The specific issue addressed in this paper is urban encroachment on agricultural lands, and the problems it poses for both analysis and the conservation of the land resource. The purpose of our discussion is two-fold: (1) to identify where and why traditional analytical and regulatory approaches fail to resolve land use conflicts, and (2) to explore ways and means of resolving some of the dilemmas which society faces in making land use decisions. This paper's contribution is in the spirit of (...) Getting Incentives Right for the inter-temporal transfer of wealth, as represented in trade-offs between environmental and resource endowments and human and physical capital. Efforts are placed on identifying what the appropriate price, levy, taxes, and grant ratios ought to be in order to encourage individuals in the marketplace to act in society's interest. We have also explored ways of efficiently transmitting those incentives through the market mechanism, without unduly relying on bureaucratic methods or suasion. Emphasis is placed on mechanisms that have little scope for preferential access and are subject to public scrutiny; emphasis on such self-disciplining approaches should result in less effort expended on (unproductive) lobbying activities and bureaucratic administration. (shrink)

Health incentive schemes aim to produce healthier behaviors in target populations. They may do so both by making incentivized options more salient and by making them less costly. Changes in costs only result in healthier behavior if the individual rationally assesses the cost change and acts accordingly. Not all people do this well. Those that fail to respond rationally to incentives will typically include those who are least able to make prudent choices more generally. This group will typically include (...) the least advantaged more generally, since disadvantage inhibits one's effective ability to choose well and since poor choices tend to cause or aggravate disadvantage. Therefore, within the target population, health benefits to the better off may come at the cost of aggravated inequity. This is one instance of a problem I name the Able Chooser Problem, previously emphasized by Richard Arneson in relation to coercive paternalism. I describe and discuss this problem by distinguishing between policy options and their effects on the choice situation of individuals. Both positive and negative incentives, as well as mandates that are less than perfectly effective, require some sort of rational deliberation and action and so face the Able Chooser Problem. In contrast, effective restriction of what options are physically available, as well as choice context design that makes some options more salient or appealing, do not demand rational agency. These considerations provide an equity-based argument for preferring smart design of our choice and living environment to incentives and mandates. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Mit Beginn der Spielzeit 2013/14 traten alle Maßnahmen des UEFA Financial Fair Play-Konzeptes in Kraft. Vornehmliches Ziel dieses regulatorischen Eingriffs ist es, der wachsenden Verschuldungs­rate auf Seiten der europäischen Vereine sowie der zunehmenden Abhängigkeit von Investoren entgegenzusteuern. Um die Effektivität und Effizienz solcher Maßnahmen zu erhöhen, ist ein tief­gehendes Verständnis der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen unabdingbar. Vor diesem Hinter­grund beschreibt und interpretiert der konzeptionelle Artikel das Verhältnis zwischen der UEFA und den Klubs mit Hilfe eines institutionenökonomischen Instrumentariums. Aus verfügungsrecht­licher Sicht wird (...) eine Verschiebung der Eigentums- und Machtverhältnisse zu Ungunsten der UEFA skizziert. Weiter zeigt sich, dass die Beziehung zwischen dem Dachverband und den Vereinen in vielen Aspekten einer klassischen Principal-Agent-Dyade entspricht. Die vorliegende Analyse baut diesbezüglich auf einer vorherigen Fallstudie von Schubert auf und entwickelt dessen Modell weiter. Die von der UEFA im Rahmen von Financial Fair Play verfolgte Strategie wird evaluiert, um daraus theoriebasiert handlungsleitende Gestaltungsempfehlungen zur Steigerung der Wirksamkeit des regulatorischen Eingriffs abzuleiten. (shrink)

In the 1920s, Ludwig von Mises argued correctly that the problem of making economic calculations without market‐generated prices would be an insuperable difficulty for socialist systems of production. Bryan Caplan is right to argue that there is no theoretical way to infer the magnitude of this difficulty, but he is wrong to insist that the history of poor economic performance displayed by real‐world socialism should be attributed not to the “socialist calculation problem,” but to inadequate work incentives. A (...) state that had solved the calculation problem would have well within its means the solution to the incentives problem, too. (shrink)

Background Policies to use financial incentives to encourage healthy behaviour are controversial. Much of this controversy is played out in the mass media, both reflecting and shaping public opinion. Objective To describe UK mass media coverage of incentive schemes, comparing schemes targeted at different client groups and assessing the relative prominence of the views of different interest groups. Design Thematic content analysis. Subjects National and local news coverage in newspapers, news media targeted at health-care providers and popular websites between (...) January 2005 and February 2010. Setting UK mass media. Results The study included 210 articles. Fifteen separate arguments favourable towards schemes, and 19 unfavourable, were identified. Overall, coverage was more favourable than unfavourable, although most articles reported a mix of views. Arguments about the prevalence and seriousness of the health problems targeted by incentive schemes were uncontested. Moral and ethical objections to such schemes were common, focused in particular on recipients such as drug users or the overweight who were already stereotyped as morally deficient, and these arguments were largely uncontested. Arguments about the effectiveness of schemes and their potential for benefit or harm were areas of greater contestation. Government, public health and other health-care provider interests dominated favourable coverage; oppo- sition came from rival politicians, taxpayersÕ representatives, certain charities and from some journalists themselves. Conclusions Those promoting incentive schemes for people who might be regarded as ÔundeservingÕ should plan a media strategy that anticipates their public reception. (shrink)

This book, first published in 2006, examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers. The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well being. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, from (...) auctions to labor markets, to the entire economy. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text. (shrink)

The U.S. Constitution employs a utilitarian view in authorizing Congress to establish patents and copyrights. Let us refer to this way of justifying copyright as the Incentives Argument, or more extensively, the Incentives Argument for Intellectual Property Rights. While seemingly straightforward, the Incentives Argument has been widely criticized in philosophical literature on intellectual property. Scholars have come to prefer Neo-Lockean labor-desert accounts, grounding intellectual property rights in the author's natural ownership claims over his creations. Neo-Lockean accounts are thought to avoid (...) some of the problems classically associated with utilitarian arguments, such as vulnerability to empirical evidence and an inability to make sense of rights or duties morally prior to consequential considerations. Fortunately, many criticisms articulated by opponents of the Incentives Argument can be answered by a strategic retreat to the version of utilitarianism found in the work of John Stuart Mill. I argue that not only does a Millian account of the Incentives Argument prove less vulnerable to oft-cited criticisms, but also allows for a more robust account of how the audience benefits from a proliferation of creative works. Mill's focus on the importance of critical self-development allows for a deeper analysis of how creative works benefit members of the audience as individuals and as a community. Within a Millian framework, viewing the audience as mere passive consumers of media fails to take into account the impact of expressive acts on an individual's critical self-development. Instead, one must see members of the audience as active participants in the creation of meaning and the common culture. Construing the community that receives creative works as an Active Audience alters the landscape of copyright, and the Incentives Argument, making balancing the desires of creators and the desires of audience members a key priority. (shrink)

Background: Giving money as a direct incentive for patients in exchange for depot medication has proved beneficial in some clinical cases in assertive outreach . However, ethical concerns around this practice have been raised, and will be analysed in more detail here.Method: Ethical concern voiced in a survey of all AO teams in England were analysed regarding their content. These were grouped into categories.Results: 53 of 70 team managers mentioned concerns, many of them serious and expressing a negative attitude (...) towards giving money for depot adherence. Four broad categories of ethical concern following Christensen’s concept were distinguished: valid consent and refusal , psychiatric paternalism , resource allocation , organisational relationships , with a residual category others and unspecified .Discussion: The main concerns identified are discussed on the background of existing ethical theories in healthcare and the specific problems of community mental health and AO. Points for practice are derived from this discussion. A way forward is outlined that includes informed consent and an operational policy in the use of incentives, further randomised controlled trials and qualitative studies, and continuing discussions with all stakeholders, especially service users. (shrink)

Current incentive structures are more favorably aligned with the world’s problems than with their solutions. We conceptualize this as the paradox of incentives to argue the need for new thinking and restructuring of incentives to break the paradox during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond, and create new opportunities for societal transformation.

Background Offering financial incentives to achieve medication adherence in patients with severe mental illness is controversial. Aims To explore the views of different stakeholders on the ethical acceptability of the practice. Method Focus group study consisting of 25 groups with different stakeholders. Results Eleven themes dominated the discussions and fell into four categories: (1) ‘wider concerns’, including the value of medication, source of funding, how patients would use the money, and a presumed government agenda behind the idea; (2) ‘problems requiring (...) clear policies’, comprising of practicalities and assurance that incentives are only one part of a tool kit; (3) ‘challenges for research and experience’, including effectiveness, the possibility of perverse incentives, and impact on the therapeutic relationship; (4) ‘inherent dilemmas’ around fairness and potential coercion. Conclusions The use of financial incentives is likely to raise similar concerns in most stakeholders, only some of which can be addressed by empirical research and clear policies. (shrink)

In this paper I consider thecontribution that theories about common propertyresource management and policies relating toparticipation can make to our understanding ofcommunal water resource management. Common totheoretical and policy approaches are the ideas thatincentives are important in defining the problem ofcollective action and that institutions apparentlyoffer a solution to it. The gendered dynamics ofincentives and institutions are explored. This paperbriefly outlines theoretical approaches toinstitutions as solutions to collective actionproblems and indicates the linkages with policiesregarding participation in water resource management.It (...) suggests that, whilst offering considerableinsights, such approaches are limited and may resultin policy prescriptions that do little to involve orempower women. In particular, I argue that themodeling of incentives is impoverished in itseconomism and its abstraction of the individual froma life world. I suggest that the conceptualization ofinstitutions is primarily an organizational one,which, whilst alluding to the role of norms,practices, and conventions, focuses primarily onformal manifestations of collective action; contracts,committees, and meetings. Where women‘s participationis concerned, I illustrate that incentives tocooperative may be devised from reproductive concernsand the minor exigencies of daily life (as well asfrom productive concerns) and that alternative modelsof institutions may better reflect the way in whichdecisions are made and implemented within a socialcontext. (shrink)

This essay challenges the belief in the superiority of capitalism as practiced today, and outlines an alternative economic system aimed at avoiding current capitalism’s main weaknesses. This alternative, built around employee ownership, is designed to result, over time, in a more equal distribution of income and wealth, while surpassing current capitalism’s main strength, its extraordinary economic productivity. It is an economic system that spreads economically beneficial incentives around more widely than today, and helps equalize opportunities. At its core is a (...) buy-in and payoff scheme that avoids what are often said to be the major problems with employee ownership. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13.1 (2003) 53-64 [Access article in PDF] Incentives for Providing Organs Patricia Milmoe McCarrick and Martina Darragh After a contentious debate at its 2002 annual meeting, the American Medical Association's House of Delegates voted to endorse the opinion of its Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs that the impact of financial incentives on organ donation should be studied (Josefson 2002). The shortage of organs (...) for transplantation has been an ongoing problem for more than 20 years. In June1981, Representative Philip Crane (R-IL) introduced legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives proposing a $25,000 income tax deduction and a $25,000 estate tax exclusion for donating an organ (Tax Incentives 1981). Still the National Organ Transplant Act enacted in October 1984 prohibited the offering of any "valuable consideration" in return for organs (United States 1984).The developments of a legal market for tissues in the United States and a black market for organs around the world have raised the question of whether donation without compensation is the only ethically viable option. Some critics of the current system claim reliance on donation actually promotes a black market in organs (Kaserman and Barnett 2002, p. 38; Palmer 1999, p. 36). In addition, a new set of compensation issues has arisen as living kidney donor transplantations begin to rival those performed with cadaveric organs (United States 2001).As a result, current suggestions for incentives go far beyond the traditional death benefit payment to include such ideas as medals of honor for donors, reimbursement for funeral expenses, exchange programs for organ donation, and special medical insurance for living organ donors. Numerous bills introduced into the 107th Congress have proposed such incentives (Delmonico et al. 2002.) In October 2002, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services awarded $5.2 million in grants to study both clinical and behavioral interventions for increasing organ donations that do not involve incentives. The inspiration for some of the funded proposals comes from the successes of Spain's social services and the United Kingdom's clinical administration of organ procurement programs (Robeznieks 2002). [End Page 53]With a nod to evidence-based medicine, the underlying concern expressed in much of the current literature is that no idea for increasing the supply of organs should be discounted before it is studied. This bibliography provides a short introduction to the range of opinions expressed on the issue of incentives for providing organs.al-Mousawi, M.; Samhan, M.; al-Mezairee I.; Razzak, M.A.; and Khawari, F. Cadaver Organ Procurement in Kuwait. Transplantation Proceedings 31 (8): 3375-76, 1999.The authors describe a protocol that significantly increased cadaveric organ donation and credit it with fostering the expansion of an organ sharing program among the Arab Gulf states. Developed by Kuwaiti neurologists and anesthetists after a continuing education course on transplantation, the protocol places a special emphasis on the role of local transplant coordinators who facilitate the investigation of brain death cases by neurologists.Arnold, Robert; Bartlett, Steven; Bernat, James; et al. [Ethics Committee of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons] Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: an Ethical Reappraisal. Transplantation 73 (8): 1361-67, 27 April 2002.To prepare for proposed studies of financial incentives for organ donation, the American Society of Transplant Surgeons convened a panel to develop a methodology for evaluating the ethics of such research. Comprised of organ procurement organization executives, physicians, surgeons, and ethicists, the panel generated a list of nine criteria for use in judging any incentives proposal. While opposed to direct payment or tax incentives for organ donation, a majority of the members support funeral expense reimbursement or charitable contributions as incentives that would not violate or undermine the ideal of altruism.Cameron, J. Stewart, and Hoffenberg, Raymond. The Ethics of Organ Transplantation Reconsidered: Paid Organ Donation and the Use of Executed Prisoners as Donors. Kidney International 55 (2): 724-32, February 1999.After reviewing arguments for and against payment for organ procurement, the authors apply these arguments to the specific case of obtaining organs from executed... (shrink)

The current study investigates whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officer to be socially responsible. Furthermore, it explores the role of sub-national institutional contingencies [i.e., state-owned enterprises vs. non-SOEs, foreign-owned entities vs. non-FOEs, cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed, developed region] in CEO tournament incentives and the corporate social responsibility performance relationship. Data were collected from all A-shared companies listed in the stock exchanges of China from 2014 to 2019. The study uses the baseline methodology of ordinary least squares and cluster OLS regression. (...) Moreover, firm-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares regression, and propensity score matching deal with the endogeneity problem and check the robustness of the results. The results provide reliable evidence that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. On the other hand, sub-national institutional contingencies positively affect the association between CEO tournament incentives and CSRP. The findings have important implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSP by providing incentives to top managers. (shrink)

Incentive schemes, which offer recipients benefits if they meet particular requirements, are being used across the world to encourage healthier behaviours. From the perspective of equality, an important concern about such schemes is that since people often do not have equal opportunity to fulfil the stipulated conditions, incentives create opportunity for further unfair advantage. Are incentive schemes that are available only to disadvantaged groups less susceptible to such egalitarian concerns? While targeted schemes may at first glance seem well (...) placed to help improve outcomes among disadvantaged groups and thus reduce inequalities, I argue in this paper that they are susceptible to significant problems. At the same time, incentive schemes may be less problematic when they operate in ways that differ from the ‘standard’ incentive mechanism; I discuss three such mechanisms. (shrink)

As concern over the use of questionable research practices in academic science has increased over the last couple of decades, some reforms have been implemented and many others have been debated and recommended. While many of these proposals have merit, efforts to improve scientific practices are more likely to succeed when they are responsive to the prevailing views and concerns of scientists themselves. To date, there have been few efforts to solicit wide-ranging input from researchers on the topic of needed (...) reforms. This article is a qualitative report of responses from federally funded scientists to the question of what should be done to address the problem of QRPs in their disciplines. Overall, participants were concerned about how institutional and career-oriented incentives encourage the use of QRPs. Compared to previous recommendations, participants had surprisingly little confidence in the ability of ethics training to improve research integrity. (shrink)

The problem of fake news and the spread of misinformation has garnered a lot of attention in recent years. The incentives and norms that give rise to the problem, however, are not unique to journalism. Insofar as academics and journalists are working towards the same goal, i.e., publication, they are both under pressures that pervert. This chapter has two aims. First, to integrate conversations in philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphilosophy to draw out the publishing incentives that promote (...) analogous problems of fake news and misinformation in academic research communities more broadly. Second, to argue for a (partial) solution. This chapter argues that research communities benefit when authors believe what they argue for in print and it warns against attempts to loosen our publication norms to permit publishing without belief. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Setting specific, challenging goals motivates employees to exert greater effort in their jobs. However, goal-setting may have unintended consequences of also motivating unethical behavior. The present study explores these consequences in the context of other features of goal-setting in organizations, how goals are framed and rewarded, to determine the tradeoff between performance and ethical behavior. Undergraduate students were incentivized to complete math problems using different outcome frames and incentive structures and were also provided an opportunity to cheat. Findings (...) demonstrate that when goals rewarded with piece-rate incentives are framed as a loss, performance increased, though cheating behavior increased as well. (shrink)

This paper develops Bernard Williams’s claim that moral incapacity – i.e., one’s inability to consider an action as one that could be performed intentionally – ‘is proof against reward’. It argues that we should re-construe the notion of moral incapacity in terms of self-identification with a project, commitment, value, etc. in a way that renders this project constitutive of one’s self-identity. This consists in one’s being insensitive to incentives to reconsider or get oneself to change one’s identification with this project. (...) More precisely, self-identification with a project implies that no state-given reason can justify for oneself reconsidering, or getting oneself to revise, or abandon one’s identification with that project. This view ties together integrity and self-identification, and avoids problems common to competing views: it avoids regress problems faced by hierarchical theories of identification; it demonstrates that integrationist views of identification overlook the fact that a deep, well-integrated attitude may fail to be incentive-insensitive; and it helps explain what’s wrong with ‘perverse’ cases, where one values acting in a way that one does not all things consider value. It also improves on Williams’s own view, by construing moral incapacity not merely in terms of one’s incapacity to perform an action (that undermines one’s project and thus violates one’s integrity), but also in terms of one’s incapacity to reconsider one’s commitment (to said project). (shrink)

I focus on a number of issues arising from Depue & Collins's target article that require further consideration: (1) data that fail to confirm extraversion effects in positive incentive experiments; (2) the role of personality factors, other than extraversion, in dopamine agonism on positive mood states; (3) the role of extraversion in nonspecific arousal, indicating that extraversion may not be an homogeneous trait; and (4) the problem of identifying neurobiologically important traits from existing structural models of personality. I (...) applaud the heuristic value of the model presented and suggest ways in which aspects of the model may be used to identify the personality traits associated with positive incentive motivation. (shrink)

An important but neglected problem in the philosophy of action concerns the normative nature of intentional action. The hypothesis at issue is that knowingly ignoring a bad effect of one’s actions implies that one brings it about intentionally. For example, a CEO who runs her business without any consideration for the foreseen and harmful effects on the environment harms it intentionally. Recent empirical research confirms that this is how we think about intentional action: experimental philosophers have made the striking (...) discovery that people are more willing to say that someone brought about a side effect intentionally when they regard it as bad rather than good. The hypothesis has never been developed into a full-blown theory of intentional action. The burgeoning research in experimental philosophy provides a new motivation for doing just this. The first part of the project is devoted to the development of a new theory of intentional action and moral responsibility. The central innovation is the idea that whether or not we do something intentionally depends not only on the significance we actually ascribe but also to the significance we should ascribe to the effects of our actions. The overall picture envisaged is that intentional action concerns reasons for and against action including moral reasons. The theory will be applied to two topics in moral philosophy, one in meta-ethics and one in applied ethics. Both concern foreseen effects of actions that have moral significance. The application in meta-ethics is a matter of disentangling persisting riddles concerning the Principle of Double Effect, according to which it can be permissible to bring about an effect one foresees even though it is impermissible to intend to bring about that effect. The second application concerns global justice and the role that people in affluent countries play in causing poverty in underprivileged countries. Here the theory is used for examining the sustainability of the argument that we do so intentionally and can be blamed for doing so.. (shrink)

"The largest Ebola outbreak to date—first detected in December 2013 and still ongoing as of April 2015—has cast new light on the shortfalls of international public health systems.1 As in previous health crises, scrutiny has reemerged over the pharmaceutical industry’s ability and willingness to innovate new medicines for underserved disease areas. The public debate has intensified following revelations that promising drug candidates to treat Ebola had gone undeveloped despite compelling preclinical results.2 This lack of development is especially troubling because it (...) occurred after a recently implemented U.S. incentive scheme—the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) tropical disease priority review voucher program—designed to counteract exactly this problem. Taking Ebola as a case in point, it is useful to examine the short history and ongoing refinement of this voucher program, since it represents one of the most significant legislative efforts to systematically address the relative absence of com- mercial rewards for drugs targeting tropical diseases. This analysis evaluates the voucher program’s effectiveness for both stimulating private sector innovation and achieving positive health impacts among populations most severely burdened by tropical diseases. It then proposes specific recommendations for how law- makers can improve the program’s legislation to better achieve these objectives. ". (shrink)

For years, the phenomenon of experimental reactivity (defined as the alteration of the subject’s behaviour as a result of their awareness of being studied) seemed to be of little or no concern to experimental economists. With their clear-cut methodological stance shaped by Vernon Smith’s list of precepts, economists could avoid the worries associated with subjects’ reactivity through a rigorous control over the incentives proposed by the experimental setting as designed in the game. More recently, as experimental economists gradually moved in (...) their study towards topics in which economic incentives intermingled with normative considerations (such as in the study of altruism, punishment, or social norms), a corresponding interest in the problem of reactivity has ensued. This chapter offers an interpretation of this transit: it argues that the success of experimental economics and the unforeseen expansion of their object of enquiry into the realm of ethics and norm-related behaviour forces experimental economists to adopt some of the conceptual tools of psychologists. This ultimately undermined the economists’ initial methodological project, but this is the price to be paid to study the mechanisms of prosociality. This way, and regarding the pitfalls of reactivity, experimental economists are in the same predicament as fellow psychologists, philosophers, and other social scientists. (shrink)

In “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Liam Murphy ~1999! makes a distinction between two approaches to normative political theory. He labels these two positions “dualism” and “monism.” The former maintains that “the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principle” ~1999: 254!. The most influential proponent of dualism is John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice Rawls defends his theory of “justice as fairness,” which recognizes a division (...) of responsibility between the principles that apply to the main social, economic and political institutions of society, and the principles that apply to individuals. Institutions are to be arranged so that citizens’ basic rights and liberties are protected and social and economic inequalities are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. The principles that apply to individuals include various principles of natural duty, as well as the principle of fairness. These principles impose on citizens a diverse array of duties and obligations, such as the duties of mutual respect and mutual aid. (shrink)

: In its response to pressures to rationalize health care resource allocation, the American health care system has embraced managed care without concurrent comprehensive health care reform, either in the form of the centralized tax-based systems found in Europe and Canada or that of the Clinton reform plan. What survives is managed care without managed competition, employer mandates, or universal access. Two problems inherent in the incentive structure of managed care plans developed in the absence of comprehensive health care (...) reform work against the public interest. First, sacrifices in terms of medical innovation and quality of care may not be offset by greater equity in the distribution of health care. Second, such managed care plans fail to address the need for long-term accountability. (shrink)

Previous research has identified several factors (such as remuneration, workload, negative perceptions of criminal defendants) which may lead to a barrister not acting in the defendant's best interests, when advising on plea or engaging in plea bargaining. This article applies aspects of the principal – agent problem to the relationship between defence barristers and defendants in England and Wales in order to analyse the extent to which incentives can align the interests of the agent (the barrister) with those of (...) the principal (the defendant) in order to prevent moral hazard caused by the agent's competing interests. Coercive, material and moral incentives are considered, and the role of the solicitor and the significance of the barrister's reputation are also discussed. It is argued that none of the forms of incentive which would traditionally reduce the risk of moral hazard do so to any great extent in the barrister – defendant relationship, and that this is due in part to the complexity of the overlapping principal – agent dynamics within which the barrister – defendant relationship lies. (shrink)

The publication of scientific papers has become increasingly problematic in the last decades. Even if we agree that a renewed model is needed for peer-reviewed scientific publication, we think the problem does not essentially lie in professional publishing—with economic incentives—but in the publish-or-perish culture that dominates the lives of researchers and academics.

This paper explains how the current architecture of the pharmaceutical markets has created a misalignment of financial incentives and public health that is a central cause of harmful practices. It explores three possible solutions to address that misalignment: taxes, increased financial penalties, and drug pricing based on value. Each proposal could help to partly realign financial incentives and public health. However, because of the limits of each proposal, there is no easy solution to fixing the problem of financial incentives.

The paper reviews the discussion within transplantation medicine about the organ supply and demand problem. The focus is on the evolution of attitudes toward compensation plans from the early 1980s to the present. A vehement rejection on ethical grounds of anything but uncompensated donation—once the professional norm—has slowly been replaced by an open debate of plans that offer financial rewards to persons willing to have their organs, or the organs of deceased kin, taken for transplantation. The paper asks how (...) this shift has occurred and what it tells us about the dynamics of bioethical debates, both within professional circles and in wider public arenas. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls’s difference principle is incompatible with his endorsement of incentives inequality—higher pay for certain professions is just when that pay benefits everyone. Cohen concludes that Rawls must reject both incentives inequality and ‘institutionalism’—the view that egalitarian principles, including the difference principle, apply exclusively to social institutions. I argue that the premises of Cohen’s ‘internal criticism’ of Rawls require rejecting two important parts of his theory: a ‘subjective circumstance of justice’ and a ‘shared conception of justice’. (...) These are important parts of Rawls’s ‘constructivism’. Constructivism is the view that a conception of justice is the solution to a practical interaction problem and is solved in part by examining the facts of the problem. Thus, an upshot of my arguments is that this Cohen/Rawls dispute reduces to another dispute over ‘constructivism’. (shrink)

The publication of scientific papers has become increasingly problematic in the last decades. Even if we agree that a renewed model is needed for peer-reviewed scientific publication, we think the problem does not essentially lie in professional publishing—with economic incentives—but in the publish-or-perish culture that dominates the lives of researchers and academics.

The paper explores the problem of motivation in organizations. This problem arises because people may prefer to pursue their own interest instead of the firm's common goals (the two underlying forces in any organization). First, the most representative economic proposals to motivate people are studied and summarized. The study leads us to the conclusion that those proposals do not mitigate the conflict of interests, because they do not make people pursue the common goals. To solve the problem, (...) the common elements of the firm must be promoted. In order to be really "common," those elements must be composed of "nonmaterial" goods. which are the only perfectly shareable ones. They motivate workers by attracting their internal faculties, making the job more interesting and appealing, and providing it with a meaning. Finally, these considerations imply that a richer model of human motivation must be developed in order to reach more comprehensive conclusions. (shrink)

The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective politicians to do what is ethically wrong. This essay discusses a related problem in democratic elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial policy issues. Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public good. I contrast this problem with the classic (...) prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates. (shrink)

We find that agency problems are embedded in firm's excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder's motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure. The excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average. The abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance. Our empirical evidences of 345 Taiwanese non-financial listed firms show that firm's (...) excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder's cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control-cash flow deviation, and board affiliation. The results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by La Porta et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 1147-1171) and Claessen et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 2741-2742). The negative relation between equity investment and firm's value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders. This study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner's ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm's value. (shrink)

"American criminal justice is a dysfunctional mess. The so-called Land of the Free imprisons more people than any other country in the world. Understanding why means focusing on color -- not only on black or white, but also on green. The problem is that nearly everyone involved in criminal justice faces bad incentives. "Injustice for All" systematically diagnoses why and where American criminal justice goes wrong, and offers functional proposals for reform. By changing who pays for what, how people (...) are appointed, how people are punished, and which things are criminalized, we can make the US a country which guarantees justice for all." --. (shrink)

The current study examines the relationship between financialization, managers’ incentives, and the enterprise’s innovation. Based on the principal-agent and incentive theories, this study proposes a research model with two management incentives as moderating variables between financialization and the enterprise’s innovation. First, we analyze the direct relationship between financialization and the enterprise’s innovation. Second, we examine the moderating effect of managers’ equity incentive and compensation incentives on the relationship between entity financialization and the enterprise’s innovation in high-tech/non-high-tech enterprises and (...) state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This study covers the most recent updated data from both A-share listed companies in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange in China from 2009 to 2019. This study’s finding indicates a significant negative impact of entity financialization and the enterprise’s innovation. It means that the entity financial has a significant “crowding-out” effect on the enterprise’s innovation. This study also confirms that management incentives cannot effectively suppress a “crowding-out” impact of entity financialization on firm innovation because of the principal-agent severe problem in financialization. Finally, considering the heterogeneities of property rights and degrees of dependence on the enterprise’s innovation, a “crowding-out” effect of entity financialization on the enterprise’s innovation is more significant in high-tech and state-owned enterprises. Managers’ equity incentive significantly affects the enterprise’s innovation in high-tech enterprises, while the managers’ compensation incentive affects the enterprise’s innovation in state-owned enterprises. Our study could help the enterprise to improve the company manager’s incentive and provide the optimal assets allocation to improve the enterprise’s innovation ability. Lastly, this study provides significant policies and recommendations for the public sector high-tech enterprise and private sector high-tech enterprises. Moreover, policies and recommendations are fruitful for the public sector non-high-tech enterprise and private sector non-high-tech enterprise. (shrink)

The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders’ controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership (...) concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior. (shrink)

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral (...) behavior and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death. (shrink)

In “Regulating social media as a public good: Limiting epistemic segregation” (2022), Toby Handfield tackles a well-known problematic aspect of widespread social media use: the formation of ideologically monotone and insulated social networks. Handfield argues that we can take some cues from economics to reduce the extent to which echo chambers grow up around individual users. Specifically, he argues that tax incentives to encourage network heterophily may be levied at any of three different groups: individual social media users, social media (...) sites/companies, or advertisers who use social media to promote their products and material. In this response, I examine the plausibility of using such incentives on each of the these groups. I argue, first, that using tax incentives on either (1) social media companies or (2) advertisers would be ineffective as these incentives could not feasibly be made strong enough to override the enormous financial gain of the standard social media algorithms. Next, I argue that levying the incentives/penalties on individual users would be a hazard, due to the risk of what is called the epistemic “backfire effect”. Finally, I argue that the problem lies in relying on incentives and disincentives—rather than direct regulation—to increase network heterophily. (shrink)

Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and voluntary contribution to public goods provision in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories on the evolution of altruistic in-group beneficial behavior in humans. Many of these theories abstract away from the effects of kinship on the incentives for public goods provision, though. Here, it is investigated analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and (...) experimentally investigate collective action problems: the linear public goods game. Using recent anthropological data sets on relatedness in 61 contemporary hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies the relevant parameters of this model are then estimated. It turns out that the kinship patterns observed in these societies substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision. It is suggested, therefore, that renewed attention should be given to inclusive fitness theory in the context of public goods provision also in sizable groups, because its explanatory power with respect to this central problem in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism might have been substantially underrated. (shrink)

The paper explores the problem of motivation in organizations. This problem arises because people may prefer to pursue their own interest instead of the firm's common goals . First, the most representative economic proposals to motivate people are studied and summarized. The study leads us to the conclusion that those proposals do not mitigate the conflict of interests, because they do not make people pursue the common goals. To solve the problem, the common elements of the firm (...) must be promoted. In order to be really "common," those elements must be composed of "nonmaterial" goods. which are the only perfectly shareable ones. They motivate workers by attracting their internal faculties, making the job more interesting and appealing, and providing it with a meaning. Finally, these considerations imply that a richer model of human motivation must be developed in order to reach more comprehensive conclusions. (shrink)

The American criminal justice system creates incentives for false conviction. For example, many public crime labs are funded in part per conviction. We show that the number of false convictions per year in the American criminal justice system should be considered ?high.? We examine the incentives of police, forensic scientists, prosecutors, and public defenders in the U.S. Police, prosecutors, and forensic scientists often have an incentive to garner convictions with little incentive to convict the right person. These incentives (...) create what economists call a ?multitask problem? that seems to be resulting in a needlessly high rate of false convictions. Public defenders lack the resources and incentives needed to provide a vigorous defense for their clients. Corrective measures are discussed, along with a call for more research. (shrink)

This article examines difficulties with bureaucratic reform for transitional economies, drawing on the American experience. Bureaucracies have incentive and performance problems that could retard economic growth in transitional economies. A remedy for a politicized corrupt bureaucracy is an autonomous, professional bureaucracy, chosen on the basis of merit. This article argues, however, such a move will not necessarily bring improvement. Political controls over the bureaucracy must be developed and inserted so that the bureaucracy has incentives to be more efficient and (...) to be more responsive to changing citizen demands. The American experience indicates that absent such provisions, a highly-protected, professional bureaucracy can engage in opportunism to advance its interests and those interests may not coincide with promoting economic growth.Cet article examine les difficultés auxquelles font face les tentatives de réforme de la bureaucratie dans les économies en transition en s’inspirant de l’expérience américaine. Les questions d’incitation et l’inefficacité des bureaucraties pourraient retarder la croissance économique dans les économies en transition. Une bureaucratie autonome, professionnelle, choisie sur la base du mérite est un remède à une bureaucratie politiquement corrompue. Cependant, cet article soutient qu’une telle démarche n’engendre pas nécessairement des améliorations. Il faut en plus élaborer des contrôles politiques de la bureaucratie afin que celle-ci soit incitée à être plus efficace et davantage sensible aux besoins changeants des citoyens. L’expérience américaine indique qu’en l’absence de telles dispositions, une bureaucratie professionnelle et très protégée peut se comporter de manière opportuniste en cherchant à promouvoir ses propres intérêts, pas toujours compatibles avec l’accélération de la croissance économique. (shrink)

The Peter Principle states that employees tend to be promoted until they reach their level of incompetence. In a sophisticated simulation study, Pluchino et al confirmed a version of the principle. However, they also noted that their model has the counterintuitive consequence that “the best ways for improving the efficiency of a given organization are either to promote each time an agent at random or to promote randomly the best and the worst members”. We argue that what promotion rule is (...) used can in general influence employee productivity. Accommodating this psychological aspect of promotion is noted as an open problem by Pluchino et al. Using an amended simulation model we verify that if the incentive induced by promoting the best is strong enough, then that strategy will be optimal. In a final simulation experiment we consider the effect on the efficiency of an organization of using “double standard” promotion strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on the official promotion rule being different from the de facto promotion rule. We show that double standard promotion strategies can be highly efficient, although we also note that in using such strategies the employer may take an unacceptable medium to long term risk. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes the control problem, the unique principal‐agent problem that arises with the creation of an artificial superintelligent agent. It distinguishes two broad classes of potential methods for addressing this problem, capability control and motivation selection, and examines several specific techniques within each class. It also alludes to the esoteric possibility of “anthropic capture”. Capability control methods seek to prevent undesirable outcomes by limiting what the superintelligence can do. This might involve boxing methods or incentive (...) methods, stunting method. In addition, capability control methods might involve tripwires method. Motivation selection can involve explicitly formulating a goal or set of rules to be followed (direct specification) or setting up the system so that it can discover an appropriate set of values for itself by reference to some implicitly or indirectly formulated criterion (indirect normativity). (shrink)

The process of agricultural unification will dominate the German scene for the next few years. At this stage, however, analysis and forecasts are hampered by the considerable problem concerning the viability of East German agriculture in a market economy and by the absence of reliable data in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This can only be understood in terms of the agricultural situation in the GDR before unification, which is discussed in the first section. The political and economic incentives (...) for German unification are described in the next section of this paper, focusing especially on the integration of the GDR into CAP. The third section considers some critical structural, legal, social, and economic constraints in the process of integrating the two agricultural systems. Finally, the implications for German agriculture as well as the challenges for the CAP will be addressed. Data were collected from interviews with key agricultural policy makers, farm organizations, commodity groups, consumer groups, and agricultural experts, as well as interviewing East German farmers. Additional data were compiled from government statistics, EC publications, and press reports. The conclusions reached in this research show the urgent need for the German government to reconsider the objectives and rationale for structural policies in agriculture, and point out that the new Germany, itself full of paradoxes and uncertainty, stands at the center of European agricultural disorder. (shrink)