This paper tries to study philosophical standpoints of Shankara and Spinoza in comparative manner. Though these two philosophers are from totally different cultures, their philosophical method has certain similarities.

Madhvācārya’s Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇaya is the oldest Bhāgavata commentary available to us, most probably predating the Advaitic commentary of Śrīdhara. Thus Madhva’s commentary occupies a crucial place in the development of the Bhāgavata tradition. In this paper, I examine Madhva’s commentary on the first verse of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa, focusing on his exegesis. In so doing, I shall point out how Madhva emphasizes what are arguably the two most important doctrines of Dvaita Vedānta, namely, Viṣṇu’s absolute independence and the reality of the (...) world. With this teaching Madhva vehemently rejects absolute monism and the idea that the world is illusory, which, we might say, are the core doctrines of Advaita Vedānta. This paper is also a modest attempt to revise the general perception of Vedānta as ‘the exegetical tradition on the prasthānatraya’. I argue that we need to include commentaries on the purāṇas within our understanding of Vedāntic discourse since, starting with Madhva, the purāṇas such as the Bhāgavata became an important text for Vedānta authors to comment upon. This is evidenced by the proliferation of commentaries on the Bhāgavata in the early modern period. The Bhāgavatapurāṇa attracted commentaries produced not only by Vaiṣṇava authors such as Sanātana, Jīva, Vallabha and Vīrarāghava but also by Advaita authors like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Śaivas such as Rāghavānanda. In this connection, toward the end of this paper I will point out Madhva’s influence on the Gauḍīya school that flourished in the early modern period. (shrink)

Leibniz's metaphysics appears to go a long way towards monism: it supports a strong dependence of limited things on the absolute or God and understands this dependence not only as causal dependence but also as a pervasive ontological dependence which involves the communality of nature between absolute and limited. Yet, Leibniz stops short of affirming monism. Why? This paper takes a fresh look at Leibniz's reasons for opposing monism through the lens of a virtually unknown (...) text of 1698 on the metaphysical foundations of the infinite. Against the backdrop of the present-day monistic proposals of Jonathan Schaffer and Michael Della Rocca, the paper identifies and evaluates four different types of monism: 1. Whole-Part Monism; 2. World-Animal Monism; 3. God-Nature Monism and 4. Eleatic Monism. It argues that Leibniz's opposition to Whole-Part Monism, World-Animal Monism, and God-Nature Monism, is due to his conceptions of the infinite and of what it is to be “an absolutely absolute Being”. Furthermore, it argues that the only type of monism which could preserve Leibniz's demanding notions of real infinite and absolute is Eleatic Monism. The latter, however, is also rejected by Leibniz due to our first-hand experience of what it is to be a substance. (shrink)

By the absolute Good, I understand the Idea of the Good; by the human goods, I understand pleasure and reason, which have been disqualified in Plato's "Republic" as candidates for the absolute Good (cf.R.505b-d). Concerning the Idea of the Good, we can distinguish a maximal and a minimal interpretation. After the minimal interpretation, the Idea of the Good is the absolute Good because there is no final cause beyond the Idea of the Good. After the maximal interpretation, (...) the Idea of the Good is the One. The maximal and the minimal interpretation go beyond the textual evidence. I will defend two theses: (1) Since the platonic Socrates deliberately gives no more information, it seems wise to stop with Socrates and to give only a formal, not a substantive, interpretation: The absolute good is the third item between and above knowledge and the known. (2) To mediate between the absolute Good and the human goods, Plato’s Eleatic Stranger introduced in the "Politicus" and "Philebus" an intermediate principle: "the appropriate" (to metrion). For more information concerning "the appropriate" cf. Ferber, Rafael (2010). Plato's Side Suns: Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. Comments concerning semantic monism and pluralism of the "Good" in the Philebus (65A 1-5). Elenchos, 31, p. 51-76, esp. 64-67. (shrink)

This paper considers various senses of the notion of identity and describes the strongest sense of the term—what it labels “absolute identity.” Absolute identity combines monistic identity of all in all as one substance with the absence of internal differentiation. The paper explores the possibility of absolute identity along three lines—linguistic, mental, and ontological. It determines that though there are serious difficulties, linguistic and mental, involved with positing absolute identity the possibility of its coming to be (...) real cannot be ruled out. Finally, on grounds of its lack of coherence-functionality absolute identity is rejected as an adequate conception of the world. The paper closes with a discussion of the ramifications of the denial of absolute identity. (shrink)

Qualia, Sensa and absolute Processes. In this paper, the development of Sellars' thoughts concerning the mind-body-problem is reconstructed. Starting from an elaborate critique of the identity theory, Sellars claims that the ultimate 'Scientific Image' must contain a concept of sensa as the bearers of certain properties of manifest sense impressions. In his later work Sellars' notion of absolute processes leads him to a new monism and thus to an extended critique of rival theories. It is argued that (...) these Sellarsian thoughts can be helpful in the actual discussion of the mind-body-problem. (shrink)

Talk of metaphysical modality as “absolute” is ambiguous, as it appears to convey multiple ideas. Metaphysical possibility is supposedly completely unrestricted or unqualified; metaphysical necessity is unconditional and exceptionless. Moreover, metaphysical modality is thought to be absolute in the sense that it’s real or genuine and the most objective modality: metaphysical possibility and necessity capture ways things could and must have really been. As we disentangle these ideas, certain talk of metaphysical modality qua “absolute” turns out to (...) be misguided. Metaphysical possibility isn't completely unrestricted or most inclusive compared to the other modalities; metaphysical necessity, like all kinds of necessities, is relative to or conditional upon a specific framework of reference. Still, metaphysical modality captures how things could and must have really been most generally because it deals with reality and the nature of things or their essence. That’s the chief interest of metaphysics. Arguments against the alleged absoluteness of metaphysical modality may not thereby undermine its philosophical significance. (shrink)

Qualia, Sensa and absolute Processes. In this paper, the development of Sellars' thoughts concerning the mind-body-problem is reconstructed. Starting from an elaborate critique of the identity theory, Sellars claims that the ultimate 'Scientific Image' must contain a concept of sensa as the bearers of certain properties of manifest sense impressions. In his later work Sellars' notion of absolute processes leads him to a new monism and thus to an extended critique of rival theories. It is argued that (...) these Sellarsian thoughts can be helpful in the actual discussion of the mind-body-problem. (shrink)

Monism is a doctrine that claims to deduce the entire system of knowledge from one first principle. It must be a system of a mutually connected propositions that are obtained by a methodologically reliable unfolding of one original proposition accepted as self-evident and unquestionable. Modern philosophy in its rationalist version, beginning with Descartes, tends precisely to this kind of monistic construction of the system of knowledge from a first principle. The striving toward monism is demonstrated most clearly in (...) Spinoza's and Fichte's systems. Spinoza's original principle is substance-that which exists by itself and is comprehended through itself. Fichte replaces substance by the Absolute Subject, the Absolute I, which by an act of self-positing brings itself into being and defines itself only by itself. In one and the other, all the determinations of the system must follow from the original principle with indisputable necessity. It is this logical necessity that claims to be the pure image of the scientific spirit that was valued so highly by modern European thought. (shrink)

In this article, we present for the first time Schelling’s early critique of absolute idealism within his middle metaphysics (1804–1820), which has great relevance and influence on the subsequent course of German philosophy, and, more broadly considered, on later systematic thinking about the categories of unity and duality. We aim to show how Schelling defends a form of metaphysical duality, from 1804 onwards, without relapsing into a stronger Kantian dualism. In this sense, our author rejects both the dualism between (...) nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, as well as the monist-immanent metaphysical stance later associated with Hegelian panlogism. Against Hegel, Schelling increasingly vindicates the reality of the finite and degrades the infinite to mere ideality in a movement that resembles later existentialism. Furthermore, we defend Schelling against the accusation of irrationalism that sections of Hegelianism formulated against him and present the concept of infinity without the notion of totality, which he thinks of, much like Fichte, in the light of the concept of an ‘infinite task’. Schelling’s later criticisms of Hegel are shown to be influenced by his early idealist critique of the period at hand. (shrink)

Rāmānuja is known as a theistic ācārya who interpreted Brahmasūtras in Viśiṣṭādvaita point of view. He propounded his philosophy by refuting Kevāldvaita system of Śaṅkara. He criticized the existence and knowledge of indeterminate objects and refuted the concept of Nirviśeṣa Brahman. Therefore, Brahman for him is Saviśeṣa. The name Viśiṣṭādvaita itself signifies that it is Qualified Monism. Brahman is qualified by matter and soul. Matter and soul though real are completely dependent on Brahman for their existence. Hegel is a (...) German Philosopher who propounded Absolute Idealism. Hegel solved the problem of reality from a synthetic and positive point of view. Predecessors of Hegel were reflecting on Reality with one sided abstractions. Absolute is ultimately real for him. Hegel’s Absolute is not devoid of all objects and qualities. Absolute is inclusive of all the categories and all things of the world. Absolute is not abstract like Śaṅkara’s Brahman but it goes very much closer to Ramanuja’s Saviśeṣa Brahman. Thus, both these philosopher though differ in some principles which are very peculiar to them, they definitely meet at on one point of ‘Concrete Monism’. Logical method adopted by them to reach towards their goal is also strikingly similar. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of monism according to Rāmānuja and Hegel with philosophical point of view. Comparative study of both will throw light on some striking similarities as well as some differences of these great philosophers. (shrink)

The question of whether the true character of reality is monistic or pluralistic spans almost the entire history of metaphysics. Though little discussed in recent decades, it presents problems that are nowadays considered of the utmost importance. Think, for instance, of the ultimate nature of elements such as matter, elemental particles or physical fields. Are they self-sufficient? Do they depend on a higher reality? A major discussion regarding the metaphysical grounds of such questions took place in Britain during the late (...) nineteenth century. It saw Francis Herbert Bradley and James Ward trying to understand the nature of experience. By recalling that specific discussion, this article seeks to show why the monistic character of reality prevails. (shrink)

Abstract:The closing section of James's "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" contains a surprisingly abrupt dismissal of Kant's philosophy. This paper suggests that James's real target is his host, George Holmes Howison, whose Philosophical Union had invited James to speak at Berkeley. James and Howison shared a common commitment to pluralism in opposition to the Absolute monism such as Josiah Royce was developing. Howison relies on Kant's account of the a priori as well as his moral ideal of a (...) Kingdom of Ends in order to fashion a pluralistic form of |idealism that would avoid the errors he found in Absolute monism while also countering the influential evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer. While James shared Howison's opposition to monism, as well as his critical view of Spencer, he did not share his aversion to evolutionary ideas. Ultimately, the pragmatism that he announced at Berkeley would reply to Howison's Kantian approach by retaining a pluralism while building on the modern psychology growing out of evolution. James's position would test the alliance that they had forged against monism. In time, it would prove too fragile to withstand their growing differences until a final break came in the year before James's death. (shrink)

“Why did God create the World?” is one of the traditional questions of theology. In the twentieth century this question was rephrased in a secularized manner as “Why is there something rather than nothing?” While creation - at least in its traditional, temporal, sense - has little place in Spinoza’s system, a variant of the same questions puts Spinoza’s system under significant pressure. According to Spinoza, God, or the substance, has infinitely many modes. This infinity of modes follow from the (...) essence of God. If we ask: “Why must God have modes?,” we seem to be trapped in a real catch. On the one hand, Spinoza’s commitment to thoroughgoing rationalism demands that there must be a reason for the existence of the radical plurality of modes. On the other hand, the asymmetric dependence of modes on the substance seems to imply that the substance does not need the modes, and that it can exist without the modes. But if the substance does not need the modes, then why are there modes at all? Furthermore, Spinoza cannot explain the existence of modes as an arbitrary act of grace on God’s side since Spinoza’s God does not act arbitrarily. Surprisingly, this problem has hardly been addressed in the existing literature on Spinoza’s metaphysics, and it is my primary aim here to draw attention to this problem. In the first part of the paper I will present and explain the problem of justifying the existence of infinite plurality modes in Spinoza’s system. In the second part of the paper I consider the radical solution to the problem according to which modes do not really exist, and show that this solution must be rejected upon consideration. In the third and final part of the paper I will suggest my own solution according to which the essence of God is active and it is this feature of God’s essence which requires the flow of modes from God’s essence. I also suggest that Spinoza considered radical infinity and radical unity to be roughly the same, and that the absolute infinity of what follow from God’s essence is grounded in the absolute infinity of God’s essence itself. (shrink)

Is there a language of transcendence which does not fall under the well-worn categories of monism, theism, pantheism, biblical or pagan monotheism, personal or tripersonal God, or an impersonal absolute, conceived as immanent and/or transcendent? The present set of studies from different fields of research centers on the question whether it is possible to speak at all of transcendence or a divinity, and if it is, under what limitations does such speech proceed. In current discussion in theology and (...) in philosophy of religion, there is a pervasive awareness that the inherited terms and alternatives, developed in the western tradition, no longer facilitate an adequate understanding of the divine. Increasing familiarity with the languages of 'immanence' and 'transcendence' (under erasure) in Hindu and Buddhist thought has further jumbled our coordinates, while holding out the promise of a more subtle and vital engagement with the matter itself of religious inquiry. A further long-established distinction, between 'personal' and 'impersonal, ' also takes on rich new hues in Asian contexts, where the very notion of 'person' may undergo unsettling critiques. Transgressing the categories of 'personal' and 'impersonal' points to the mystical depth of religious traditions, emphasizes their openness and reintegrates essential elements of both perspectives. Advancing with curiosity and caution, all the contributors take seriously the diversity of historical religious traditions, while nevertheless searching for a fresh language that may connect these traditions and provide a common ground of understanding. (shrink)

This is a work in speculative metaphysics in the grand manner. The type of absolute idealism Sprigge endeavors to vindicate is monistic panpsychism. This he does not only by means of detailed sustained argument but also by informed discussions, manifesting admirable erudition, of recent analytic philosophers such as Russell, Feigl, Quine, Armstrong, and Williams and of philosophers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Bradley, Royce, James, Santayana, Husserl, Whitehead, and Hartshorne.

This article discusses Leibniz’s claim that every substance is endowed with the property of perception in connection with Platonism, rationalism and the problem of substance monism. It is argued that Leibniz’s ascription of perception to every substance relies on his Platonic conception of finite things as imitations of God, in whom there is ‘infinite perception’. Leibniz’s Platonism, however, goes beyond the notion of imitation, including also the emanative causal relation and the logical (i.e. definitional) priority of the absolute (...) over the limited. It is proposed that Leibniz’s endorsement of Platonism, in conjunction with some rationalist elements of his philosophy, implies a monistic conception of particulars as modifications of a single substance. Following some scholars and opposing others, the article offers evidence that Leibniz accepted this implication during the last years of his Paris period. However, it is further argued that it was precisely the idea of perception as a property of every substance that allowed Leibniz to find a way out of monism after that period. More specifically, the article defends the view that what made room for ontological pluralism within Leibniz’s rationalist and Platonic outlook was the idea that perception is the property which constitutes the very being of substances: substances are their perceptions. (shrink)

Kant's 'Copernican Revolution', which began in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), had, by the early 1790s, fundamentally altered the terrain of German philosophy – but not entirely in the way that Kant had foreseen. Skeptical challenges to Kant's discursive account of cognition, in which experience arises from the separate faculties of sensibility and understanding, had led thinkers such as K.L. Reinhold and J.G. Fichte to attempt to provide a first, foundational principle for the critical philosophy. These efforts were enormously (...) influential, but by the middle of the 1790s, they too were facing a great deal of critical scrutiny. The central challenge to the Fichtean project came from an unlikely quarter: a group of young thinkers and poets who are collectively known as the early Romantics. For the Romantics, Fichte's project remains too 'subjectivist', for it tries to provide an account of the world by beginning with the conditions that govern subjectivity alone. Rather, the Romantics argue that the world must be understood in terms of a monistic Absolute, akin to Spinoza's substance, in which all dualisms are overcome. It is with this step that Absolute Idealism comes on the scene, and sets the stage for the development of Hegel's system in the early 1800s. This essay, which continues the story of 'Who's Who from Kant to Hegel I', examines the ways in which early Romanticism reacted to the Fichtean project, looks at a variety of anti-foundationalist idealisms that the Romantics – in particular Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher – developed, and traces the role that Friedrich Schelling plays in offering the first systematic account of Absolute Idealism. (shrink)

Bradley thought that there is a connexion between the theory of reality and the theory of truth. The theory of reality to which he subscribed, Monism, rules out a correspondence theory of truth, he thought, since it denies the existence of a plurality of facts, or things, in virtue of correspondence to which a judgment could be true. But though he rejects the correspondence theory he insists on the independence of truth from belief, wish and hope. For him the (...) test of truth is coherence, which has two aspects, system and comprehensiveness. However, he does not think that this test yields ?absolute? truth. This, he maintains, for at least three different reasons, is unobtainable. Judgments can only be partially true. However, since there are degrees of truth, some judgments are closer to the truth than others, even though none are, or could be, unconditionally true. (shrink)

In Jena Hegel began his philosophical career under the auspices of Schelling’s Spinozism. His declaration of philosophical independence from Schelling, dating from publication of the Phenomenology, was a repudiation of the Spinozistic definition of the absolute as merely substance. Substance without the flux of accidents, he came to see, is nothing at all. Yet in the judgment of history Hegel’s break with Schellingian Spinozism, though clearly embarked upon, was not so clearly consummated. The struggle of monism and pluralism (...) is no longer a burning issue in philosophy, and that is perhaps why Hegel’s monism is rarely mentioned by today’s Hegel scholars. But the belief that Hegel was a one-substance monist — affirming the existence of spirit as an all-encompassing and indivisible substance — was never far from the minds of earlier interpreters. Such interpreters range from K. F. Göschel to C.E.M. Joad in “Outline of Hegel’s Philosophy: Monistic Idealism,” Chapter 15 of his Guide to Philosophy,. By failing to distinguish the absolute idealism of Hegel from that of the British idealists, Whitehead himself lent support to the monistic interpretation of Hegel when he wrote. (shrink)

In Jena Hegel began his philosophical career under the auspices of Schelling’s Spinozism. His declaration of philosophical independence from Schelling, dating from publication of the Phenomenology, was a repudiation of the Spinozistic definition of the absolute as merely substance. Substance without the flux of accidents, he came to see, is nothing at all. Yet in the judgment of history Hegel’s break with Schellingian Spinozism, though clearly embarked upon, was not so clearly consummated. The struggle of monism and pluralism (...) is no longer a burning issue in philosophy, and that is perhaps why Hegel’s monism is rarely mentioned by today’s Hegel scholars. But the belief that Hegel was a one-substance monist — affirming the existence of spirit as an all-encompassing and indivisible substance — was never far from the minds of earlier interpreters. Such interpreters range from K. F. Göschel to C.E.M. Joad in “Outline of Hegel’s Philosophy: Monistic Idealism,” Chapter 15 of his Guide to Philosophy,. By failing to distinguish the absolute idealism of Hegel from that of the British idealists, Whitehead himself lent support to the monistic interpretation of Hegel when he wrote. (shrink)

The author has made this treatise on Madhva’s realistic school of Ved?nta philosophy convincing to the modern mind by employing western logical apparatus in substantiating Madhva’s ideas. Following the Indian classical tradition, the author has examined the validity of Advaitaved?nta, the Absolute Monism of ?a?kara and Bh?skara as P?rvapak?a, and logically proved its inconsistencies. He has then established the Dvaitasiddh?nta i.e., the Monotheistic Dualism of Madhva. He has successfully brought out the nuances of the realistic school of Indian (...) philosophical thought in this work. A Modern Introduction to M?dhva Philosophy is Prof B H Kotabagi’s posthumous publication. (shrink)

This paper explores Calkins’ absolute idealism and its ramifications for libertarian free will. Calkins’ metaphysics is a version of absolute idealism, according to which the absolute is a person who has everything else as either a part or an aspect. Three different arguments for the conclusion that Calkins’ metaphysics is incompatible with libertarian freewill are formulated and critically assessed. Finally, I assess the extent to which these arguments are independent of each other.

William James undertook to steer his way between a rationalistic system that was not empirical enough and an empirical system so materialistic that it could not account for the value commitments on which it rested. In arguing against both the absolutists (gnostics) and the empiricists (agnostics), he defined a position of pluralistic moralism that seemed equally distant from both, leaving himself vulnerable to the criticism that he had rescued morality from scientism only by reducing religion to morals. Such criticism, however, (...) ignores distinctions James made between religion and theology and between monistic theology and dualistic theology. When these distinctions are taken into account, it becomes evident that James can be criticized for reducing religion to morality only from the point of view of either absolute monism or religious humanism and that radical empiricism not only embraces a significant number of nonmoral religious experiences but also leaves open the possibility of belief in the particular historical God of traditional Christianity. (shrink)

Astavakragita (The Song of the Self Supreme) contains the Sanskrit text of Astavakragita (both in Nagari and Roman script), its English translation, Exegesis and Glossarial Index. It presents in twenty chapters the substance of Astavakra`s teaching in respect of the Cosmic Self in the form of his dialogue with Janaka, the seer-king of Videha. The teaching is based on the Upanisadic creed of Absolute monism (Advaitavada) that identifies the Self with the non-dual Ultimate Reality. But the contribution of (...) Astavakra is also immense, for he has introduced the element of emotional experience or the mystical feeling as the means for realizing the non-dual nature of the Self. Written in a lucid style and dealing systematically with the subject matter, the book will hold a unique position among the contemplative classics of the world. (shrink)

Description: This volume is a scholarly treatise in which the author has tried to bring out the philosophy and system of Advaita Vedantism. Besides the philosophy of the Upanishads it includes a detailed exposition of the metaphysics of Absolute Monism and covers the views of the philosophers from Sankara to the neo-Vedantists. The exposition of the principles and the abstruse doctrines, set forth with clarity and objectivity by the author, have made this work invaluable for the students of (...) Indian philosophy. In the five chapters the learned author has discussed the concepts like 'Being', 'Appearance', 'Culture', 'Realisation and Freedom' besides the 'Cosmology and Psychology of Vedanta' based on the original sources. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides: The Origins of PhilosophyScott AustinArnold Hermann. To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides: The Origins of Philosophy. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004. Pp. xxx + 374. Cloth, $32.00.Mr. Arnold Hermann could presumably have used his connection with Parmenides Press to publish anything he wanted. Instead, he has put out a sober, bibliographically well aware, thesis about the origin, nature, and motivations (...) of Parmenides' thought, one evolved in dialogue with scholars such as Cordero, McKirahan, and Curd. The resulting monograph, to be the first of three on subjects connected with Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides, is a legitimate contribution to the field, to be taken very seriously as part of any scholarly bibliography. Best of all, in this reviewer's opinion, is the exploration of Parmenides' legal language and metaphors as they might affect the type of abstract object which can count as subject for the esti, the differences between or among routes and rules of inquiry, the necessity for a Doxa-section, the relationships with Xenophanes and Plato. Less successful, I think, is the attempt to put together a coherent picture out of the hazy evidence on Pythagoras and to distinguish levels of probability within that evidence. Nor, in spite of his praise for Mourelatos's book ("... truly one of the most indispensable works on the Eleatic," 214), does Hermann seem aware (see 189) that the possibility of a pluralistic Eleatic ontology was also present in that book, before it was followed by Curd's book.Hermann's thesis is that Parmenidean philosophy was an answer both to Xenophanes' challenge, to his indication of the limits of our human inquiry—our difference from the gods—and the problem of irrationals in Pythagoreanism. By setting out the rational limits which any purely theoretical inquiry must have, Parmenides intended to show that, in pursuing theory, we can, indeed, think like the gods. (Here excellent use is made of work by Mourelatos and Long.) But by distinguishing theoretical inquiry from empirical inquiry, Parmenides showed the limits of Pythagoreanism, which had been unable to make that distinction. (Units are theoretical entities, but points are empirical, so there are in reality no Pythagorean unit-points; rational numbers are theoretical while irrationals are empirical, and so on.) (Here there are affinities with the recent Popper book.) That is, the Doxa-section, according to Hermann, shows tragically that we do not always think like the gods, especially when we think empirically. Our contemporary science is continuing the inquiry that Parmenides began, but the original Parmenidean philosophy was a methodology about how to inquire into abstract objects, not necessarily a metaphysics, a theory about what those abstract objects are. Here Hermann differs from the standard portrait of Parmenides as theorist of an intelligible world; he thinks that it is Plato who is more responsible than Parmenides for theorizing about which objects correspond to the methodology. (Here he follows Mourelatos and Curd in viewing fragment 2 as setting up types of inquiry rather than types of entity.)One has no quarrel with the claim that Parmenides' originality is at least partly methodological. Yet a methodology whose strictures are this strong was thought, by Plato at least, to require absolute monism; is it an accident that I cannot have a pluralistic ontology without having non-identities between members of pairs of objects, non-identity being an example of saying what is not (fragment 8, lines 36–38)? Does not this particular methodology necessitate a very particular metaphysics? [End Page 481]And, if we do think like the gods, at least at times, are we not then thinking about what is ultimately real, i.e., about a certain type of object? If rules can be given which secure a kind of thought which is exempt from Xenophanean scepticism, do not these rules determine sorts of entities? And, if Pythagoreanism errs in confusing theoretical with empirical entities, must not we ourselves possess the perspective of a god or goddess in order to avoid the confusion?These are some of the questions provoked by this fresh book, which, untrammelled by much scholarly narrowness, is yet capable of contributing much to scholarly... (shrink)

It is argued in this paper that a greater understanding of dualism is needed to secure the future of humanism and of humanity. Its study consists in understanding the extremes of opinion and attitude to which we are all prone and which pervade every aspect of our society. These extremes are even today impeding our future and threatening to plunge the world into internecine struggles between factions competing for power and pre-eminence. The fruitless conflicts, wars and divisions caused by extremism (...) will only be avoided when a dualist view is adopted that makes the ‘either-for-us-or-against-us’ mentality universally unacceptable. The dualist view also helps us to deal with situations that demand insight more than logic. A distinction is made here between naïve and systematic dualism in which the former refers to confused and muddled thinking whereas the latter involves organized and purposeful thinking to deal systematically with confusing and conflicting situations. There is a spectrum between naïve dualism at one extreme and absolute monism at the other extreme. Most of us, most of the time, are systematic dualists subsisting somewhere in the middle. Our future is constantly threatened by those few people who have one answer to everything and are intolerant of other views. If the dualist view becomes prevalent they may learn to think differently. Humanism is distinct from religion in being essentially dualist in its outlook and in being prepared to countenance alternative views. The further development of the dualist view therefore strengthens humanism against its monist enemies who are looking for certainty and easy solutions. (shrink)