Estetika 58 (2):100-113 (2021)

Authors
Christopher Bartel
Appalachian State University
Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University
Abstract
Traditional monist theories of art fail to account for the diversity of objects that intuitively strike many as belonging to the category art. Some today argue that the solution to this problem requires the adoption of some version of pluralism to account for the diversity of art. We examine one recent attempt, which holds that the correct account of art must recognize the plurality of concepts of art. However, we criticize this account of concept pluralism as being unable to offer an explanation of why some concept is an art concept. Instead, many of the disagreements over the definition of art could be reconciled by recognizing that works of art can be valued in a plurality of ways. By recognizing a plurality of values for art, we claim further that the definition of art becomes a non-issue.
Keywords concept  pluralism  eliminativism  artistic value  definition of art
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,944
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What Makes a Kind an Art-Kind?Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (4):471-88.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism.Ingo Brigandt - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.
Conceptual Fragmentation and the Rise of Eliminativism.Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):17-40.
Why Concepts Should Not Be Pluralized or Eliminated.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):7-23.
Art Concept Pluralism.Christy Mag Uidhir & P. D. Magnus - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):83-97.
“Population” Is Not a Natural Kind of Kinds.Jacob Stegenga - 2010 - Biological Theory 5 (2):154–160.
“Population” Is Not a Natural Kind of Kinds.Jacob Stegenga - 2010 - Biological Theory 5 (2):154-160.
Against Natural Kind Eliminativism.Stijn Conix & Pei-Shan Chi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8999-9020.
Mental Representation and Two Kinds of Eliminativism.Jonny Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):1-24.
“Population” Is Not a Natural Kind of Kinds.Jacob Stegenga - 2010 - Biological Theory 5 (2):154-160.
Eliminativism and Gunk.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1):59-66.
A Proposed Taxonomy of Eliminativism.Bernardo Pino - 2017 - Co-herencia 14 (27):181-213.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-09-16

Total views
18 ( #604,867 of 2,497,996 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #102,504 of 2,497,996 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes