Brain imaging studies suggest that truth telling constitutes the default of the human brain and that lying involves intentional suppression of the predominant truth response. By manipulating the truth proportion in the Sheffield lie test, we investigated whether the dominance of the truth response is malleable. Results showed that frequent truth telling made lying more difficult, and that frequent lying made lying easier. These results implicate that the accuracy of lie detection tests may be improved by increasing the dominance of (...) the truth response and that habitual lying makes the lie response more dominant. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIs lying in a different language easier or more difficult? The Emotional Distance and the Cognitive Load hypothesis give competing answers. Suchotzki and Gamer measured the time native German speakers needed to initiate honest and deceptive answers to German and English questions. Lie-truth differences in RTs were much smaller for the foreign compared to the native language. In our preregistered replication study in native Dutch speakers, we found that lie-truth differences in RTs were moderately smaller when participants were tested in (...) English than when tested in Dutch. These findings indicate that people struggle with quickly retrieving the truth in another language, and that foreign language use may diminish lie-truth differences. (shrink)

Although affective facial pictures are widely used in emotion research, standardised affective stimuli sets are rather scarce, and the existing sets have several limitations. We therefore conducted a validation study of 490 pictures of human facial expressions from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF). Pictures were evaluated on emotional content and were rated on an intensity and arousal scale. Results indicate that the database contains a valid set of affective facial pictures. Hit rates, intensity, and arousal of the 20 (...) best KDEF pictures for each basic emotion are provided in an appendix. (shrink)

Geven, Ben‐Shakhar, Kindt and Verschuere point out that research on deception detection usually employs instructed cheating. They experimentally demonstrate that participants show slower reaction times for concealed information than for other information, regardless of whether they are explicitly instructed to cheat or whether they can freely choose to cheat or not. Finding this ‘cognitive signature of lying’ with self‐initiated cheating too is argued by the authors to strengthen the external validity of deception detection research. [75].

Lying is typically more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Yet, recent cognitive models of lying propose that lying can be just as easy as truth telling, depending on contextual factors. In line with this idea, research has shown that the cognitive cost of deception decreases when people frequently respond deceptively, while it increases when people rarely respond deceptively (i.e., the truth proportion effect). In the present study, we investigated two possible underlying mechanisms of the truth proportion effect. In Experiment 1 (...) ( N = 121), we controlled for the impact of switch costs by keeping the number of switches between deceptive and truthful responses constant. We found that people who often responded deceptively made fewer errors when responding deceptively than people who only occasionally responded deceptively, replicating the truth proportion effect. Thus, while the truth proportion effect in earlier studies may be partially driven by the cost of switching between truthful and deceptive responses, we still found evidence for the truth proportion effect while controlling for switch costs. In Experiment 2 ( N = 68), we assessed whether the truth proportion effect is influenced by goal neglect. According to this view, the truth proportion effect should be reduced if participants are cued to maintain the task goals, while it should be larger when participants are allowed to neglect the task goals. In line with this hypothesis, we found a smaller truth proportion effect when participants were cued with the task goals compared to when they were not cued. This study shows that the truth proportion effect is influenced by goal neglect, implying that frequent deceptive responding strengthens the goal of responding deceptively. Our findings imply that the accuracy of lie detection tests could be increased by using a majority of truth-items (i.e., induce the truth proportion effect), and that the truth proportion effect should be maximized by (1) increasing the number of truth-lie task switches and (2) inducing goal neglect. (shrink)

In recent years, some theorists have argued that the clogics are not only defined by their inferences, but also by their metainferences. In this sense, logics that coincide in their inferences, but not in their metainferences were considered to be different. In this vein, some metainferential logics have been developed, as logics with metainferences of any level, built as hierarchies over known logics, such as \, and \. What is distinctive of these metainferential logics is that they are mixed, i.e. (...) the standard for the premises and the conclusion is not necessarily the same. However, so far, all of these systems have been presented following a semantical standpoint, in terms of valuations based on the Strong Kleene truth-tables. In this article, we provide sound and complete sequent-calculi for the valid inferences and the invalid inferences of the logics \ and \, and introduce an algorithm that allows obtaining sound and complete sequent-calculi for the global validities and the global invalidities of any metainferential logic of any level. (shrink)

In his article Banicki proposes a universal model for all forms of philosophical therapy. He is guided by works of Martha Nussbaum, who in turn makes recourse to Aristotle. As compared to Nussbaum’s approach, Banicki’s model is more medical and less based on ethical argument. He mentions Foucault’s vision to apply the same theoretical analysis for the ailments of the body and the soul and to use the same kind of approach in treating and curing them. In his interpretation of (...) philosophical therapy, there are, however, some controversial issues, to which we would like to call attention: -/- Is restoring health by a philosophical method of treatment – health understood as a person’s ability to reach his/her vital goals – a convincing explication of philosophical therapy in general? In order to answer this question, it may be useful to look at Plato. It is not only Platonism (and especially Neo-platonism since Plotinus) that questions the idea that therapy is necessarily connected with „vital goals“. Buddhist and Gnostic philosophies are questioning „the vital“ in general. The immense effort in the history of philosophy to liberate the mind from the body casts doubt on the project to explain philosophical therapy solely in analogy to medical therapy. -/- According to Banicki a therapeutic philosophy has to identify the diseases it attempts at curing. There are, however, reasons for associating the term therapy with suffering/risk rather than disease. If a therapy aims at reducing the fear of death, as for example many classical philosophical therapies do, then there is no disease to be cured. A model based on chances and risks also has the advantage that the Buddhist and Stoic reinterpretation of desires/emotions as “diseases” can be dropped in contemporary philosophical therapy. -/- Banicki mentions the comparison of therapies as one of the primary goals of modelling. Methods should be verified by a statistical correlation between method and therapeutic success and/or by a theory which justifies the method. Some forms of therapies, however, avoid theory-specific terms and concepts in favor of an unprejudiced interpretation of the patient’s statements. Others share the (Nietzschean) aspiration to explore and change measures of value. If the therapeutic process is seen as a unique phenomenon, then there can be no theory and no statistics with co-occurrences. -/- According to Banicki philosophical therapy has to describe techniques which qualify as genuinely philosophical. Techniques like maieutics and hermeneutics, however, are antique philosophical “inventions”, which were later adopted by psychotherapy. If meditation is accepted as a therapeutic tool – as it was in ancient times – then there is not only a methodical but also an emotional relation to religion. If finally, the Socratic search for a good life is seen as one of the characteristics of philosophical therapy, then delimitation even turns into a criterion for non-philosophical therapies. The search for a good life requires an interdisciplinary approach. -/- For the concretization of the formal structure, we suggest a typology of therapies, which is based on chances and risks. Such a typology has the advantage, that it can model conflicting (and even opposing) forms of therapies. The variety of therapeutic goals and methods is a consequence of the historical development towards conceptual freedom. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce au juste que le mental? Les nouvelles "sciences de l'esprit" ne paraissent pas avoir de doute sur la réponse : c'est ce qu'il y a dans la boîte crânienne. L'idée que le mental puisse être autre chose que le côté "interne" d'une métaphore qui l'oppose à de l'externe, et qu'à ce titre il puisse s'avérer intrinsèquement social, leur paraît incongrue. C'est pourtant cette idée que le présent ouvrage s'applique à défendre. Il élabore une conception sociale du mental, en prenant (...) appui sur les courants de recherche qui, en philosophie et en sciences humaines et sociales, ont souligné, tant d'un point de vue conceptuel qu'empirique, l'imbrication du social et du mental. Cette élaboration passe par une clarification des deux concepts. D'un côté, il est nécessaire de remédier au rétrécissement du social non seulement par les sciences cognitives, mais aussi par une partie des sciences sociales. De l'autre, il faut proposer une nouvelle compréhension de ce que l'on entend par mental. La conception esquissée est une conception qu'on peut qualifier d'adverbiale : "mental" est un concept opératoire qui qualifie une modalité de l'action d'agents appartenant à une société. (shrink)

This book analyses the evolution of the French model of capitalism in relation to the instability of socio-political compromises. In the 2010s, France was in a situation of systemic crisis, namely, the impossibility for political leadership to find a strategy of institutional change, or more generally a model of capitalism, that could gather sufficient social and political support. This book analyses the various attempts at reforming the French model since the 1980s, when the left tried briefly to orient the French (...) political economy in a social-democratic/socialist direction before changing course and opting for a more orthodox macroeconomic and structural policy direction. The attempts of governments of the right to implement a radically neo-liberal structural policy also failed in the face of a significant social opposition. The enduring French systemic crisis is the expression of contradictions between the economic policies implemented by the successive left and right governments, and the existence of a dominant, social bloc, that is, a coalition of social groups that would politically support the dominant political strategy. Since 1978, both the right and the left have failed to find a solution to the contradictions between the policies they implemented and the expectations of their respective social bases, which are themselves inhabited by tensions and contradictions that evolve with the structural reforms that gradually transformed French capitalism. (shrink)

This research examines the association between attitudes on cheating and cognitive moral development. In this research, we use Rest's (1979a) Defining Issues Test, the Attitudes on Honesty Scale (Authors) and Academic Integrity Index (Authors); the last two are adaptations of the DIT. A total of 220 students from three universities participated in the study (66 psychology majors and 154 business majors). The data indicate that 66.4 percent of the students reported that they cheated in high school, college, or both high (...) school and college. Psychology majors scored higher than business majors on both the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979a) and the Attitudes on Honesty Scale (AHS, Authors). Using factor analysis, we found significant associations between students' ratings of the importance considerations present in the three cheating scenarios and their estimates of whether cheating would occur (i.e., the Academic Integrity Index). Finally, using logistic regression, we found that the scores on the Attitudes on Honesty Scale and Academic Integrity Index associate with the self-reported cheating behavior of college students. (shrink)

In this thesis I defend optimism about philosophical progress, which is a form of anti-exceptionalism about philosophy. Pessimists maintain that philosophy lacks the distinctive features that make science progressive. Optimism maintains that philosophy is like science, in this respect. My argumentative strategy is the following. I review the literature on philosophical progress to identify the feature that, according to pessimists, philosophy lacks. Then, I develop a historical case study to show that philosophy has these features. The goal is showing that (...) philosophy makes progress by pessimistic standards. My strategy is novel because other optimists, including Stoljar and Dellsén, Firing, and Norton, focus on arguing that a certain set of conditions are sufficient for progress, contrary to what pessimists hold. I focus instead on arguing that, contrary to what pessimists hold, philosophy makes progress by their standards. The most common pessimistic argument is the following: first, pessimists argue that consensus is a necessary condition for progress, second, they argue that philosophy is pervaded by disagreement. It follows that philosophy is exceptional. Beebee, Chalmers, Dietrich, Goldberg, and Kornblith employ various versions of this reasoning. Optimistic responses to this argument typically grant the second premise and challenge the first. Instead, I follow Williamson in granting the first premise and challenging the second. My case study focuses on the work of Gottlob Frege, who is widely regarded as one of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy. I argue that there is consensus in contemporary philosophy about some of the views that Frege set forth. In fact, Frege’s case meets not only the pessimistic requirements for progress, Frege also produced all the epistemic goods that are associated to progress by participants in the more general debate about scientific progress. To show this, I review the literature about scientific progress, following Rowbottom’s analysis. Then I analyse various aspects of Frege’s work to show that it meets all the known conditions of progress. Thus, no matter what view about progress is correct, Frege made progress. Having argued that Frege made progress, I generalize my argument by considering three other authors that arguably made progress in the past. Moreover, I consider contemporary debates in contemporary philosophy to argue that philosophy continues to make progress to this day. Finally, I review some of the barriers to progress that seem indeed to be holding back philosophy, and other disciplines. Philosophy made progress in the past and continues to make progress to this day. But not all is good. Having ruled out pessimism about philosophical progress, we are in a better position to see how philosophy, and other disciplines, could be improved. (shrink)

Beschreibung der Persönlichkeit und des Lebens Immanuel Kants, seiner vorkritischen Schriften, der Theorie der Erkenntnis, der praktischen Philosophie sowie der Ästhetk und Theologie. Nachdruck des Originals von 1916.

We propose a new theory based on the notions of marginal and large difference which has natural models in the context of nonstandard mathematics. We introduce the notion of finite marginality and show a representation result which ensures, for finitely marginal countable models, the existence of a homomorphism of the structure of marginal and large difference into a nonstandard model of the natural numbers, and show the extent to which any such homomorphism is unique. Finally, we show that our theory (...) constitutes part of the underlying abstract structure of three distinct philosophical theories of vagueness: Dean’s neofeasibilism, Itzhaki’s theory of nonstandard heuristics, and our own initial sketch of a nonstandard primitivism about vagueness. (shrink)

After more than three centuries, Molyneux's question continues to challenge our understanding of cognition and perceptual systems. Locke, the original recipient of the question, approached it as a theoretical exercise relevant to long-standing philosophical issues, such as nativism, the possibility of common sensibles, and the empiricism-rationalism debate. However, philosophers were quick to adopt the experimentalist's stance as soon as they became aware of recoveries from congenital blindness through ophtalmic surgery. Such recoveries were widely reported to support empiricist positions, suggesting that (...) the question had found its empirical answer. Contrary to this common view, we argue that studies of patients recovering from early blindness through surgery cannot provide an answer. In fact, because of the very nature of such ophtalmological interventions it is impossible to test the question in the empirical conditions outlined by Molyneux. Thus we propose that Molyneux's question be treated as an early thought experiment of a specific kind. Although thought experiments of this kind cannot be turned into actual experimental conditions, they provide a conceptual restructuring of theories. Such restructuring in turn leads to new predictions that can then be tested by “normal” experiments. In accord with this interpretation, we show that Molyneux's question can be analyzed into a hierarchy of specific questions about vision in its phenomenal and sensory-motor components. Some of these questions do lead to actual experimental conditions that could be studied empirically. (shrink)

pt. I. En tout temps, l'art comme figure du bonheur -- pt. II. La réinitialisation artistique de la culture -- pt. III. La réinitialisation des perceptions bienheureuses du monde.

Ce livre repart de la notion nietzschéenne de "philosophe-artiste" pour s'en désolidariser aussitôt. Certes, la philosophie-artiste, qui se caractérise par l'indissociabilité de la pensée et de la vie et par l'hétérogénéité de ses discours, est le mode mineur du philosopher depuis Platon. Mais, à sa conception musicale encore partagée par Nietzsche, l'auteur oppose une conception visuelle de la pensée, qui prend sa source conceptuelle dans l'oeuvre de Giorgio de Chirico, inventeur de la peinture métaphysique. Dans un second temps, ce livre (...) esquisse une série de perspectives de recherches visant à déployer le concept de philosophie-artiste dans toutes ses dimensions : la primauté de "la narration philosophique", avec J.-P. Faye ; le cadre posé par "le théâtre de la pensée", avec Platon et Nietzsche ; la pragmatique de " 'image totale", avec Eisenstein et Artaud ; ce dernier permettant, en plus, au théâtre de la pensée une sortie de la métaphore... Enfin, en guise de conclusion, l'auteur propose que la poésie, repensée à l'aune de l'éthno-poésie et des dialogues transculturels, soit la terre d'élection de cette nouvelle conceptualité de la pensée visuelle libérée de la pesanteur de la technique et des appareils. (shrink)

1. Notes d'anthropologie esthéthique --.

De tous les professeurs ayant participé à l'expérience viennoise, René Scherer apparaît comme le philosophe hospitalier par excellence, c'est-à-dire celui qui invite à philosopher ensemble dans une communauté de réflexion et de discussion. Mais ce recueil rappelle que la communauté homogène est impossible, fantasmatique du seul fait que l'homogène est la destruction de la communauté. C'est pourquoi le philosophe hospitalier convie à une "communauté de singularités" constituée par la diversité et la pluralité.

Desde los remotos tiempos de la tragedia Ática en Grecia, el teatro es y ha sido siempre movimiento, siendo este una característica esencial de los seres orgánicos, es decir, de los dotados de vida. No obstante, se corre el riesgo de reemplazar su mecánica natural con metafísica, cuando ello no es coherente ni siquiera en hipótesis. Cabe demostrar las disimilitudes del teatro con las doctrinas escolásticas, idealistas, o hinduistas, y su compatibilidad con los átomos, electrones y las leyes de la (...) física, sometiendo sus conceptos al rigor epistemológico. La creación artística nace del psiquismo humano, aun no siendo material en primera instancia, pero ya luego cobra su forma cualitativa definitiva. Para ello atraviesa por varios tipos de censura, tanto física como psicológica, buscando expresarse mediante el lenguaje en que se comunican los distintos géneros dramáticos, dando a conocer su situación de crisis sin retorno, esa que se debate entre crueldad y violencia. Antonin Artaud intrinca al teatro las ideas cabalísticas y no busca contrastarlas con argumentación lógica. La evidencia demuestra que, si es que hay una unidad, esa es la del teatro con lo físico. Lo físico es su verdadero “doble”. Un sucinto pero conciso repaso histórico, bien prodigado de documentación y basado en los preceptos erigidos por el materialismo dialectico, nos dará la certeza de que el teatro pertenece exclusivamente al mundo físico, no solo en la práctica, sino también en esencia, y esta es la materia, siendo solo la metafísica un estadio improbable dentro de ella. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there exist conventions of a peculiar sort which are neither norms nor regularities of behaviour, partaking of both. I proceed as follows. After a brief analysis of the meaning of ‘convention’, I give some examples of the kind of phenomena I have in mind: bodily skills, know-how, taste and style, habitus, “disciplines”. Then I group some arguments supporting my claim: considerations about the identity conditions of precedents and about the projectibility of predicates in inductive (...) inference generally ; thoughts about rule-following ; an examination of some of J. R. Searle’s ideas about the “Background” of intentionality. I conclude with some remarks about the time-honoured antithesis ‘nature’ v. ‘convention’.  The Italian original of this text was published in: Ragion Pratica 2: 605–632. (shrink)

A ficção corresponde a um estilo de escrita que sustenta a construção de narrativas capazes de arrancar o escritor de si mesmo em um sentido de, por meio do experimento da própria linguagem, constituir-se esteticamente. Quando observamos as obras de Nietzsche, percebemos que há uma pluralidade de estilos literários, compostos, frequentemente, por aforismos que demandam outro performático: a escrita hiperbólica. Por meio da escrita artística, Nietzsche cria um mundo compreendido como vontade de poder em que dá a si mesmo como (...) personagem dentre outros tipos psicológicos. Já na filosofia de Foucault o traço marcante de suas obras é o tom histórico com o qual aborda seus temas. Porém, como o próprio afirma em algumas entrevistas, não escreve outra coisa que não sejam ficções, seleciona e organiza enunciados históricos criando diversos cenários, sujeitos e objetos de seu discurso. Este estilo presente em ambos entra em contato com o exterior provocando um reposicionamento do leitor, que é afetado promovendo, como efeito de subjetivação, um reposicionamento político de insubmissão de não querer mais ser governado dessa forma. (shrink)

The evaluation of probabilities, or the art of forecasting, is neither a question of taste nor a mathematically determined question. All evaluations are admissible, provided only that coherence is satisfied; among these, everybody may judge one or the other more or less ‘reasonable’. The major aspect of coherence consists in conforming “learning from experience” to Bayes’ theorem.