Aristotle: Prior Analytics

This chapter argues in favour of three interrelated points. First, I argue that demonstration (as expression of scientific knowledge) is fundamentally defined as knowledge of the appropriate cause for a given explanandum: to have scientific knowledge of the explanandum is to explain it through its fully appropriate cause. Secondly, I stress that Aristotle’s notion of cause has a “triadic” structure, which fundamentally depends on the predicative formulation (or “regimentation”) of the explanandum. Thirdly, I argue that what has motivated Aristotle to (...) choose the syllogism as a demonstrative tool was precisely the fact that syllogisms are apt to express causal relations in their triadic structure. Instead of complaining against Aristotle’s preference for the syllogisms as demonstrative tools, I argue that Aristotle was fully aware of the advantages of regimenting the explanandum into a predication. One of these advantages is to abandon a purely extensional standpoint and to highlight the importance of the notion of relevancy in explanation. (shrink)

Collective volume with papers by alumni and students from the Campinas Aristotle Group.

Discuto a semântica das formas categóricas em Aristóteles.

Aristotle's General Definition of the Syllogism may be taken as consisting of two parts: the Inferential Conditions and the Final Clause. Although this distinction is well known, traditional interpretations neglect the Final Clause and its influence on syllogistic. Instead, the aforementioned tradition focuses on the Inferential Conditions only. We intend to show that this neglect has severe consequences not just on syllogistic but on the whole exegesis of Aristotle's Prior Analytics I. Due to these consequences, our objective is to analyse (...) the General Definition's Final Clause and its consequences on syllogistic. We propose a reading of the Final Clause as an additional criterion for distinguishing some arguments as properly syllogistic ones and as a main theme which connects all parts of the Prior Analytics I into one coherent piece of work. (shrink)

We begin with an introductory overview of contributions made by more than twenty scholars associated with the Philosophy Department at the University of Buffalo during the last half-century to our understanding and evaluation of Aristotle's logic. More well-known developments are merely mentioned in..

This is a German translation with commentary of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Book I. The introduction (‚Einleitung‘, pp. 97–182) contains a concise history of the reception of Aristotle’s syllogistic from Theophrastus to Kant and Hegel. The commentary places special attention to the modal chapters (i. e. I 3 and 8–22). Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is treated with more sympathy than in other modern commentaries and discussions of this part of Aristotle’s logic.

The reason for Aristotle’s treatment of (traditional) fourth figure syllogisms as first figure syllogisms with inverted terms in the conclusion is the following: To disprove the conclusiveness of a premiss pair Aristotle formulates two triplets of true propositions such that two of them correspond to the premiss pair in question and that the third proposition corresponding to a conclusion is an a-proposition in the first case, an e-proposition in the other. Since the truth of an a-proposition grants the falsity of (...) the contrary e- and of the contradictory o-proposition, the first triplet offers two counter-instances for invalid syllogisms with true premisses and false conclusions. Similarly the true e-proposition grants the falsity of an a- and an i-conclusion. Since an a-proposition can be converted to an i-proposition and an e-proposition is equivalent to its converse, these first figure triplets also disprove any first figure syllogism with converted conclusions, with the exception of o-conclusions. The invalidity of the latter ones, however, can be shown by using premiss conversions of (invalid) second and third figure syllogisms. The proposed explanation also makes clear why there are no rejection proofs for invalid syllogisms of (traditional) fourth figure syllogisms in the Analytics. (shrink)

The editors of the invaluable "Philosophische Bibliothek" perceived the need of providing readers of German with translations of both the Prior and the Posterior Analytics, two volumes in their edition of the Organon that had been out of print for some time. Having lost hope—so they tell us in the Vorwort—of obtaining fresh versions of them in the near future, they decided to reprint the old Rolfes translation of the Posteriora which had appeared in the series for the first time (...) in 1922. In spite of Rolfes’s undeniable merits as a translator of Aristotle, the solution seems to be unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the quality of the Greek text and our understanding of Aristotelian idioms and terminology in this treatise have been improved considerably in the last fifty years. A landmark in this type of studies is doubtless the edition with an extensive and valuable commentary by Sir David Ross. On the other hand, contemporary developments in logic and philosophy of science have led to new and sometimes more accurate assessments of Aristotelian ideas on demonstrative science. There is in fact an excellent English translation with notes by Jonathan Barnes conceived along these lines. One token example of the disadvantages of a translation that cannot take into account scholarly work done after 1922 can be seen at 89b25-26 where Aristotle speaks about "putting into number" a certain type of question. Both Ross and Barnes warn us that the phrase is curious, that it is bizarre, and we may easily infer that not much weight should be put on it in interpreting the passage. Rolfes, on the contrary, has an uncritical attitude towards the expression. He translates it literally and then goes on to comment on it as if it were normal Aristotelian usage. Needless to say, this can easily mislead the unexperienced student of Aristotle to pursue a chain of false problems. But the tendency to translate as literally as possible has its advantages, and it is fair to say that Rolfes’s translation is sufficiently accurate to be of considerable help in many difficult passages. (shrink)