A partir da leitura da Fenomenologia do espírito [Phänomenologie des Geistes], de Hegel, em particular, da Introdução, busca-se elaborar os pressupostos da formação da consciência, mostrando os momentos em que essa passa pelo seu formar, diferentemente do que ocorria no período moderno. Percebe-se o surgimento de novo critério de formação, cujo fundamento é assinalado pela crítica que Hegel faz à formação representativa, que sustenta a educação mediante a interiorização do pensamento e a representa a partir de conceitos que não passaram (...) pela experiência com o objeto e nem realizaram a negação de seu saber com o intuito de formar outro. Já na formação dialética, a partir dos pressupostos hegelianos, a consciência sai do seu estado natural e percorre o movimento do círculo espiral e, em cada momento desse percurso circular, realiza a experiência entre o saber da consciência com a verdade do objeto. Nesse sentido, cada etapa dessa experiência é o aprofundar no saber da consciência e na verdade do objeto, causando dúvida e desespero em seu formar, pois vê desaparecerem o conhecer e a verdade que tinha do objeto. Com isso, têm-se os momentos de negação, de conservação e de superação tanto na consciência quanto no objeto, constituindo a suprassunção [Aufhebung] até alcançar o saber conceitual em que há a identificação entre o saber e a verdade. Com esse princípio de formação, Hegel faz a crítica da crítica e efetiva a experiência entre o saber do sujeito e a verdade do objeto. Nesse itinerário, a consciência, paulatinamente, entra no processo do trabalho de formação, cujo fundamento é o concrecere – crescer juntos; ou seja, o saber da consciência com a verdade do objeto. Isso se realiza no momento em que a consciência é tocada pelo fenômeno do objeto. Há, então, novo procedimento pedagógico que leva em consideração a negação, o ceticismo amadurecido e a experiência para alcançar o saber real de sua formação [Bildung]. Palavras-chave: Formação. Consciência. Experiência. Desespero. Ceticismo. (shrink)

Considering citizenship education specifically in relation to deliberative politics, first, I focus on the role that Habermas in Between Facts and Norms allots to opinion and will formation as a kind of Bildung, emphasizing the collective aspect of discursive formation in the state as well as in civil society. Secondly, even though I have stressed the crucial role of deliberation in the formation to virtue, I recognize that Habermas attempts to combine the republican call for civic (...) virtue with the liberal claims to have rights. Thirdly, I emphasize that also for Habermas Bildung in some sense constitutes the truth of human being, although it is not specified in detail. Fourthly, I argue that democratic citizenship education would benefit from a substantial notion of Bildung, but that Habermas does not support such an argument. Recognizing that Habermas’s idea of collective formation is restricted to providing justice in terms of politics and law, and bearing in mind the alienation in fact produced within the multitudes of modern capitalist and militarist society, I conclude by expressing the fear that Habermas’s account of democratic formation will not be sufficiently attractive to contemporary democratic citizens and thus unable to function as a normative ideal. (shrink)

David Bakhurst's 2011 book ‘The Formation of Reason’ explores the philosophy of John McDowell in general and the Aristotelian notion of second nature more specifically, topics to which philosophers of education have not yet given adequate attention. The book's widespread appeal led to the symposium ‘Second Nature, Bildung and McDowell: David Bakhurst's The Formation of Reason’, which appeared in the first issue of the 50th anniversary volume of the Journal of Philosophy of Education in 2016. Despite its (...) obvious educational relevance, whether and how Bakhurst's McDowellian line of philosophical argument shapes the domain of educational enquiry or discourse remains up for debate. The rich contributions of Sebastian Rödl, Paul Standish and Jan Derry help us confront this issue. Proceeding with an analysis that is partly explanatory and partly critical of the central aspects of their respective views, I try to show that the basic attraction of the McDowellian/Bakhurstian line of argument concerning educational thinking is that it enables us to address education in the proper context of the natural and the social. In other words, their depiction of a human being as a natural animal in a normative world allows us not to be perturbed either by the natural-scientific conception of the natural or by the social constructivist thinking of the social, both of which have occasionally distorted how education is addressed and therefore impoverished our understanding of education itself. I conclude with a brief word on the significance of continuing and advancing the conversation initiated by the symposium by noting two viable examples of future work. (shrink)

This paper is part of a broader project in which I investigate autobiographical experiences and transcribed memories. Specifically, this essay analyzes the potential linkages between philosophical ideas and everyday social existence. First, I consider the correspondence between an anecdote from my own lived experience and the concept of Bildung—a multidimensional notion loosely translated as “formation,” “self-formation,” “cultivation,” “self-cultivation,” “self-development,” “cultural process,” and so on. Building on Hegel’s and Gadamer’s contributions to Bildungstheorie, I introduce readers to the concept. (...) Then, in analyzing my anecdote, I destabilize the concept and demonstrate that any act of Bildung can be trivialized easily by Rückbildung. The general scope of this essay is neither to contribute to the systematization of the concept of Bildung nor to discuss potential commonalities within the realm of interpretative contributions to this notion. Instead, I demonstrate that thinkers cannot measure this concept with a set of fixed criteria and, finally, I propose a critical understanding of Bildung through a dialogue of theoria and praxis. (shrink)

This study aims to critique the concept of active learning in childhood education based on Hegelian Bildung. We have defined childhood education from the perspective of Hegel’s Bildung in The Phenomenology of Spirit. We describe childhood education as a ‘primary Bildung’ having the aim of ‘entering into the conceptual world’. This aim indicates that children can and are required to express their experiences in conceptual language. Finally, we critique the conceptual components of active learning from the Hegelian (...) point of view and suggest three alternative components: ‘child-educator interaction’, ‘understanding historical knowledge’, and ‘addressing concrete-abstract affairs.’ We suggest that the concept of active learning needs to be replaced by ‘Communicative-Interactive Learning (CIL)’. CIL takes both objectivity and subjectivity into account during the process of knowledge formation in education. (shrink)

This study aims to critique the concept of active learning in childhood education based on Hegelian Bildung. We have defined childhood education from the perspective of Hegel’s Bildung in The Phenomenology of Spirit. We describe childhood education as a ‘primary Bildung’ having the aim of ‘entering into the conceptual world’. This aim indicates that children can and are required to express their experiences in conceptual language. Finally, we critique the conceptual components of active learning from the Hegelian (...) point of view and suggest three alternative components: ‘child-educator interaction’, ‘understanding historical knowledge’, and ‘addressing concrete-abstract affairs.’ We suggest that the concept of active learning needs to be replaced by ‘Communicative-Interactive Learning (CIL)’. CIL takes both objectivity and subjectivity into account during the process of knowledge formation in education. (shrink)

The author claims that we should differentiate the concept, the conception and the ideal of Bildung. Based on these differences, Bildung could be considered as a kind of attitude, project, or as specific - normative and optative - practice.. Autor smatra da treba praviti formalnu razliku izmedju pojma, koncepcije i ideala Bildung-a. Na osnovu tako utvrdjene razlike, Bildung bi se mogao poimati kao stav, projekt ili specificna, u isti mah i normativno i optativno intonirana, praksa..

In this article, I discuss education in a time in the history when the human impact on Earth is massive and pervasive, with devastating consequences on the conditions for life. Within various academic fields, this era is increasingly distinguished as the Anthropocene. The term highlights the new, dominant position of the human species in Earth’s history, but is contentious, hiding as much as it reveals. Humanity is surely not one, but many, participating in a complex web of relations constituted by (...) other species and the material world. Moreover, the Anthropocene is also a time of global corporate capitalism, when the magnitude and the consequences of human activities are unequally distributed among humans and more-than humans alike. The ethical and political dimensions involved in this determine the reflections in this article. Specifically, I examine Wolfgang Klafki’s educational theory as an expression of and a response to the Anthropocene. Klafki is a salient contributor to the rethinking of North European general didactics in the 20th century, in which Bildung, formations of the self, plays a key role. In Klafki’s later works, epochal key problems are integrated in his concept of Bildung, addressing environmental crisis, social inequity, and threats to peace on Earth, in a global outlook that transcends Bildung’s traditionally national scope. At the same time, Klafki’s educational response expresses an anthropocentric outlook, which calls for rethinking. In such a rethinking I suggest to see the mediating element of the common, crucial in Klafki’s Bildung theory, not as limited to human interests but as including concerns for life on Earth, and to conceive of historical situatedness as an aspect of the commonality of Bildung. (shrink)

Recently there has been a spate of interest in Max Scheler’s social phenomenology (Schloßberger, 2016; Szanto & Moran, 2016; Cusinato, 2018). In this paper I aim to show that his philosophical contribution on Europe and Europeanism has its focal point on the concepts of rebuilding (Wiederaufbau) and rebirth (Wiedergeburt). My idea is that, for Scheler, the essential condition of any attitude towards socio-cultural change (Umkehr) have its center in the idea of the formation and the development of the personal (...) singularity (Personbildung) (Scheler, 2009a; Scheler, 2010a; Scheler, 2013). And this means the growth and the expression, in a solidaristic perspective, of one’s own ethical singularity (An-sich-Gutes für mich) and of one’s own vocations. The idea of solidarity declined in terms of Bildung is therefore strictly interdependent on the testimony coming from Otherness-exemplar (Vorbild) (Scheler, 2009f). (shrink)

“A mouth that speaks, many ears, and half the hands that write. These are the ac a demic ap - pa ra tus, these are the ac tive ma chines of Bildung in the Uni ver sity”, as writen by Nietz sche.. What should we do? Nietz sche gave us some an swers, in his ha bit ual form: ques tions, met a phor..

This book is the first to systematically reconstruct the complete works of the Swiss-Jewish cultural philosopher Michael Landmann (1913–1984) and make them fruitful for teaching purposes: as a philosophical theory of the teaching of cultural plurality. The multiplicity of human life forms represents the content and target horizon of educational processes as well as the underlying value and prejudice of Landmann's anthropology. Taken seriously as such, cultural plurality is the yardstick of a humanity that starts from the natural and cultural (...) artificiality of being human and in which the boundaries of what is human are mediated: spiritually and communicatively in dialogical encounters, and culturally and practically in the formation of lifestyles. (shrink)

Ontological perspectives in higher education and particularly in professional education and development have focused attention on the question of the learner’s being and becoming rather than on the epistemological concern of what and how they know. This study considers the formation of the professional self in the light of the requirements for professional practice. It raises the question of agency in relation to this formational process and considers the implications of the autonomy paradox which arises from the simultaneous influence (...) of the sovereign self and the external authority of the profession on the formation of the professional self. This study considers a structural perspective on both of these matters and concludes with implications for professional education and development derived from constructive developmental theory and the notion of subject–object transformation. (shrink)

My contribution seeks to unfold an ontology of the imagination based on the history of the productive imagination in its relation to common sense and recent developments of the notion of the social imaginary, while making use of ideas found in both Western and Japanese thinkers. Kyoto School philosopher Miki Kiyoshi shows a connection between the imagination he inherits from Kant and a certain form-formlessness dynamic he inherits from Nishida Kitarō’s notion of a self-forming formlessness. The source of the imagination’s (...) creativity is in that formlessness that lies both within the interior depths of the psyche and outside in the environing nature. Post-war Japanese philosopher Nakamura Yūjirō—taking off from Miki’s attempts to concretize Nishida’s theory of place in terms of the imagination—in turn points to a connection between imagination and place and explicates this via his development of the Aristotelian notion of common sense (koinē aisthēsis, sensus communis). Common sense in itself has a long history within the West that involves a variety of meanings starting with the Aristotelian faculty for integrating the various senses (as koinē aisthēsis) that was closely associated with the imagination, and ending with two contrasting notions of a communal or social sensibility (as sensus communis)—the vulgar “commonplace” notion of common sense as habituated custom and the healthy sense of common sense as prudential, contextual, ethical judgment explicated by thinkers like Hannah Arendt. Both are found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment but the imagination’s creativity expressed in genius comes into tension with the latter communal sense of common sense that attempts to fetter that creativity of genius with the judgment of taste. The contemporary notion of the social imaginary, for example in Cornelius Castoriadis, seems to encompass both the vulgar and the healthy senses of common sense, and also recalls the close connection between the imagination and common sense in Aristotle. Contrary to what Kant sought, however, this underscores the temporal contingency or historicity and non-transcendental status of common sense, even in its healthy sense, and its communal judgments. At the same time, the form-formlessness dynamic found in Miki and the tension between unbounded creativity and communal responsibility found in Kant’s third Critique in a certain sense also reappears in Castoriadis’ ontology (of magmas) whereby chaos is the source of the imagination’s creativity not only for the individual psyche but for the social-historical or social imaginary significations as well, that is, in the social imaginary’s inner tension between the instituting and the instituted. Recalling the fact that Nishida was inspired by the Greek notion of chōra in developing his theory of place, I then suggest that the linking of the imagination with the process of the forming of the formless as well as with place may allow us in turn to understand the creative imagination ontologically in the Greek terms of chōrismos—etymologically related to chōra—as the difference that brings order to chaos by allotting beings, each to its own place. Imagination as Ein-bildung might then be viewed as the ontological formation that, through differentiation, gives shape, form, to place. This then leads to the issue of autonomy—To whom does the spontaneity of the creative imagination belong when the chaos or formlessness, indeed “freedom,” at the root of its creativity exceeds the boundaries of subjectivity or reason? Heidegger in his later works, albeit in only a few places, suggests such a sense of the imagination as no longer a faculty of the human subject, no longer a doing of man. (shrink)

Introduction -- From paideia to humanism -- Pietism and the problem of human craft (Menschen-Kunst) -- The harmonious harp-playing of humanity: J. G. Herder -- Ethical formation and the invention of the religion of art -- The rise of the Bildungsroman and the commodification of literature -- Authorship and its resignation in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister -- "The Bildung of self-consciousness itself towards science": Hegel.

Dans ce livre issu de sa thèse de doctorat, F. Jégoudez reconstitue les grandes étapes de l’évolution du concept de Bildung (éducation, formation et développement de soi) à travers l’œuvre de Nietzsche, repartant des premières occurrences de celle-ci et accompagnant l’évolution du rapport du philosophe à ceux qu’il nomme les « savants ». La lecture proposée par F. Jégoudez a notamment l’intérêt d’insister sur la distinction produite par le philosophe entre une vraie ou authentique Bildung qui...

Education, Self-consciousness and Social Action reconstructs the Hegelian concept of education, Bildung, and shows that this concept could serve as a powerful alternative to current psychologist notions of learning. Taking a Hegelian perspective, Stojanov claims that Bildung should be interpreted as growth of mindedness and that such a growth has two central and interrelated components, including the development of self-consciousness toward conceptual self-articulation and the formation of one's capacity for intelligent social action. The interrelation between the two (...) central components of education implies that learning is transformed into education only when it involves the self-consciousness and the identity of the learner. Since both are grounded in the ethical beliefs and values of the individual, transforming learning into education therefore requires that education also address students' everyday ethical assumptions, as well as their articulation and conceptualization. This claim has a number of implications for educational policy and pedagogy; one being that learning and teaching in schools are educative only if they have ethical significance for both students and teachers. Another implication is that the point of departure for educative teaching becomes the actual, everyday ethical beliefs and experiences of the students, rather than fixed curricular contents. Students' encountering with sciences and arts should aim at the conceptual articulation of those beliefs and experiences - an articulation which makes individual's rational autonomy and self-determination possible. Education, Self-consciousness and Social Action will be of great interest to academics, researchers and postgraduate students interested in the philosophy of education. It should also be essential reading for anyone engaged in the study of Hegel's work. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to contribute to the conceptualization of creativity in education. The article makes use of the self-Bildung perspective, which is an up-to-date version of the Neo-humanistic notion of the formation of the personality in order to interpret the original notion of the 'four stages' of the creative process. The conclusion is that in this perspective creativity can be understood as a state of transcendence and a practice of taste. Finally, the article seeks to (...) sketch out a suggestion of the creative capacities that are important to cultivate in education. (shrink)

In this book, John H. Smith investigates the influences of classical and humanistic rhetoric on Hegel's theory and practice of philosophical representation. Smith focuses on Hegel's concept of Bildung (roughly, education, development, or formation) which occupies a central position in his philosophy.

The conceptual history of Bildung, the German term for self-formation, encapsulates the ethical revolution of modern German thought, associated with the Kantian moment and its aftermath. Reshaped in modernity to respond to a post-Kantian, critical sensibility, the modern term emphasizes the reflexive, active process of self-formation, in contrast with the medieval theological sensibility which emphasized the receptive imprint of the image of God. In this article, I unpack Moses Mendelsohn’s idiosyncratic notion of Bildung. I show that (...) what is unique, indeed, singular in Mendelssohn’s notion of Bildung is the way it merges the traditional, theological notion with the modern one. For Mendelssohn, to imitate God is to come to value one’s contingent being. The imitation of the ideal, the most perfect, is tantamount to embracing the perfectible, and the process of perfection or self-actualization. Jacobi, Mendelssohn, Bildung, Contingency, Pantheism affair, Moral Perfectionism. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage réunit une dizaine d’interventions faites au congrès de la société allemande de pédagogie qui s’est tenu à Dortmund en 1994. À travers certains concepts repris dans le titre, tels que « Bildung » désignant à la fois l’éducation et la formation de la personnalité ou « Menschen-Geschlechter » qui au singulier signifie le genre humain mais, au pluriel, induit deux sexes différenciés, se révèlent d’emblée l’ambition et l’ambiguïté d’un thème aussi vaste que le rôle et l’influence (...) de l... (shrink)

Cet ouvrage réunit une dizaine d’interventions faites au congrès de la société allemande de pédagogie qui s’est tenu à Dortmund en 1994. À travers certains concepts repris dans le titre, tels que « Bildung » désignant à la fois l’éducation et la formation de la personnalité ou « Menschen-Geschlechter » qui au singulier signifie le genre humain mais, au pluriel, induit deux sexes différenciés, se révèlent d’emblée l’ambition et l’ambiguïté d’un thème aussi vaste que le rôle et l’influence (...) de l... (shrink)

The present study clarifies the theological importance of feeling in the formation of a person, as Edith Stein understands it. Feeling constitutes the originating dimension of the finite spirit, disclosing the dynamic pair of thinking and willing while being capable of anticipating infinite Spirit. A finite spirit is a most real and authentic incarnate spirit when it comprehends itself as stemming from God. The foundations of this formation are to be found in the ontic, historical, dynamic relationship between (...) finite spirit and the Infinite Spirit, who anticipates finite spirit answering to an “image” logos (Bild ) as one who is led toward a “full similitude” (Gleichnis) to God by the Holy Spirit. The longing of the finite for the infinite manifests itself in the dynanimic relations between feeling, intelligence, and willing. Guided by these fundamental insights, Edith Stein teaches that the relationship between Bildung and Ausbildung constitutes a process of divinization based in a loving dialogue. (shrink)

Nietzsche's philosophy unfolds, at all times, in denouncing that the schools and universities in Germany serve, mostly, to domesticate as a modern force in favor of the values administered by the State. Considering this horizon, this article investigates the analytical background of the Nietzschean critique of education (Ersiehung) of his time to show the necessary tension that human formation (Bildung) emerges in the framework of his philosophy as the cultivation of new values. For that, it will be necessary (...) to show that another level of discipline, at the same time cause and effect of a unique and proper formative experience, must be triggered as a creative power of and for other existential values. (shrink)

El reto de todas las sociedades, tanto a nivel de lo que se ha denominado formación (Bildung) como de lo que constituye la institucionalización jurídico-política, es el problema del mal que se concretiza a la manera de la banalización y destrucción de la humanidad misma. La filosofía práctica kantiana asume este desafío y plantea un proyecto ético-político que pasa a través de lo pedagógico y estético. El propósito de este artículo es hacer una exploración en torno a las posibilidades (...) de configuración moral y jurídica de tos sujetos a partir de los planteamientos kantianos, contrastándolas con la dificultad permanente que para ellas representa el mal radical. Para esto se procederá a través de cuatro apartados. El primero versará sobre los presupuestos antropológicos o rasgos humanos que se convierten en condición de posibilidad tanto de la moralización como de la normalización. El segundo tendrá como tema la legislación ético-moral ahondando en el concepto de autonomia. El tercero planteará la relación entre ética y política a través de lo jurídico para, finalmente, esbozar algunas conclusiones. (shrink)

El reto de todas las sociedades, tanto a nivel de lo que se ha denominado formación (Bildung) como de lo que constituye la institucionalización jurídico-política, es el problema del mal que se concretiza a la manera de la banalización y destrucción de la humanidad misma. La filosofía práctica kantiana asume este desafío y plantea un proyecto ético-político que pasa a través de lo pedagógico y estético. El propósito de este artículo es hacer una exploración en torno a las posibilidades (...) de configuración moral y jurídica de tos sujetos a partir de los planteamientos kantianos, contrastándolas con la dificultad permanente que para ellas representa el mal radical. Para esto se procederá a través de cuatro apartados. El primero versará sobre los presupuestos antropológicos o rasgos humanos que se convierten en condición de posibilidad tanto de la moralización como de la normalización. El segundo tendrá como tema la legislación ético-moral ahondando en el concepto de autonomia. El tercero planteará la relación entre ética y política a través de lo jurídico para, finalmente, esbozar algunas conclusiones. (shrink)

Nineteenth-century German classical philology underpins many structures of the modern humanities. In this book, Constanze Güthenke shows how a language of love and a longing for closeness with a personified antiquity have lastingly shaped modern professional reading habits, notions of biography, and the self-image of scholars and teachers. She argues that a discourse of love was instrumental in expressing the challenges of specialisation and individual formation (Bildung), and in particular for the key importance of a Platonic scene of (...) learning and instruction for imagining the modern scholar. The book is based on detailed readings of programmatic texts from, among others, Wolf, Schleiermacher, Boeckh, Thiersch, Dilthey, Wilamowitz and Nietzsche. It makes a case for revising established narratives, but also for finding new value in imagining distance and an absence of nostalgic longing for antiquity. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the relation of the three major spheres of ethical life that Hegel distinguishes – family, civil society, and the state – and analyse their contribution to the constitution of the "second nature" of objective spirit. Family and civil society are both analyzed by Hegel as ways of taking up and transforming our given nature such that a second ethical nature can be produced. Where the family helps bring forth such a second nature by means of (...) “education” (Erziehung), civil society does so by means of “cultural formation” (Bildung). As I show in sections (I) and (II), these processes are characterised by Hegel as steps of an actualization of freedom insofar they liberate us from our given nature without suppressing it and bring forth a second nature that gives freedom the consistency of living reality. However, while these processes constitute forms of liberation, they are at the same time forms of social subjection, involving discipline and normalization, the subjection to the will of another, and the adaption to the given necessities of the social world. Therefore, the completion of the process of liberation seems to require a third sphere that allows individuals to relate, collectively and politically, to the second nature thus produced. In order for the second nature of spirit to be a self-constitutive actualization of freedom, ethical life thus requires a specific political dimension that I turn to in section (III). While this political process is only possible on the basis of the republican infrastructures of family and civil society, it at the same time calls these infrastructures into question. Although Hegel himself does not develop this dimension properly, his conception of second nature points towards the desideratum of a politics of second nature. I will close the discussion of this political dimension in section (IV) by pointing out the general and diagnostic dimensions that such a politics of second nature can help us elaborate. (shrink)

Hegel’s account of the unconscious and his broader philosophy of mind offer us a well worked out form of non-dualist, non-reductionist, non-eliminativist, non-representationalist naturalism. Hegel describes the development of discursively structured thought (and responsiveness to norms) in ethological terms as emerging from initial somatic-sensory states, from states and processes of bodily activity on the part of a feeling soul, and from structured habituation in relation to other subjects. Importantly, earlier, less organized states of sensory awareness and feeling persist as residues (...) underneath cognitive development in “the pit of imagination.” Imagistic and sensory-somatic materials from this pit can burst out, among other things, in dreams, madness, somnambulism, witty conversation, and puns. In the face of the permanent possibility of regressions from cognitive development, a continual activity of self-formation (Bildung) through art and participation in second nature is essential to maturity. (shrink)

The scope of this investigation is to find out to what extent the style (Stil), for the young Nietzsche, consists of a means through which the philosopher accomplishes the supreme task of philosophy: the formation (Bildung). I start from the statement that the stylistic problem composes one of the main elements of the evaluation that the young philosopher makes of the German formation and culture (Kultur) of his time to, finally, present how Nietzsche finds in the extemporaneous (...) character of style and in the Schopenhauer's philosophy the way to overcome the barbarism (Barbarei). (shrink)

Subject of my paper is the connection between Hegel’s philosophy of nature and the new conception of subjectivity developed in his works. At the centre of my reflection is the origin of desire from biological needs of the animal world, as affirmed by Hegel in the Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences and inPhenomenology of Spirit. The animal nutrition is periodical: hunger and thirst are forms of lack, from which, in Hegel’s eyes, arises the first form of self‐consciousness: they produce a first, (...) obscure and indefinite sense of self. The correspondent concept in Phenomenology of Spirit is desire, as awareness of limits, and also as necessity to overcome them: as impulse to action. The fight and recognition which follow imply this natural source. The formation (Bildung) of subjectivity itself presupposes in Hegel this fundamental role of desire: What I want to analyse is the measure in which philosophy of nature influenced Hegel’s theory of subjectivity. Researches of the last decades give a new evaluation of the importance of this part of his philosophy and show the evident links to romantic philosophy of nature. My paper intends to demonstrate that desire in Hegel’s philosophy shows an evident cognitive value and can be considered a key-instrument for a new conception of reason, not opposed to passions. This approach can be interesting within the present international debate about the strategic role of passions in our post-modern world. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate the idea of universality through the lens of translation, in an attempt to sketch out what can be called a translational universality. As the starting point, I will take into consideration the recent Étienne Balibar's works on the universals, and especially his strategy of translation, i.e. the strategy of enunciating the universal by means of translational process. In the next step, I will analyze political consequences of the universalizing practices of translation, which (...) due to their capacity to enunciate the universals, according to Balibar's thesis, have generated political communities. In order to examine this aspect, I will discuss the constitutive role of translation in the formation of German cultural identity in the 19th Century, by exposing Humboldt-Schleirmacherian model of translation. In doing so I will lean on Berman's study on translation in Romantic Germany and on Venuti's political reading of nationalist narratives of typically German foreignizing translation. The conception of Bildung, envisaged as an experience of the otherness through translation, will be approached as a historical model to understand the notion of translational universality that is at issue in this paper. After these historical and philosophical analyses, which in translation view one possible way to articulate a certain struggle over the universal from the particular position of cultural difference, the article will address some questions regarding our contemporary situation: what would be a historically different and potentially emancipatory form of universality? What are the translational capacities of such a universality to generate a new framework for political communities? (shrink)

Botticelli and Tizian depict the Annunciation in two very different ways. Botticelli portrays a kneeling angel in an act of guiding from below, while Tizian represents an angel imposing himself from above with an authoritarian forefinger. Botticelli's painting suggests an intention of orientation that is not authoritarian yet able to bring about a transformation (Umbildung). It also suggests that an individual's transformation cannot be achieved in a closed solipsistic dimension, but requires a disclosure from otherness. My theory is that at (...) the origin of ethics there is a non-authoritarian way of orientation that comes from otherness and arises from the emotional sphere thanks to a "care of desire". The expression cura sui has often been interpreted as a care confined to a private and solipsistic dimension with the aim of strengthening the self-referential subject. By "care of desire" I mean a care not turned upon itself but made possible by a disclosure coming from otherness and addressed to the transformation of the individual and of society. In the human existence, emotions reveal an extraordinary plasticity. They are not already regulated by instinct but develop and get to maturity even many years after biological birth. Moreover, this maturation process does not follow a universal process identical for everyone, being different for every individual. In fact it finds its realization in the unique order of feelings (ordo amoris) that characterizes every individual. Emotions guide actions and the way we interact with the others and with the world. In the human existence they become plastic and don't have only a homeostatic function of self-regulation. They give flexibility to our way of perceiving, of existing and of taking our position in the world. The care of desire is dedicated to the plasticity of emotions and makes ethics, i.e. a person's formation process (Bildung) and flourishing, possible. It also allows the transition from the “environmental closedness” (Umweltgeschlossenheit) to the world-openness (Weltoffenheit). To sum up, the care of desire implies the transition from a solipsistic self-care to a “care for world-openness”. From this point of view, emotion is no more the secondary result of a cognitive process, but at the origin of every formative, perceptive and cognitive process: In the beginning was the emotion. Yet in this process of creative transformation not every emotion has the same significance: at the core of emotions’ plasticity there are love and wonder (thaumàzein), whose peculiar feature is “lack of envy” (aphthonoi). (shrink)

The main theory at the core of this monograph is that the person is an entity ontologically new, since she is able to perform an act of self-transcendence, which is meant as her critical distancing from her own “self”, understood as subject of social recognition (Anerkennung), in order to open to the encounter with the world (Weltoffenheit). This allows us to consider a person in a new way, different both from confessional interpretations that see her only as a center of (...) the spirit and from reductivistic views. Schelling examines the act of self-transcendence through the concept of ecstasy, whereas Scheler associates it with the phenomenological reduction. The act of self-transcendence, that Schelling sees as originated by the “hunger of being”, is at the roots of the formation process of a person (Bildung): the person takes her shape by exiting from her own self-referential dimension and encountering otherness. If considered from this viewpoint, Plato’s “epimeleia heautou” exceeds an intimistic perspective: the “care” is no more a solipsistic self-care, but rather becomes the care through which the person transcends her own self to open to the relationships with otherness. It turns, therefore, into a care for world-openness (care for Weltoffenheit). The transformation of the individual and of society so becomes the double-faced aspect of the same process. The development of this set of problems occurs through a dialogue with Schelling’s and Scheler’s positions, but it is also supported by a historical-philosophical investigation, that for instance provides evidence of the influences of Schelling’s Berlin period on Scheler’s last theories and on the philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. Schelling was the first to conceive the concept of “eccentricity” in an anthropological sense, since until then the term had been confined to Kepler’s astronomy. Consequently, the planets’ elliptic (eccentric) movement heightens to an emblematic metaphor of human nature and freedom. The monograph also examines a possible convergence between Plato’s epimeleia heautou and Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. The book ends with a chapter on the topic of Vorbild. The exemplary testimony, that is Vorbild, becomes witnessing evidence immune from any pedagogical-moralistic intent: in fact, if it should relapse into the rhetoric of the “wish to give a good example”, it would immediately conform to the opposite logic of the model. A model is universal in so far as it makes everyone more like the others, nullifying the diversity, whereas exemplariness is universal in so far as it makes everyone more unique and motivates each one to follow her own characteristic path of existential trans-formation. Exemplarity doesn’t convey any contents, but rather encourages a kind of solidaristic involvement. Yet there are also negative exemplarities (Gegenbild) that place obstacles in the formation and block the existence of the personal center. (shrink)

This essay examines which contemporary scientific and philosophical problems led to the reference points for the resumption and reformation of diaresis. These multifaceted methodological and epistemological considerations form the contemporary background for Fichte's development of a new type of analytical-synthetic method. By laying down a basic form which in itself contains the possibility of a differentiated formation, the philosophical development of the concept becomes traceable in its genesis. This marks the point where Fichte's conception crosses over the contemporary taxonomic (...) approaches and their spatially-static stratification of concepts as well as the approaches that shape hybridization with their latent temporalization of the conceptual chain. It forms a rupture in thinking related to the linking of species, in that the idea of the mediation of the species (of concepts) among themselves becomes the idea guiding the knowledge. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird untersucht, welche zeitgenössischen naturwissenschaftliche und philosophische Problemstellungen Anknüpfungs¬punk¬te zur Wiederaufnahme und Neuausformung der Diäresis führten. Diese vielgestaltigen methodologischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Überlegungen bilden den zeitgenössischen Hintergrund für Fichtes Ausbildung einer neuartigen analytisch-synthetischen Methode. Durch das Zugrundelegen einer Grundform, die in sich selbst die Möglichkeit zu einer differenzierenden Bildung enthält, wird die philosophische Begriffsentfaltung in ihrer Genese verfolgbar. Hiermit ist das Überschreiten der fichteschen Konzeption gegenüber den zeitgenössischen taxonomischen Ansätzen und deren räumlich-statischer Schichtung der Begriffe ebenso wie gegenüber den die Hybridisierung ausformenden Ansätzen mit ihrer latenten Verzeitlichung der Begriffskette markiert. Es bildet einen Bruch des Denkens über die Verkettung der Arten, indem der Gedanke der Vermitteltheit der Arten (der Begriffe) untereinander zu der das Wissen leitenden Idee wird. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to analyse the influence of Johann Bernhard Basedow and Rousseau on Kant’s cosmopolitanism and concept of cosmopolitan education. It argues that both Basedow and Kant defined cosmopolitan education as non-denominational moral formation or Bildung, encompassing—in different forms—a thin version of moral religion following the core tenets of Christianity. Kant’s encounter with Basedow and the Philanthropinum in Dessau helps to understand the development of Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism and educational theory ‘in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’. (...) Rousseau’s role is more complex: he clearly influenced Kant; he is usually considered a precursor of modern nationalism and national education; and recent studies have stressed the cosmopolitan dimension of his educational programme. I claim that the dilemma of education according to Rousseau is that one has to choose between education of homme or education of citoyen, and that there is no way to avoid or go beyond this stark alternative. Kant’s reinterpretation of Rousseau is favourable and creative and has found many followers up to the present, but is misleading, as he ignores the dilemma and imposes his own conception of cosmopolitanism, of cosmopolitan education and of (possible) progress in history on Rousseau while claiming that this was actually Rousseau’s message. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.4 (1999) 3-18 [Access article in PDF] Grounds of Comparison Pheng Cheah Reflection is born of the comparison of ideas, and it is their variety that leads us to compare them. Whoever sees only a single object has no occasion to make comparisons. Whoever sees only a small number and always the same ones from childhood on still does not compare them, because the habit of seeing them (...) deprives him of the attention required to examine them: but as a new object strikes us, we want to know it, we look for relations between it and the objects we do know; this is how we learn to observe what we see before us, and how what is foreign to us leads us to examine what touches us.Apply these ideas to the first men, you will see the reason for their barbarism. Never having seen anything other than what was around them, they did not know even it; they did not know themselves. They had the idea of a Father, a son, a brother, but not of man. --Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of LanguagesIn recent years, the comparative study of cultural formations has undergone critical reinvigoration. The quasi-exponential globalization of all aspects of human existence, which has brought territorially divided or geographically bounded units such as states, national economies, and cultures into an unprecedented and jarring proximity to one another, is, no doubt, an important material condition of possibility of this heightened interest in the cultural branch of comparative studies. For comparison is today no longer a matter of intentional choice. The gradual defamiliarization of our daily lives by globalizing processes has made comparison an inevitable and even unconscious perspective.Indeed, the grounds of comparison have changed. Comparative work is generally understood as a mode of analysis that begins from one given national or cultural case of a subject of legitimate interest, X, which is the basis for forming a provisional hypothesis or working idea about this subject that serves as the tertium comparationis. One then proceeds to examine a range of other cases of X. Discovered similarities confirm or amplify the various essential features of X that were initially posited, and recognized differences serve to modify our working idea about X. A ground of comparison is therefore both the empirical or objective basis from which comparison begins as well as the interest or principle of reason that motivates each particular activity of comparison.In the past, the grounds of comparison were undeniably Eurocentric. Not only was the material starting point of comparison always from Europe or the North Atlantic; comparison also had a teleological aim. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the interests of comparison in canonical texts such as Hegel's Aesthetics; his Lectures on the Philosophy of History; and Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion; or Max Weber's sociology of world religions served to affirm a certain idea of Europe as a world historical model. For Hegel and Weber, other cases merely provided the mise-en-scène for the appearance and Bildung of this idealized, universalized figure of Europe. Today, in the humanities [End Page 3] and interpretive social sciences, this old framework for comparison has been challenged by critiques of Eurocentrism and Orientalism, by postcolonial studies, and also from the more parochial perspective of multiculturalism. One can no longer nonchalantly or dogmatically start a comparative endeavor from Europe or the North Atlantic. But the problem goes deeper. Many theorists and some funding bodies, including the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) of the USA, have recently suggested that post-Cold War transnationalism has rendered obsolete the traditionally bounded areas of area studies. If this is so, the claim to begin from any area outside the North Atlantic has also become problematic. In other words, if comparison has always presupposed geographical or cultural areas that are a priori distinct and to be compared, how must the grounds of comparison be reenvisioned?The work of Benedict Anderson stands in an oblique relation to such recent trends in humanistic studies. Although Anderson is an area specialist, a Southeast Asianist trained in political studies, his... (shrink)

The contribution focuses on Neo-Confucian texts as collected by Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian and is a look from the ‘outside’, from the perspective of German theories of Bildung. It aims at demonstrating that among other insights that today’s readers may gather from Neo-Confucian literature, one aspect protrudes from others: that learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life and mode of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated, from this perspective, to (...) state that Neo-Confucian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and self-transformation which offers fruitful irritants for questioning the widespread habits of thinking about skills and their development in today’s strong and problematic discourses and corresponding educational policies. (shrink)

In this essay I build on John Cottingham’s suggestion that we need an epistemology of involvement (or receptivity), as opposed to an epistemology of detachment, if we are properly to understand the world in religious terms. I also refer to these as ‘engaged’ and ‘disengaged’ stances. I seek to show how the spiritual practice of an ‘active’ or ‘engaged’ love is integral to the sort of epistemology of involvement through which we come to a religious understanding of the world. Such (...) an understanding is one that gives proper recognition to the sacred or reverence-worthy character of the world. I discuss how a religiously-inflected language of love and the practice it informs can transfigure the world for us and enable its sacred or reverence-worthy character to come into view (supposing it is there in any case). I also seek to show how this is connected to a process of spiritual formation (or Bildung). (shrink)

Constitutional paideia designates a form of constitutionalism that construes a nation’s constitution essentially in terms of ongoing processes of collective self-formation. This paper explores the notion of constitutional paideia as formulated by Hegel, who explicitly defines constitutionalism with categories of Bildung. The paper’s strategy is to present Hegel’ position in light of questions that can be raised about it. The paper advances three central theses: in spite of his historico-culturist approach to law, Hegel is a theoretician of constitutional (...) paideia; despite construing constitutionalism in terms of ongoing processes of popular self-interpretation, Hegel does not vitiate the distinction between law and politics deemed so central to constitutional theory; and despite construing constitutionalism in terms of self-formative processes of a particular culture, Hegel does not jettison the normativity and trans-contextualism long associated with modern constitutional theory. The paper concludes with some observations on the contemporary significance of Hegelian constitutionalism. (shrink)

Der lebende Organismus stellt einen bestimmten, individuellen Teil des Universums dar, indem er seine Selbständigkeit abgetrennt von dem übrigen Universum erhält, durch den Teilungseffekt, welcher durch die Anordnung seiner Teile bestimmt wird. Es ist anerkannt, dass die Teilung nicht vollständig ist, jedoch eine beschränkte gegenseitige Beziehung zulässt. Es ist auch anerkannt, dass der Grad der Organisation in einer verwandten Reihe sich ändert von den tiefen Verwickelungen der einfachen Zelle zu den mannigfachen Abwandlungen wie sie beim Menschen auftreten. Die Auffassung von (...) effektiver Teilung ist ausserdem auch fest und substantiell auf der Tatsache begründet, die durch das Vorhandensein der Plasmamembran und Grenzflächen kolloidaler Aggregaten gegeben ist. Betont ist die dynamische Natur der charakteristischen Gleichgewichtszustände und es wird aufmerksam gemacht auf die kontinuierliche Bildung von effektiven Teilungen bei verschiedenen Gleichgewichtszuständen. Weitere Untersuchung der Bedeutung dieser Teilungen ergibt viele interessante Folgerungen. Schwierigkeiten finden sich, wenn man eine derartige Beschreibung auf geistige Phänomena ausdehnt. Zwar bestehen grundlegende Übereinstimmungen, aber es ist schwer sie genau zu definieren. Es ist klar, dass eine Synthese dieser Art notwendigerweise unvollständig ist, aber es schien wertvoll den Versuch zu machen, L'organisme vivant est présenté ici comme une partie définie et individualisée de l'univers maintenant son individualité propre au moyen de „l'effet de partition” déterminé par l'arrangement de ses parties. Il est entendu que la partition n'est pas complète mais permet encore des relations réciproques mais limitées. Il est reconnu aussi que le degré d'organisation varie dans le cours d'une série, des complexités profondes de la cellule aux innombrables modifications exhibées par l'organisme humain. Le concept de la partition effective est basé solidement sur l'évidence présentée par la membrane plasmatique et les limites de phases dans les aggrégations colloidales. De plus il est important de noter spécialement la nature dynamique des équilibres caractéristiques et l'on ne saurait manquer d'attirer l'attention sur la formation continue de partitions effectives aux différents niveaux d'équilibre. L'étude ultérieure de la signification de ces partitions présente un grand nombre d'implications intéressantes. Il est à noter que des difficultés sont rencontrées quand on essaie d'inclure en une description de ce genre les phénomènes mentaux et psychiques. Des stabilités fondamentales existent, mais elles sont difficiles à définir avec précision. Il est évident du reste au lecteur qu'une synthèse telle que celle-ci est nécessairement incomplète mais néanmoins intéressante à faire. (shrink)

!is paper aims to focus on the main common points of the lecture of the totalitarian phenomenon supported by!eodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt, despite the divergence of their analysis.!e balance of this contrast conveys that both thinkers display an aesthetics of resistance facing the totalitarian ideology, which is based principally on two tenets.!e "rst is the claim of the concept of culture, which Arendt thinks belongs to the making of a traditio and Adorno sees as a re#exion linked to the (...) critical potential of the fragment and the ruin.!e second refers to the educational task, which Arendt considers as an unavoidable pre-political condition and Adorno de"nes as a fundamental piece of the only possible Bildung after the totalitarian catastrophe, that is, the formation of a non-rei"cated consciousness.El texto propone identi"car los principales puntos de acuerdo del diagnóstico que!eodor Adorno y Hannah Arendt realizan sobre el fenómeno totalitario, a pesar de que recurren a distintos análisis. El saldo arrojado por esta lectura conjunta pone de mani"esto que ambos pensadores preconizan una suerte de estética de la resistencia a la ideología totalitaria, que se basa fundamentalmente en dos pilares. El primero sería la reivindicación del concepto de cultura, que Arendt enlaza con los mecanismos generadores de una traditioy Adorno entiende como re#exión ligada al potencial crítico del fragmento y la ruina. El segundo remite a la tarea educativa, que Arendt considera como una condición pre-política ineludible y Adorno de"ne como pieza fundamental para la única Bildung posible tras la catástrofe totalitaria, a saber, la de una conciencia no cosi"cada. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: McDowell on Judgement Owens's Critique Defending Intellectual Freedom Freedom and the Sources of Normativity Sources of Normativity I: Practical Reasoning Sources of Normativity II: Theoretical Reasoning A McDowellian Response Conclusion.

For Gadamer, understanding moves between two different levels. One is the everyday ontological level in which there is a meeting between the familiar and the alien, between the known and the not‐quite‐expected. But understanding can also be a skill to be developed. This is the way in which we achieve good knowledge. In pedagogical terms, encountering the alien is the basis for self‐formation, or bildung, originating in Hegel. But there is an ambiguity at the heart of bildung. (...) The notion of encountering the alien runs together two different notions: (a) being pulled up short, as elaborated by Deborah Kerdeman; and (b) allowing oneself to be interrogated by the other, as described by Charles Taylor. And each of these has affective psychodynamic parallels in Jungian and Freudian psychology, the first in the notion of deflating hubris, and the second, in the reintegration of projection. The experiences of encountering the alien in these two forms can be extremely intense for university students and they constitute significant self‐transformations. (shrink)

A transcendental comunicative structure of reason underlies J. G. Fichte's thought as exposed in his main works on history and law. On this basis, this paper tryes to show that rational intervention upon such human formation processes, as learning, political action and history is only possible through bringing it's subjects to a dialogue reciprocity. Theory of "Bildung" consists, according to Fichte, not on prescriptions to action, but on a description of conditions to a comunicative integration.

Fichte’s doctrine of science is a theory and practice of thinking, which reconstructs the constituent acts of “knowledge”. As “system of freedom” is therefore in Fichte’s Transcendental Philosophy not only a system of knowledge, but also, and at the same time, the never definitive result of an activity of thinking, which is never satisfied with the results already obtained and deals with new issues. It was Fichte’s fundamental conviction that the construction of the theory of science as an “art” of (...) reflection presupposes the formation of a particular “organ” of reflection or of “seeing”. This inner sense is called the “sense of philosophy”. A genuine philosophical attitude presupposes the formation of the sense of philosophy and can come into being only through it. In this paper, the issue of the formation of the philosophical sense is taken into consideration, such as Fichte has developed it in the Introduction to the theory of science of autumn 1813 at the University of Berlin.Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre stellt eine Theorie und Praxis des Denkens dar, welche die konstituierenden Akte des „Wissens“ zum Thema hat. Als „System der Freiheit“ erweist sich daher die Transzendentalphilosophie Fichtes nicht nur als System der Erkenntnisse, sondern auch, und zugleich, als nie definitives Ergebnis einer Tätigkeit des Denkens, das sich mit den errungenen Resultaten nie zufrieden gibt und sich mit neuen Fragestellungen auseinandersetzt. Es war Fichtes grundlegende Überzeugung, dass die Konstruktion der Wissenschaftslehre als „Kunst“ der Besinnung die Bildung eines bestimmten „Organs“ des Besinnens bzw. des Sehens voraussetzt und fordert. Dieser innere Sinn wird als „Sinn für die Philosophie“ bezeichnet. Die echte philosophische Haltung hat die Bildung des Sinnes für die Philosophie zur Voraussetzung und kann erst durch ihn zustande kommen. In diesem Aufsatz wird das Thema der Bildung des philosophischen Sinnes in Betracht genommen, wie Fichte es in der Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre von Herbst 1813 an der Universität Berlin entfaltet hat. (shrink)

Commentators often construe Foucault as an anti-Enlightenment thinker; much of this criticism assumes that Foucault inherits early German Romanticism in some sense. This essay examines these claims by assessing the role the German Romantics play in Foucault’s work, both early and late. After a brief consideration of the meaning of the term “Romanticism,” the essay examines the role that language and literature plays in Foucault early texts before examining the place of self-formation or Bildung in his later work. (...) I conclude that examining the relationship between Foucault and the German Romantics can help us better understand Foucault’s texts and thereby avoid what Foucault terms the “blackmail of the Enlightenment,” the idea that one must be either for or against Enlightenment ideals rather than critically interrogating them. (shrink)

"Men living under the domination of catchwords live in a hell of their own making."The modern university, inspired by the German model envisioned by Wilhelm von Humboldt, is often considered an "ivory tower," since it seems to position itself outside of political and economic influences. By refusing any external impact on its freedom to organize research and teaching, it has the tendency to cut itself off from the rest of society. But it is this very freedom that nurtures the civic (...) model of social apprenticeship. Outside of immediate political or religious interests, outside of economic investments in the formation solely of elites, is the necessary Bildung: edification by the knowledge of individuals who can .. (shrink)

This paper analyses the coevolution of the concept of 'Bildung' (inner-formation, selfcultivation) and the structures of education and society. Although a newcomer to the German language, with a still somewhat obscure meaning, 'Bildung' becomes a key concept in social discourse around 1800. In this paper, I will focus on the concept and its social role in a mainly European context. This paper will deal with the meaning of the concept and with the coevolution of 'Bildung' and (...) societal structures. (shrink)

This paper analyses the coevolution of the concept of 'Bildung' (inner-formation, selfcultivation) and the structures of education and society. Although a newcomer to the German language, with a still somewhat obscure meaning, 'Bildung' becomes a key concept in social discourse around 1800. In this paper, I will focus on the concept and its social role in a mainly European context. This paper will deal with the meaning of the concept and with the coevolution of 'Bildung' and (...) societal structures. (shrink)