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Dorothy Edgington
Birkbeck College
  1. On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
  2. Vagueness by Degrees.Dorothy Edgington - 1997 - In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press.
    Book synopsis: Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole"—have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If you remove one grain from a heap of (...)
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  3. The Paradox of Knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.
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  4. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica, Unam.
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  5.  84
    Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight.Dorothy Edgington - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey (...)
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  6. Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.
  7. Two Kinds of Possibility.Dorothy Edgington - 2004 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1):1-22.
    I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
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  8. Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions.Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
  9. Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2006 - Mind.
  10. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Critica 18 (52):3-39.
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  11. Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52.
    Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual (...)
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  12.  17
    I-Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.
    I argue that the suppositional view of conditionals, which is quite popular for indicative conditionals, extends also to subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. According to this view, conditional judgements should not be construed as factual, categorical judgements, but as judgements about the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent. The strongest evidence for the view comes from focusing on the fact that conditional judgements are often uncertain; and conditional uncertainty, which is a well-understood notion, does not function like uncertainty about matters (...)
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  13. What If ? Questions About Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):380–401.
    Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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  14.  51
    Matter-of-Fact Conditionals.Richard Jeffrey & Dorothy Edgington - 1991 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 65 (1):161 - 209.
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  15.  81
    Validity, Uncertainty and Vagueness.Dorothy Edgington - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):193 - 204.
  16. Matter-of-Fact Conditionals.Richard Jeffrey & Dorothy Edgington - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 65:161-209.
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  17. Conditionals, Causation, and Decision.Dorothy Edgington - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (2):75-87.
  18.  90
    Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - unknown
    We provide an introduction to some of the key issues raised in this volume by considering how individual chapters bear on the prospects of what may be called a ‘counterfactual process view’ of causal reasoning. According to such a view, counterfactual thought is an essential part of the processing involved in making causal judgements, at least in a central range of cases that are critical to a subject’s understanding of what it is for one thing to cause another. We argue (...)
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  19.  60
    Wright and Sainsbury on Higher-Order Vagueness.Dorothy Edgington - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):193-200.
  20.  71
    Credence, Conditionals, Knowledge and Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):332-342.
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  21.  25
    The Presidential Address: Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):1 - 21.
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  22.  76
    Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):691-707.
    The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.
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  23.  30
    The Inaugural Address: Two Kinds of Possibility.Dorothy Edgington - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 78:1-22.
    I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
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  24. Truth, Objectivity, Counterfactuals and Gibbard.Dorothy Edgington - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):107-116.
  25. Lowe on Conditional Probability.Dorothy Edgington - 1996 - Mind 105 (420):617-630.
  26.  98
    Indeterminacy de Re.Dorothy Edgington - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):27--44.
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  27.  5
    What If? Questions About Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):380-401.
    : Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans. Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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  28.  44
    Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Stephen Read & Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):47 - 86.
  29.  34
    Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - forthcoming - History and Philosophy of Logic:1-8.
    Conditional judgements—judgements employing ‘if’—are essential to practical reasoning about what to do, as well as to much reasoning about what is the case. We handle them well enough from an early...
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  30. Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Stephen Read & Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 69:47-86.
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  31. Mellor on Chance and Causation. [REVIEW]Dorothy Edgington - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):411-433.
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also (...)
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  32.  41
    The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness.Dorothy Edgington - 2001 - Legal Theory 7 (4):371-378.
    Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. "There is no such point", is a natural thought: one color just shades gradually into the next.
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  33. ``The Paradox of Knowability&Quot.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94:557-568.
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  34.  12
    The Metaphysics of Modality.Dorothy Edgington - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):365-370.
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  35. Conditionals, Truth and Assertion.Dorothy Edgington - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
     
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  36. Un argumento de Orayen en favor del condicional material.Dorothy Edgington - 1987 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 13 (1):54.
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  37.  42
    Verificationism and the Manifestations of Meaning.Anthony Appiah & Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1):17 - 52.
  38. Verificationism and the Manifestations of Meaning.Anthony Appiah & Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 59:17-52.
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  39.  92
    General Conditional Statements: A Response to Kölbel.Dorothy Edgington - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):109-116.
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  40.  17
    Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2005 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show how relevant it is to (...)
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  41.  7
    Logic and Philosophy: A Modern Introduction.Dorothy Edgington - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (81):406.
  42.  41
    Meaning, Bivalence and Realism.Dorothy Edgington - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:153 - 173.
  43.  61
    Explanation, Causation and Laws.Dorothy Edgington - 1990 - Critica 22 (66):55-73.
  44.  96
    Andrew Bacon: Vagueness and Thought. [REVIEW]Dorothy Edgington - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (12):691-698.
  45.  33
    The Mystery of the Missing Boundary. [REVIEW]Dorothy Edgington - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):704–711.
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  46.  23
    X—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism.Dorothy Edgington - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1):153-174.
  47.  48
    Frank Ramsey.Fraser MacBride, Mathieu Marion, Maria Jose Frapolli, Dorothy Edgington, Edward J. R. Elliott, Sebastian Lutz & Jeffrey Paris - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–30) made seminal contributions to philosophy, mathematics and economics. Whilst he was acknowledged as a genius by his contemporaries, some of his most important ideas were not appreciated until decades later; now better appreciated, they continue to bear an influence upon contemporary philosophy. His historic significance was to usher in a new phase of analytic philosophy, which initially built upon the logical atomist doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, raising their ideas to a new level of (...)
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  48. And Assertion.Dorothy Edgington - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. pp. 283.
     
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  49.  86
    Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology: A Critique of the Method of Truth in Metaphysics.Brian A. Ball, Dorothy Edgington & John Hawthorne - unknown
    In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth (...)
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  50.  22
    Is Prior to Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 230.
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