinely absolute principle; Plato's second principle, the Many, is not a second absolute - otherwise it (...) would dissolve the very concept of the absolute. Instead, Plato conceives the principle of multiplicity itself as a unity, therefore as in some - in any event ineffable - way as being derived or having emanated from the absolute One. The One itself is wholly transcendent and thus ineffable, knowable neither by reason nor by intellective intuition. Nonetheless, being and knowledge are constituted by the coordination of the One and the Many, for which reason the latter is a principle. Hence, Plato's metaphysics combine a monistic ascent to the absolute with a dualistic derivation of being, a combination made necessary because the One transcends not only all being, but also all knowledge. (shrink)