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David Papineau [234]Davidn D. Papineau [1]
  1. Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
  2. Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. David Papineau argues that there is no real puzzle here. Consciousness seems mysterious, not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. Papineau exposes the confusion, and dispels the mystery: we see consciousness in its place in the material world, and we are on the way to a proper understanding of the mind.
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  3. Reality and representation.David Papineau - 1987 - New York: Blackwell.
  4. The rise of physicalism.David Papineau - 2000 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.). Cambridge University Press.
  5.  38
    The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience.David Papineau - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? David Papineau argues controversially for a purely qualitative account: conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties.
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  6. Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.
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  7.  50
    Précis of Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):143-143.
  8. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):1070-1077.
     
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  9. Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The term ‘naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed ‘naturalists’ from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars. These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the (...)
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  10. Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.
    1 Introduction 2 Perceptual Concepts 2.1 Perceptual Concepts are not Demonstrative 2.2 Perceptual Concepts as Stored Templates 2.3 Perceptual Semantics 2.4 Perceptually Derived Concepts 3 Phenomenal Concepts.
     
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  11. Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents.Justin Garson & David Papineau - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (3):36.
    Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that underlies it, (...)
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  12. Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality.Marion Godman, Antonella Mallozzi & David Papineau - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (3):1-19.
    This paper aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research, the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have “essences”. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way that kinds (...)
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  13. Reality and Representation.David Papineau - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):629-632.
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  14. Reality and Representation.David Papineau - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):85-88.
     
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  15. Representation and explanation.David Papineau - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72.
    Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition that we consider the purposes of the (...)
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  16.  72
    Precis of Philosophical NaturalismPhilosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):657.
    This precis explains that _Philosophical naturalism contains three parts. Part I examines arguments for physicalism and maintains I) that all causally relevant special science properties must be realized by physical ones, and II) that all special science laws must reduce to physical ones, apart from the significant category of special laws that result from selection processes. Part II defends a teleological theory of representation and an identity theory of consciousness. Part III defends reliabilism and applies it to inductive scepticism and (...)
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  17. There Are No Norms of Belief.David Papineau - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues that there is no distinctive species of normativity attaching to the adoption of beliefs.
     
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  18. The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.
    I argue that the concept of knowledge is a relic of a bygone age, erroneously supposed to do no harm. I illustrate this claim by showing how a concern with knowledge distorts the use of statistical evidence in criminal courts, and then generalize the point to show that this concern hampers our enterprises across the board and not only in legal contexts.
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  19. The philosophy of science.David Papineau (ed.) - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The newest addition to the successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, this collection contains the most important contributions to the recent debate on the philosophy of science. The contributors crystallize the often heated arguments of the last two decades, assessing the skeptical attitudes within philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific realists. Contributors include Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, Arthur Fine, Clark Glymour, Larry Laudan, Peter Lipton, Alan Musgrave, Wesely C. Salmon, Lawrence Sklar, Bas C. van Fraassen, and John (...)
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  20. In the Zone.David Papineau - 2013 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 73:175-196.
    On the Friday afternoon of the 3 rd test at Trent Bridge in 2001, the series was in the balance. The Australians had won the first two tests easily, but England now found themselves in a position of some strength. They had restricted Australia to a first-innings lead of just 5 runs, and had built a lead of 120 with six wickets in hand. Mark Ramprakash was in and had been batting steadily for well over an hour. Even though this (...)
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  21. Note on the Completeness of ‘Physics’.David Spurrett & David Papineau - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):25-29.
    David Spurrett, David Papineau; A note on the completeness of ‘physics’, Analysis, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 January 1999, Pages 25–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/anal.
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  22. I—The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties.David Papineau - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):1-33.
    This paper is about the nature of conscious sensory properties. My initial thesis is that these properties should not be equated with representational properties. I argue that any such representationalist view is in danger of implying that conscious sensory properties are constituted by relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time; and I add that, even if this implication can be avoided, the broadness of representational properties in any case renders them unsuitable to constitute conscious properties. In (...)
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    A Study of Concepts.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):425-432.
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  24. Causation is macroscopic but not irreducible.David Papineau - 2013 - In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 126.
    In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible.
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  25. The Statistical Nature of Causation.David Papineau - 2022 - The Monist 105 (2):247-275.
    Causation is a macroscopic phenomenon. The temporal asymmetry displayed by causation must somehow emerge along with other asymmetric macroscopic phenomena like entropy increase and the arrow of radiation. I shall approach this issue by considering ‘causal inference’ techniques that allow causal relations to be inferred from sets of observed correlations. I shall show that these techniques are best explained by a reduction of causation to structures of equations with probabilistically independent exogenous terms. This exogenous probabilistic independence imposes a recursive order (...)
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  26. Theory-dependent terms.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):1-20.
    The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy. In these special cases, but not otherwise, it is necessary to refine the term's definition.
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  27. A defense of the via negativa argument for physicalism.Barbara Montero & David Papineau - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):233-237.
  28. Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays.Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.) - 2006 - New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Teleosemantics seeks to explain meaning and other intentional phenomena in terms of their function in the life of the species. This volume of new essays from an impressive line-up of well-known contributors offers a valuable summary of the current state of the teleosemantics debate.
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  29. The poverty of analysis.David Papineau - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):1-30.
    I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed (...)
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  30. Mind the gap.David Papineau - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:373-89.
    On the first page of The Problem of Consciousness , Colin McGinn asks "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain states? How can technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter?" Many philosophers feel that questions like these pose an unanswerable challenge to physicalism. They argue that there is no way of bridging the "explanatory gap" between the material brain and the lived world of conscious experience , and that physicalism about the mind can therefore provide no (...)
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  31. I_– _David Papineau.David Papineau - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17-43.
    It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548).
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  32. Against representationalism.David Papineau - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347.
    It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational. However this thought gives rise to any number of philosophical problems and confusions. I shall argue that it is quite mistaken. Conscious phenomena cannot be constructed out of representational materials.
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  33. Teleosemantics and indeterminacy.David Papineau - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):1-14.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the teleological theory of representation against an objection by Jerry Fodor. I shall argue that previous attempts to answer this objection fail to recognize the importance of belief-desire structure for the teleological theory of representation.
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  34.  64
    Choking and The Yips.David Papineau - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):295-308.
    IntroductionSporting skills divide contemporary theorists into two camps. Let us call them the habitualists and the intellectualists. The habitualists hold that thought is the enemy of sporting excellence. In their view, skilled performers need to let their bodies take over; cognitive effort only interferes with skill. The intellectualists retort that sporting performance depends crucially on mental control. As they see it, the exercise of skill is a matter of agency, not brute reflex; the tailoring of action to circumstance requires intelligent (...)
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  35. Teleosemantics.David Papineau - 2016 - In David Livingstone Smith (ed.), How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for Naturalism. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 95-120.
  36.  8
    Normativity and Judgement.David Papineau & Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73:17-61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  37. Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy.David Papineau - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.
  38. What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?David Papineau - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.
    It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way.
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  39.  23
    Mind the Gap.David Papineau - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):373-388.
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  40. Scientific realism without reference.Pierre Cruse & David Papineau - 2002 - In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism. Ashgate. pp. 174--189.
     
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  41. Many Minds are No Worse than One.David Papineau - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):233-241.
  42. The status of teleosemantics, or how to stop worrying about swampman.David Papineau - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):279-89.
  43. The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism.David Papineau - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  44.  97
    The virtues of randomization.David Papineau - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):437-450.
    Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypothesis. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an essential role in our route to causal conclusions.
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  45. Why supervenience?David Papineau - 1989 - Analysis 49 (2):66-71.
  46. Reliabilism, induction and scepticism.David Papineau - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):1-20.
  47.  76
    Swampman, teleosemantics and kind essences.David Papineau - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-19.
    One powerful and influential approach to mental representation analyses representation in terms of biological functions, and biological functions in terms of histories of natural selection. This “teleosemantic” package, however, faces a familiar challenge. Surely representation depends only on the present-day structures of cognitive systems, and not on their historical provenance. “Swampman” drives the point home. Suppose a bolt of lightning creates an intrinsic duplicate of a human being in a steamy tropic swamp; will not this creature be representing its surroundings, (...)
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  48. For Science in the Social Sciences.David Papineau - 1981 - Mind 90 (357):151-153.
  49.  26
    Why supervenience?David Papineau - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):66-71.
  50. Can any sciences be special?David Papineau - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 179--197.
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