This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I (...) attribute to John Broome—normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide normative reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view is susceptible to two serious objections. First, the view generates an explanatory gap. Secondly, the view is implausible. I argue that these two objections give us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements over the reasons-providing view. (shrink)

The emergence of human communication systems is typically investigated via 2 approaches with complementary strengths and weaknesses: naturalistic studies and computer simulations. This study was conducted with a method that combines these approaches. Pairs of participants played video games requiring communication. Members of a pair were physically separated but exchanged graphic signals through a medium that prevented the use of standard symbols (e.g., letters). Communication systems emerged and developed rapidly during the games, integrating the use of explicit signs with information (...) implicitly available to players and silent behavior-coordinating procedures. The systems that emerged suggest 3 conclusions: (a) signs originate from different mappings; (b) sign systems develop parsimoniously; (c) sign forms are perceptually distinct, easy to produce, and tolerant to variations. (shrink)

Abstract: The standard picture of rationality requires that the agent acts so as to realize her most preferred alternative in the light of her own desires and beliefs. However, there are circumstances where such an agent can predict that she will act against her preferences. The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is the paradigmatic example of such cases. In those circumstances the orthodoxy requires the agent to be ‘sophisticated’. That is to say, she should take into account her expected (...) future choices and prevent her future self to act in certain ways. She should ‘bind’ herself to a certain course of action. This is a form of causal commitment. It is generally recognized that this form of self-commitment is the only one that is available to a rational agent. Rational commitment, where the agent gives herself a reason to act in a certain way rather than making herself act in that way, is considered not feasible. In this paper, I question this verdict. I sketch the broad outlines of a model of rational commitment, which takes as its starting point Michael Bratman’s ‘planning theory’ of intention. There are two important objections against this theory (one by John Broome and one by the Dutch philosopher Govert den Hartogh.) Both criticisms claim that such a theory is a form of ‘bootstrapping’ reasons for action into existence. In the remainder of the paper, I will defend the theory against these objections. This way, I hope to establish that defending the feasibility of rational commitment is not an obvious mistake. (shrink)

This paper argues that we should solve paradoxes for propositions (such as the Russell–Myhill paradox) in essentially the same way that we solve Russellian paradoxes for sets. That is, the standard, iterative approach to sets is extended to include properties, and then the resulting hierarchy of sets and properties is used to construct propositions. Propositions on this account are structured in the sense of mirroring the sentences that express them, and they would seem to serve the needs of philosophers of (...) language and metaphysicians who rely on such propositions. The resulting account has limitations, comparable to those faced by the iterative approach to sets, but it is argued to be in important ways preferable to others that have been proposed. (shrink)

Eye movements during mental imagery are not epiphenomenal but assist the process of image generation. Commands to the eyes for each fixation are stored along with the visual representation and are used as spatial index in a motor‐based coordinate system for the proper arrangement of parts of an image. In two experiments, subjects viewed an irregular checkerboard or color pictures of fish and were subsequently asked to form mental images of these stimuli while keeping their eyes open. During the perceptual (...) phase, a group of subjects was requested to maintain fixation onto the screen's center, whereas another group was free to inspect the stimuli. During the imagery phase, all of these subjects were free to move their eyes. A third group of subjects (in Experiment 2) was free to explore the pattern but was requested to maintain central fixation during imagery. For subjects free to explore the pattern, the percentage of time spent fixating a specific location during perception was highly correlated with the time spent on the same (empty) locations during imagery. The order of scanning of these locations during imagery was correlated to the original order during perception. The strength of relatedness of these scanpaths and the vividness of each image predicted performance accuracy. Subjects who fixed their gaze centrally during perception did the same spontaneously during imagery. Subjects free to explore during perception, but maintaining central fixation during imagery, showed decreased ability to recall the pattern. We conclude that the eye scanpaths during visual imagery reenact those of perception of the same visual scene and that they play a functional role. (shrink)

In recent years researchers have begun to investigate how the perceptual, motor and cognitive activities of two or more individuals become organized into coordinated action. In the first part of this introduction we identify three common threads among the ten papers of this special issue that exemplify this new line of research. First, all of the papers are grounded in the experimental study of online interactions between two or more individuals. Second, albeit at different levels of analysis, the contributions focus (...) on the mechanisms supporting joint action. Third, many of the papers investigate empirically the pre‐requisites for the highly sophisticated forms of joint action that are typical of humans. In the second part of the introduction, we summarize each of the papers, highlighting more specific connections among them. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

Are there different sizes of infinity? That is, are there infinite sets of different sizes? This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the infinite. But it is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections between them. These results settle the question, given an almost universally accepted principle relating size to the existence of functions. The principle is: for (...) any sets A and B, if A is the same size as B, then there is a bijection from A to B. The aim of the paper, however, is to argue that this question is in fact wide open: to argue that we are not in a position to know the answer, because we are not in one to know the principle. The aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there is only one size of infinity. (shrink)

My first aim in this paper is to use time diagrams in the style of Brentano to analyze constructions in Brouwer's separable mathematics more precisely. I argue that constructions must involve not only pairing and projecting as basic operations guaranteed by the intuition of twoity, as sometimes assumed in the literature, but also a recalling operation. My second aim is to argue that Brouwer's views on the intuition of twoity and arithmetic lead to an ontological explosion. Redeveloping the constructions of (...) natural numbers and systems sketched in an appendix to Brouwer's Cambridge lectures, I observe that the only plausible way he can make some elementary arithmetic in his separable mathematics is by allowing for the same canonical number to be determined by multiple separable entities, resulting in an overabundant mathematical ontology. (shrink)

The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...) new hierarchical account that solves the problem. (shrink)

Metaphysically possible worlds have many uses. Epistemically possible worlds promise to be similarly useful, especially in connection with propositions and propositional attitudes. However, I argue that there is a serious threat to the natural accounts of epistemically possible worlds, from a version of Russell’s paradox. I contrast this threat with David Kaplan’s problem for metaphysical possible world semantics: Kaplan’s problem can be straightforwardly rebutted, the problems I raise cannot. I argue that although there may be coherent accounts of epistemically possible (...) worlds with fruitful applications, any such an account must fundamentally compromise the basic idea behind epistemic possibility. (shrink)

Ni konstruas nun malbonajn korpojn, kun malfinita Morleya ranko, kiuj estas ricevitaj per memsuficanta amalgameco de korpoj kun unara predikato nomanta sumigan au obligan subgrupon, ciam lau la Hrushovskija maniero. Al uzado de ciuj kiuj la anglujon malkonprenas, tiel tradukigas la supera citajo : "Estas prava ke tiu ci kiu kun la sago interrilatigas, la sagecon rikoltas". Gustatempe, la autoro varmege dankas ciujn kiuj la korektan citajon sendis al li, speciale la unuan respondinton : David KUEKER.

A necessarily true sentence is 'brute' if it does not rigidly refer to anything and if it cannot be reduced to a logical truth. The question of whether there are brute necessities is an extremely natural one. Cian Dorr has recently argued for far-reaching metaphysical claims on the basis of the principle that there are no brute necessities: he initially argued that there are no non-symmetric relations, and later that there are no abstract objects at all. I argue that there (...) are nominalistically acceptable brute necessities, and that Dorr's arguments thus fail. My argument is an application of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. (shrink)

Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. (...) In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene's strong scheme, and Kripke's theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers. (shrink)

First, the approaches of 'Diskursethik' (Discourse ethics) and of Modern Political Economy are described. While the latter investigates political decision processes, the former is concerned with the discourse process which takes place before a decision is made. This is shown by using referenda as an example. The discourse which takes place before referenda obviously does not conform to the ideal conditions defined in Diskursethik, but discourse and decisions in the context of referenda come nearer to the intentions of Diskursethik and (...) Political Economy than other decision procedures which are used in representative democracies. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...) The present proposal is quite different. According to this, there is no such alternative logic. Rather, classical logic retains the status of the ‘one true logic’, but this status must be reconceived so as to be compatible with (almost) all of its rules admitting of exceptions. This would seem to have significant repercussions for a range of widely held views about logic: e.g. that it is a priori, or that it is necessary. Indeed, if the arguments of the paper succeed, then such views must be given up. (shrink)

Dans deux études à paraître, José Luis Garcia Ramón et moi avons proposé de nouvelles interprétations de quelques épiclèses de la déesse thessalienne Ennodia : Ennodia est Κορουταρρα, « celle qui fait grandir », et plus précisément « celle qui dote de nourriture / de croissance », Στροπικά, déesse « aux éclairs », porteuse de lumière, et encore Μυκαικα, « déesse des tombeaux ». Cette interprétation nouvelle de l’épiclèse Μυκαικα apporte un témoignage supplémentaire sur le caractère de déesse protectrice des (...) tombeaux qu’il faut reconnaître à Ennodia. Ce caractère d’Ennodia peut être confirmé encore par la réinterprétation d’une autre inscription thessalienne, la dédicace IG IX 2, 592, de Larisa. L’on peut en effet reconnaître dans ce texte fragmentaire une consécration à Ennodia d’un enclos funéraire et l’on peut y restituer de plus une autre épiclèse de la déesse, épiclèse qu’a fait connaître une dédicace d’Azôros récemment publiée par P. Chrysostomou, pour Ἐννοδία Ἰλιάδι.In two studies currently awaiting publication, José Luis Garcia Ramón and I have proposed new interpretations of some epithets of the Thessalian goddess Ennodia: Ennodia is Κορουταρρα, ‘the one who makes grow’ and, more precisely, ‘the one who provides food’, Στροπικά ‘the goddess who carries lightning’, and Μυκαικα, ‘goddess of the tombs’. This new interpretation of this last epiclesis gives us new evidence on the character of Ennodia as protectress of the tombs. This character of Ennodia can now be confirmed by the reinterpretation of another votive inscription, IG IX 2, 592, from Larisa. It is possible to recognize in this fragmentary inscription the consecration of a funerary enclosure to Ennodia; here we can make the restitution of another epiclesis of Ennodia, an epiclesis which is now seen in a votive inscription coming from Azoros in northern Thessaly and recently published, with the formula Ἐννοδία Ἰλιάδι. (shrink)

Un décret de Trikka trouvé en 1987, le premier que l'on connaisse pour cette cité, honore un Cretois de Tylissos, Orthotimos, fils de Kélaithos, qui devait être un officier au service de la Macédoine. Vers la fin du nr" siècle av. J.-C, il a été honoré par une autre cité thessalienne, Atrax. Le décret de Trikka présente deux particularités de formulaire : la mention d'un privilège appelé isomoiria, celle de tages «à Trikka». L'étude de ces deux expressions conduit à reposer (...) le problème des groupes d'exilés accueillis en Étolie, qui devaient former des communautés auxquelles les Étoliens reconnaissaient un statut de «polis» organisée. Ce décret apporte ainsi un éclairage nouveau sur l'histoire politique de la Thessalie à la fin du ni· siècle av. J.-C. (shrink)

Researches on the funerary stelai of Demetrias I. Lykidas son of Thrasyménès of Zakynthos : a comic actor at Delphi and Demetrias in the middle of the third century BC. The epitaph of Λυκίδας Θρασυμένους Ζακύνθιος on a funeral column is that of a κωμωιδός who participated at the Soteria at Delphi in 254/ 3 BC. This Lykidas must have performed at Demetrias towards the middle of third century BC. — II. A monumental exedra in the sanctuary of Artemis Iolkia (...) at Iolkos (Demetrias). Two blocks from the Kastro Volou carry the dedications made by a Demetrian in the second century BC, Diogenes son of Nikolaos, for his wife, daughter of Menandros, and his daughter, priestesses of Artemis Iolkia. — III. The family or families of Menandros and Diogenes at Demetrias, Korakai-Koropè and Iolkos. To a stela which carries the epitaph of an Archidikè, daughter of Menandros, one may associate the stela of Kleinô, daughter of Menandros, and follow from the second century BC to the second century AD several holders of this name who appear to belong to the same family. (shrink)

Le décret IG IX 2, 103, qui ne nous est connu que par une transcription imprimée publiée par un érudit voliote du siècle dernier, Zosimas Esphigménitis, est, à n'en pas douter, un décret de la Confédération thessalienne et il atteste clairement qu'au moment où il a été pris, les cités de Mélitaia en Achaïe Phthiotide et d'Héracleia Trachinia, capitale des Oitaiens, appartenaient à la Confédération thessalienne. Il doit dater du IIe siècle av. J.-C, mais la disparition de la pierre laisse (...) peu de chance de préciser davantage. Ce que l'on sait de l'histoire de Mélitaia et d'Héracleia conduit à identifier deux périodes au cours desquelles ces deux cités ont pu se retrouver ensemble sous l'autorité des Thessaliens : soit pendant quelques années, entre 190 et 184 av. J.-C, soit à partir de 146 ; toutefois il paraît plus probable de placer le document dans la seconde moitié du IIe siècle, ce qui permet d'avancer l'hypothèse qu'Héracleia est devenue thessalienne bien avant l'époque d'Auguste, contrairement à l'opinion reçue. L'intégration de cette cité à l'ensemble thessalien a dû intervenir dès 146 av. J.-C. Le décret IG 103 semble indiquer qu'il a été nécessaire de régler un ou des différends qui opposaient Héracleia et Mélitaia, dans le cadre fédéral, en faisant appel à des arbitres que l'on a demandés à Démétrias, une cité non thessalienne mais assez proche pour avoir des relations avec chacune des parties et connaître leur situation. Les trois stratèges de la ville ont été chargés de constituer un tribunal et le fait d'avoir sollicité à cette occasion les citoyens les plus en vue de Démétrias dit assez l'importance qu'on attachait à cette affaire. (shrink)