Generally speaking, naturalism is the view that the methods of empirical science are our best, perhaps only, methods for obtaining knowledge. Merrick reshapes this debate by introducing a new question: Is naturalism compatible with fostering appreciative love for the created order? She argues the naturalism's operating paradigm for evaluating explanations is well-tailored to achieve the goal of scientific inquiry championed by Francis Bacon in the 17th century. But it systematically weeds out explanations more likely to induce appreciative (...) love for the phenomena. Merrick concludes by looking at C.S. Lewis' The Four Loves and Henri Nouwen's Life of the Beloved for attitudes and practices that inquirers should adopt. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Original and Derived Meaning The Causal‐Historical Theory The Crude Causal Theory The Asymmetric Dependency Theory Teleosemantics Informational semantics.

Wittgenstein was centrally concerned with the puzzling nature of the mind, mathematics, morality and modality. He also developed innovative views about the status and methodology of philosophy and was explicitly opposed to crudely "scientistic" worldviews. His later thought has thus often been understood as elaborating a nuanced form of naturalism appealing to such notions as "form of life", "primitive reactions", "natural history", "general facts of nature" and "common behaviour of mankind". And yet, Wittgenstein is strangely absent from much of (...) the contemporary literature on naturalism and naturalising projects. This is the first collection of essays to focus explicitly on the relationship between Wittgenstein and naturalism. The volume is divided into four sections, each of which addresses a different aspect of naturalism and its relation to Wittgenstein's thought. The first section considers how naturalism could or should be understood. The second section deals with some of the main problematic domains—consciousness, meaning, mathematics—that philosophers have typically sought to naturalise. The third section explores ways in which the conceptual nature of human life might be continuous in important respects with animals. The final section is concerned with the naturalistic status and methodology of philosophy itself. This book thus casts a fresh light on many classical philosophical issues and brings Wittgensteinian ideas to bear on a number of current debates-for example experimental philosophy, neo-pragmatism and animal cognition/ethics-in which naturalism is playing a central role. (shrink)

This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. (...) On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion. (shrink)

This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. (...) On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion. (shrink)

This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. (...) On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion. (shrink)

This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. (...) On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion. (shrink)

The paper examines the ramifications of naturalism with regard to the question of individuality in economics and biology. Economic theory has to deal with whether households, firms, and states are individuals or are mere entities such as clubs, networks, and coalitions. Biological theory has to deal with the same question with regard to cells, organisms, family packs, and colonies. To wit, the question of individuality in both disciplines involves three separate problems: the metaphysical, phenomenist, and ontological. The metaphysical problem (...) is concerned with purposeful action: Is the firm or organism exclusively the product of efficient causality (optimization) or is it motivated by final causality (purposefulness)? The phenomenist problem is interested in the substantiality of essences: Is the firm''s or organism''s scheme of institutions/traits deep or is it extraneous to identity? The ontological problem is related to the issue of reductionism: Is the behavior of lower-level organization governed by a pre-constituted entities or is it context-sensitive? The paper finds that theoretical differences run along the naturalist/anti-naturalist divide rather than along disciplinary specialization. Also, the paper finds that it is not inconsistent for the same theorist to be naturalist with regard to one problem and anti-naturalist with respect to the other two problems. (shrink)

This essay some first steps toward the naturalization of what I call rational intentionality or alternatively type II intentionality. By rational or type II intentionality, I mean that full combination of rational powers and content-bearing states that is paradigmatically enjoyed by mature intact human beings. The problem I set myself is to determine the extent to which the only currently extant approach to the naturalization of the intentional that has the singular virtue of not being a non-starter can be aggregated (...) up into an account of rational intentionality. I have in mind a broadly defined family of accounts whose main members are the indicator/information-theoretic approach of Dretske (1988), the asymmetric dependence theory of Jerry Fodor (1987, 1990, 1994) and the teleo-semantics of Ruth Millikan (1984, 1993). Somewhat inaccurately, I will call this family of approaches the information-theoretic family. To be sure, there is only a rough family resemblance among the members of the information-theoretic family. Indeed, several intense quarrels divide the members of that family one from another, but the precise outcome of those internecine struggles is not directly relevant to the aims of this essay. ² Taken collectively, the information-theoretic family yields a compelling picture of the place of at least a crude form of intentionality -- what I call frog-like or type I intentionality -- in the natural order. Though frog-like or type I intentionality is, I think, a genuine species of intentionality, it may subsist in the absence of rational powers. It is that species of intentionality enjoyed by irritable creatures who, following Brandom (1994). (shrink)

The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to (...) relate Husserl's account to Fregean insights about the sense and reference of a term. Neither Husserl nor Frege suggest plausible routes to a naturalistic account of intentionality and I turn to Wittgenstein to provide a naturalistic reading of the crucial terms involved in the analysis of intentional content. His account is normative in a way required by both Husserl and Frege and yet manages a kind of Aristotelian naturalism which avoids crude biologism. (shrink)

Naturalism is the label for the thesis that the tools we should use in answering philosophical problems are the methods and findings of the mature sciences—from physics across to biology and increasingly neuroscience. It enables us to rule out answers to philosophical questions that are incompatible with scientific findings. It enables us to rule out epistemological pluralism—that the house of knowledge has many mansions, as well as skepticism about the reach of science. It bids us doubt that there are (...) facts about reality that science cannot grasp. It gives us confidence to assert that by now in the development of science, absence of evidence is prima facie good grounds for evidence of absence: this goes for God, and a great deal else. (shrink)

Semantic Naturalism is a metaphysical doctrine about the status of semantic properties. It is the view that, the metaphysical connections between naturalistic and semantic properties are sufficiently systematic and transparent to allow us to see that certain naturalistic conditions are sufficient for certain semantic properties. Most semantic naturalizers also think that the property of being a belief involves an internal mental representation, and that this representation bears the state's semantic properties. This chapter provides survey of specific naturalization proposals with (...) the crude causal theory (CCT) for the reference of Mentalese predicates. Teleological theories propose to explain the truth‐conditional content of mental states, especially certain desires and beliefs, in terms of their biological functions. The chapter explains causal‐role semantics (CRS), an approach to naturalizing semantics that deserves mention. In attempting to avoid counter‐examples, semantic naturalists place restrictions on the reference constituting causes or information. (shrink)

This article picks up from William James's pragmatism and metaphysics of experience, as expressed in his “radical empiricism,” and further develops this Jamesian pragmatist approach to uncertainty and ignorance by connecting it to phenomenological thought. The Jamesian pragmatist approach avoids both a “crude naturalism” and an “absolutist rationalism,” and allows for identification of intimations of the sacred in both scientific and religious practices—which all, in their respective ways, try to make sense of a complex world. Analogous to religious (...) practices, emotion and the metaphysics of experience play a central role in science, especially the emotion of wonder. Engaging in scientific or religious practices may create opportunities for individuals to realize that they are co-creators of the world in partnership with God, in full awareness of uncertainty and ignorance and filled with the emotion of wonder. (shrink)

IntroductionThanks to Dominic Wilkinson, a formidable clinician-philosopher, for his considered response, and especially for highlighting my work's translatability outside of an theological context. In part, because bioethics’ pioneers were theologians, the discipline misses something important when theology is not an integral part of the conversation. I do not have the space to do an in-depth response,i so the best I can do is use some assertions to gesture at a few key points.Relational anthropology and the best interests of the patientWilkinson (...) spends significant time critiquing my claim that the Social Quality of Life Model is consistent with a healthcare provider acting in the best interest of her patient. And though he notes that my general argument goes through without this claim, the idea that clinicians should always act in the best interests of their patients is so commonly held that this topic deserves sustained attention. Wilkinson highlights my relational anthropology as the foundation of my claims about the sQOL, but this anthropology is not founded, as he suggests, on a crude naturalism. Ultimately, it is founded on the first principle that human beings are made in the image of a Triune God who is intrinsically relational. Many different kinds of thinkers have a similar anthropology. We may see the interconnectedness and social nature of human beings as empirical evidence which supports our position, but it is not sufficient to produce the anthropology itself without the naturalistic fallacy Wilkinson rightly mentions.Much of Wilkinson's disagreement comes down to anthropological first principles. He appears to have an enlightenment view which begins with the person, an individual subject of benefits and burdens. Someone with …. (shrink)

In this paper, the author draws several fundamental distinctions between two central notions in Nietzsche’s anthropology, namely those of Kraft and Macht. The distinctions and interpretations following them are based on a close reading of Nietzsche’s published writings. Following that, the author introduces a psychological typology between what is being called “positive” and “negative” power patterns. As a consequence, author argues, it is becoming clear that allegedly Nietzschean idea of a military and physical Macht as employed by Nazis is in (...) fact properly to be understood as the Nietzschean Kraft and Gewalt. He also stresses that, according to Nietzsche, violent manifestations of Macht are usually confined to the behaviour of persons who suffered from the psychological phenomenon of “negative” power. Author argues also that Nietzschean notions of power are not based on a crude naturalism nor on the biological distinctions which were a cornerstone of Nazi racism. Key words NIETZSCHE. (shrink)

A much-maligned feature of ancient and medieval political thought is its tendency to appeal to nature to establish norms for human communities. From Aristotle's claim that humans are "political animals" to Aquinas' invocation of "natural law," it may seem that pre-modern philosophers were all too ready to assume that whatever is natural is good, and that just political arrangements must somehow be natural. The papers in this collection show that this assumption is, at best, too crude. From very early, (...) for instance in the ancient sophists' contrast between nomos and physis, there was recognition that political arrangements may be precisely artificial, not natural, and it may be questioned whether even such supposed naturalists as Aristotle in fact adopt the quick inference from "natural" to "good." The papers in this volume trace the complex interrelations between nature and such concepts as law, legitimacy, and justice, covering a wide historical range stretching from Plato and the Sophists to Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy, Cicero, the Neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry, ancient Christian thinkers, and philosophers of both the Islamic and Christian Middle Ages. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Knave and the Interests of JusticeJason Baldwin, doctoral student in philosophyHume's account of the artificial virtues of justice and promise-keeping developed in Book III, Part ii of the Treatise is among the most provocative elements of his ethics. His goal there is to tell a naturalistic story of the origin and moral standing of these virtues, a story that makes no appeal to any irreducibly moral motives or (...) properties but instead grounds even our most basic and apparently binding obligations in the same thoroughly human passions and sentiments with which Hume explains all our actions. Several modern critics, including David Gauthier and Stephen Darwall, have claimed that Hume's story of the artificial virtues is inconsistent with his account of natural human motivations, and have further claimed that Hume himself became aware of this problem in the second Enquiry, where he discussed it in the famous "sensible knave" passage in the last paragraphs of the "Conclusion." They therefore claim that Hume abandoned in the Enquiry what is usually taken to be his official Treatise account of justice and promise-keeping, and may also have intended a different account in the Treatise itself.This paper argues that the sensible knave passage neither signals nor requires any significant change in Hume's official Treatise story of the artificial virtues. Part 1 summarizes this official account, Part 2 explains the challenge Gauthier and Darwall believe the sensible knave poses to this account, and Part 3 defends the standard Humean account from this challenge. Whatever other problems Hume's account of justice and promise-keeping may have, the free rider problem, as developed by Gauthier and Darwall through the character of the sensible knave, is not among them.1. The Interest Account of Artificial Virtues1.1 Hume's Predecessor TraditionsHume makes few explicit references to the English-speaking predecessors whose work informs his thinking about the artificial virtues, and I shall follow his example. [End Page 277] But without pretending to survey that rich and varied history, we may usefully think of Hume's approach to justice and its allied virtues as an attempt to preserve the strengths of two opposed predecessor traditions.1 The first tradition, represented most prominently by Hobbes but also by Mandeville, explains the origin of virtues generally, including Humean artificial virtues, in purely naturalistic terms, without any appeal to divinely ordained ends or observer-independent moral facts. Hume shares this humanistic aspiration, but he disavows the cynical skepticism and crude egoism which are usually taken to accompany it. He wants to tell a story about justice which will allow us to admire its genuine moral worth even as we acknowledge its human pedigree.The second tradition, a reaction to the first, is the moral sense school represented by Shaftesbury, Butler, and especially Hutcheson. This tradition insists, against the cynical egoists, on a moral reality to which our sentiments or consciences give us immediate access, an access secured by God's design. Also characteristic of the moral sense theorists is the claim that human nature contains benevolent motives which are the objects of the moral sense's approval and which are just as basic to our constitution as are selfish motives. Hume avails himself of both moral sense strands, albeit in attenuated form. He agrees that justice and injustice are known by the sentiments, and he also believes that benevolent first-order motives are a part of human nature. But Hume rejects the moral sense tradition's Christian teleology, and he is also less optimistic about the potential of benevolence to explain such complex moral behaviors as are involved in our institutions of justice and promise-keeping.Hume's standard Treatise story of the origin of justice and promise-keeping, which we may call the "interest account," has two stages. In the first stage, Hume explains how the practices which constitute justice and promise-keeping arise through the working of our natural interests; in this stage Hume might be seen as working in the broadly naturalistic-egoist tradition. In the second stage, Hume explains how these practices and the motives which underlie them become the objects of moral evaluation, i.e., why... (shrink)

My dissertation is concerned with some recent attempts to develop a naturalistic account of perceptual judgement as a step towards a solution of the metaphysical problem of intentionality. Broadly speaking, two naturalistic approaches to this issue can be found in the recent literature: the causal theories of Fodor and others, and the teleological account of Millikan and Papineau. I present both approaches, and exhibit one common problem facing these accounts. The common problem is what I call, "The Problem of Multiple (...) Contents." Crudely speaking, the problem for a causal theory of perceptual content is that normally there are multiple causal links between an object and the perception of it. What is special about the cup that makes it the object of perception? A parallel problem occurs for the teleological theory which emphasizes the effects of a perceptual state for the determination of its object. I argue that the above accounts don't have enough resources to single out a unique intentional content. ;I turn next to Dretske's account, which combines elements of and , an account centered on the notion of "indication function". Dretske's sophisticated account turns out, after a careful examination, not to be completely free from the problem that afflicts and . ;In the final chapter of my dissertation, I propose a strategy for solving the problem of multiple contents. My proposal is based on the observation that perceptual objects are often what we interact with not only through sensory transactions, but also through behavior. Sensory information from the objects located in a perceiver's environment guides his behavior, and which in turn make an impact on the environment, in particular, on those very objects which triggered the perceptually guided behavior. There is something special about the object of perception in that it lies at the intersection of the sensory causal chain and the behavioral chain. Much work needs to be done before this strategy will yield a full account of intentionality. Nevertheless, I argue that it is a promising approach to the problem of multiple contents. (shrink)

Inspection of surviving mirrors and related objects shows that they were too crude to offer the early Renaissance painter an optical short-cut to a naturalistic image of his subject. The craftsmanship of mirror makers was independent of and inferior to the quality of theories of image formation of the day.

The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl’s, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to (...) relate Husserl’s account to Fregean insights about the sense and reference of a term. Neither Husserl nor Frege suggest plausible routes to a naturalistic account of intentionality and I turn to Wittgenstein to provide a naturalistic reading of the crucial terms involved in the analysis of intentional content. His account is normative in a way required by both Husserl and Frege and yet manages a kind of Aristotelian naturalism which avoids crude biologism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 299-303 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Asian Religions in America: A Documentary History Asian Religions in America: A Documentary History. Edited by Thomas A. Tweed and Stephen Prothero. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 416 pp. Although this book is not about interreligious dialogue per se, it makes several important contributions to it. Two of the necessities for successful interreligious dialogue are a knowledge (...) of the religions of other cultures and an awareness of one's own culture's past misinterpretations of these religions in order to guard against repeating them. This book helps accomplish both of these aims very well. First it helps to understand Asian religions as they are practiced in the United States. This book discusses Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, and Chinese religions in America, and it includes selections on Jainism and Sikhism; (it excludes Islam as a monotheistic religion with Middle Eastern roots). Second, the book adroitly catalogues the ways that Americans have misinterpreted Asian religions in the past. Its selections demonstrate that two of the worst errors that Americans commit in dealing with Asian religions is either romanticizing them as being all "spiritual," and thus categorically different from the "worldly" West, or of ignoring their diversity. Anyone reading these selections will be less likely to repeat these errors.The book is an anthology of primary documents with well-written, brief introductions to the selections. Its aim is not just to describe Asian religions in America, but also to document American encounters with Asian religions since the American Revolution. The book is organized historically in four major sections: 1784-1840, 1840-1924, 1924-1964, and 1965 to the present. Within each historical section, the authors have chosen selections that illustrate how Americans during that time viewed Asian religions, how Asian religions were practiced in the U.S., and how Asian religions influenced American culture during that time period.The first section (1784-1840) is, not surprisingly, the shortest. It has one chapter on how Americans abroad viewed Asian religions and another chapter on how those at home viewed Asian religions. This period is dominated by a belief that Christianity is the one, true religion; Asian religions by contrast, are full of "debasing superstitions and cruel abominations" (p. 58). Even those who try to get beyond such crude views demonstrate a gross ignorance of Asian religions. For example, Hannah Adams (the first woman in America to support herself through writing) claimed that the Dalai Lama was the spiritual leader or "pope" of China as well as Tibet (p. 55). Better informed and more balanced are the comments from two of the period's most important intellectuals, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams. Franklin, like other Deists, admired Confucian naturalism and humanism, and he reprinted excerpts of Confucius in the Pennsylvania Gazette. John Adams defended the sublimeness of Indian religion, claiming that it had heavily influenced Greek philosophy because Pythagoras had learnt his most important doctrines there.The second section (1840-1924) has six chapters covering missionaries and their [End Page 299] critics, literary encounters with Asian religions, the World Parliament of Religions, the immigrant experience in America, academic discussions, and American sympathizers and converts to Asian religions. Several selections from nineteenth-century dictionaries and books show how Asian religions were commonly perceived at the time. While there was growing sophistication about Asian religions, the period's most popular book on the subject (James Freeman Clarke, Ten Great Religions) still maintained that only Christianity had the fullness of truth and Asian religions were static and stunted. On the other hand, this section balances out Christian triumphalism with some excerpts from Henry Steel Olcott and other Americans who converted to Asian religions. Substantial selections from Emerson, Whitman, Thoreau, and T. S. Eliot reveal how Asian religions deeply influenced the most important writers of the time.The third section (1924-1964) has four chapters dealing with the closing of America to Asian immigrants, Hindu gurus and their disciples in America, Buddhist masters and their students, and one on artists and missionaries. It reprints sections of the Asian exclusion act of 1924... (shrink)

Background and Aims The study of intraspecific trait variation (ITV) in plants has a long history, dating back to the fourth century BC. Its existence was widely acknowledged by the end of the 18th century, although systematic and experimental studies commenced only a century later. However, the historiography of ITV has many gaps, especially with regard to early observations and visual documents. This note identifies an early depiction of plant ITV. -/- Methods The botanical works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (...) (1749–1832), a German writer and naturalist, were subjected to close reading. This included all publications and unpublished sources related to botany between 1785 and 1832 (e.g. notes, drafts, diaries, letters, drawings). This material is accessible in the multi-volume historical-critical edition of Goethe’s studies in natural science (Leopoldina-Ausgabe). -/- Key Results A diary entry from 9 September 1786 described changes in leaf morphology along an elevation gradient in the Bavarian Alps. The leaves of an unidentified species of willow (Spix sp.) and gentian (Gentiana sp.) were said to become narrower with increasing elevation; leaves also stood further apart on twigs, and the latter became thinner. A crude drawing of two willow twigs illustrated the differences. Goethe conjectured that the differences were due to environmental conditions. -/- Conclusions Goethe’s notes were anecdotal, and it is unclear whether the observed plant individuals actually belonged to the same species. Nevertheless, the notes represent an early and clear articulation of the hypothesis that changes in environmental conditions can cause ITV in a natural plant population. The drawing may be the earliest visual record of environmentally caused plant ITV in the wild. (shrink)

One can no longer truly say that virtue theory is the neglected tradition in moral philosophy. I won’t say much about the reasons for its revival, although the reasons for its temporary , though long, decline interest me. Now there are very many things that could be said here. For example, it is often thought that virtue theory requires some sort of teleology, but with the decline of Aristotelian physics and its replacement with the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century, (...) notions of function and purpose were given an ever-diminishing role throughout intellectual life. (MacIntyre 1982) Alternatively, or in addition, one might see virtue theory condemned through guilt by association with Aristotle. Pursuing this line it might be predicted that a developing discontent with forms of reductionist naturalism in metaphysics might also give weight to a new respect for Aristotelian themes in ethics. But while I want to paint here with a reasonably broad brush, I want to draw the focus in a little. Thinking specifically now about the relation between virtue theory and the twentieth century, one can see various ways in which virtue theory was out of keeping with the spirit of the age. As we shall see, however, some of the criticisms seem to be somewhat at odds with each other. One general line of criticism, which has several parts to it, starts from a philosophical view about the nature of morality. The second general 2 line is harder to characterise but might be thought to derive from reflection about the model of moral agent that virtue theory offers. There are several related but distinct ways in which virtue ethics has been out of step with modern moral theory. First, a developing consensus - - though one now strongly challenged - - supposes that there are certain constraints on what is to count as moral behaviour. It presupposes that the central problem of morality is that there is a conflict, to put it crudely, between morality and self-interest.. (shrink)

This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori ; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with (...) the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, a naturalistic approach to epistemology seeks to explain human knowledge – and justification in particular – as a phenomenon in the natural world, in keeping with the tenets of naturalism. Naturalism is typically defined, in part, by a commitment to scientific method as the only legitimate means of attaining knowledge of the natural world. Naturalism is often thought to entail empiricism by virtue of this methodological commitment. However, scientific methods themselves may incorporate a priori elements, (...) so empiricism does not follow from the methodological commitments of naturalism alone. And given a suitably-naturalistic conception of the a priori, a priori forms of justification may be compatible with naturalism generally. A priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism – and hence naturalistic epistemologies – if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of some of the inessential properties that have been associated with the concept. I argue that some of the more prominent strategies for accommodating normative notions within a naturalistic framework allow for the possibility of a priori justification. These include reliabilism, instrumental rationality, and nonfactualism about justification. A priori justification thus need not be seen as standing in opposition to all naturalistic epistemologies. It is only with nonnormative naturalistic epistemologies that a priori justification per se is incompatible, and this only because the notion of justification itself has no role to play within a nonnormative approach to epistemology. (shrink)

A substantial guide providing an overview of both physicalism and metaphysical naturalism, reviewing both questions of formulation and justification for both doctrines. Includes a diagnostic strategy for understanding talk of naturalism as a metaphysical thesis.

The use of mathematical models in philosophy is largely neutral over the extent of experimental input. They can figure in an entirely armchair methodology, but they can also play the sort of role they do in physics, economics, and other natural and social sciences. Andrea Bianchi’s description of the starting‐point of philosophy as “empirical data” also suggests a special connection between philosophy and the natural sciences. Many contemporary philosophers describe themselves as naturalists. Naturalists typically criticize some traditional forms of philosophy (...) as insufficiently scientific, because they ignore experimental tests. Naturalism tries to condense the scientific spirit into a philosophical theory. Penelope Maddy rightly emphasizes the weirdness of the idea, found in some contemporary internalist epistemology, that introspection has epistemic priority over perception, but her central objection is to demands on the Plain Inquirer to justify her methods “from scratch.”. (shrink)

I address here the question what sense to make of the idea that there can be thought prior to language. I begin by juxtaposing two familiar and influential philosophical views, one associated with the work of Paul Grice, the other associated with the work of Donald Davidson. Grice and Davidson share a broad, rationalist perspective on language and thought, but they endorse conflicting theses on the relation between them. Whereas, for Grice, thought of an especially complex sort is a precondition (...) of linguistic meaning, for Davidson, there can be no genuine thought without language. I argue that both views present us with unpalatable alternatives concerning our understanding of the natural origins of objective thought and meaningful language. Drawing on what I take to be key insights from Grice and Davidson, I then lay out some broad desiderata for an intermediate position. I finally turn to a certain form of nonlinguistic communication of the sort of which both prelinguistic children and languageless animals are capable, viz., expressive communication. I propose that a proper appreciation of the character and function of expressive communication can help us trace the outlines of the desired intermediate position. (shrink)

Naturalism in Mathematics investigates how the most fundamental assumptions of mathematics can be justified. One prevalent philosophical approach to the problem--realism--is examined and rejected in favor of another approach--naturalism. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be successfully applied in set theory. Her clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both (...) disciplines. (shrink)

Two countervailing trends mark the intellectual tenor of our age the spread of naturalistic worldviews and religious orthodoxies. Advances in biogenetics, brain research, and robotics are clearing the way for the penetration of an objective scientific self-understanding of persons into everyday life. For philosophy, this trend is associated with the challenge of scientific naturalism. At the same time, we are witnessing an unexpected revitalization of religious traditions and the politicization of religious communities across the world. From a philosophical perspective, (...) this revival of religious energies poses the challenge of a fundamentalist critique of the principles underlying the modern Wests postmetaphysical understanding of itself. The tension between naturalism and religion is the central theme of this major new book by Jrgen Habermas. On the one hand he argues for an appropriate naturalistic understanding of cultural evolution that does justice to the normative character of the human mind. On the other hand, he calls for an appropriate interpretation of the secularizing effects of a process of social and cultural rationalization increasingly denounced by the champions of religious orthodoxies as a historical development peculiar to the West. These reflections on the enduring importance of religion and the limits of secularism under conditions of postmetaphysical reason set the scene for an extended treatment the political significance of religious tolerance and for a fresh contribution to current debates on cosmopolitanism and a constitution for international society. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Nietzsche's (Artful) Naturalism The Subject Naturalized Nietzsche's Artful Naturalism Toward an Ethos of the Agonized Subject.

Philosophers and scientists both ask questions about what the world is like. How do these fields interact with one another? How should they? Naturalism Beyond the Limits of Science investigates an approach to these questions called methodological naturalism. According to methodological naturalism, when coming up with theories about what the world is like, philosophers should, whenever possible, make use of the same methodology that is deployed by scientists. Although many contemporary philosophers have implicit commitments that lead straightforwardly (...) to methodological naturalism, few have a clear understanding of how widespread and disruptive methodological naturalism promises to be for the field. By way of a series of case studies involving laws of nature, composition, time and modality, and drawing on historical and contemporary scientific developments including the discovery of the neutrino, the introduction of dark energy, and the advent of relativity theory, this book demonstrates the ways in which scientists rely on extra-empirical reasoning and how that very same extra-empirical reasoning can yield surprising results when applied to philosophical debates. Along the way, Nina Emery's investigation illuminates the complex relationship between philosophy and the sciences, and makes the case that philosophers and scientists alike would benefit from a greater understanding of the connections between the two fields. (shrink)

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains (...) us persons is irreducibly personal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality. (shrink)

The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

Such are those thick & gloomie shadows dampe Oft seene in charnel vaults, & sepulchers, Lingering, & sitting by a new made grave, As loath to leave the bodie that it lov'd, & link’t it selfe by carnall sensualtie To a degenerate, & degraded state.

Normative naturalism is a view about the status of epistemology and philosophy of science; it is a meta-epistemology. It maintains that epistemology can both discharge its traditional normative role and nonetheless claim a sensitivity to empirical evidence. The first sections of this essay set out the central tenets of normative naturalism, both in its epistemic and its axiological dimensions; later sections respond to criticisms of that species of naturalism from Gerald Doppelt, Jarrett Leplin and Alex Rosenberg.

This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain sui generis normative properties. This (...) is the only metaphysical explanation for supervenience on offer, the chapter argues, that can both clearly maintain the pre-theoretical commitments of non-naturalism, and provide a metaphysical explanation not just for supervenience, but for all metaphysical necessities involving natural and normative properties. (shrink)

Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri. Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that (...) there must be a transcendent realm of norms. _Naturalism and Normativity_ engages with both sides of this debate. Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism. They articulate a liberal conception of philosophy that is neither reducible to the sciences nor completely independent of them—yet one that maintains the right to call itself naturalism. Contributors think in new ways about the relations among the scientific worldview, our experience of norms and values, and our movements in the space of reason. Detailed discussions include the relationship between philosophy and science, physicalism and ontological pluralism, the realm of the ordinary, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and justification, and the liberal naturalisms of Donald Davidson, John Dewey, John McDowell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)