We present a new functional interpretation, based on a novel assignment of formulas. In contrast with Gödel’s functional “Dialectica” interpretation, the new interpretation does not care for precise witnesses of existential statements, but only for bounds for them. New principles are supported by our interpretation, including the FAN theorem, weak König’s lemma and the lesser limited principle of omniscience. Conspicuous among these principles are also refutations of some laws of classical logic. Notwithstanding, we end up discussing some applications of the (...) new interpretation to theories of classical arithmetic and analysis. (shrink)

Schwichtenberg showed that the System T definable functionals are closed under a rule-like version Spector’s bar recursion of lowest type levels 0 and 1. More precisely, if the functional Y which controls the stopping condition of Spector’s bar recursor is T-definable, then the corresponding bar recursion of type levels 0 and 1 is already T-definable. Schwichtenberg’s original proof, however, relies on a detour through Tait’s infinitary terms and the correspondence between ordinal recursion for α < ε₀ and primitive recursion over (...) finite types. This detour makes it hard to calculate on given concrete system T input, what the corresponding system T output would look like. In this paper we present an alternative (more direct) proof based on an explicit construction which we prove correct via a suitably defined logical relation. We show through an example how this gives a straightforward mechanism for converting bar recursive definitions into T-definitions under the conditions of Schwichtenberg’s theorem. Finally, with the explicit construction we can also easily state a sharper result: if Y is in the fragment Tᵢ then terms built from BR^ℕ,σ for this particular Y are definable in the fragment T_i+max{1,level(σ)}+2. (shrink)

This article presents a parametrized functional interpretation. Depending on the choice of two parameters one obtains well-known functional interpretations such as Gödel's Dialectica interpretation, Diller-Nahm's variant of the Dialectica interpretation, Kohlenbach's monotone interpretations, Kreisel's modified realizability, and Stein's family of functional interpretations. A functional interpretation consists of a formula interpretation and a soundness proof. I show that all these interpretations differ only on two design choices: first, on the number of counterexamples for A which became witnesses for ¬A when defining (...) the formula interpretation and, second, the inductive information about the witnesses of A which is considered in the proof of soundness. Sufficient conditions on the parameters are also given which ensure the soundness of the resulting functional interpretation. The relation between the parametrized interpretation and the recent bounded functional interpretation is also discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, we present another case study in the general project of proof mining which means the logical analysis of prima facie non-effective proofs with the aim of extracting new computationally relevant data. We use techniques based on monotone functional interpretation developed in Kohlenbach , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 225–260) to analyze Cheney's simplification 189) of Jackson's original proof 320) of the uniqueness of the best L1-approximation of continuous functions fC[0,1] by polynomials pPn of degree n. Cheney's (...) proof is non-effective in the sense that it is based on classical logic and on the non-computational principle WKL . The result of our analysis provides the first effective uniform modulus of uniqueness . Moreover, the extracted modulus has the optimal ε-dependency as follows from Kroó 331). The paper also describes how the uniform modulus of uniqueness can be used to compute the best L1-approximations of a fixed fC[0,1] with arbitrary precision. The second author uses this result to give a complexity upper bound on the computation of the best L1-approximation in Oliva 66–77). (shrink)

This article presents an analysis of Gödel's dialectica interpretation via a refinement of intuitionistic logic known as linear logic. Linear logic comes naturally into the picture once one observes that the structural rule of contraction is the main cause of the lack of symmetry in Gödel's interpretation. We use the fact that the dialectica interpretation of intuitionistic logic can be viewed as a composition of Girard's embedding of intuitionistic logic into linear logic followed by de Paiva's dialectica interpretation of linear (...) logic. We then investigate the various properties of the dialectica interpretation, such as the characterisation theorem, and variants of Gödel's interpretation within the linear logic context. The role of contraction in extensions to classical logic, arithmetic and analysis is also discussed. (shrink)

We show that Spector's “restricted” form of bar recursion is sufficient (over system T) to define Spector's search functional. This new result is then used to show that Spector's restricted form of bar recursion is in fact as general as the supposedly more general form of bar recursion. Given that these two forms of bar recursion correspond to the (explicitly controlled) iterated products of selection function and quantifiers, it follows that this iterated product of selection functions is T‐equivalent to the (...) corresponding iterated product of quantifiers. (shrink)

In this article we study applications of the bounded functional interpretation to theories of feasible arithmetic and analysis. The main results show that the novel interpretation is sound for considerable generalizations of weak König’s Lemma, even in the presence of very weak induction. Moreover, when this is combined with Cook and Urquhart’s variant of the functional interpretation, one obtains effective versions of conservation results regarding weak König’s Lemma which have been so far only obtained non-constructively.

This article presents an analysis of Gödel's dialectica interpretation via a refinement of intuitionistic logic known as linear logic. Linear logic comes naturally into the picture once one observes that the structural rule of contraction is the main cause of the lack of symmetry in Gödel's interpretation. We use the fact that the dialectica interpretation of intuitionistic logic can be viewed as a composition of Girard's embedding of intuitionistic logic into linear logic followed by de Paiva's dialectica interpretation of linear (...) logic. We then investigate the various properties of the dialectica interpretation, such as the characterisation theorem, and variants of Gödel's interpretation within the linear logic context. The role of contraction in extensions to classical logic, arithmetic and analysis is also discussed. (shrink)

We present a refinement ofthe bounded modified realizability which provides both upper and lower bounds for witnesses. Our interpretation is based on a generalisation of Howard/Bezem's notion of strong majorizability. We show how the bounded modified realizability coincides with our interpretation in the case when least elements exist . The new interpretation, however, permits the extraction of more accurate bounds, and provides an ideal setting for dealing directly with data types whose natural ordering is not well-founded.

We show how two iterated products of selection functions can both be used in conjunction with systemTto interpret, via the dialectica interpretation and modified realizability, full classical analysis. We also show that one iterated product is equivalent over systemTto Spector’s bar recursion, whereas the other isT-equivalent to modified bar recursion. Modified bar recursion itself is shown to arise directly from the iteration of a different binary product of ‘skewed’ selection functions. Iterations of the dependent binary products are also considered but (...) in all cases are shown to beT-equivalent to the iteration of the simple products. (shrink)

This paper presents an algebraic framework for investigating proposed translations of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, such as the four negative translations introduced by Kolmogorov, Gödel, Gentzen and Glivenko. We view these asvariant semanticsand present a semantic formulation of Troelstra’s syntactic criteria for a satisfactory negative translation. We consider how each of the above-mentioned translation schemes behaves on two generalisations of Heyting algebras: bounded pocrims and bounded hoops. When a translation fails for a particular class of algebras, we demonstrate that (...) failure via specific finite examples. Using these, we prove that the syntactic version of these translations will fail to satisfy Troelstra’s criteria in the corresponding substructural logical setting. (shrink)

This article systematically investigates so-called “truth variants” of several functional interpretations. We start by showing a close relation between two variants of modified realizability, namely modified realizability with truth and q-modified realizability. Both variants are shown tobe derived from a single “functional interpretation with truth” of intuitionistic linear logic. This analysis suggests that several functional interpretations have truth and q-variants. These variants, however, require a more involved modification than the ones previously considered. Following this lead we present truth and q-variants (...) of the Diller-Nahm interpretation, the bounded modified realizability and the bounded functional interpretation. (shrink)

It is well known that for a given continuous function f : [0, 1] → ℝ and a number n there exists a unique polynomial pn ∈ Pn which best L1-approximates f. We establish the first upper bound on the complexity of the sequence n∈ ℕ, assuming f is polynomial-time computable. Our complexity analysis makes essential use of the modulus of uniqueness for L1-approximation presented in [13].

We show that the types of the witnesses in the Herbrand functional interpretation can be simplified, avoiding the use of “sets of functionals” in the interpretation of implication and universal quantification. This is done by presenting an alternative formulation of the Herbrand functional interpretation, which we show to be equivalent to the original presentation. As a result of this investigation we also strengthen the monotonicity property of the original presentation, and prove a monotonicity property for our alternative definition.