The paper presents the role of the experience of historical transformation in the modifications of the historical conscience: the fragmentation, the marginality and the removal from the rational foundation of values. It associates the postmodern world with different forms of losing the sense of values, the lack of measure and nuance in appreciation, the weak preoccupation for identity, authenticity, conscience of values in human behavior. In order to discuss the theory of values the paper introduces Rickertʼs (...) theory of the autonomy of value, Andreiʼs and Vianuʼs conceptions on the system of values, Schelerʼs hierarchy of values, and Hartmannʼs concept of knowledge of value. (shrink)

Value pluralism is the idea, most prominently endorsed by Isaiah Berlin, that fundamental human values are universal, plural, conflicting, and incommensurable with one another. Incommensurability is the key component of pluralism, undermining familiar monist philosophies such as utilitarianism. But if values are incommensurable, how do we decide between them when they conflict? George Crowder assesses a range of responses to this problem proposed by Berlin and developed by his successors. Three broad approaches are especially important: universalism, (...) contextualism, and conceptualism. Crowder argues that the conceptual approach is the most fruitful, yielding norms of value diversity, personal autonomy, and inclusive democracy. Historical context must also be taken into account. Together these approaches indicate a liberal politics of redistribution, multiculturalism, and constitutionalism, and a public policy in which basic values are carefully balanced. The Problem of Value Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and Beyond is a uniquely comprehensive survey of the political theory of value pluralism and also an original contribution by a leading voice in the pluralist literature. Scholars and researchers interested in the work of Berlin, liberalism, value pluralism, and related ideas will find this a stimulating and valuable source. (shrink)

This chapter considers the difficulties inherent in judgment, and focuses on differences of an ethical variety, shot through with the normative reality of the ethical pluralism of values, from relativisms to monisms, and some of their characteristics conditionality, incompatibility, and incommensurability. It also considers the type of commitments made in relation to these values and different types of conflict. The chapter explains five types of burdens of judgment listed by John Rawls. Rawls' solution for avoiding the general (...) fact of State oppression has collateral effects on moral philosophy and on ethics. Unlike pluralism, relativism questions, in a variety of ways, the possibility of discussion, of justification and of a critique of values. There are at least three distinct types of relativism: radical relativism, conventionalist relativism, and perspectivist relativism. The most notable fact is reasonable pluralism, described as “the diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies”. (shrink)

By way of introduction I want first to distinguish between several types of pluralism; then I want to consider more closely the pluralism of norms and values in order to formulate, finally, the problem that is central to this essay, the problem of particular versus universal norms.

Value pluralists believe in multiple dimensions of value. What does betterness along a dimension have to do with being better overall? Any systematic answer begins with the Strong Pareto principle: one thing is overall better than another if it is better along one dimension and at least as good along all others. We defend Strong Pareto from recent counterexamples and use our discussion to develop a novel view of dimensions of value, one which puts Strong Pareto on firmer footing. We (...) conclude by defending Dimensionalism, the hypothesis that overall value relations are determined solely by how things compare along value dimensions. These are first steps towards a more systematic value pluralism. (shrink)

William Galston is a distinguished political philosopher whose work is informed by the experience of having also served from 1993–5 as President Clinton's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy. He is thus able to speak with an authority unique amongst political theorists about the implications of advancing certain moral and political values in practice. The foundational argument of this 2002 book is that liberalism is compatible with the value pluralism first espoused by Isaiah Berlin. William Galston defends a version (...) of value pluralism - liberal pluralism - and argues, against the contentions of John Gray and others, that it undergirds a kind of liberal politics that gives weight to the ability of individuals and groups to live their lives in accordance with their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning and purpose to life. (shrink)

I argue that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly distinguished. The first kind of pluralism, weak pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say that there are many things that are valuable. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Moore, Brentano and Chisholm were interested in. The second kind of pluralism, strong pluralism, is the view (...) philosophers have in mind when they say there are many values, or many kinds of value. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Stocker, Kekes and Nussbaum have advanced. I separate and elucidate these views, and show how the distinction between them affects the contemporary debate about value pluralism. (shrink)

It is increasingly accepted by philosophers of science that values influence the scientific process. The next question is then: under what conditions is the influence of values justifiable? Elliott (2017) highlights three conditions, namely value influences should be (1) made transparent, (2) representative of our major social and ethical priorities, (3) scrutinized through engagement between different stakeholders. Here, I analyze Elliott’s conditions (1) and (2). The first condition, transparency, brings benefits, but also has its drawbacks, in particular in (...) relation to fostering scientific pluralism, as I argue, analyzing transparency initiatives in political science. Elliott’s second condition, representativeness, might help us in answering which/whose values scientists should (justifiably) use. This condition might be understood as values used in science should be representative/democratically legitimate. Alternatively, one could consider some values just being incorrect, while others conform to our principles. Elliott’s account of representativeness seems to sway between those two views. Starting from this ambiguity and considering the discipline of economics, I develop an alternative account of representativeness acknowledging that science consists of a variety of approaches adequately addressing particular types of questions and different groups of stakeholders might be interested in answering different questions. Would modifying Elliott’s conditions along those lines not lead to a too isolationist scientific pluralism? Clarifying the social-epistemic dynamics science and democracy share, I emphasize the importance of agonistic channels to deal with isolationist risks. Throughout this chapter, it is evident how close questions about scientific plurality and value influences are to questions about democracy. (shrink)

William Galston is a distinguished political philosopher whose work is informed by the experience of having also served from 1993–5 as President Clinton's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy. He is thus able to speak with an authority unique amongst political theorists about the implications of advancing certain moral and political values in practice. The foundational argument of this 2002 book is that liberalism is compatible with the value pluralism first espoused by Isaiah Berlin. William Galston defends a version (...) of value pluralism - liberal pluralism - and argues, against the contentions of John Gray and others, that it undergirds a kind of liberal politics that gives weight to the ability of individuals and groups to live their lives in accordance with their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning and purpose to life. (shrink)

The main claim of this thesis is that value-judgments should play a profound role in the construction and evaluation of species classifications. The arguments for this claim will be presented over the course of five chapters. These are divided into two main parts; part one, which consists of the two first chapters, presents an argument for a radical form of species pluralism; part two, which comprises the remaining chapters, discusses the implications of radical species pluralism for the role (...) of values in species classification. The content of the five chapters is as follows. Chapter 1 starts with a discussion of the theoretical assumptions concerning species and natural kinds that form the broad framework within which the arguments of the thesis are placed. The aim of this chapter is to introduce a set of relatively uncontroversial assumptions that frame the rest of the thesis. On the basis of these assumptions, chapter 2 presents an argument for radical species pluralism. The chapter substantiates this argument with a broad range of examples, and compares this position to other forms of species pluralism. Chapter 3 returns to the main interest of the thesis, namely, the role of values in species classification. It introduces the notion of values and presents an argument for the value-ladenness of taxonomy on the basis of the considerations in the first two chapters. It then sketches three important views on values in science in the literature. Chapter 4 argues that the case presented in chapter 3 provides strong support for one of these views, called the ‘Aims View’, and against two other prominent views, called the ‘Epistemic Priority View’ and the ‘Value-Free Ideal’. The resulting view, in line with the Aims View, is that value-judgments should play a particularly substantial role in species classification. Chapter 5 then considers the popular assumption that these value-judgments in taxonomy commonly take the shape of generally accepted classificatory norms, and argues that this assumption is not tenable. Finally, a brief concluding chapter points at some implications of the claims and arguments in this thesis. (shrink)

Philosophers of neuroscience have been employing scientific explanation as an epistemic value to evaluate neuroscientific models for the past twenty years. Consequently, they have developed mechanistic and non-mechanistic accounts of neuroscientific explanation. These two types of accounts explicate how to use a specific kind of explanatory value to evaluate the epistemic value of neuroscientific models. This paper presents a case study involving the canonical models from mathematical and computational neuroscience. This case study will show that the above mechanistic and non-mechanistic (...) framework overly focuses on analyzing neuroscientific models as objects with representational contents. As a consequence, it pays less attention to the process of modeling and the epistemic attitudes of modelers; moreover, it can miss some important epistemic values used by modelers. By reconstructing their modeling process, I will identify the relevant modelers' epistemic attitudes and argue that these modelers use different kinds of epistemic values to evaluate the same type of canonical models. Furthermore, among them, one epistemic value is not captured by the relevant mechanistic and non-mechanistic accounts. I develop a processual framework that centers on the modeling process and modelers' epistemic attitudes. This process framework is better because it it accommodates both the mechanistic and non-mechanistic accounts of neuroscientific explanation regarding the canonical model in addition to capturing what both accounts leave out. (shrink)

Value pluralism is the metaphysical thesis that there is a plurality of values at the fundamental level of the evaluative domain. Value monism, on the other hand, is the claim that there is just one fundamental value. Pluralists, it is commonly argued, have an edge over monists when it comes to accounting for the conspicuous heterogeneity of the evaluative domain and the rationality of regretting well-justified decisions. Monists, in turn, seem to provide a far more plausible account of (...) rational evaluative decision-making. I argue that the impression of a theoretical stalemate, which is suggested by the exchange of those arguments, is premature. An assessment of the sub-positions in both camps, in conjunction with an analysis of value fundamentality based on the notion of grounding, reveals that certain versions of pluralism and monism—which I call moderate positions—can counter the respective objections. Thus, moderate value pluralism and moderate value monism emerge as the strongest positions in both camps. I conclude that the further debate should center around those two positions. (shrink)

There is a clear need for interventions that reduce moral distress among healthcare providers (HCPs), given the high prevalence of moral distress and the far-ranging negative consequences it has for them. Healthcare ethics consultants are frequently called upon to manage moral distress, especially among nursing staff. Recently, researchers have both broadened the definition of moral distress and demarcated subcategories of the phenomenon with the intent of creating more targeted and effective interventions. One of the most frequently occurring subcategories of moral (...) distress in this new taxonomy has been labeled “moral-constraint distress,” though scholars have argued that not all constraints on HCPs’ moral agency are inappropriate given the often-competing healthcare values of patients, families, and clinical staff. To attempt to reduce the instances of moral distress in cases in which the constraints on HCPs’ moral agency are justified, we propose an intervention that focuses on shifting the HCPs’ “frame of reference” on moral-constraint distress, teaching HCPs how to distinguish unjustified and justified constraints on their moral agency. The anchors of this blueprint for reducing moral-constraint distress are the philosophical concepts of “values pluralism” and “values imposition.” The rationale for this intervention is that, in situations where the constraint on moral agency is justified but the experience of moral distress could nevertheless be severe, the emphasis needs to be on helping the HCP to “think differently” rather than “act differently.”. (shrink)

In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in court, whose values (...) exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology. (shrink)

This essay discusses monism and pluralism about two related evaluative notions: welfare, or what makes people better off, and value simpliciter, or what makes the world better. These are stipulatively referred to as 'axiological value'. Axiological value property monists hold that one of these notions is reducible to the other (or else eliminable), while axiological value property pluralists deny this. Substantive monists about axiological value hold that there is just one basic kind of thing that makes our lives or (...) the world better, while substantive pluralists hold that there is more than one such thing. A more radical kind of pluralism holds that each of the plurality of good things is good in its own way, thus raising questions concerning value comparability and compensability. The essay elucidates these theories and discusses important arguments for and against them. (shrink)

In my reply to George Crowder’s criticism of my essay on the Soviet Revolution in the last issue of Analyse & Kritik, I discuss two problems: the nature of a reasonable value pluralism and the relation between ethics and philosophy of history. Concerning the first, I insist on the necessity of an objective rank ordering of values; with regard to the second, I side with Kant, who builds philosophy of history on ethics, and reject the Marxist idea that (...) ethics is itself grounded in philosophy of history. (shrink)

It will be shown in this article that a pluralism of causality is needed. Not only, as might be expected, for such different domains as natural sciences and humanities, but even within the domain of physics different causal relations are necessary. This will be illustrated with examples from Classical Mechanics and Special Relativity, Thermodynamics and Quantum Mechanics. In these domains causal relations differ in their properties. A model for five types of causal relations is provided that is based on (...) a decidable 6-valued logic. (shrink)

This volume addresses whether, how, and where laws (variously defined) teach values and shape moral character in late modern liberal societies. Each author recognizes the essential value of state law in fostering peace, security, health, education, charity, trade, democracy, constitutionalism, justice, and human rights, among many other moral goods. Each author also recognizes, however, the grave betrayals of law in supporting fascism, slavery, apartheid, genocide, persecution, violence, racism, and other forms of immorality and injustice. They thus call for state (...) laws that set a basic civil morality of duty for society and for robust freedoms that protect private individuals and private groups to cultivate a higher morality of aspiration"--Back cover. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Qualitative Hedonism Objections to Mill's Qualitative Hedonism: Internal Inconsistency and Value Pluralism The Judgment of Competent Agents: Self‐Development and Value Measurement Self‐Development and Virtue Ethics Further Reading.

One of the most fascinating debates in the field of political theory has been the one about the relationship between value pluralism and liberalism. Based on their different conceptions and definitions, various theorists have often theorized a tension in the relationship between pluralism and liberalism. On the one hand, liberal authors who believe in the universality of liberal values that have to do with the safeguard of freedom (conceived at least to some extent as “negative freedom”), in (...) the expressions and the free choices that individuals within a society or group can make, tolerance, in their individuality, in the equality of opportunities for everyone, etc., and on the other hand, the pluralists, who emphasize that different values, beliefs and human goods (the diversity) in society are essentially incompatible with one another, and as such, also incommensurable. Against the positions of some various authors who theorize an inherent conflict between these two ideas, in this paper, we argue that in practice, but also theoretically justified, there is a connection and a mutual support relationship existing between pluralism and liberalism. Therefore, the main principles that pluralism protects, such as pluralism of value, incommensurability between multiple conceptions of the goods, etc., can find themselves best in the context of a liberal society. (shrink)

This paper outlines a new pluralistic theory of normative reasons for belief, welfarist pluralism, which aims to explain how there can be basic alethic/epistemic reasons for belief and basic pragmatic/non-alethic reasons for belief that can combine to determine what one ought to believe. The paper shows how this non-derivative first-order pluralism arises from a purely welfarist account of the foundations of theoretical normativity, thereby combining foundational pragmatism with non-derivative pluralism about normative reasons for belief. In addition, this (...) paper outlines how welfarist pluralism provides a new and potentialy attractive account of the value of truth (or its indicators), namely that the value of truth (or its indicators) is its direct contribution to individuals' personal good or wellbeing. (shrink)

This book argues for the real possibility of an amelioration of an individual's life within the parameters of available resources, against all odds, or rather in spite of the odds, and against unfavorable economic and political conditions.

Different judgments by Christian communities on issues in sexual ethics involve different weightings of various sources of moral authority, different understandings of the normativity of the natural, and different assessments of the scope of freedom to be exercised in relation to the goods of marriage. These fundamental differences of interpretation can be exemplified by the ongoing Roman Catholic discussion of the legitimacy of voluntary sterilization in certain “hard cases.” The contributors to this issue of Christian Bioethics, in their spirited exchange (...) on that issue, exemplify the need for careful attention to the ways that differences of theological emphasis and moral method lead to different judgments in particular cases, both within and between particular Christian communities. (shrink)

Changing values may give rise to intergenerational conflicts, like in the ongoing climate change and energy transition debate. This essay focuses on the interpretative question of how this value change can best be understood. To elucidate the interpretation of value change, two philosophical perspectives on value are introduced: Berlin’s value pluralism and Dworkin’s interpretivism. While both authors do not explicitly discuss value change, I argue that their perspectives can be used for interpreting value change in the case of (...) climate change and the energy transition. I claim that Berlin’s pluralistic account of value would understand the value change as an intergenerational conflict and therefore provide a too narrow and static ground for understanding ongoing value change. Instead, by exploring Dworkin’s standpoint in moral epistemology, this essay distills a more encompassing perspective on how values may relate, converge, overlap, and change, fulfilling their functions in the course of climate change and energy transition. This perspective is further detailed by taking inspiration from Shue’s work on the interpretation of equity in the climate change debate. I argue that the resulting perspective allows us to see value change as a gradual process rather than as a clash between generations and their values. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore makes an epistemic argument for democracy. She contends that, due to their greater cognitive diversity, democratic groups will engage in superior deliberation and information aggregation than will groups of experts; consequently, the quality of their policies will be better. But the introduction of value diversity into Landemore's model—which is necessary if the argument is to apply to the real world—undermines her argument for the epistemic superiority of democratic deliberation. First, the existence of value diversity threatens (...) to stop deliberation prematurely. This has the effect of making the outcome of group deliberation more dependent on individual ability, which gives groups of experts a distinct advantage. Second, the introduction of value diversity raises the question of how to understand the standard of correctness of an epistemic argument, which Landemore does not adequately answer. (shrink)

The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is better (...) than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline. (shrink)

In recent years an increasing number of moral theorists have come to embrace the term "moral pluralism" to describe a particular kind of moral theory. Unfortunately, there has been little consensus regarding what exactly constitutes a pluralistic theory, and what specific commitments such theories involve. My dissertation takes on the task of articulating the underlying schema of pluralist moral theory, and of analyzing the plausibility and implications of pluralism's fundamental commitments. I argue that the most thoroughgoing pluralist theories (...) are shaped by two defining theses; the plurality of the good , and the plurality of the right , and that these are conceptually linked by two additional meta-ethical commitments. My analysis of the plausibility of these commitments is at times friendly to moral pluralism and at times critical of it. For instance, I develop an account of "value incommensurability," an idea upon which pluralism depends, that resists some of more the important attacks within the literature. Yet I also criticize the commitment to the plurality of the right, as held by Susan Wolf and several other pluralists. I argue that this view is less plausible than "limited pluralism"---a view that is pluralistic about the good but monistic about the right. In the final chapter I explore the relationship between moral pluralism and political liberalism, focusing on the role that overriding values play within each type of theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe question of how to engage with stakeholders in situations of value conflict to create value that includes a plurality of conflicting stakeholder value perspectives represents one of the crucial current challenges of stakeholder engagement as well as of value creation stakeholder theory. To address this challenge, we conceptualize a discursive sharing process between affected stakeholders that is oriented toward discursive justification involving multiple procedural steps. This sharing process provides procedural guidance for firms and stakeholders to create pluralistic stakeholder value (...) through the discursive accommodation of diverging stakeholder value perspectives. The outcomes of such a discursive value-sharing process range from stakeholder value dissensus to low and increasing levels of stakeholder value congruence to stakeholder value consensus. Hence, this article contributes to the emerging literature on integrative stakeholder engagement by conceptualizing a procedural framework that is neither overly oriented towards dissensus nor consensus. (shrink)

This book (edited by Jonathan Y. Tsou, Jamie Shaw, and Carla Fehr) offers eighteen original historical and philosophical essays focused on values in science, scientific pluralism, and pragmatism. These themes have been central in the work of Matthew J. Brown, and the book frames these topics through an engagement with Brown’s broadly ranging work on values in science. The themes of this book are integrated and unified in the pragmatic and value-laden ideal of science defended by Professor (...) Brown in his fascinating 2020 book, Science and Moral Imagination. Brown's ideal of moral imagination prescribes that scientists should recognize the contingencies in their work as unforced choices, examine morally salient aspects of these decisions, recognize the various interests of relevant stakeholders, explore and construct alternative options, and exercise fair and warranted value judgments to guide those decisions. The interdisciplinary essays in this volume engage with different aspects of Brown's philosophical research on scientific values as well as his historical research on figures such as John Dewey and Paul K. Feyerabend. The international contributors to this volume include distinguished and familiar voices from the values in science literature (e.g., Kevin Elliott, Janet Kourany, and Don Howard) as well as newer voices. The resulting book showcases some of the latest innovative research being done on values, pluralism, and pragmatism, and it will be an important resource for researchers working on values in science. Specific topics addressed in the book include: moral imagination, inductive risk, epistemic priority, the value free ideal of science, values in the contexts of artificial intelligence and medicine, varieties of pluralism (e.g., epistemic, ethical, and cultural), and the structure of scientific communities. The book also features novel historical research on important figures in the traditions of pragmatism, pluralism, and values in science, such as John Dewey, John Stuart Mill, Paul Feyerabend, W. V. O. Quine, Ludwig Fleck, among others. The contributions to the volume represent a broad range of contemporary history and philosophy of science perspectives, which have guided Brown's own work, including socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPoiSE), history of philosophy of science (HOPOS), feminist philosophy of science, and philosophy of science in practice (SPSP). The book will be of interest to a broad audience of researchers working in philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, history and philosophy of science, and science and technology studies. (shrink)

This paper presents a basically new theory of values. Potential goods such as flying machines have been creatively actualized and thus value is creative actualization. Norms, ideals, standards, and theories also require creative actualization. As actions melioristically transform the world for the better, the goals of action provide purpose and meaning, as well as the ground of change, a superior goal providing the end for which agents undertake action. The kinds of value represent irreducibly plural categories of good: beauty, (...) knowledge, prosperity, intimacy, and so on. (shrink)

Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture (...) different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. (shrink)

The 70th anniversary of Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1949) approaches. For philosophers—environmental ethicists in particular—this text has been highly influential, especially the ‘Land Ethic’ essay contained therein. Given philosophers’ acumen for identifying and critiquing arguments, one might reasonably think a firm grasp of Leopold’s ideas to have emerged from such attention. I argue that this is not the case. Specifically, Leopold’s main interpreter and systematiser, philosopher J. Baird Callicott, has shoehorned Aldo Leopold’s ideas into differing monistic moral theories (...) that ill-serve a proper understanding. Against Callicott, my paper argues that Aldo Leopold embraces a robust moral pluralism, one that goes beyond mere pragmatics, and he does so while seeking a consistency maximisation of values. A new, improved understanding of Leopold’s ideas thus emerges. (shrink)

Traditional monist theories of art fail to account for the diversity of objects that intuitively strike many as belonging to the category art. Some today argue that the solution to this problem requires the adoption of some version of pluralism to account for the diversity of art. We examine one recent attempt, which holds that the correct account of art must recognize the plurality of concepts of art. However, we criticize this account of concept pluralism as being unable (...) to offer an explanation of why some concept is an art concept. Instead, many of the disagreements over the definition of art could be reconciled by recognizing that works of art can be valued in a plurality of ways. By recognizing a plurality of values for art, we claim further that the definition of art becomes a non-issue. (shrink)

Stakeholders in global health, including governments, international and nongovernmental organizations, and corporations, face complex decisions about how to help improve the lives of those most burdened by sickness and disease while upholding their rights and facilitating the transition to a more just social and political order. In “The Case for Resource-Sensitivity: Why It Is Ethical to Provide Cheaper, Less Effective Treatments in Global Health,” Govind Persad and Ezekiel Emanuel argue that “[t]he provision of health care in developing countries should reflect (...) what best balances utility, equality, and priority to the least advantaged in those countries.” This positive proposal faces several difficulties. For one thing, it is not clear that these are the only relevant values, and moreover, even if we assume that they are, we do not know what global health policies these values rule out because conflict between the values is pervasive. (shrink)

Horizons is a critical inventory of value-related thinking, demonstrating that the mind has the ability to profile a distinctive circumstance in diverse ways. Readers are first invited to a historical inquiry into typical configurations of values, their collisions, and the worldviews that drive them. They are then introduced to the epistemologies employed by the social sciences, so that they are better able to gauge the potential of these disciplines for coming to terms with values. Axiology is portrayed as (...) a field that has broken free from its neo-Kantian roots, benefiting from challenging new conceptual frames based in documents with global reach-mainly the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After scrutiny of what various sociological models claim about values and the way in which empirical surveys approach them, Horizons reaffirms the assumption that social life and its dynamics condition the fate of values. Yet, for the sake of more accurate accounts, research should consider to a greater extent social stratification, and pressing macrosocial problems such as environmental protection, sustainable development, and attainment of some form of global equity. Social sciences' limitations modulate their ability to serve as an unequivocal guide for value choices. These limitations are a problem because of the significance of the process of dialogue and deliberation in value-related fields. Rather than advancing the allegedly universal characteristics of any one culture, in a world consisting of many civilizations, the imperative is to acknowledge pluralism and discern what is held in common. (shrink)

All cultures are infused by or even rooted in certain values. Although those values are generally recognised in all societies, they are diversely ranked or proritised in different human groups and different perceptions partly account for cultural diversity as not all values can be equally upheld in any community or by any individual. Though value universalism in a strict sense is unachievable, we can all agree on a pluralistic mutual understanding of and tolerance for diversity.

In situations where we ought to tolerate what we morally disapprove of we are faced with the following moral conflict: we ought to interfere with X, we ought to tolerate X, we can do either, but we cannot do both. And the aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between toleration as a value commitment and value pluralist and value monist approaches to moral conflict. Firstly, value monists side-step the moral conflict at the heart of toleration. Nonetheless, secondly, (...) it is not the case that toleration as a value commitment is entailed by value pluralism. Rather, the value pluralist line of argument that can be defended is that toleration is simply one value among others, that there is no general rule showing that it has priority over other values, but also that it cannot be excluded altogether as a value. (shrink)

Kim-chong Chong’s 2016 book on the Zhuangzi balances the textual and historical approaches with conceptual and contemporary philosophical concerns. The focus on the early Confucian context and the philosophy of value pluralism, as well as the analysis of key concepts and creative interpretation of well-known passages, mark out Chong’s Zhuangzi from other accounts. Nevertheless, Chong faces the interpretative and philosophical challenge of reconciling value pluralism with the normative concerns and privileged ideals also present in the Zhuangzi.

How can we, as people and communities with different religions and cultures, live together with integrity? Does tolerance require us to deny our deep differences or give up all claims to truth, to trade our received traditions for skepticism or relativism? Cultural philosopher Lenn E. Goodman argues that we can respect one another and learn from one another's ways without either sharing them or relinquishing our own. He argues that our commitments to our own ideals and norms need not mean (...) dogmatism or intolerance. In this study, Goodman offers a trenchant critique of John Rawls's pervasive claim that religious and metaphysical voices must be silenced in the core political deliberations of a democracy. Inquiry, dialogue, and open debate remain the safeguards of public and personal sanity, and any of us, Goodman illustrates, can learn from one another's traditions and explorations without abandoning our own. (shrink)

Valuing -- Morality and reasonable partiality -- Doing and allowing -- The division of moral labour : egalitarian liberalism as moral pluralism -- Is the basic structure basic? -- Cosmopolitanism, justice, and institutions -- What is egalitarianism? -- Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality -- Is terrorism morally distinctive? -- Immigration and the significance of culture -- The normativity of tradition -- The good of toleration.

A book review of Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). I will pass over her compelling critiques of cost-benefit analysis, rational desire theory, and "consequentialist" moral theories, among many topics she dispatches successfully, with fierce intelligence and wit. Instead I want to focus on the central justificatory strategy that underpins her defense of her pluralist, nonconsequentialist, rational attitude theory of value. Anderson states at the outset that she is not that interested in such (...) metaethical questions as whether value judgments express beliefs or emotions or other attitudes (p. xiii). But I think her own answers to these questions might have implications for normative and pragmatic issues of concern to her. So I want to try tinkering with the metaethical arguments in ways that might streamline her treatment of the normative and pragmatic ones somewhat. (shrink)