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Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 40 (2013)

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  1. The Compatibility of the Structure-and-Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism About Space.Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):44-52.
    Chalmers (2002) argues against physicalism in part using the premise that no truth about consciousness can be deduced a priori from any set of purely structural truths. Chalmers (2012) elaborates a detailed definition of what it is for a truth to be structural, which turns out to include spatiotemporal truths. But Chalmers (2012) then proposes to define spatiotemporal terms by reference to their role in causing spatial and temporal experiences. Stoljar (2015) and Ebbers (Ms) argue that this definition of spatiotemporal (...)
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  • Eden Benumbed: A Critique of Panqualityism and the Disclosure View of Consciousness.Itay Shani - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-24.
    In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism occupies an interesting position. It is a distinct variant of neutral monism, as well as of protophenomenalism, and as such it strives to carve out a conceptual niche midway between physicalism and mentalism. It is also a brand of Russellian monism, advocated by its supporters as a less costly and less extravagant alternative to panpsychism. Being clearly articulated and relatively well-developed it constitutes an intriguing view. Nonetheless, the (...)
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  • Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics.Torin Alter & Derk Pereboom - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    It is often claimed that Russellian monism carries a commitment to a structuralist conception of physics, on which physics describes the world only in terms of its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. We argue that this claim is mistaken. On Russellian monism, there is more to consciousness, and to the rest of concrete reality, than spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. But the latter claim supports only a conditional claim about physics: if structuralism about physics is true, then there is more to consciousness (...)
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  • Consciousness and Categorical Properties.Christopher Devlin Brown - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Russellian physicalism is a view on the nature of consciousness which promises to satisfy the demands of both traditional physicalists and non-physicalists. It does so by identifying subjective experience with physically acceptable categorical properties underlying structural and dispositional properties described by science. Though promising, the view faces at least two serious challenges: it has been argued that science deals in both categorical and non-categorical properties, which would undercut the motivation behind Russellian physicalism, and it has been argued that only nonphysicalist (...)
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