In the past ten years, work by K€olbel, MacFarlane, Richard and others has rekindled old debates on relativism. In this important contribution to those debates, the authors defend a ‘mainstream’ view about the contents of thought and talk that they call Simplicity against the assaults from such ‘analytic relativists’.

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking (...) or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking. (shrink)

Okuma etkinliği hem ana dilde hem de yabancı bir dil öğrenmede önemli bir yer tutar. Bireyler okuma aracılığıyla başka görüş, düşünce ve kültürel unsurları öğrenir, onlarla etkileşimde bulunurlar. Bireylerin yabancı dil öğreniminde, yabancı dilde okuma becerilerini geliştirmek amacıyla bazı uygulamalar önerilir. Bunlardan biri, basitleştirilmiş kitaplardır. Bu çalışma, yabancı dil öğreniminde okuma becerisinin arttırılması için yapılan basitleştirilmiş okuma kitaplarının kullanımıyla ilgili önemli unsurları belirtmeyi ve bu tür kitapların kullanımına eleştirel bir bakış sunmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu çalışma, öncelikle basitleştirilmiş kitapların kullanımını tarihsel açıdan (...) ele almış, faydaları hakkında destekleyici ve karşıt görüşleri derlemiş, son olarak da basitleştirilmiş kitaplardan yapısal örnekler ile dil öğrenimi açısından sorgulama yapmıştır. Basitleştirilmiş kitaplar aracılığıyla, öğrencinin okuma becerisi ve yabancı dil öğrenmesinin gelişmesi düşünülse de, bu tür kitapların yabancı dil öğreniminde kullanımına temkinli bir şekilde yaklaşmak, kitapları seçerken içerik olarak dil edinimi ve kültürel duruş olup olmadığını gözden geçirmek gereklidir. Buna ek olarak, yabancı dil öğreniminde yapısal ve bağlamsal olarak bir kazanım olup olmadığı sorgulanmalıdır. Sonuç olarak, basitleştirilmiş olan edebi eserler yerine orijinallerin ve her seviyeye uygun farklı edebi metin türlerinin yabancı dilde okuma becerisini geliştirmede kullanılması önerilmektedir. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to clarify Husserl’s critical remarks about Kant’s view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl criticizes Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logic, but rather ascribing an ‘extraordinary apriority’ to it. He thinks the reason for Kant’s uncritical attitude to logic lies in Kant’s view of logic as directed toward the subjective, instead of being concerned with a ‘“world” of ideal Objects’. Whereas (...) for Kant, general logic is about laws of reasoning. Husserl thinks that formal logic should describe formal structures. Husserl claims that if Kant had had a more comprehensive concept of logic, he would have thought of raising critical questions about how logic is possible. This kind of criticism cannot itself use forms of judgments or syllogisms of logic, nor even the ‘inferential’ [schliessende] method more generally, but should be descriptive in nature. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the method for such criticism. The paper argues that this results in reflection, and possibly revision, of the logical principles with respect to the normative goals governing the investigation in question. (shrink)

Doctoral programs at U.S. universities play a critical role in the development of human resources both in the United States and abroad. This volume reports the results of an extensive study of U.S. research-doctorate programs in five broad fields: physical sciences and mathematics, engineering, social and behavioral sciences, biological sciences, and the humanities. Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States documents changes that have taken place in the size, structure, and quality of doctoral education since the widely used 1982 editions. (...) This update provides selected information on nearly 4,000 doctoral programs in 41 subdisciplines at 274 doctorate-granting institutions. This volume also reports the results of the National Survey of Graduate Faculty, which polled a sample of faculty for their views on the scholarly quality of program faculty and the effectiveness of doctoral programs in preparing research scholars/scientists. This much-anticipated update of such an essential reference will be useful to education administrators, university faculty, and students seeking authoritative information on doctoral programs. (shrink)

Recently, the substance view of persons has been heavily criticized for the counterintuitive conclusions it seems to imply in scenarios such as embryo rescue cases and embryo loss. These criticisms...

[...] Schapiro’s new metaphor of ‘being drawn out of oneself’ is suggestive of alienation, even though it is supposed to apply at a different level. As much as in Korsgaard’s account of reflective endorsement, the problem of the agent’s dealing with their inclinations is treated as a solitary internal affair: what is staged is a psychodrama, that is, a drama that plays in the agent’s mind. The (social) world enters solely as backdrop scenery, and social roles and scripts are ultimately (...) up for choice. But this is reductive and unduly simplifies matters. In this regard, Kant’s forensic and political metaphors seem far more perspicuous in articulating the activity that leads to the agential authority of action. The ekstatic view is bound to disregard the dynamic and historical dimension of rational agency. The ekstatic view of the rational will charges the dramatic moment of choice-making with all significance, hence implicitly overshadowing the long-term history of inner conflict and the preparatory and processual stages of deliberation. This may result in a loss of explanatory power regarding the diachronic dimension of practical thinking, the long-term activities leading to decision-making, the complex processes of self-formation, the construction of practical identity and the social practices and activities that help us to sustain our commitments across time. [...]. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be (...) more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies. (shrink)

This paper investigates what it is to understand human differences in terms of deficits and examines criticisms of this approach. In the past few decades, across many fields of inquiry and outside the academy there has been a surge of interest in critiquing "the deficit view" of all manner of group differences and deviations from the norm. But what exactly is meant by "deficit view" and related terms when they figure in accounts of human differences? Do critics of (...) the deficit view claim that they are never appropriate or that particular applications of the approach are inappropriate? The aim of this paper is twofold: to identify and articulate some of the conceptual issues at the heart of debates about deficit approaches and to examine how these issues matter. Autism is my focus case. As we will see, many critiques of the deficit view of autism tend to characterize what is problematic about taking a deficit view in terms of the personal and social harm that deficit views can or do effect. One important upshot of my discussion, I argue, is that there is another kind of drawback to deficit thinking that is independent of the deficit view's potential negative personal and social consequences, a drawback that deserves serious consideration and sustained critical attention: in some instances, at least, deficit views impede scientific and philosophical progress in our understanding of the phenomena themselves. Thus, articulating and assessing deficit approaches is of practical and theoretical importance. (shrink)

Whether perception involves the manipulation of representations is currently heavily debated. The embedded view advanced by Nico Orlandi seeks a middle passage between representationalism and radical enactivism. In this paper I argue for a non-representational take on EV. I argue that this is the best way to resolve the objections EV has received from both representationalists and non-representationalists. I analyze this debate, and distinguish four sorts of objections: the objection of the wrongfully cut middleman, the argument against explanatory exclusionism, (...) the case for scientific benefits of representations, and the charge of inconsistent ascription of representational status in EV. I argue that the middleman was never cut in EV, and is controversial to boot, otherwise equal, non-representational explanations have primacy over representational explanations, due to the lack of naturalistic grounds for representations and the unnecessarily ascribed cognitive load to the system. Further, I show that puts the cart before the horse, and the arguments on offer are viciously circular. However, the final objection, lays bare a deeper issue for EV. At the cost of giving up the middle position, however, the explanatory tools already available to EV can be shown to cover the work initially thought to require representation. I conclude that EV is best altered to be a non-representational theory of perception. (shrink)

이 논문의 주된 목표는 프리드릭과 사우스우드가 제안한 약속의무에 대한 신뢰견해의 한계를 보이는 것이다. 신뢰견해에 따르면, 약속인이 피약속인에게 무엇을 하겠다고 약속하는 것은 기본적으로 피약속인으로 하여금 그것을 신뢰하게끔 요청하는 것이다. 이 견해에 대한 가장 기초적인 해석에 따르면, 이렇게 형성된 신뢰를 저버리는 것이 그르므로 약속인은 자신이 말한 대로 행위 해야 할 의무를 지니게 된다. 바로 이런 방식으로 약속의무가 설명된다. 먼저 필자는 신뢰견해에서 중요한 역할을 하는 신뢰 개념 자체에 대해서 논한다. 특히 이 개념을 프리드릭과 사우스우드가 어떻게 이해하고 있는지 분석한다. 다음으로 이를 바탕으로 신뢰견해에 대한 (...) 두 가지 해석을 논한다. 프리드릭과 사우스우드는 신뢰를 저버리는 행위의 그름을 강조하는 신뢰견해에 대한 가장 기초적인 해석을 말하면서도, 약속인이 스스로 피약속인에게 제기한 신뢰에 대한 요청을 무시하는 행위의 그름을 더 강조하기도 한다. 필자는 이런 두 입장 사이의 긴장을 해소하는 방식을 제안하고 그것이 신뢰견해에 대한 최선의 해석이 된다고 주장한다. 하지만 이렇게 이해된 신뢰견해마저도 궁극적으로는 일반적 설명력의 감소라는 난관에 봉착함을 보인다. (shrink)

This volume of the Townsend Papers in the Humanities commemorates the twenty-fifth year of the Doreen B. Townsend Center for the Humanities at the University of California, Berkeley. As such, the volume is an attempt to capture the breadth and depth of lectures and events presented by the center. Many are revised versions of lectures and presentations organized in connection with the annual appointment of the Avenali Professor in the Humanities at Berkeley, or Berkeley's Una's Lecturer ; several are based (...) on other events presented by the center over the years, such as the "Humanities Perspectives on Aging" program or the "Futures" lecture series organized to commemorate the center's tenth anniversary. All are the reflection of a public event before a live audience. We have chosen to retain references to the live event where they occur, though space limitations would not permit the inclusion of audience questions. (shrink)

Gadamer’s hermeneutics has met with criticism in the more than forty years since the original German publication of Wahrheit und Methode in 1960. A figure who has recently criticized Gadamer’s hermeneutics from the perspective of traditional hermeneutics is Pol Vandevelde. He published a book entitled: "The Task of the Interpreter: Text, Meaning, and Negotiation”. The first two chapters of this book, especially the second chapter, with the title “Interpretation as Event: A Critique of Gadamer’s Critical Pluralism,” is devoted to (...) attacking some aspects of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. He has called his critiques as 'Ambiguities'. In fact, he focuses on three ambiguities: the fusion of horizons, the active role of the interpreter, and the status of language. Vandevelde’s critiques, similar to the critical views of other critics, are directed to four subjects: the problem of author's intention, the problem of objectivity, the problem of validity of interpretation, and finally the problem of relativism. Although I have examined all his three ambiguities, but because of the limitations that you have mentionedin the ‘Submission Guidelines’, I have sent you only a part of my paper. It seems to me that Vandevelde’s critiques shows that he has not adequate consideration to the foundations of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

Gadamer’s hermeneutics has met with criticism in the more than forty years since the original German publication of Wahrheit und Methode in 1960. A figure who has recently criticized Gadamer’s hermeneutics from the perspective of traditional hermeneutics is Pol Vandevelde. He published a book entitled: "The Task of the Interpreter: Text, Meaning, and Negotiation”. The first two chapters of this book, especially the second chapter, with the title “Interpretation as Event: A Critique of Gadamer’s Critical Pluralism,” is devoted to (...) attacking some aspects of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. He has called his critiques as 'Ambiguities'. In fact, he focuses on three ambiguities: the fusion of horizons, the active role of the interpreter, and the status of language. Vandevelde’s critiques, similar to the critical views of other critics, are directed to four subjects: the problem of author's intention, the problem of objectivity, the problem of validity of interpretation, and finally the problem of relativism. Although I have examined all his three ambiguities, but because of the limitations that you have mentionedin the ‘Submission Guidelines’, I have sent you only a part of my paper. It seems to me that Vandevelde’s critiques shows that he has not adequate consideration to the foundations of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

Justification of believe in God had been one of the most challenging problem throughout history of philosophy. The problem is "is believe in god epistemically justified?" Gutting's theory in justification of theism is combined of two parts. He critiques Witgenstainian's view firstly, and then considers Aquinas’, Plantinga's, and some other views as incorrect views on theism. Gutting says that Witgenstainians and Tomistic approaches cannot draw a religious language exactly. He also considers Plantinga's view as an incorrect view, (...) because it is completely possible that the viewpoint of believers in believing to the existence of God to be evaluate epistemological as true as the non-believers’ view to the nonexistence of God. Discussing his own view, Gutting justifies believing in God regarding the religious experience. This article explains Gutting's critique of Witgenstainian's, Thomistic and Planting's approach on justification of believe in God. (shrink)

El siguiente trabajo se propone analizar críticamente la concepción clásica y monológica de la imparcialidad del juez, su respectivo correlato institucional y las consecuencias para interpretar el vínculo que debería tener con los afectados. Para ello se realiza un análisis reconstructivo de El Federalista de Hamilton, Madison y Jay. En primer lugar, se analiza en tal documento el concepto de imparcialidad y sus supuestos teóricos. En segundo lugar, se señala el modelo constitucional derivado. En tercer lugar, se muestra cómo, a (...) pesar de los giros y la distancia teórica del "nuevo constitucionalismo", algunas de las ideas subyacentes en El Federalista permanecen vigentes. Finalmente, el trabajo intenta poner en práctica el marco teórico-normativo de la democracia deliberativa para el análisis histórico reconstructivo de la teoría constitucional. The following work intends to critically analyze the classic and monological conception of the Judge´s impartiality, its respective institutional correlate and the consequences to understand the bond that should have with those affected. For this, a reconstructive analysis of The Federalist by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay is made. In the first place, the concept of impartiality and its theoretical assumptions are analyzed in such document. Second, it shows how, despite the turns and transformations of the "new constitutionalism", some of this assumptions remain applicable. Finally, the paper attempts to put into practice the normative theoretical framework of deliberative democracy for the historical reconstructive analysis of constitutional theory. (shrink)

The Received View on quantum non-individuality is, roughly speaking, the view according to which quantum objects are not individuals. It seems clear that the RV finds its standard expression nowadays through the use of the formal apparatuses of non-reflexive logics, mainly quasi-set theory. In such logics, the relation of identity is restricted, so that it does not apply for terms denoting quantum particles; this “lack of identity” formally characterizes their non-individuality. We face then a dilemma: on the one (...) hand, identity seems too important to be given up, on the other hand the RV seems to require that identity be given up. In this paper we shall discuss how the specific characterization of the RV through non-reflexive logics came to be framed. We examine some of the main objections to this version of the RV and argue that they are misguided under this specific “non-reflexive” understanding of the RV. Finally, we shall also argue that this non-reflexive view is not the only option for a metaphysical articulation of the RV: less radical approaches to identity and logic are open. In particular, some of these alternative approaches to the RV we present may be immune to most of the criticisms presented against the non-reflexive approach. (shrink)

We perceive a world of mind-independent macroscopic material objects such as stones, tables, trees, and animals. Our experience is the joint upshot of the way these things are and our route through them, along with the various relevant circumstances of perception; and it depends on the normal operation of our perceptual systems. How should we characterise our perceptual experience so as to respect its basis and explain its role in grounding empirical thought and knowledge? I offered an answer to this (...) question in Perception and its objects. Here I aim to clarify some of my central arguments and to develop and defend the position further in the light of subsequent critical discussion. (shrink)

Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. (...) These tensions raise an important question, namely, what are the metaphysical implications of the phenomenologically intuitive claim that objects themselves are constituents of experience? To answer this question, I draw on a broad swath of thought on transcendental idealism and phenomenology. I argue that a modest metaphysics of appearance is warranted within the critical limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Through discussing and addressing the problems that typically plague transcendental arguments, I show that Husserlian phenomenology permits stronger claims about objects of experience than deflationary accounts allow but does not permit claims about intrinsic properties allowed by some forms of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Halvorson argues that the semantic view of theories leads to absurdities. Glymour shows how to inoculate the semantic view against Halvorson's criticisms, namely by making it into a syntactic view of theories. I argue that this modified semantic-syntactic view cannot do the philosophical work that the original "language-free" semantic view was supposed to do.

Neuroscience and psychiatry -- Psychotherapy and psychiatry -- Diagnosis in psychiatry -- The boundaries of mental disorders -- Mood and mental illness -- Psychiatry's problem children -- Evidence-based psychiatry -- Psychiatric drugs: miracles and limitations -- Talk therapies: the need for a unified method -- Psychiatry in practice -- Training psychiatrists -- Psychiatry and society -- The future of psychiatry.

In his formidable Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of an in-between stance which he calls the “parallaxview”: when confronted with an antinomic stance, in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other. One should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not as a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but as (...) the irreducible gap between the positions themselves, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant’s stance is thus “to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference .” What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution—the transcendental turn—is unique in that it first rejects any ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated—reconciled. And, according to Karatani, Marx, in his “critique of political economy,” when faced with the opposition of the “classical” political economy and the neo-classic reduction of value to a purely relational entity without substance, accomplished exactly the same breakthrough toward the “parallax” view: he treatedthis opposition as a Kantian antinomy, i.e., value has to originate outside circulation, in production, and in circulation. (shrink)

1960년대에 집중적으로 제기된 논리경험주의에 대한 대다수의 철학적 공격은 이른바 논리경험주의의 ‘수용된 견해’를 향한 것이었고, 이후 과학철학자들이 공공연히 ‘논리경험주의는 죽었다’라는 표현을 쓸 정도로까지 논리경험주의 과학철학의 위상은 낮아졌다. 문제는 이와 같은 논리경험주의의 ‘수용된 견해’가 대부분 비엔나 학파를 대표하는 카르납의 철학적 관점을 반영하고 있다는 데 있다. 최근의 논리경험주의에 대한 역사철학적 탐구가 보여주듯, 논리경험주의 내에 다양성이 존재했고 특히 카르납으로 대표되는 비엔나 학파와 라이헨바흐로 대표되는 베를린 학파 사이에는 중요한 철학적 입장의 차이가 있었다. 만약 우리가 라이헨바흐의 과학철학적 입장을 카르납과 비견될 만한 논리경험주의의 중요한 인식론적 입장이라고 간주한다면, (...) 과연 그의 입장이 이후 논리경험주의에 대해 제시된 각종 비판을 견딜 수 있는지 다시 점검해 볼 필요가 있다. 이를 위해 우선 나는 논리경험주의의 입장과 이에 대한 비판을 체계적으로 정리하는 과학철학자 수피(Suppe)의 논의를 검토한 후, 논리경험주의에 대한 후대 철학자들의 비판이 결정적이지는 않았음을 보인다. 다음으로 나는 ‘과학적 철학’ 개념, ‘발견의 맥락’과 ‘정당화의 맥락’ 구분, ‘과학 이론의 합리적 재구성’, ‘과학자와 철학자의 노동 분업’ 등 논리경험주의의 주요 인식론적 논제에 관한 라이헨바흐의 입장을 재구성한다. 이러한 재구성을 통해 나는, 라이헨바흐의 인식론적 입장이 구체적인 과학 이론의 인식론적 의의와 함축을 도출해내는데 있어 여전히 유효한 입장이라는 것을 보일 것이다. 실제로 라이헨바흐가 주장한 ‘이론 구체적인 인식론적 분석’은 오늘날에도 여전히 유용하고 필요한 철학적 방법론이며, 이 방법론은 논리경험주의에 반대하면서 얻어진 것이 아니라 논리경험주의가 오늘날의 과학철학에 남긴 소중한 유산이라고 보아야 한다. (shrink)

The foremost Italian philosopher of the first half of the 20th century, Croce's influence extended to every aspect of Italian intellectual life. This collection explores the depth, originality, and significance of his thought.

According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human (...) fetuses have the same intrinsic value and moral standing as adult human beings. After giving consideration to defenders of the substance view's replies to these charges, I then critique each of them, ultimately concluding that none is successful. Of course, in order to understand all of these things – the reductio charges, defenders of the substance view's replies to them, and my criticisms of their replies – one must have a better understanding of the substance view as well as its defense. Accordingly, I address the substance view's understanding of rational moral agency as well as present its defense. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a defence of the New View, on which ignorance is lack of true belief rather than lack of knowledge. Pierre Le Morvan has argued that the New View is untenable, partly because it fails to take into account the distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. I argue that propositional ignorance is just a subspecies of factive ignorance and that all the work that needs to be done can be done by using the concept (...) of factive ignorance. I also defend two arguments of mine in favour of the New View against Le Morvan’s criticisms. As to the Linguistic Argument, I point out that the intuitions of the adherent of the New View about cases of true belief that fall short of knowledge are really intuitions about factive rather than propositional ignorance. As to the Excuse Argument, I argue that true belief is exculpatorily relevant: a true belief in a proposition p , where disbelief that p or suspension on p would provide at least a partial excuse, is relevant in that it renders one blameworthy for one’s action, unless further excuses hold. Finally, I reply to two closely related objections that might be levelled against the New View, namely that it seems false that one can reduce one’s ignorance by arbitrarily believing as many propositions as possible and that it seems false that an intellectually conscientious and critical person is more ignorant than an intellectually sloppy and credulous person just because the latter has more true beliefs. (shrink)

In his formidable Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of an in-between stance which he calls the “parallaxview”: when confronted with an antinomic stance, in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other. One should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not as a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but as (...) the irreducible gap between the positions themselves, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant’s stance is thus “to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference (parallax).” What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution—the transcendental turn—is unique in that it first rejects any ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation (“finitude”) of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated—reconciled. And, according to Karatani, Marx, in his “critique of political economy,” when faced with the opposition of the “classical” political economy and the neo-classic reduction of value to a purely relational entity without substance, accomplished exactly the same breakthrough toward the “parallax” view: he treatedthis opposition as a Kantian antinomy, i.e., value has to originate outside circulation, in production, and in circulation. (shrink)

In the Western classical tradition music criticism represents one of the most complex and influential forms of performance assessment and evaluation. However, in the age of peer opinion sharing and quick communication channels it is not clear what place music critics’ judgments still hold in the classical music market. This article presents expert music critics’ view on their role, function, and influence. It is based on semi-structured interviews with 14 native English- and German-speaking critics who had an average of (...) 32 years professional activity in classical music review. We present the first visual model to summarize music critics’ descriptions of their role and responsibilities, writing processes, and their influences. The model distinguishes six roles : consumer adviser, teacher, judge, writer, stakeholder, and artist advocate. It identifies core principles governing critical writing for music as well as challenges that arise from balancing the above six responsibilities whilst remaining true to an implicit code of conduct. Finally, it highlights the factors that inform critics’ writing in terms of the topics they discuss and the discursive tools they employ. We show that music critics self-identify as highly skilled mediators between artists, producers and consumers, and justify their roles as judge and teacher based on a wealth of experience as against the influx of pervasive amateur reviews. Our research approach also offers occupation-based insights into professional music review standards, including the challenges of maintaining objectivity and resisting commercial pressures. This article offers a new viewpoint on music critics’ judgments and recommendations that helps to explain their expectations and reflections. (shrink)

In his formidable Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of an in-between stance which he calls the “parallaxview”: when confronted with an antinomic stance, in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other. One should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not as a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but as (...) the irreducible gap between the positions themselves, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant’s stance is thus “to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference (parallax).” What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution—the transcendental turn—is unique in that it first rejects any ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation (“finitude”) of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated—reconciled. And, according to Karatani, Marx, in his “critique of political economy,” when faced with the opposition of the “classical” political economy and the neo-classic reduction of value to a purely relational entity without substance, accomplished exactly the same breakthrough toward the “parallax” view: he treatedthis opposition as a Kantian antinomy, i.e., value has to originate outside circulation, in production, and in circulation. (shrink)

Different conceptions of scientific theories, such as the state spaces approach of Bas van Fraassen, the phase spaces approach of Frederick Suppe, the set-theoretical approach of Patrick Suppes, and the structuralist view of Joseph Sneed et al. are usually put together into one big family. In addition, the definite article is normally used, and thus we speak of the semantic conception of theories and of its different approaches . However, in The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism , (...) starting from certain remarks already made in “Theory Structure” , Current Research in Philosophy of Science, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979, pp. 317–338), Frederick Suppe excludes the structuralist view as well as other “European” versions from the semantic conception of theories. In this paper I will critically examine the reasons put forward by Suppe for this decision and, later, I will provide a general characterization of the semantic family and of the structuralist view of theories in such a way as to justify the inclusion of the structuralist view as a member of this family. (shrink)

This book argues for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. The central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through. To develop and defend this central claim, the first step is to show that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social (...) ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. The second step is to show that, when taken together, objections to the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology) imply that this model needs to be given up in favor of nonideal social ontology. In other words, we should look to nonideal rather than ideal social ontology for core concepts. The third step is to offer a positive account, called the power view, of nonideal social ontology. This account places the concept of social power at the core of a general theory of the social world and replaces the flat and narrow conception of power in ideal social ontology with a richer and more extensive conception. In addition, it rectifies a shortcoming in nonideal social ontology by attending to class, which has been notably and oddly overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

It is from the mere announcement of the possibility of human cloning that moralists have formulated critical arguments against the permissibility of introducing this practice. A critical survey of these arguments, however, shows that they are not well founded, i.e. that frequently they are not such that they can be used as legitimate arguments in the debate about what is publicly permissible in a state, that they rely on mistaken premises, or that they are non coherent with permissions (...) in relation to other forms of human reproduction. Each argument in favor of the banning of human cloning is analyzed by at least one of these means: whether it is coherent with the fundamental principles of contemporary democracies , whether it relies on well-founded and widely accepted results of scientific researches, and whether it is coherent with the usual and widely shared moral attitudes related to other forms of human reproduction. The most important argument that is taken as a good foundation for the prohibition of human cloning is the moral duty not to harm future persons. The result of the rejection of traditional moral arguments against human cloning does not represent an overall justification of human cloning, it only shows that new, or more sophisticated, arguments must be found if human cloning is to be banned. (shrink)

This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higher-order cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view.” In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis) with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do (...) represent objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject. (shrink)

The paper explores the view that in mathematics, in particular where the infinite is involved, the application of classical logic to statements involving the infinite cannot be taken for granted. L. E. J. Brouwer’s well-known rejection of classical logic is sketched, and the views of David Hilbert and especially Hermann Weyl, both of whom used classical logic in their mathematical practice, are explored. We inquire whether arguments for a critical view can be found that are independent of (...) constructivist premises and consider the entanglement of logic and mathematics. This offers a convincing case regarding second-order logic, but for first-order logic, it is not so clear. Still, we ask whether we understand the application of logic to the higher infinite better than we understand the higher infinite itself. (shrink)

This article responds to critical views of John Rhym, Martin Rossouw, Ludo de Roo, and Annie Sandrussi on my 2017 book Phenomenology of Film: A Heideggerian Account of the Film Experience. The article also takes up positive footholds from the analyses of Chiara Quaranta and Jason Wirth. The main topics addressed include Martin Heidegger’s ontic-ontological distinction; the notion of film-as-philosophy; being-in-the-world read as being-in-the-film-world; and questions surrounding the facticity and identity of the film viewer.

"Thinking about thinking", the topic of this section of our volume, leads us into an Escherian web of self-referential interconnections — which nevertheless make sense, at least if we do not shy away at once in the face of paradox, for fear of inconsistency. How do our critical faculties enter the picture? Adding a few conceptual dimensions to the merely linearly causal one may help us to shed light on the issue, and may help us also to understand some (...) of the basic strategies "Western" thought has developed throughout its historical pathway in its conscious dealings with the 'real'. Of course, in a few pages it is impossible to do justice to this complicated subject. But I'll try to give the reader an as clear as possible description of the, in my view, crucial issues, pointing out the ways they resonate into the many fields of interest represented in the intended readership, and leave it to the reader to dig deeper through the given references. (shrink)

To the mind of humans death is an impossible riddle, the ultimate of mysteries; therefore it has always been considered a task of paramount importance for philosophers to provide a satisfactory account for death. Among the numerous efforts to deal with the riddle of death, Epicurus’ one stands out not only for its unsurpassed simplicity and lucidness, but also for the innovative manner in which it approaches the issue: Epicurus denounces the fear of death as a profoundly unfruitful, unreasonable and (...) unjustifiable passion of the mind. In this short paper I will first provide a brief account of Epicurus’ argumentation. Then I will argue that, although Epicure’s efforts to annihilate the fear of death proved to be unconvincing (people never ceased to fear death), still in a way they have been successful. Epicurus managed to rationalize in a certain degree the most deeply rooted fear in the souls of humans, and this seems to have been his initial purpose: consolation sometimes is due not only to definite resolution, but also to doubt and inconclusiveness. (shrink)