Humans typically display hindsight bias. They are more confident that the evidence available beforehand made some outcome probable when they know the outcome occurred than when they don't. There is broad consensus that hindsight bias is irrational, but this consensus is wrong. Hindsight bias is generally rationally permissible and sometimes rationally required. The fact that a given outcome occurred provides both evidence about what the total evidence available ex ante was, and also evidence about what that evidence (...) supports. Even if you in fact evaluate the ex ante evidence correctly, you should not be certain of this. Then, learning the outcome provides evidence that if you erred, you are more likely to have erred low rather than high in estimating the degree to which the ex ante evidence supported the hypothesis that that outcome would occur. (shrink)

Ethical decision theory may not be sufficiently well developed to furnish reliable guidelines to people involved in complex decision making that involves conflict between ethical considerations and business imperatives such as making a profit. In conditions of ethical uncertainty hindsight bias may occur, and this study reports on an exploration of hindsight bias effects among participants in continuing education in business programmes. Perceptions of business ethics were found to differ among groups within the sample depending on what they (...) thought had been the outcome of the ethical decision concerned. (shrink)

I argue that Jan Patočka’s phenomenology can be understood as a kind of questioning philosophy that preserves the work and thought of Edmund Husserl by holding it in hindsight. Following Martin Heidegger’s lead to take up Husserl’s phenomenological questions more than Husserl’s answers, Patočka further develops Heidegger’s strategy with the addition of heresy: the philosophical process of distinguishing traditional questions from their answers in such a way as to preserve both, the original wonder sourced in questioning as well as (...) the specific answers that compose tradition. As excellent answers can tend to eclipse the powerful dynamism of original questions, heretical philosophy is revealed to be Patočka’s way to take up, modify, and enact Husserl’s motto “to the [questions] themselves!” In this way, Patočka’s further develops phenomenology while at the same time throwing a thinker back onto phenomenology’s central questions. (shrink)

This article explores one central assumption that is guiding large portions of contemporary (analytic) moral philosophy: the idea that moral philosophy has to be forward-looking and action-guiding. By paying attention to a number of examples, it is argued that this guiding assumption flies in the face of important aspects of actual moral life. Moral situations are not (always) of the nature that we can plan for them, and reason about them in advance. Rather, the moral reality, or the moral contexts, (...) are often such that the moral situation is created in the scene, and hence something that is only available to reflect upon in hindsight. There are, at least, two central reasons why this is so: The first is that the sense, meaning, of the actions and the concepts we use in reflection about them, are not locked beforehand, and our understanding of them are formed in the process. The second reason is that moral situations come about in a responsive, rather than planned, way. That is, we discover our moral world by means of our reactive interactions, rather than in theoretical reflection that aims to produce “anticipated beliefs.” Thus, this article suggests a way of exploring morality’s backward-looking nature that does not misrepresent moral reality. (shrink)

Does hindsight knowledge make research seem more ethical and predictable? In line with the notion of hindsight bias, students in 3 experiments knowing the outcome of an animal experiment judged the results as more foreseeable and ethical relative to students who did not know the outcome. Via self to other comparisons, students evaluate themselves more favorably compared to a peer but exhibited hindsight bias in doing so. Uniquely, the findings reveal the possibility that students deem themselves to (...) be more skeptical and objective than their peers. Implications for teaching animal ethics and for Institutional Review Boards are discussed. (shrink)

In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N=2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability – a phenomenon sometimes labelled moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, lead to increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently to increased attribution of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating a hindsight bias (as is common), we employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the (...) outcome-driven asymmetry across perceived probabilities constitutes a systematic cognitive distortion. We then explore three distinct strategies to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and culpability ascriptions. Not all are successful, but at least some prove promising. They should, we argue, be taken into consideration in criminal jurisprudence, where distortions due to the hindsight bias are likely considerable and deeply disconcerting. (shrink)

Summary This article compares the discoveries of the planets Neptune and Pluto and the unsuccessful search of intra-Mercurial planets. Its conclusion is, that the search of intra-Mercurial planets was started on the basis of reasonable assumptions and competently pursued, that the success in the search of Neptune and Pluto and the failure in the search of intra-Mercurial planets was not due to greater competence of the successful planet searchers, but to good luck of the successful researchers and bad luck of (...) the unsuccessful researchers. (shrink)

Ordinary normative discourse includes talk about the reasons for action we had in the past but only came to discover in hindsight. In some cases, we come to discover these reasons not because new information has come to light, but because our values have changed. Contemporary metaethical views, namely Street's Humean constructivism and Blackburn's and Gibbard's quasi-realism, have some difficulty accounting for these reasons and the claims we make about them. This difficulty hinges on the diachronic complexity of these (...) reasons and claims. It cannot be the case that these reasons were constructed by the perspective we had in the past before our values changed. If there were no extant reasons in the past, then it would seem that our claims about them in the present cannot be true. Quasi-realists can account for the way in which reason claims purport to be true by appealing to a deflationary sense of truth and so can remain agnostic on the actual existence of these reasons. Nevertheless, Street argues that t.. (shrink)

Summary This article compares the discoveries of the planets Neptune and Pluto and the unsuccessful search of intra-Mercurial planets. Its conclusion is, that the search of intra-Mercurial planets was started on the basis of reasonable assumptions and competently pursued, that the success in the search of Neptune and Pluto and the failure in the search of intra-Mercurial planets was not due to greater competence of the successful planet searchers, but to good luck of the successful researchers and bad luck of (...) the unsuccessful researchers. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of facts or events once the actual facts or events are known. Several theoretical frameworks suggest that affective states might influence hindsight bias. Nondysphoric participants in negative or neutral mood, and dysphoric participants generated and recalled answers to difficult knowledge questions. All groups showed hindsight bias, that is, their recalled estimates were closer to the correct answer when this answer was shown at recall. Multinomial modelling revealed, however, that (...) under dysphoria and induced negative mood different processes contributed to hindsight bias. Dysphoria, but not induced negative mood, was associated with a stronger reconstruction bias, compared with neutral mood. A recollection bias appeared in neutral, but neither in induced negative nor dysphoric mood. These findings highlight differences between the cognitive consequences of dysphoria and induced negative mood. (shrink)

In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N=2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability – a phenomenon sometimes labelled moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, lead to increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently to increased attribution of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating a hindsight bias (as is common), we employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the (...) outcome-driven asymmetry across perceived probabilities constitutes a systematic cognitive distortion. We then explore three distinct strategies to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and culpability ascriptions. Not all are successful, but at least some prove promising. They should, we argue, be taken into consideration in criminal jurisprudence, where distortions due to the hindsight bias are likely considerable and deeply disconcerting. (shrink)

Outcome bias and hindsight bias are important in philosophical debates and have wide-ranging implications outside of philosophy. Recently, Hedden has articulated a novel line of argumnt that the empirical evidence for what he labels hindsight bias is largely misguided and that empirical researchers who postulate such a bias are engaged in a fallacy fallacy. In this paper, I articulate Hedden’s core insights in terms of two principles and argue that in the relevant empirical research, these principles are often (...) (i) recognized, (ii) invoked in theoretical explanation, and (iii) guiding study designs and interpretation of data. On this basis, I argue that there is ample empirical evidence for outcome and hindsight bias and that cognitive psychologists do not generally exhibit a fallacy fallacy of postulating such biases in cases where there are none. More constructively, the present paper articulates some general principles that help us to better understand when an empirical study provides evidence of these types of bias. Thus, the debate casts light on both the specific evidence for outcome and hindsight bias but also on the general division of labor between philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

The central concept of Carnap's probabilistic theory of induction is a triadic relation, c, the probability or degree of confirmation of the hypothesis, h, on evidence, e. The relation is a purely logical one. The value of c can be computed from a knowledge of h, of e, of the structure of the language, and of the inductive rule to be employed.

Context: Many AI and machine-learning techniques are primarily focused on past-to-future extrapolations of statistical regularities in large amounts of data. We introduce a method that builds on an….

According to Scheck, Newfeld, and Dwyer (2000), there have been innumerable individuals wrongly convicted of a crime and sentenced to life imprisonment or to death based upon faulty evidence. The historical development of DNA evidence as a tool in the investigative process during the past 25 years is explained/analyzed, and the role of eyewitness evidence in the wrongful conviction of innocent individuals. This paper culminates in the Anthony Capozzi case study where eyewitness testimony wrongfully imprisoned a man before the advent (...) of DNA technology and which ultimately freed him years after the crime. The methodology used is the examination of journal articles, books, and newspaper articles on the phenomenon of wrongful convictions. (shrink)

The capacity of visual attention/STM can be determined by change-detection experiments. Detecting the presence of change leads to an estimate of 4 items, while detecting the absence of change leads to an estimate of 1 item. Thus, there are two magical numbers in vision: 4 and 1. The underlying limits, however, are not necessarily those of central STM.

Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey (...) world we actually live in: can one theory of causation cover all instances of cause and effect? (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with issues of mind have been turning to the neurosciences, especially neuropsychology, for empirical guidance. While I endorse this emphasis, I find that one important neuropsychological phenomenon, blindsight appears to have been misused by some prominent philosophers. In this paper, I examine this alleged misuse by spelling out the accounts of blindsight given by Daniel Dennett and Ned Block. I attempt to show that both Dennett and Block have ignored many complications surrounding blindsight including subjects' reports of visual (...) sensations. This neglect has serious ramifications for their respective models of human consciousness which I also try to explicate. Further, by misrepresenting blindsight, these accounts serve to hamper scientific and philosophical understanding of the phenomenon and of consciousness. I conclude by sketching a model of blindsight that acknowledges these neglected details. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with issues of mind have been turning to the neurosciences, especially neuropsychology, for empirical guidance. While I endorse this emphasis, I find that one important neuropsychological phenomenon, blindsight appears to have been misused by some prominent philosophers. In this paper, I examine this alleged misuse by spelling out the accounts of blindsight given by Daniel Dennett and Ned Block. I attempt to show that both Dennett and Block have ignored many complications surrounding blindsight including subjects' reports of visual (...) sensations. This neglect has serious ramifications for their respective models of human consciousness which I also try to explicate. Further, by misrepresenting blindsight, these accounts serve to hamper scientific and philosophical understanding of the phenomenon and of consciousness. I conclude by sketching a model of blindsight that acknowledges these neglected details. (shrink)

There is already a copious literature comparing Claudius' oration on the admission of the primores Galliae into the Roman Senate with Tacitus’ account of the speech and of the opposition's case in Annals 11. 23–4. Yet the Emperor's own purpose in speaking as he did still needs some illumination. Scholarly concentration on technical points about the citizenship, on Claudius’ antiquarianism and on his debt to Livy has been fruitful, but it has often distracted attention from Claudius’ immediate aim. Meanwhile, Tacitus’ (...) interpretation has been insidious in colouring our view of what course of action the imperial orator was trying to defend before the Senate. (shrink)

This paper revisits a 2003 publication in Nursing Philosophy: The need for accurate perception and informed judgement in determining the appropriate use of the nursing resource: hearing the patient's voice. The author suggests that the basic ideas and focus of this 16‐year‐old paper are still topical and relevant in considerations of nursing care. However, it is also suggested that greater attention to the importance of the nurse–patient relationship in considerations of resource allocation, and potential rationing of nursing care, would have (...) strengthened the original paper. (shrink)

Il y a vingt-cinq ans, j’étais un étudiant de doctorat intéressé par la philosophie d’Aristote et à la recherche d’un sujet de thèse. Au cours de mes études supérieures, j’ai eu la chance d’étudier l’Éthique à Nicomaque avec Rémi Brague et Les Politiques avec Judith Swanson. Ces deux érudits m’ont, à leur façon, fait prendre conscience de l’importance d’enquêter sur le public cible des œuvres d’Aristote. Tous deux parlaient en bien du livre Le philosophe et la cité (Les Belles Lettres, (...) 1982) de Richard Bodéüs, qui venait d’être traduit en anglais sous le titre The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics (State University of New York Press, 1993). Il se trouva qu’un jour de printemps, ayant été appelé à siéger comme juré, je pris avec moi mon tout nouvel exemplaire du volume de Bodéüs. Heureusement, le jury ne fut pas convoqué, mais on ne me laissa pas partir avant la fin de l’après-midi. Aussi passai-je toute la journée au palais de justice à lire l’ouvrage de Bodéüs et à réfléchir à la relation entre le concept de justice déployé dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et les analyses des constitutions qu’on trouve dans Les Politiques. Je découvris alors une réflexion savante, riche et profondément historique, portant sur la façon de comprendre les divers traités d’Aristote sur «la philosophie des choses humaines» (EN 10.9.1181b15). C’est ainsi que je fus mis sur la voie du sujet de sur lequel porterait ma thèse : la nature de la justice politique chez Aristote. C’est aussi ainsi que j’en vins à penser en compagnie de l’un des plus éminents spécialistes et traducteurs d’Aristote du siècle dernier. En 2018, la Northeast Political Science Association annonça que sa réunion annuelle allait se tenir à Montréal et invita ses membres à soumettre des contributions dans les deux langues officielles canadiennes. Étant donné que Montréal abrite également l’université dans laquelle Bodéüs avait enseigné, l’Université de Montréal, il m’est immédiatement venu à l’esprit de proposer un panel bilingue pour explorer la philosophie d’Aristote à la lumière de son ouvrage novateur, Le philosophe et la cité, qui fut déterminant pour mon parcours intellectuel. Deux panels furent constitués. Le premier rassemblait les participants anglophones : Jordan Jochim (Cornell University), Kevin Cherry (Richmond University) et moi-même (Quinnipiac University), et fut présidé par Jill Frank (Cornell University). Le second panel rassemblait les participants francophones : Léa Derome (Université McGill), Timothée Gautier (Université Paris 1 — Panthéon-Sorbonne), Louise Rodrigue (Collège universitaire dominicain), et fut présidé par Elsa Bouchard (Université de Montréal). Bodéüs, qui est à présent professeur émérite, accepta généreusement de lire toutes les contributions à l’avance et, combattant un mal de gorge le jour de la conférence, accompagna chacune d’entre elles de commentaires à la fois perspicaces et magnanimes. N’ayant pas pu inclure toutes les présentations de la conférence de novembre 2018, ce numéro de Dialogue comprend les versions révisées de trois contributions : mon “ὁμόνοια: The Hinge of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics?”, la contribution de Kevin Cherry, “Lawgivers, Virtue, and the Mixed Regime: Reflections on Richard Bodéüs’s The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics,” et celle de Louise Rodrigue, «La conception aristotélicienne de la servilité dans l’Éthique et la Politique». Nous remercions tout particulièrement Léa Derome, qui a édité cette tribune du livre, coordonné la soumission de nos documents et des réponses de Bodéüs à Dialogue, et a aidé à la traduction en français. Les trois articles présentés composent avec des interrogations héritées du travail du professeur Bodéüs. Nous sommes donc particulièrement reconnaissants qu’il ait accepté de contribuer à ce projet de publication. Nous espérons que l’ensemble parvienne à capturer ne serait-ce qu’un simulacre de l’expérience intellectuelle passionnante que fut notre journée de conférences de novembre 2018. (shrink)

The paper questions the extent to which MacIntyre’s current ethical and political outlook should be traced to a project begun in After Virtue. It is argued that, instead, a critical break comes in 1985 with his adoption of a ‘Thomistic Aristotelian’ standpoint. After Virtue’s ‘positive thesis’, by contrast, is a distinct position in MacIntyre’s intellectual journey, and the standpoint of After Virtue embodies substantial commitments not only in conflict with, but antithetical to, MacIntyre’s later worldview-mostly clearly illustrated in the contrasting (...) positions on moral conflict and tragedy. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called the historian's fallacy (HF). In HF, the writing of a historical event has been skewed by way of biased hindsight on the author's part. The historian has written the details of the event down in such a way that the facts of the event, only seen after the event has occurred, cause the initial event to become distorted. HF should not be confused with a method historians (...) use in the present day when documenting the past. This is called presentism, a mode of historical analysis in which present‐day ideas are projected into the past. Another issue to address is that HF should not be confused with historical fallacy. One commits the historical fallacy when one reads into a process the results that occur because of that process. (shrink)

In hindsight, it is primarily Susanne K. Langer’s theory of act, and only secondarily her theory of art, that is central to the conception of Vitality Semiotics. It focuses on affective, semiotically relevant forms that constitute our world experience, human social interaction, and ultimately art experience. Thus, this somewhat unusual distinction between these two aspects of Langer’s work is not only important for art and our understanding of the world, but can also be seen as fundamental to social interaction (...) and, furthermore, to the universal formation of culture(s). It is, as the article suggests, to be regarded as the basis of the conditio humana. (shrink)

With historical hindsight, it can be little questioned that the view of protozoa as unicellular organisms was important for the development of the discipline of protozoology. In the early years of this century, the assumption of unicellularity provided a sound justification for the study of protists: it linked them to the metazoa and supported the claim that the study of these “simple” unicellular organisms could shed light on the organization of the metazoan cell. This prospect was significant, given the (...) state of cytology circa 1910. In the wake of the major gains made in understanding nuclear division in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, cytology was suddenly confronted with many, seemingly less penetrable, problems. Several aspects of nuclear organization still remained unexplained, and recent research had revealed the presence in the cytoplasm of structures whose functions in cell life were unknown. Classical methods of cytology, relying on descriptive, morphological analysis, seemed ill equipped to resolve these questions.Hertwig's program for protozoology, grounded in the assumption of the fundamental unity of organization in protozoa and metazoa, offered a potential means for investigating these and other problems of cell theory. Linked to mainstream cytology, protozoology was advocated as a means of experimentally investigating key biolobical processes — reproduction, metabolism, and organelle morphology and physiology — less accessible in higher organisms. Protozoa were hailed as prime experimental organisms, in which cell structure and function could be more easily studied. Unlike the metazoan cell, they could be subjected to controlled experiments in which the external environment was modified and the effects monitored. Protozoa offered, in other words, a promising experimental means by which to investigate the cell — its structures and its processes.The success of this program within Germany was soon apparent. In contrast to the rather neglected state of the discipline in 1900, protozoology began to be recognized as more than a somewhat obscure area of study for specialists. In practical terms, this translated into greater numbers of students attracted to the field, increased institutional support for the discipline, and its elevation in status within the biological sciences as new developments, particularly in connection with medical applications, began to draw attention to the field.64The unicellular hypothesis also promoted the internal development of the science. It provided a rationale for introducing the various techniques used in cytology, embryology, physiology, and the new field of biochemistry as suitable research tools for protozoology as well. This vastly extended the research possibilities and facilitated the understanding of, among other things, protozoan organization, modes of reproduction, and evolutionary relationships. The new experimental grounding of the discipline in turn fitted in well with developments in biology at large: in contrast to the descriptive methodology that had predominated in the nineteenth century, this new experimental program placed protozoology at the forefront of the early twentieth-century movement to make biology an experimental science comparable to physics and chemistry.Yet the criticism of the unicellular hypothesis can also be seen as having served a valuable function within the development of the discipline. It focused attention on the study of protists as organisms in their own right, not simply as models for metazoan cells. More generally, it helped to remind biologists of the particular evolutionary assumptions that supported this conception. Dobell and other British critics pointed out, among other things, the association between the theory of recapitulation and the interpretation of protozoa as unicellular organisms. At the time when the recapitulation theory and the germ-layer doctrine were in decline, it was important to stress how these evolutionary ideas also entered into the contemporary concepts of subsidiary specialties. This was as true for protozoology as it was for cell theory itself. The chromidial theory, in its various guises, and the binuclearity hypothesis did in fact contain elements of recapitulationist reasoning, and they were open to criticism for the same kind of overly speculative theorizing that characterized this evolution theory. Dobell's critique forced protozoologists and cell theorists alike to review the theoretical postulates guiding their investigations.In the absence of further historical studies, it is hard to evaluate the consequences of this debate in later years. The issue was not whether protozoa were the precursors of metazoa — both sides accepted this. They disagreed over which particular protozoon had served as the ancestral form, and this, in turn, influenced their stance on the question of unicellularity. The situation is little changed today. Because the former question is still an open one, the latter remains so too. Both of the models for the origin of multicellular organisms — colonies of ciliates versus multinucleate protists — are still presented as possible mechanisms in modern textbooks of evolution. Unable to judge the dispute in terms of the ultimate validity of the competing conceptions, the historian requires other criteria. It perhaps becomes more important to evaluate the issues in the context of the internal and external stimulus they provided the discipline.65 In these terms, and from the present historical vantage point, Hertwig's research program for protozoology, based upon the unicellular hypothesis, appears to have been a successful one. (shrink)