This article discusses Leibniz’s claim that every substance is endowed with the property of perception in connection with Platonism, rationalism and the problem of substance monism. It is argued that Leibniz’s ascription of perception to every substance relies on his Platonic conception of finite things as imitations of God, in whom there is ‘infinite perception’. Leibniz’s Platonism, however, goes beyond the notion of imitation, including also the emanative causal relation and the logical (i.e. definitional) priority of the absolute over the (...) limited. It is proposed that Leibniz’s endorsement of Platonism, in conjunction with some rationalist elements of his philosophy, implies a monistic conception of particulars as modifications of a single substance. Following some scholars and opposing others, the article offers evidence that Leibniz accepted this implication during the last years of his Paris period. However, it is further argued that it was precisely the idea of perception as a property of every substance that allowed Leibniz to find a way out of monism after that period. More specifically, the article defends the view that what made room for ontological pluralism within Leibniz’s rationalist and Platonic outlook was the idea that perception is the property which constitutes the very being of substances: substances are their perceptions. (shrink)

Discussions of Leibniz’s view of the relation between God and nature in 1675–1676 has split commentators into two competing camps. According to some scholars, Leibniz was a pantheistic substance monist in these years. However, other scholars think that he was neither a substance monist nor a pantheist. This paper advocates a middle ground between these two interpretations. With scholars in the first camp, it is argued that Leibniz was a substance monist in 1675–1676. However, it is also argued that he (...) was not a pantheistic substance monist, but rather a panentheistic one. This interpretation has at least a twofold virtue vis-à-vis the anti-monistic and pantheistic readings. For one thing, unlike the anti-monistic reading, the panentheistic interpretation is in keeping with the weight of textual evidence, which strongly indicates that in 1675–1676 Leibniz did embrace, and actually argue for, the idea that God is the only substance. For another, unlike the pantheist interpretation, it can accommodate the fact that, while endorsing monism in 1675–1676, Leibniz at the same time rejected necessitarianism. (shrink)

RESUMO Um problema de longa data na erudição aristotélica diz respeito à questão de como reconciliar a dupla descrição de Aristóteles da metafísica como ontologia (a ciência universal do ser enquanto ser) e teologia (a ciência da substância imutável e separada). Uma tentativa importante de responder a esta questão (iniciada primeiro por G. Patzig) consiste em dizer que a substância imutável e separada é focalmente anterior (ou o significado focal da) substância e, portanto, de ser em geral (uma vez que (...) a substância é focalmente anterior a ser no geral). Este artigo visa refutar esse tipo de abordagem para o problema da unidade da metafísica de Aristóteles, argumentando que (i) as relações de significado focal implicam a prioridade lógica (definição) dos itens anteriores sobre os itens dependentes situados em tais relações; (ii) a substância imutável e separada não é logicamente anterior aos outros tipos de substâncias distinguidas por Aristóteles; e, portanto, (iii) a substância imutável e separada não é focalmente anterior à (o significado focal de) substância. (shrink)

This article elaborates a new framework for understanding Leibniz’s conception of the unity and reality of the world as an aggregate. It defends the view that Leibniz conceives of the world as a particular type of aggregate, the main characteristic of which is that its members are bound together by the perceptual activity of the infinite mind of God. It is argued that, so conceived, the world can in a sense have a unity and reality that, while aggregative and relational, (...) do not reduce to the perceptual states of the constituent-substances it comprises. At the same time, it is further argued that this does not involve renouncing Leibniz’s world-apart conception of substance, or his reductionism about relations and relational accidents. (shrink)

This article argues that Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts in his essay, Directions in Space yields not the conclusion that space is an objective reality, but rather that it is an absolute and dynamical framework that grounds spatial properties, a view which is neutral with respect to the objective/subjective nature of space. It is suggested that, so construed, Kant’s argument in this essay can be made consistent with his later employment in support of transcendental idealism with regard to space.

This article aims to offer a thorough and new account of the components of Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony, understood as an explanation of the unity among all substances. It argues for a formulation of the theory in terms of six complementary components, developing interpretations of them along with critical discussions of other interpretations found in the Leibniz literature. The paper shows that, as they have been presented so far, interpretations of pre-established harmony have almost universally omitted one of its (...) key components, namely Leibniz’s construal of intrinsic force as representational power. Once this is established, the article offers a novel interpretation of the relationship between representational power and the harmony among substances. Particularly, it is argued that, correctly understood, the representation of all substances among themselves entails, or is sufficient for, their harmony. (shrink)

La filosofía de Wolff y Baumgarten ha sido tradicionalmente evaluada como nada más que una sistematización, carente de toda originalidad, de las doctrinas de Leibniz. El presente trabajo revisa esta opinión generaliza, concentrándose en el problema específico de la interacción de las sustancias naturales. Se muestra que Wolff y Baumgarten no siguen a Leibniz con el mismo grado de cercanía en relación a algunos de los principios centrales de la teoría armonía preestablecida y, con ello, se problematiza el uso de (...) la etiqueta “leibnizianismo” como referida a un cuerpo homogéneo e indiferenciado de doctrinas. (shrink)

This article aims to make further progress in revising the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a popularisation and systematisation of Leibniz’s doctrines. It focuses on the topic of the communication among substances and the metaphysics of simples and activity underlying it. It is argued that Wolff does not accept the pre-established harmony in its orthodox Leibnizian version. The article explains Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s PEH as stemming from his rejection of Leibniz’s construal of the activity of every simple as (...) representational power and of the metaphysics of unity and activity in which that construal is rooted. (shrink)

Las filosofías de Wolff y Baumgarten han sido tradicionalmente evaluadas como una mera sistematización de las doctrinas de Leibniz, carente de toda originalidad. Se revisa esta opinión, concentrándose en el problema específico de la interacción de las sustancias naturales. Se muestra que ellos no siguen a Leibniz con el mismo grado de cercanía en algunos de los principios centrales de la teoría de la armonía preestablecida. Se problematiza así el uso de la etiqueta "leibnizianismo" como referida a un cuerpo homogéneo (...) e indiferenciado de doctrinas. The philosophies of Wolff and Baumgarten have been traditionally evaluated as mere systematizations of the doctrines of Leibniz, and, therefore, as lacking all originality. The paper revises that opinion, focusing on the specific problem of the interaction of natural substances, in order to show that they do not follow Leibniz as closely with respect to some of the central principles of pre-established harmony. It also questions the use of "Leibnizianism" as a label to refer to a homogeneous and undifferentiated body of doctrines. As filosofias de Wolff e Baumgarten têm sido tradicionalmente avaliadas como uma mera sistematização das doutrinas de Leibniz, carente de toda originalidade. Neste artigo, revisa-se essa opinião concentrando-se no problema específico da interação das substâncias naturais. Mostra-se que eles não seguem Leibniz com o mesmo grau de aproximação em alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria da harmonia preestabelecida. Problematiza-se, assim, o uso da etiqueta "leibnizianismo" como referência a um corpo homogêneo e indiferenciado de doutrinas. (shrink)