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  1. Putnam’s Diagonal Argument and the Impossibility of a Universal Learning Machine.Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):633-656.
    Putnam construed the aim of Carnap’s program of inductive logic as the specification of a “universal learning machine,” and presented a diagonal proof against the very possibility of such a thing. Yet the ideas of Solomonoff and Levin lead to a mathematical foundation of precisely those aspects of Carnap’s program that Putnam took issue with, and in particular, resurrect the notion of a universal mechanical rule for induction. In this paper, I take up the question whether the Solomonoff–Levin proposal is (...)
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  2. Universal Prediction: A Philosophical Investigation.Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Groningen
    In this thesis I investigate the theoretical possibility of a universal method of prediction. A prediction method is universal if it is always able to learn from data: if it is always able to extrapolate given data about past observations to maximally successful predictions about future observations. The context of this investigation is the broader philosophical question into the possibility of a formal specification of inductive or scientific reasoning, a question that also relates to modern-day speculation about a fully automatized (...)
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  3. Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Copan Paul, Tremper Longman I. I. I., Reese Christopher L. & Strauss Michael G. (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
    A brief introduction to the life and key work of Rudolf Carnap with special attention to his work on inductive logic.
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  4. Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
    My dissertation explores the ways in which Rudolf Carnap sought to make philosophy scientific by further developing recent interpretive efforts to explain Carnap’s mature philosophical work as a form of engineering. It does this by looking in detail at his philosophical practice in his most sustained mature project, his work on pure and applied inductive logic. I, first, specify the sort of engineering Carnap is engaged in as involving an engineering design problem and then draw out the complications of design (...)
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  5. Rudolf Carnap: Philosophy of Science as Engineering Explications.Christopher F. French - 2015 - In Uskali Mäki, Stéphanie Ruphy, Gerhard Schurz & Ioannis Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 293-303.
    One way of explaining Rudolf Carnap’s mature philosophical view is by drawing an analogy between his technical projects—like his work on inductive logic—with a certain kind of conceptual engineering. After all, there are many mathematical similarities between Carnap’s work in inductive logic and a number of results from contemporary confirmation theory, statistics and mathematical probability theory. However, in stressing these similarities, the conceptual dependence of Carnap’s inductive logic on his work on semantics is downplayed. Yet it is precisely the conceptual (...)
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  6. An observation on Carnapʼs Continuum and stochastic independencies.J. B. Paris - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):421-429.
    We characterize those identities and independencies which hold for all probability functions on a unary language satisfying the Principle of Atom Exchangeability. We then show that if this is strengthen to the requirement that Johnson's Sufficientness Principle holds, thus giving Carnap's Continuum of inductive methods for languages with at least two predicates, then new and somewhat inexplicable identities and independencies emerge, the latter even in the case of Carnap's Continuum for the language with just a single predicate.
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  7. Symmetry and evidential support.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2011 - Symmetry 3 (3):680--698.
  8. (1 other version)Statistical and inductive probability.Rudolf Carnap - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge.
  9. Phases of the ethical judgement seen from a viewpoint of motivism.Yusuke Kaneko - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Tokyo
    Although written in Japanese, 動機説の観点から見た倫理的判断の諸相(Phases of the ethical judgement)has formed my original ideas on action theory, ethics, and so on.
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  10. Logical Foundations of Evidential Support.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.
    Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging (...)
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  11. Inductive logic, verisimilitude, and machine learning.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2005 - In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. pp. 295/314.
    This paper starts by summarizing work that philosophers have done in the fields of inductive logic since 1950s and truth approximation since 1970s. It then proceeds to interpret and critically evaluate the studies on machine learning within artificial intelligence since 1980s. Parallels are drawn between identifiability results within formal learning theory and convergence results within Hintikka’s inductive logic. Another comparison is made between the PAC-learning of concepts and the notion of probable approximate truth.
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  12. Carnap and the logic of inductive inference.S. L. Zabell - 2004 - In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the history of logic. Boston: Elsevier. pp. 10--265.
  13. Probabilities for multiple properties: The models of Hesse and Carnap and Kemeny. [REVIEW]Patrick Maher - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):183-215.
    In 1959 Carnap published a probability model that was meant to allow forreasoning by analogy involving two independent properties. Maher (2000)derived a generalized version of this model axiomatically and defended themodel''s adequacy. It is thus natural to now consider how the model mightbe extended to the case of more than two properties. A simple extension waspublished by Hess (1964); this paper argues that it is inadequate. Amore sophisticated one was developed jointly by Carnap and Kemeny in theearly 1950s but never (...)
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  14. (1 other version)Carnap Y la imposibilidad de la semantica.Juan José Acero - 1995 - Theoria 10 (1):59-99.
  15. Inductive Logic and the Foundations of Probability Theory: A Revaluation of Carnap's Program.Maria Concetta Di Maio - 1992 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    In this thesis I defend and pursue that line about the foundations of probability theory which has come to be known as "the logicist view about probability", and, in particular, the shape which it took in Carnap's Inductive Logic. ;Most philosophers who now deal with probability theory claim that Carnap's program of Inductive Logic has failed. The main aim of my thesis is to show that this judgment is based on a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature and the aim of (...)
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  16. (1 other version)Probability functions and their assumption sets — the binary case.Hugues Leblanc & Charles G. Morgan - 1984 - Synthese 60 (1):91 - 106.
  17. À propos du terme "probabilité".H. Breny - 1983 - Logique Et Analyse 26 (2):129.
  18. On Carnap and Popper Probability Functions.Hugues Leblanc & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (3):369 - 373.
  19. Carnap and de finetti on bets and the probability of singular events: The dutch book argument reconsidered.Klaus Heilig - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):325-346.
  20. On a K-Dimensional System of Inductive Logic.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1976 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:425 - 447.
  21. Notes on probability and induction.Rudolf Carnap - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):269 - 298.
  22. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Rudolf Carnap, Richard C. Jeffrey. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (4):549-553.
  23. The Leibniz-Carnap program for inductive logic.Ian Hacking - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (19):597-610.
  24. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability.Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.) - 1971 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
    Then, in 1960, Carnap drew up a plan of articles for Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability — a surrogate for Volume II of the ...
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  25. Representation of symmetric probability models.Peter H. Krauss - 1969 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (2):183-193.
    This paper is a sequel to the joint publication of Scott and Krauss in which the first aspects of a mathematical theory are developed which might be called "First Order Probability Logic". No attempt will be made to present this additional material in a self-contained form. We will use the same notation and terminology as introduced and explained in Scott and Krauss, and we will frequently refer to the theorems stated and proved in the preceding paper. The main objective of (...)
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  26. The one systematically ambiguous concept of probability.William H. Baumer - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (2):264-268.
  27. Carnap's inductive logic.Wesley C. Salmon - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):725-739.
  28. Logical Foundations of Probability. By Rudolf Carnap. Second edition, 1962. The University of Chicago Press. Pp. xxii and 613. $10.00. [REVIEW]R. H. Vincent - 1963 - Dialogue 2 (1):97-101.
  29. (1 other version)Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit. R. Carnap, W. Stegmüller. [REVIEW]Y. Bar-Hillel - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):94-95.
  30. (1 other version)Reply to professor Carnap.K. R. Popper - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):244-245.
  31. Concerning a controversy on the meaning of 'probability'.Siri Blom - 1955 - Theoria 21 (2-3):65-98.
  32. Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.
  33. Prediction and hindsight as confirmatory evidence.Herbert A. Simon - 1955 - Philosophy of Science 22 (3):227-230.
    The central concept of Carnap's probabilistic theory of induction is a triadic relation, c, the probability or degree of confirmation of the hypothesis, h, on evidence, e. The relation is a purely logical one. The value of c can be computed from a knowledge of h, of e, of the structure of the language, and of the inductive rule to be employed.
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  34. Probability.D. R. Cousin - 1954 - Philosophical Quarterly 4 (14):82-84.
  35. Scientific method without metaphysical presuppositions.Herbert Feigl - 1954 - Philosophical Studies 5 (2):17 - 29.
  36. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. By Rudolf Carnap. (The University of Chicago Press. 1952. Cambridge University Press. Pp. vi + 92. Price 26s.). [REVIEW]L. J. Russell - 1953 - Philosophy 28 (106):272-.
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  37. The continuum of inductive methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1952 - [Chicago]: University of Chicago Press.
  38. Professor Carnap and probability.William H. Hay - 1952 - Philosophy of Science 19 (2):170-177.
    Most handbooks on statistics and the theory of probability leave the reader in a mysterious tangle of mathematical rules for computing apparently arbitrarily chosen numerical functions. At first sight, then, a treatise on the Logical Foundations of Probability raises hopes that it will be a guide to clarity in these matters. These hopes are strengthened if the reader remembers that the author, Professor Rudolph Carnap of the University of Chicago, is noted for his thesis that philosophy is the study of (...)
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  39. Professor Carnap's philosophy of probability.Donald C. Williams - 1952 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (1):103-121.
  40. The nature and application of inductive logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1951 - Chicago,: University of Chicago Press.
  41. The problem of relations in inductive logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (5):75 - 80.
  42. Carnap on Probability.John G. Kemeny - 1951 - Review of Metaphysics 5 (1):145 - 156.
  43. Carnap's theory of probability.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (3):362-374.
  44. (1 other version)Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
    APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...)
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  45. (1 other version)On the application of inductive logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (1):133-148.
  46. Probability as a guide in life.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (6):141-148.
  47. Much ado about probability.C. West Churchman - 1947 - Philosophy of Science 14 (2):176-178.
  48. On inductive logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1945 - Philosophy of Science 12 (2):72-97.
    Among the various meanings in which the word ‘probability’ is used in everyday language, in the discussion of scientists, and in the theories of probability, there are especially two which must be clearly distinguished. We shall use for them the terms ‘probability1’ and ‘probability2'. Probability1 is a logical concept, a certain logical relation between two sentences ; it is the same as the concept of degree of confirmation. I shall write briefly “c” for “degree of confirmation,” and “c” for “the (...)
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  49. The two concepts of probability: The problem of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1945 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5 (4):513-532.
  50. (1 other version)Remarks on induction and truth.Rudolf Carnap - 1945 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (4):590-602.
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