A. P. Martinich's The Two Gods of Leviathan appeared in 1992, and J. R. Collins's The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes in 2005. Martinich offered a revisionist interpretation of Thomas Hobbes's religious commitments. He rebuked the conventional view that Hobbes was an atheist and placed him within particular traditions of reformed Christian theology. Collins's book strongly differed from these conclusions, and reasserted Hobbes's hostility to traditional Christianity as part of a general contextualization of his writings within the period of the English (...) Revolution. The following exchange between Martinich and Collins was first aired in 2007 as a debate at the Southwestern Political Science Association's Annual Conference. (shrink)

First published in 1975 by Leeds Books Ltd., this second, revised edition adds only a short, twelve page Postscript and an Index. The former replies to reviews of the original edition by clarifying the use of two key terms, by commenting on its principal weaknesses, and by indicating the direction of further work required by the position advocated.

A new translation which is eminently readable and extremely accurate. Much of the awkwardness and unnecessary obscurity of the Ogden translation has been eliminated. The comprehensive index which combines both English and German expressions is designed to meet the special problems involved in understanding the Tractatus. Unfortunately Russell's introduction to the 1922 edition is reproduced without any indication of the controversy concerning Russell's interpretation, or subsequent interpretations of the Tractatus.--R. J. B.

The doctrine of scientific realism has once again come into the center of attention for many philosophers of science, although of course the approaches, arguments, and emphases have somewhat changed. This book is an excellent entree to the current debates on this topic, as seen by van Fraassen who is probably the most direct and severe opponent of scientific realism. What is at stake is nothing less than the ultimate goal of science and the significance of its theories.

During the past decade some of the most provocative and controversial disputes concerning the philosophy and history of science have centered about the work of Thomas Kuhn and Sir Karl Popper. One, therefore, looks with anticipation to this volume which is based on a symposium held in July, 1965 where Kuhn, Popper and several of Popper's former students met for an intellectual confrontation. But the result is depressing. The volume is an editorial mess. Two of the main scheduled speakers never (...) appeared at the symposium, although papers by them are published here. Some of the remarks published here seem to be those spoken on the day the symposium was held while others, like Kuhn's answer to his critics, were written four years after the symposium. The result is a confusing and distracting editorial unevenness. While Kuhn's fair-minded opening paper raises some of the most important issues to be confronted, one quickly senses that the Popperians are not really very much interested in discussing Kuhn's work but rather in pushing their own pet theses. Kuhn puts this rather generously when he labels it an example of "talking-through-each-other." Most of the Popperians seem to be obsessed with Kuhn's understanding of normal science and neglect the much more interesting questions concerning his views on scientific revolutions, the sense in which science does and does not make progress, the criteria involved in adjudicating among competing theories. It is almost with relief that one reads Margaret Masterman's remark that it is a "crashingly obvious fact" that there is normal science. Ironically, Masterman's article which is basically sympathetic to Kuhn's work is the most illuminating and the most critical. More successfully than any of other contributors she shows the ambiguities involved in Kuhn's idea of a paradigm. One's wishes that the Popperians would take a good hard look at themselves and what they are doing as it is so disastrously illustrated here. Although ostensibly dedicated to serious critical rationalism, they seem more eager to score points than to understand what they are criticizing. Although they supposedly abhor clubiness, they are rapidly forming themselves into a scholastic circle where the object seems to be to show how brilliant or how stupid some other student of Popper is. Although they scorn the quest for origins, they are almost compulsive in attempting to show that anything worthwhile was previously said by Sir Karl. This book illustrates the faults of the Popperians at their worst and few of their virtues. There is much heat and wit, but little light.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Despite the enormous and growing interest in Marx and the availability of Marx's writing in paperback, it is scandalous how little care has been taken in producing careful texts and English translations of Marx's work. O'Malley's edition is an outstanding exception. It is carefully and intelligently edited. The result makes available an extremely interesting text of Marx. A number of scholars have already argued that in this early critique, one can discover some of the earliest formulations of distinctive Marxian themes. (...) Now the reader can judge for himself, for this is the first full English translation of Marx's Critique. But this Critique is not only extremely important for understanding Marx's intellectual development, it also helps to make Hegel's Philosophy of Right come alive. Marx's fundamental ambivalence toward Hegel is evidenced here. It is clear that Marx is still very much under Hegel's influence and we can see how deeply Hegel is shaping Marx's thought, but there is also a toughness and incisiveness in Marx's criticism of Hegel. O'Malley has provided a very extensive introduction which not only provides the necessary background for understanding this text but also explores the role of this work in the totality of Marx's development. Altogether this edition shows a care and judiciousness which is exceptional. It eminently serves the purpose of making an important text accessible.--R. J. B. (shrink)

A sampler of Russell's writings from 1963 to 1959 which provides representative selections from his multifarious writings. The book is designed more for the general reader than for the scholar interested in piecing together the complex mosaic of the man and his work. There is a preface by Bertrand Russell. Handsomely printed, the total effect shows once again how unique and many-sided is this twentieth-century intellectual explorer.--R. J. B.

Mourant has provided a carefully edited, topically organized anthology. The introductions are clearly written. One still waits, however, for an Augustinian anthology which reveals, rather than conceals Augustine's development.—R. J. W.

A brilliant attempt to show how the Transcendental Deduction can be construed as a strict logical deduction. Using Kemp Smith's "pathwork" theory in a novel way, Wolff organizes his commentary around four versions of the main argument which reflect Kant's increasing philosophic subtlety. The heart of the commentary is an analysis of synthesis as a rule-directed mental activity. Throughout there is a judicious balance of historical, textual and philosophic analysis, making this a truly rich commentary.--R. J. B.

The product of the seventh symposium of New York University's Institute of Philosophy, this volume centers on three topics: grounds for judgment of artistic excellence, interpretation of meaning in art criticism, and art and reality. Each of the three sections features a lead paper, followed by a series of comments. Issues raised by the main papers are quite thoroughly explored, but sometimes one wishes that provocative suggestions made in commentary were taken up by other participants.—R. J. W.

This volume is based on a sharp distinction between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas. Its essays on the major philosophers of past and present make little attempt to trace historical connections, but rather concentrate on exposition and criticism. In general the individual authors are experts on the philosophers they discuss, and the level of the exposition is high. Most of the contributors are British, and practitioners of the method of linguistic analysis. This gives the volume a (...) rather tendentious tone.—R. J. W. (shrink)

For many years scholars have paid lip service to the "dramatic" or "mimetic" character of Plato's dialogues, but too few have taken this character seriously. Klein does, making it the basis of his exposition. He convincingly demonstrates that the dramatic action and the topic discussed are tightly interwoven and must be taken together to understand the Meno. In his introduction he distinguishes three kinds of mimesis: ethological, doxological, and mythological. The Meno is interpreted as primarily ethological. But one can ask (...) whether the author has done justice to the doxological element in the dialogue. He places considerable emphasis on the character of the "historical" Meno and does not seem to consider seriously the possibility that Meno's responses to Socrates show that he is learning something about the nature of ἀρετή. To suggest a possible criticism is in no way to take issue with the major thesis of this thorough and imaginative study.—R. J. W. (shrink)

During the past few years there has appeared an enormous amount of secondary literature dealing with various aspects of the Tractatus. In the main, the purpose animating this scholarship has been a search for a coherent interpretation or key to the Tractatus. Those who have looked forward to the appearance of Black's book for a definitive interpretation of the Tractatus will be disappointed. For Black is not primarily concerned with arguing for a definitive, coherent interpretation. Instead, this book is a (...) companion "intended to make it easier for a serious student of Wittgenstein's early work to reach his own interpretation of the Tractatus." Black has divided the text into "installments" which are introduced by preliminary statements. These are followed by detailed notes commenting on difficult expressions, relevant quotations from Wittgenstein's other works and unpublished manuscripts, explanations of the views to which Wittgenstein refers, cross references to related passages, and occasional free paraphrases of puzzling passages. Given Black's modest but difficult aim, the book will prove invaluable to all students of Wittgenstein, although it will certainly not satisfy those who continue to search for "the key" to what is surely the most mystifying and intriguing philosophic book of our times.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Professor Hall with this work supplements the earlier bibliography of T. E. Jessop, who has collaborated on some of the entries in the current work. There is an overlap of some ten years, inasmuch as Hall’s work commences with the year 1930; entries run through early 1971. The bibliography is extensive, containing some 800 items in all the various Western languages as well as transliterated Japanese. In addition, attention is directed to critical studies of many of the listings. An eighteen-page (...) subject index contributes further to making this a quite useful and valuable addition to the field of Hume scholarship.—R. J. G. (shrink)

Passmore is one of the most outstanding historians of the contemporary philosophical scene. He seems to have read everything, digested it, and has an uncanny ability to empathize with diverse philosophical viewpoints and elucidate them in a clear, witty, cogent style. Although the first three quarters of this revised edition is basically the same as earlier editions, we now have additions to his account of Ayer, Popper, Wittgenstein and Sartre; enlarged sections on Austin, Jaspers and Heidegger; a new section on (...) Merleau-Ponty and a chapter bringing us right up to the present discussions of the mind-body problem in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. With this revised edition, one feels more acutely the pinch of the limitations that Passmore initially set for himself, viz., to treat the ideas of those writers that entered into the public domain of philosophical discussion in England during the past hundred years. Consequently his treatment of continental thinkers is not nearly as complete or perceptive as his treatment of British philosophers, or his chapters on "classical" American thinkers which are among the best written by anybody.—R. J. B. (shrink)

There are many signs of a renewed and increasing interest in Hegel. And gradually this is spreading to philosophy students, both graduate and undergraduate. In part, this has been stimulated by the affinity students feel with some of the intellectual orientations that have emerged from, or in reaction to, Hegelianism. In part, it represents a search for a richer intellectual base from which one can explore the pressing issues of our time. Considering the foreignness of the Hegelian idiom from Anglo-Saxon (...) traditions, the problem remains of how to "get into" Hegel. This brief book is intended to serve as an introduction for the uninitiated and it may well serve to whet a student's appetite to study Hegel's own texts. Despite the claim to be an introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics, it is really an introduction to some central themes in Hegel. While its brevity is in some ways an advantage, I am dubious if a student will be able to get very much of a "concrete" idea of what Hegel is "up to." Considering Soll's purpose, he gives too much attention here to commenting on other interpreters of Hegel. For the novice, this will be confusing, and for the serious scholar of Hegel, Soll's almost exclusive concern with English language commentators will seem excessively provincial.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The title of this work evokes suspicion: how can Soll aim at one "part"--metaphysics--of a philosophy such as Hegel's? How would one go about introducing only Hegel's metaphysics? One might, with some validity, go about discussing Hegel's metaphysics ; but how would one, assuming his reader's general unfamiliarity with Hegel, introduce his "metaphysics," and that alone? Alas, one's worst fears are soon realized: the opening sentence reads, "Hegel's method is best approached by asking what he was trying to accomplish with (...) it." Bifurcation. The operant supposition which guides the work is that Hegel "has" a method with which he attempts to "do" various things. This view is utterly un-Hegelian, as even a cursory reading of the introduction to the Logic, to cite only one source, illustrates. No guide to Hegel is going to be useful that clouds this fundamental point. The whole texture of Hegel's integrated and integrative system is never rescued. Soll's presentation approaches, and treats of, Hegel from the standpoint of pedestrian philosophizing, leaning heavily on the collected tradition to make distinctions in a glib and altogether external way. From his starting point, Soll proceeds, drawing on a handful of secondary sources, to deliver an extended series of facile, shotgun commentaries: but if one already has the ability to adjudge which of them find their mark, he does not need the book in the first place. The primary problem a book of this kind faces is the perhaps insuperable difficulty of creating a suitable "introduction" to Hegel's thought. And to be fair, one might say that most of the shortcomings of Soll's book are attributable to this problem. Where does one start, if not where Hegel did; and whither does one proceed, except in the direction Hegel did? One should either attempt to go that path, or elect not to go at all. It is too easy to lose one's way in so dense a forest.--R. J. G. (shrink)

Based on the 1964 Morse Lectures delivered at the Union Theological Seminary, this brief volume provides the best introduction to Hartshorne's defense of natural theology and the distinctive themes that he has developed in exploring religious and theological matters. Once again he calls for throwing off the intellectual chains in which the Aristotelian, so-called Platonic and neo-Platonic influences have confined theological discussion and for repudiating the claims of Hume and Kant concerning natural theology. Whether discussing the meaning of God, worship, (...) love, the status of theistic proofs, the relations between religion and science, Hartshorne has fresh insights to share. There is a vital optimism that pervades these lectures about the future of natural theology and its ability to answer rationally its critics.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The first three volumes of the Minnesota Studies have become recent classics. They contain some of the most important and philosophically suggestive papers published during the fifties and early sixties. Some of the discussions which are the basis of volume IV took place in 1966 and a number of the papers here seem "dated"--at least to the extent that discussion of the relevant issues has been superseded by publication in other places. There is still another tour de force by Paul (...) K. Feyerabend, who is becoming more strident and more anarchistic in his politics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. There is a brief paper by the late N. R. Hanson and a typically solid and balanced defense of the "standard conception" of scientific theories by Carl G. Hempel. Three papers by Paul E. Meehl are included which, as usual, excel in the care and clarity of argument--even though there seems to be little that is new here. And there is also an informed discussion of correspondence rules by a number of participants in a special conference dedicated to this subject. While the quality of the papers is high, this volume nevertheless lacks some of the excitement and novelty of the earlier volumes.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Written in 1933 when the author was under the influence of logical positivism, but published only in 1961. Perhaps because the author did not at the time of writing have access to Wittgenstein's early notebooks, the study suffers from a lack of subtlety and appreciation of the problems that were preoccupying Wittgenstein when he wrote the Tractatus. It offers a general interpretation rather than a detailed explication of specific propositions. Of special interest is Maslow's attempt to show that the Tractatus (...) bears a strong family resemblance to the transcendental philosophy of Kant. Quite independently, he thereby supports an interpretation of the Tractatus which has been gaining acceptance among commentators on Wittgenstein.--R. J. B. (shrink)