In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-157 (2015)

Authors
Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
This essay discusses monism and pluralism about two related evaluative notions: welfare, or what makes people better off, and value simpliciter, or what makes the world better. These are stipulatively referred to as 'axiological value'. Axiological value property monists hold that one of these notions is reducible to the other (or else eliminable), while axiological value property pluralists deny this. Substantive monists about axiological value hold that there is just one basic kind of thing that makes our lives or the world better, while substantive pluralists hold that there is more than one such thing. A more radical kind of pluralism holds that each of the plurality of good things is good in its own way, thus raising questions concerning value comparability and compensability. The essay elucidates these theories and discusses important arguments for and against them.
Keywords Value pluralism  Value monism  Comparability
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Reprint years 2015, 2016
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DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.013.0009
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References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 91 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Value Pluralism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.
Good and Good For.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):209-234.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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