In this paper, we provide a detailed critical review of current approaches to ecthesis in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, with a view to motivate a new approach, which builds upon previous work by Marion & Rückert (2016) on the dictum de omni. This approach sets Aristotle’s work within the context of dialectic and uses Lorenzen’s dialogical logic, hereby reframed with use of Martin-Löf's constructive type theory as ‘immanent reasoning’. We then provide rules of syllogistic for the latter, and provide (...) proofs of e-conversion, Darapti and Bocardo and e-subalternation, while showing how close to Aristotle’s text these proofs remain. (shrink)

L’article explore les raisons pour lesquelles Łukasiewicz dans son exposé refuse de prendre en compte le dictum de omni et de nullo en qualité d’axiome de la syllogistique aristotélicienne. Après avoir établi la faiblesse de l’argumentation textuelle de Łukasiewicz, il est montré que les réserves de Łukasiewicz à l’égard du dictum doivent être recherchées dans un anti-essentialisme qui lui interdit de suivre Aristote jusqu’au bout de sa logique.

L’article explore les raisons pour lesquelles Łukasiewicz dans son exposé refuse de prendre en compte le dictum de omni et de nullo en qualité d’axiome de la syllogistique aristotélicienne. Après avoir établi la faiblesse de l’argumentation textuelle de Łukasiewicz, il est montré que les réserves de Łukasiewicz à l’égard du dictum doivent être recherchées dans un anti-essentialisme qui lui interdit de suivre Aristote jusqu’au bout de sa logique.

When Aristotle introduces the perfect moods, he refers back to the dictum de omni et nullo, a semantic condition for universal affirmations and negations. There recently has been renewed interest in the question whether the dictum validates the assertoric syllogistic. I rehearse evidence that Aristotle provides a mereological semantics for universal affirmations and negations, and note that this semantics entails a nonstandard reading of the dictum, under which the dictum, in the presence of a minimal (...) logical apparatus, indeed validates the assertoric syllogistic. I argue that this mereological validation offers advantages over recent discussions in Morison, Malink, Ebert and Vlasits. (shrink)

Aristotle's explanation of what is said ‘of every’ and ‘of none’ has been interpreted either as involving individuals, or as regarding exclusively universal terms. I claim that Alexander of Aphrodisias endorsed this latter interpretation of the dictum de omni et de nullo. This interpretation affects our understanding of Alexander's syllogistic: as a matter of fact, Alexander maintained that the dictum de omni et de nullo is one of the core principles of syllogistic.

In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341-355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357-365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part [1] of the following article. I (...) want to show that (1) according to Aristotle's Prior Analytics perfect and imperfect syllogisms do not differ by their being evident, but by the reason for their being evident, (2) Aristotle uses the same words to denote proofs of the validity of perfect and imperfect syllogisms („apodeixis”, "deiknusthai" etc.), (3) accordingly, Aristotle defines perfect syllogisms not as being evident, but as "requiring nothing beyond the things taken in order to make the necessity evident", i.e. as not "requiring one or more things that are necessary because of the terms assumed, but that have not been taken among the propositions" (APr. I. 1), (4) the proofs by which the validity of perfect assertoric syllogisms can be shown according to APr. I. 4 are based on the Dictum de omni et nullo, (5) the fact that Aristotle describes these proofs only in rough outlines corresponds to the fact that his proofs of the validity of other fundamental rules are likewise produced in rough outlines, e.g. his proof of the validity of conversio simplex in APr. I. 2, which usually has been misunderstood (also by Ebert): (6) Aristotle does not prove the convertibility of E-sentences by presupposing the convertibility of I-sentences; only the reverse is true. (shrink)

We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī's treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on the Prior Analytics. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī's other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī's treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn Sīnā's (...) modal logic. We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī. (shrink)

Édition du troisième sophisma « Omnis homo de necessitate est animal » du ms. Paris, BnF Lat. 16135. Le texte anonyme, contenu aux f. 99rb-103vb, appartient à la seconde collection de sophismata transmis dans ce codex légué à l’Université de Paris par Étienne de Genève socius du Collège de Sorbonne, après avoir été maître ès arts à Paris dans les années 1270. Il offre un panorama des principales positions soutenues au xiiie siècle par les Antiqui et les Moderni sur la (...) sémantique des termes vides, la distinction entre l’esse essentiae et l’esse existentiae, l’être effectif et l’être logique, le temps et la modalité. (shrink)

In this article, I shall consider medieval discussions of the principles of Aristotelian syllogistic which were called the dictum de omni et nullo and the expository syllogism. I am particularly interested in how theological questions contributed to the introduction of some influential new medieval ideas, such as the extensional sameness of the subject as the basis of predication, the interpretation of the expository syllogism from this point of view, and the explication of the logical subject of universal and (...) particular syllogistic premises with the phrase `Anything/something which is A. . .'. I end with some remarks about the increasing medieval awareness that these developments were beyond Aristotle's purview. (shrink)

Penser la guerre, c'est se placer dans l'effort philosophique qui se conçoit comme élucidation et affirmation rationnelles des différentes manières dont l'option humaine pour la raison et contre la violence se réalise dans l'histoire. Cette thèse fournit le point de vue à partir duquel l'auteur épouse la pensée de Kant, von Clausewitz et Hegel, en essayant ensuite d'en tirer des leçons possibles en vue des discussions actuelles dans la philosophie politique en tant que réflexion sur la guerre et la paix. (...) Von Clausewitz, penseur de la guerre après la « révolution » militaire depuis Napoléon, n'est pas seulement le « militariste » s'appliquant à la rationalité qui se déploie dans la violence guerrière elle-même, mais a surtout montré comment la guerre doit emprunter sa rationalité spécifique à la rationalité supérieure et englobante qui est celle de la politique , selon sa célèbre formule: la guerre est la continuation de la politique avec d'autres moyens. Mais il s'agit de bien comprenre cette formule. Dans la philosophie politique hégélienne, qui veut «saisir en pensée» le système d'une pluralité d'États indépendants et également souverains, la guerre a le caractère d'une «nécessité» rationnelle. Dans la philosophie du droit de Kant, la paix stable est l'objet d'un devoir impératif de la pure raison pratique, mais la guerre semble, de fait, inévitable, et ceci encore pour longtemps. C'est dans son projet philosophique intitulé Vers la paix perpétuelle que Kant essaie de penser les conditions politiques nécessaires pour établir une paix durable et juste entre les nations. L'auteur montre que ce projet est moins irréaliste qu'on ne le pense le plus souvent, si on veut l'interpréter à la lumière de la philosophie de l'histoire de Kant. On peut se demander néanmoins si Hegel ne continue pas à avoir raison contre Kant. Mais pour Hegel aussi l'histoire est un apprentissage. Au philosophe qui la comprend elle prouve, dit-il, la perfectibilité de l'éducation du genre humain. Il est possible de trouver, de ce point de vue, une convergence de la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel avec celle de Kant. Une importance spécifique est donnée ici à l'interprétation du dictum de Hegel, que dans la guerre elle-même la guerre est déterminée comme devant être passagère . S'il est vrai que l'histoire de la dialectique de guerre et de paix peut nous rendre plus „sages”, qu'est-ce qu'elle nous a appris ? L'auteur souligne plus spécialement deux éléments: nous comprenons peut-être mieux la signification de la liberté et de ce qu'implique „libération”; nous voyons plus clairement l'importance à donner aux droits de l'homme comme expression de la justice. Il conclut que la philosophie comme „pensée de guerre” peut éclairer la politique dans son effort tendant à définir la justice qui peut établir la paix, afin de rendre superflue la guerre qui doit établir la justice. (shrink)

This paper (1) criticizes Patzig's explanation of Aristotle's reason for calling his first figure syllogisms perfect syllogisms, i.e. the transitivity relation: it can only be used for Barbara, not for the other three moods. The paper offers (2) an alternative interpretation: It is only in the case of the (perfect) first figure moods that we can move from the subject term of the minor premiss, taken to be a predicate of an individual, to the predicate term of the major premiss. (...) This contention is supported (i) by Aristotle's wording of the dictum de omni et nullo and (ii) by Aristotle's use of a formula which puts the minor term in the first position when he first states Barbara and Celarent. (shrink)

Neste artigo, fundamentado nos principais escritos de Guilherme de Ockham, O. Min. (c. 1285�1347), analisamos sua concepção a respeito das origens dos poderes imperial e secular. Ancorado no versículo paulino omnis potestas a Deo, mas ampliado, sed per homines e, igualmente, nas ideias dos confrades que o antecederam, os quais relacionaram entre si os conceitos proprietas e dominium, com vista a explicar as origens humanas dos mesmos, de um lado, ele rebate tanto a teoria hierocrata quanto a de Marsílio de (...) Pádua, relativas ao tema em exame e, de outro, oferece sua contribuição ao mesmo, mediante a qual, nem o Império nem os Estados estão completamente subordinados à Igreja, nem esta está submissa ao poder terreno, porque, quanto às origens de ambos, a Igreja tem uma procedência divina e os Estados e o Império têm imediatamente uma origem humana e, ainda, porque nas esferas respectivas de atuação, os poderes espiritual e secular independem um do outro. (shrink)

A presente investigação questiona a essência teo-lógica dos futuros contingentes. Para o efeito, analisa-se, primeiramente, a argumentação segundo a qual, sob certas con­dições lógicas, teológicas, ontológicas e cosmológicas anti-necessitantes, detetadas por G. W. Leibniz (conciliando a posição de St. Agostinho com a de L. Molina e W. Ockham), a abertura contingente do futuro parece ser compatível com o regime das “verdades contingentes pré-determinadas”, regime enquadrado teologicamente pelo princípio do “futuro melhor” ou do “único futuro verdadeiro”. No entanto, os futuros contingentes (...) incitam, com e contra Aristóteles, ao desenvolvimento de uma lógica temporal e plurivalente, ao modo de J. Łukasiewicz ou A. Prior. Esta lógica garante a abertura do futuro sem o oneroso custo metafísico da adesão a uma teo-lógica omni-determinante. A crítica do determinismo lógico, daí resultante, afigura-se mais coadunável com as condições pós-metafísicas ine­rentes à episteme agnóstica contemporânea, mas, nesse caso, a abertura do futuro impli­caria uma profunda redefinição das próprias ideias e funções de “Deus”, “matéria”, “história” e “verdade”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 34.2 (2006) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Biographical Illusion and Methodological Reality Leland De La Durantaye Pierre Bourdieu. Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse. Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2004. 1 Like his student and friend Nietzsche, Jacob Burckhardt often stressed the necessity for a scholar to work in solitude. Like Nietzsche, he also possessed a gift for acidic analogy and likened the world of academia to a group of dogs sniffing (...) one another.Few observers of the academic interactions of his time had such sharp senses as Pierre Bourdieu, and few have been as torn between solitary reflection and communal exchange. Trained by France's most elite academic institutions (such as the celebrated Parisian lycée Louis-le-Grand and the even more celebrated École Normale Supérieure), Bourdieu was grateful for the opportunities that this training afforded him. And he felt that this gratitude could best be repaid by submitting those elite academic institutions and their insular world to an unsparing critique, to unveiling the distance that separated their stated ideals from their real effects.Like Bergson and Jaurès, like Sartre and Aron, like Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu studied that which was most difficult and most prestigious where it was most difficult and prestigious: philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. Like those famous fellow alumni, he was a brilliant student, and like them, he longed to distinguish his personal vision from those around him. This led him to do something surprising, something that, despite their separate and significant dissatisfactions with the philosophy of their day, neither Bergson nor Sartre, neither Foucault nor Derrida ever did: he abandoned philosophy. He left what he saw as the intellectual royal road for the most pedestrian of paths—that of sociology.As he often reminded his readers, sociology was in a sorry state when he entered it. Both in academic appraisal and the popular imagination, it was considered dry and provincial. It was thought to have no true intellectual adventure in it—nothing of the ethnologist tramping through the rain forests of the Amazon, nothing of the lone philosopher working through the night on an opus to end metaphysics. It was laborious and abstract; it dealt in statistical generalities. Bourdieu repeatedly described sociology as "the pariah of disciplines."1 He had, however, a special mission for it in mind. [End Page 3]In Bourdieu's posthumous memoir Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, published in February 2004—two years after his death—by the small publishing house he helped found, Raisons d'Agir, he notes how, "a bit as a joke," he had often defined himself as "the leader of a liberation movement aiming to free the social sciences from philosophy's imperialism" [94].2 From early on in his career, he had wished to revolt against the "empire of the total philosopher"—an empire reigned over by, more than any other, Jean-Paul Sartre [cf. 25].3 Looking back upon this decisive period of his development, Bourdieu goes so far as to state that the shaping of his identity was done "against everything which the Sartrian enterprise represented for me" [37]. In historical accounts, Sartre is often given as counterfigure his friend and fellow normalien Raymond Aron. In his Esquisse, Bourdieu proposes a different, and less conventional, counterfigure for the imperial philosopher: the brilliant Austrian satirist and cultural critic Karl Kraus. Bourdieu notes the particular affection he had always felt for Kraus and attributes it to the latter's singular capacity for "critical reflectivenesss" [37]. Subtly, and appropriately, Bourdieu follows this remark with something that occurs nowhere else in his memoir: an epigram (the composing of which Kraus excelled in). Bourdieu writes: "there are a great many intellectuals who question the world, but there are very few intellectuals who question the intellectual world" [37]. The remark could not more compactly and precisely reflect what Bourdieu had aspired all his life to do: to excel in the art and science of questioning the intellectual world. 2 Leo Spitzer liked to cite Friedrich Gundolf's dictum "Methode ist Erlebnis" (method is lived experience). Nearing the end of his career... (shrink)

This chapter discusses the relation between Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference in ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, the views of eighteenth-century German authors who wrote on syllogism, and the conception of metaphysics that Kant developed in 1762-1764. Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even though they are not as independent from the intellectual context as Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism are not primarily motivated by polemical (...) purposes. They are strongly influenced by his views on the method of metaphysics. (shrink)

Subtitled "Rejections of Cartesian Dualism" this collection of essays traces through western Philosophy the strong but often overlooked idea that the body and the mind are not two different kinds of entity somehow reconciled in man, but rather a unity that is man. The editor's introduction sets forth Aristotle's ideas, concentrating on the dictum that it is the same man that thinks and runs. Spicker also treats Descartes' view, and the view of the Cartesians, ably separating the two when (...) necessary. The rest of the book is basically arranged chronologically, starting with extracts from Spinoza's Ethics, an essay on these extracts by Hans Jonas, and then moving through Julien de la Mettrie and two short essays by Kant. The second part of the book contains interesting essays on the human body by John Dewey, Douglas Long, and B. A. O. Williams, all defending the essential unity of body and soul. The third and last section of the book is itself divided into two parts, the first of which, entitled "Philosophy of Embodiment" contains four extracts from the works of prominent phenomenologists, Max Scheler, Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. These essays all center around the necessity of a concept of the "lived body" to the understanding of man's being-in-the-world. In the last section, the quality of the essays drops, although it is delightfully leavened by a witty essay by Richard Griffith on the foot. This section contains essays on particular parts of the human body, such as sight and the upright posture, by Herbert Plügge, Hans Jonas, and Erwin W. Straus. There is a selected bibliography for those who are captured by this basic thread of western thought.--W. A. de V. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'existential fallacy'. This fallacy occurs when we erroneously suppose some class or group has members. In other words, statements may be true about classes or groups even if no members of the class or group exist. In terms of syllogistic argumentation, this is a formal fallacy in that it results when the premises are universal in quantification and the conclusion is particular. In the history of logic, the existential (...) fallacy may be traced to dictum de omni, which refers to the principle in Aristotelian logic that whatever is said universally of a subject is said of everything that is contained under such a subject. In order to avoid this fallacy, one should look for empirical verification of the existence of whatever entity may be in question. (shrink)

In this paper we provide an interpretation of Aristotle's rule for the universal quantifier in Topics Θ 157a34–37 and 160b1–6 in terms of Paul Lorenzen's dialogical logic. This is meant as a contribution to the rehabilitation of the role of dialectic within the Organon. After a review of earlier views of Aristotle on quantification, we argue that this rule is related to the dictum de omni in Prior Analytics A 24b28–29. This would be an indication of the (...) class='Hi'>dictum’s origin in the context of dialectical games. One consequence of our approach is a novel explanation of the doctrine of the existential import of the quantifiers in dialectical terms. After a brief survey of Lorenzen's dialogical logic, we offer a set of rules for dialectical games based on previous work by Castelnérac and Marion, to which we add here the rule for the universal quantifier, as interpreted in terms of its counterpart in dialogical logic. We then give textual evidence of the use of that rule in Plato's dialogues, thus showing that Aris... (shrink)

The Logic of Port-Royal, first published in 1662 by the Jansenists Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, is a work that underlines the inadequacies of the traditional logic. Traditional logic, which included the texts of Aristotle's Organon and the works of the scholastics, was experiencing a mild renaissance in the seventeenth century following its outright and brutal discrediting by the humanists of the previous two centuries. Arnauld and Nicole introduce a fairly original system of logic that attempts to remedy the shortcomings (...) of the revived tradition; they dismiss the Aristotelian "Categories", "Predicables", and "Topics", ignore the scholastic "Doctrine of Terms and Consequence", and suggest a single "General Principle" by means of which the validity of all arguments can be decided. The Principle is based on a notion of containment, divided into entendue and comprehension , which applies to all terms. Because the notion of containment is linked to the objective reality of Cartesian ideas, the authors can claim that their system of logic properly describes reality. The General Principle also suggests that terminist logic is logically and epistemologically prior to sentential logic because, Arnauld and Nicole claim, it governs the Dictum de Omni et Nullo and the Nota Notae. The self-evidence of the two dicta confirmed the validity of all syllogisms of the first figure; furthermore, all syllogisms of other figures could be reduced to one of the first figure. With the General Principle, however, there is no need for such reduction to the first figure. This additional result makes the theorem of sentential logic, "$\supset$r)$\approx$$\supset$-q)", which was needed for the reductions of Baroco and Bocardo, unnecessary. The fact that no theorem of sentential logic is needed to underline term logic guarantees the autonomy of the latter. (shrink)

In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 341-355) I have compared Aristotle's syllogistic with Kant's theory of "pure ratiocination". "Ratiocinia pura" („reine Vernunftschlüsse") is Kant's designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called 'perfect'. In Kant's view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant's view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of (...) non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant's view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle's view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant's logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sei (2009) 40: 357-365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 199-213 (cf. Ebert's answer in the same issue pp. 215-231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2009) 40: 365-372). I shall argue, that Kant's principle 'nota notae est nota rei ipsius' and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant's logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. (shrink)

Resumen En esta contribución ofrecemos una interpretación del pons asinorum que se basa en una lógica de términos contemporánea. Esto nos permite revitalizar la idea del pons asinorum para generar el -políticamente correcto- pons scholasticorum, una versión terminística del pons asinorum que conecta la inventio medii con el dictum de omni et nullo.In this contribution we offer an interpretation of the pons asinorum by using a contemporary term logic. This interpretation allows us to revitalize the concept of the (...) pons asinorum in order to produce the -politically correct- pons scholasticorum, a terministic version of the pons asinorum that relates the inventio medii with the dictum de omni et nullo. (shrink)

The way in which early followers of St. Thomas Aquinas interpreted or misinterpreted his metaphysical doctrines and works still needs much exploration, so a text edition and editor’s commentary of this kind is a most welcomed project, especially since Conrad of Prussia has possibly left us the earliest commentary on Aquinas’ De ente et essentia. The editing task is a precarious work, however, since Conrad’s commentary survives in only one known manuscript, located in the monastery library at Admont, Austria. The (...) editors’ printed result thus has a number of flaws, but without a copy of the codex it is impossible to say which derive from the manuscript and which from the editors. Without a text a reviewer cannot legitimately correct, but can only suggest alternatives to evident mistakes. In the first lectio there is a very humorous flaw. Conrad is trying to prove that little mistakes can sometimes lead to big ones. The edited text illustrates: "omnis canis creditur, celeste sydus est canis, ergo celeste sidus creditur. Interum: quidquid creditur, habet pedes; celeste sydus, ut dictum est, creditur; ergo habet pedes. Ecce quot inconvenientia sequuntur ex uno modico errore." Creditur makes no sense: "Every dog is believed."? Currit does make sense: "Every dog runs." Unwittingly the editors prove the point the author wanted to make. By misreading or failing to correct the fundamental word currit so frequently it grew into a big error. It grew into an even bigger one later because Professor Bobik’s commentary on this text is an explanation based on this faulty text. (shrink)

A questão "se uma elocução perde seu significado com a destruição das coisas "surge como uma questão sobre o valor-verdade de declarações com um termo vazio como sujeito, a saber, como um subproblema do sofisma "Se 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' é verdade quando não há homem algum ". Neste trabalho, trarei as discussões conforme elas se apresentam em "De signis" IV.2 de Roger Bacon, em "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3 de Peter John Olivi, no OHNEA de Boethius of Dacia, (...) e no OHNEA de Anonymus Alani. Tais textos nos apresentam quatro modos diversos de nos relacionarmos com a questão sobre significação para OHNEA e, assim, com quatro posições diferentes sobre a relação entre significação e referência vazia. Usarei Anonymus Alani como o fio conductor de minha análise, inserindo outras posições onde tal se fizer relevante.The question 'whether an utterance loses its signification with the destruction of things ' is raised as a question about the truth-value of assertions with an empty term as a subject, namely as a sub-problem of the sophism 'Whether "omnis homo de necessitate est animal" is true when no man exists '. In this paper, I shall introduce the discussions as they are present in Roger Bacon's "De signis" IV.2, Peter John Olivi's "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3, Boethius of Dacia's OHNEA, and Anonymus Alani's OHNEA. These texts present us with four different ways of relating the question about signification to OHNEA, and therefore with four different positions regarding the relation between signification and empty reference. I shall use Anonymus Alani as the guiding thread of my analysis, inserting other positions where it is relevant. (shrink)

O sofisma ‘omnis homo de necessitate est animal’ é um dos mais discutidos naliteratura filosófica medieval. Meu objetivo neste texto é o de propor uma hipótese deanálise das estratégias argumentativas para uma resposta positiva, isto é, que consideraesta frase verdadeira. Para isto, trabalharei com três textos: a hipótese será formulada apartir da leitura do AnonymusGC611, soph. 7, e será em seguida testada, de maneirapreliminar, nos bem mais longos Anonymus Erfordensise Gonville e Caius 512-543. Umaestratégia postula próprio de ser como relatumde (...) uma frase descrevendo a essência dealgo, enquanto a outra propõe que tais sentenças são tornadas verdadeiras pela speciesassociada a sua apreensão. (shrink)

Na sua obra, Pedro Abelardo (1079-1142) destaca duas noções metafísicas que fundamentam sua teoria lógica: o status e o dictum propositionis , ao causar, respectivamente, a imposição ( impositio ) dos termos universais e o valor de verdade das proposições. Trata-se de expressões que se referem a naturezas ontológicas peculiares, na medida em que não são consideradas coisas ( res ), mesmo que constituem causas. Todavia, também não são nada. Abelardo as chama de ‘quase coisas’ ( quasi res ). (...) No presente artigo, explicamos, primeiro, essas duas noções essenciais da lógica abelardiana, antes de tentar, em seguida, encontrar a fonte dessa metafísica particular. Em oposição a comentadores importantes da lógica de Abelardo, que estimam que haja uma forte influência platônica sobre essa concepção específica, defendemos antes, com apoio de textos significativos e de acordo com o nominalismo abelardiano, que a maior ascendência sobre a metafísica do nosso autor é a do estoicismo, sobretudo, antigo. (shrink)