Monismus und Dualismus in Platons Prinzipienlehre

Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 2 (1):1-21 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the main problems of Plato's unwritten doctrine has to do with whether his theory of principles has a strictly dualistic or rather a more monistic character. The thesis of this essay is that Plato combines monism and dualism in a particular fashion. Both the dialogues and the testimony of the unwritten doctrine reveal that in Plato's metaphysics the One is the genuinely absolute principle; Plato's second principle, the Many, is not a second absolute - otherwise it would dissolve the very concept of the absolute. Instead, Plato conceives the principle of multiplicity itself as a unity, therefore as in some - in any event ineffable - way as being derived or having emanated from the absolute One. The One itself is wholly transcendent and thus ineffable, knowable neither by reason nor by intellective intuition. Nonetheless, being and knowledge are constituted by the coordination of the One and the Many, for which reason the latter is a principle. Hence, Plato's metaphysics combine a monistic ascent to the absolute with a dualistic derivation of being, a combination made necessary because the One transcends not only all being, but also all knowledge

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

II. Bergsons Monismus.D. Uznadze - 1926 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 37 (1-2):26-39.
Fortschritt als Ideologie: Wilhelm Ostwald und der Monismus.Andreas Braune - 2009 - [Leipzig]: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.
Der wahre cartesische Dualismus.Hermann Wein - 1956 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 10 (1):3 - 28.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-30

Downloads
47 (#331,642)

6 months
10 (#255,509)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references