It is the goal of this essay to challenge the belief that one never transcends language — that all one knows, indeed all one can meaningfully experience, is defined within language. My challenge lies not in words, but in the use of words to evoke what is beyond language and to invite a lived experience of it. If one accepts this use of language as not only possible, but primary, we ultimately see meaning not within language, but through it. Under (...) the 'rule of evocation' language need not in any way within itself express, reproduce, re-present, or capture what it evokes. It need simply evoke it, and such an evocation is not a re-presentation in language of what is evoked. It is a presentation of the thing itself. (shrink)

Philosophy studies the relation between random, routine, and reflective thought and action. It is in essence the reflective study of routine. No one can survive a random world, but a routine world will generate the same randomness it is intended to avoid owing to the inevitable errors associated with routines. The prime function of reflective inquiry is to identify and explain the logical foundation of these errors. While governments depend on strict routine to prevent anarchy, it is only with (...) the maintenance and adaptive revision of those routines that they are able to serve that purpose. Thus philosophy is essential even to preserve routine, aside from facilitating the building of better routines. To advance global understanding philosophers need to use informal means to communicate to all people everywhere the distinction between randomness and routine, and the transcending of routine by reflective study. I add a concluding note of advocacy for UNESCO’s Strategy on Philosophy. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the central theme of this conference and discusses how higher education can help us in accomplishing our humanization. It looks at the critical educational theory of Herbert Marcuse, and examines his notion of the dis-alienating power of the aesthetic imagination. In his view, aesthetic education can become the foundation of a re-humanizing critical theory. I question the epistemological underpinnings of Marcuse's educational philosophy and suggest an alternative intellectual framework for interpreting and releasing the emancipatory power (...) of education. (shrink)

I argue that once one holds (as Kant does) that the mind is equipped with innate, pre-existing, i.e. a priori structures, one can ask (as materialists or empiricists would), Is there an identifiable source of such structures and what does it imply? Already Schopenhauer, Moses Mendelssohn and others have taken that route of argument, without fully drawing the implications. In this paper I attempt to do so, posing the query: Is Kant's very explicit separation of the transcendent from the transcendental (...) necessary in his critical system? I try to answer from various perspectives. (shrink)

Proclus was one of the major Greek philosophers of late Antiquity. In his metaphysics he developed and systematized problems of Plato's thought, such as participation; transcendence - immanence; causation - participation - return; henads and monads; first and second causality. Before and after his works had been translated into Latin, Proclus influenced the Christian West through the _Liber the causis_, a Latin translation of an anonymous Arab version of Proclus' _Elementatio theologica_.

Philosophy studies the relation between random, routine, and reflective thought and action. It is in essence the reflective study of routine. No one can survive a random world, but a routine world will generate the same randomness it is intended to avoid owing to the inevitable errors associated with routines. The prime function of reflective inquiry is to identify and explain the logical foundation of these errors. While governments depend on strict routine to prevent anarchy, it is only with (...) the maintenance and adaptive revision of those routines that they are able to serve that purpose. Thus philosophy is essential even to preserve routine, aside from facilitating the building of better routines. To advance global understanding philosophers need to use informal means to communicate to all people everywhere the distinction between randomness and routine, and the transcending of routine by reflective study. I add a concluding note of advocacy for UNESCO’s Strategy on Philosophy. (shrink)

"I" will is the percondition of knowing, while "I" is identical lift of both substance and spirit. Life will reveals itself from chaos. knowing belongs to life cross-referenced an in fact, it is a indication theory of will rather than a pure theory of knowing. "I" is a narrow sense of life, but it also should indicate a broad sense of life. Word is a life creature life is the only absolute one. The showing of one thing is before existence. (...) (Existence is a character of life rather than a certainessence transcending a life). Life spirit reflects the life of the life world. - Thought is life. Existence is experience, while the existence of experience is "human" - human is the product of experience of animals "human" is a personal from, and human doctrine is personal doctrine. A country is second person andgovernment officers are persons of great bulk. Power theory distories the world, while existence theory distories the life. Showing is the form of life and it is a duty - to show life, to show the life word, this is duty theory. It is compulsory struggle that can thoroughly guarantee the relative power. We human should set up a world country - a world life organization, to shake of counter action in a country. A country democracy is a false democracy, while back democracy is real world democracy. Life exists in a impulse way. This is the real final arrangement of life impulse. As soon as society get in to the life orbit the most ideal basicorganization for human is sex organization "Philosophy", in fact, it is life science, a broad sense of life science. (theory of life）. (shrink)

According to Yoga Philosophy though the right knowledge of any phenomena is based on direct cognition, inference or testimony but the cognizance conjured up by words without any substance is devoid of objectivity. The consciousness is an aspect of the ultimate reality or substance, which is functioning, and manifesting itself in five progressive stages at five levels. What we experience or sense as consciousness is the first to five level experiences and the phenomenal cognizance in these stages, which can (...) be described in words, is instrumental one and modification of our mind. Therefore the state of consciousness as we experience is an out come of the five mental modes, viz. valid knowledge, error, imagination, deep sleep and recollection. So cognizance conforming to a word/language is devoid of a phenomenal object. Since we may speak of the unicorn though there is no real phenomenal object as such and thus the word/words may produce cognition, even though its object is nonexistent. The real consciousness and the study of consciousness cannot be instrumental one. The Yoga Sūtra suggests that the direct and unwavering awareness is required and that pure consciousness is devoid of any thing known by way of perception, memory, imagination, reasoning and intuition. The Consciousness in Yoga Sūtra is characterized as one of the four states of consciousness namely Vitarka accompanied by reasoning, Vicāra accompanied by reflection, Ānanda accompanied by bliss and Asmitā accompanied by sense of pure being. And then, after transcending these states of consciousness the one enters into the realm of real consciousness, that is the purest and non-intentional state of the self or the Knower or the Consciousness itself. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a French Philosopher and a Jew, became known first for his role in the introduction of Husserl’s phenomenology to France, and later for his criticisms of Husserl and Heidegger. As the Holocaust gave a significant impact on many theologians and philosophers to establish their theoretical systems, Levinas realized how ethic of responsibility was important through his personal tragic experience. What most peculiar character of his experience is that it leads him to cast a doubt a subject-oriented modern (...) reason. I will explore the modern subjectivity through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. As Nietzsche mentioned earlier in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is subject dead? Is it no longer meaningful to discuss the modernity in the postmodern ear?Should the trend of anti-subjectivity in the postmodernity be the only alternative? Those questions are underlain this study. For him, the preeminence of the inviolability of the human being must be regarded as the initial point of departure and final destiny. According to Levinas, philosophy is open to its role of significance only insofar as it describes the ethical situation of the responsible self that precedes the metaphysical subject. A bold assertion against the modern perquisite of theory becomes a signature aphorism of Livinas’ work: “ethics is first philosophy.” For Levinas, ethics is not a question of adjusting one’s adherence to transcendent or historical laws or inner principles. Whereas philosophy traditionally gives priority to inner subjectivity and treats ethics as derivative, Levinas’ philosophy stresses that knowing occurs within and is a result of the intersubjective relation. The subject as hostage to the Other, he writes, “has been neither the experience nor the proof of the infinite, but the witnessing of the infinite.” This subjective condition of the ‘I’ is what Levinas calls the responsible self. This article explores whether Emmanuel Levinas's ethic of the Other can be regarded as a theological discourse. After publishing Totality and Infinity, there have been manyserious questions of the relationship between transcendence and immanence; infinity and the finite among many philosophers and theologians. Interestingly enough, Levinas tries to mediate these concepts by his ethic of the Other. I examine how Levinas deals with the tension and difficulty of these two areas in his ethic of the Other. As a French phenomenologist, Jean-Luc Marion already mentioned, this kind of attempt has confronted a double-bind dilemma. One is that it would be a question of phenomena that are objectively definable but lose their religious specialty; and the other is that it would be a question of phenomena that are especially religious but cannot be described objectively. In this sense, Levinas’s ethic of the Other gives us an insight that what philosophy of religion would be. A great deal of information about such great philosophers does not always guarantee sound philosophical reflection. As Levinas’ philosophy was developed in his struggle with Heidegger’s philosophy in the matrix of Husserl’s phenomenology, my philosophical reflection on Levinas’ ethics has to be examined by those who are experts in various philosophical areas. Many members of WCP from all around the world will provide me more mature philosophical thinking, and their advice and expertise will be invaluable. In addition, chances to meet great visiting scholars who will come from all over the world will be also one of the prestigious privileges to articulate my thinking. I look forward to interacting with the great scholars who will visit Seoul National University, and in these interactions, to clarify and better articulate my ideas. (shrink)

This paper raises a moral issue for contemporary post-revolutionary Muslim intellectuals in Iran. According to traditional Islamic philosophers such as Al-Ghazali, ethics, following what Prophet Mohammed said, must transcend people form this mundane world. If this is so, ethics would need to teach people how to improve their virtues. Most of the contemporary Muslim intellectuals tried to pave the way for accomplishing this goal. After clarifying the reasons why new Muslim intellectuals have faith in virtue ethics, as the best possible (...) moral normative theory, I claim that virtue ethics fails to support some of our modern problems, such as human rights. Also, I argue that virtue ethics is not the best theory for ordinary average people who have a weak will. A preliminary conclusion of the paper will be that Utilitarianism, generally, and principle of utility, specifically, can do this job better. This has been overlooked by new Muslim intellectuals, according to my opinion. Yet, I suggest that among different versions of Utilitarianism, Rule-Utilitarianism is more suitable for this role. (shrink)

This paper interrogates Hölderlin's effort to deconstruct the speculative matrix of tragedy, with a particular focus on his "Remarks on Antigone," which are appended to his translation of the Sophoclean tragedy. In focus are, firstly, the separative force of the caesura, which stems tragic transport and is here analyzed, in terms of Hölderlin's understanding of Greece in relation to "Hesperia," as an incipiently Hesperian poetic gesture. Secondly, Hölderlin's key thought of the mutual "unfaithfulness" of God and man is at issue: (...) the god here is revealed as sheer time, while man is thrown back upon the bare moment. This "unfaithfulness" must be tempered by a striving that turns back from the quest for transcendence to the measures of fmitude and to this world. By attentiveness to the singular (which is not the particular), the tragic poet, unlike the speculative philosopher, reveals time's agonal spacing. (shrink)

This paper interrogates Hölderlin's effort to deconstruct the speculative matrix of tragedy, with a particular focus on his "Remarks on Antigone," which are appended to his translation of the Sophoclean tragedy. In focus are, firstly, the separative force of the caesura, which stems tragic transport and is here analyzed, in terms of Hölderlin's understanding of Greece in relation to "Hesperia," as an incipiently Hesperian poetic gesture. Secondly, Hölderlin's key thought of the mutual "unfaithfulness" of God and man is at issue: (...) the god here is revealed as sheer time, while man is thrown back upon the bare moment. This "unfaithfulness" must be tempered by a striving that turns back from the quest for transcendence to the measures of fmitude and to this world. By attentiveness to the singular (which is not the particular), the tragic poet, unlike the speculative philosopher, reveals time's agonal spacing. (shrink)

Be aware... and you will be mindful of a notable ambiguity in semiotics as well as of those who have masterfully strived to transcend it. This event, commented on by Elize Bisanz (Texas Tech University) and chaired by William Passarini (Institute for Philosophical Studies), is part of the activities of the 2022 International Open Seminar on Semiotics: a Tribute to John Deely on the Fifth Anniversary of His Passing, cooperatively organized by the Institute for Philosophical Studies of the Faculty of (...) Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra, the Lyceum Institute, the Deely Project, Saint Vincent College, the Iranian Society for Phenomenology at the Iranian Political Science Association, the International Association for Semiotics of Space and Time, the Institute for Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Semiotic Society of America, the American Maritain Association, the International Association for Semiotic Studies, the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies, the International Center for Semiotics and Intercultural Dialogue, Moscow State Academic University for the Humanities and the Mansarda Acesa with the support of the FCT - Foundation for Science and Technology, I.P., of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of the Government of Portugal under the UID/FIL/00010/2020 project. *** Ionut Untea is currently a fellow-in-residence at the Akademie Schloss Solitude, in Stuttgart, where he is researching on the semioethic and aesthetic coordinates of the “social compact” and intercorporeal relationships. In 2021, he has taught a course entitled “Intercultural Philosophy: Semiotic Approaches and Aesthetic Themes” as a Visiting Professor at Università degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro. Since 2016, he has been teaching History of Western Philosophy and Semiotics at Southeast University, Nanjing. He previously taught at the University of La Rochelle, and was a postdoctoral fellow of the Foundation for Interreligious and Intercultural Research and Dialogue (FIIRD) at the University of Geneva. He obtained his doctorate in 2013 at Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE), in Paris. He holds Romanian citizenship, having obtained his first degrees in philosophy and theology at the University of Bucharest. His focus is on the modern and contemporary intersections between semiotic, moral, political and religious thought. He has published recently “Peircean and Confucian Interpretations of Self-Development: Semiotic, Normative and Aesthetic Aspects,” Philosophy East and West 72.1: January 2022: 188–209. His recent work has appeared in academic journals such as The American Journal of Semiotics (2021), Semiotica (2021), Ethical Perspectives (2021, 2019), Philosophical Forum (2019), Journal of Aesthetic Education (2020), Politics and Religion (2019), The Monist (2018). *** Dr. Bisanz's education includes an MA (Philosophy) from the University of Lüneburg in Germany; Graduate Studies in Jacques Derrida's philosophy Seminars at l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris; a Ph.D. (History of Communication Sciences) from the Technische University of Berlin; and a post-doc Habilitation Degree (Image Studies), from the University of Lüneburg. Bisanz has published several interdisciplinary books reflecting her educational background; these include a major European edition of Peirce's writings The Logic of Interdisciplinarity: Charles S. Peirce, The Monist Series (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 2009), which was realized with the aid of research and publication grants from State and private endowments; Prolegomena to a Science of Reasoning: Phaneroscopy, Semeiotic, Logic, which is a collection of manuscripts by Peirce on reasoning (Peter Lang Publishers, Berlin, 2016); Overcoming the Iconic Turn: Cultural Concepts of Images [in German: Die Überwindung des Ikonischen: Kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven der Bildwissenschaft] (transcript Verlag, Hamburg, 2010). Bisanz is a member of the advising board of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Semiotik and chair of the society's subdivision for Cultural Studies. Since her Fulbright scholarship in 2006 at Texas Tech University, Bisanz has been an active member of the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism. She has organized several international congresses dedicated to Peirce and interdisciplinary research. *** Homepage: https://www.uc.pt/fluc/uidief/io2s Auditorium: https://www.uc.pt/fluc/uidief/io2s/auditorium *** Technical support assured by Robert Junqueira. The cover image for the video was designed by Zahra Soltani. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Russell's Naturalistic Turn 37 INTRODUCTION L RUSSELL'S NATURALISTIC TURN RUSSELI.?S NATURALISTIC TURN NED S. GARVIN Philosophy I Albion College Albion, MI 49224 I Quine, Ontological Relativity (New York: Columbia U. P., 1969), p. 83. 1 Russell advocated this hypothetical acceptance of science much earlier, e.g., in AMa, pp. 398-9. Here we have many of the hallmarks of naturalized epistemology: (I) fallibilism, (2) the "best theory" account of science, (...) (3) the view that "knowing" is a natural phenomenon not confined to humans, and (4) the embedding of epistemology in behavioural psychology. But in 1940 Russell was a foundationalist (though an increasingly moderate one) who insisted that normative, or as he called it, "critical" epistemology must be distinguished from natural epistemology, and that critical epistemology is philosophically more important: "Within its limitations, theory of knowledge of the above sort is legitimate and In the nrst form of theory of knowledge, we accept the scientific account of the world, not as certainly true, but as the best at present available. The world, as presented by science, contains a phenomenon caIled "knowing", and theory of knowledge, in its first form, has to consider what sort of phenomenon this is. Viewed from the outside, it is, to begin with, a characteristic of living organisms, which is (broadly speaking) increasingly displayed as the organism becomes more complex. (Pp. 12-13)2 Both knowledge and error, at this stage, are observable relations between the behaviour of the organism and the facts of the environment. (P. 14) Quine argued that traditional justification requires non-scientific propositions that are more secure than scientific propositions, and we see there are none: science is providing the best account of the world and our knowledge of it. Though we abandon the attempt to justify science, we still attempt to understand it for nearly the same reasons that always motivated epistemology: "in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence".I Russell contemplated a naturalistic turn of his own in 1943, shortly after writing An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth and nearly twentyfive years before Quine's landmark address. In the introduction to his Inquiry Russell claims that there are "two different inquiries, both important, and each having a right to the name 'theory of knowledge '" (IM~, p. 12). The first is recognizably natural epistemology: n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 36-S1.SSN 0036-016p ru•••II: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster University Library Press w. V. Quine's address to the Fourteenth International Congress of Philosophy in 1968, published a year later as "Epistemology Naturalized " in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, is a landmark of recent epistemology, marking the turn from traditional critical epistemology to a descriptive epistemology firmly embedded within natural science. I n 1943 Bertrand Russell wrote a little-known, three-page document he titled "Project of Future Work". It outlines the descriptive project of examining non-demonstrative inference that eventually becomes the focal point of Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. More remarkably, this document anticipates many salient features of naturalized epistemology, e.g., Russell argues that (I) an answer to scepticism is futile, we cannot justify scientific method; (2) the Humean Predicament arises from a traditional insistence on an unrealistic, demonstrative canon of justification; (3) non-demonstrative, fallible inference is already firmly embedded in scientific practice as a canon of inference, and should augment the demonstrative canon; and (4) the primary epistemic· problem is descriptive: in what circumstances does scientific method allow us to infer the existence of something unobserved from what we observe. These claims, in the wake of An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, suggest that Russell was on the verge of his own naturalistic turn. I argue that, despite striking anticipations of naturalized epistemology, Russell develops his descriptive project within a more traditional, critical epistemic perspective. 38 NED S. GARVIN important. But there is another kind of theory of knowledge which goes deeper and has, I think, much greater importance" (IMT;., p. 14). Russell observes that behavioural psychologists omit that they are fallible observers, and this fallibility introduces doubt into their results. Further, naive... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Japan Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies 2005 Annual MeetingPaul SwansonThe 2005 meetings of the Japan Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies focused on the theme "Personal and Impersonal Aspects of the Absolute" and were divided into two venues, with a preliminary panel at the nineteenth World Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) in Tokyo, March 24–30, and the regular annual meeting held in Kyoto on July 19–21. (...) At both meetings, the same four papers by JSBCS members were presented, in English at the World Congress and in Japanese at the regular meeting of the Society.The topic summary for the IAHR panel read as follows:In general, the Christian God is said to be transcendental and personal, but the Buddhist dharma is said to be immanent and impersonal. God, Christ, and Holy Spirit in the New Testament, however, have an immanent transcendent side, and it is impersonal on the immanence side. There is also a transcendent immanence side of the Buddhist Tathagata, and it is personal on the transcendent side. On the one hand, the three major personalistic monotheisms that originated in the Middle East traditionally understood the teachings of other religions as incomplete. On the other hand, in Buddhism other religions are looked down on as "other ways," unable to bring about final liberation (ADK IX). It is said that in the case of the personalistic religions, there is risk of spiritual attachment because God reveals His absolute divine will to believers through prophets; in the case of Buddhism, practitioners are urged to seek their own enlightenment and even, in some early sutras, to use critical reasoning. However, even in Buddhism the thoughts of the founders of the sects have authority. It is important to re-examine the meaning of God and dharma from the perspective of the human personality structure.Chaired by Watanabe Manabu, the IAHR panel consisted of the following four paper presentations:1. Hanaoka Eiko, "Absolute Infinite Openness in Christianity and Buddhism." The origin of a personal God in Christianity and impersonal "emptiness" or "absolute nothingness" in Buddhism are both personal and also impersonal [End Page 183] as an "absolute infinite openness." The self-awareness of absolute infinite openness is the self-awareness of the experience of the most personal dimension, and always simultaneously of the most impersonal dimension. It is that impersonal dimension that this paper investigates.2. Takemura Makio, "On the Significance of Buddha in Buddhism." Buddhism has a view of the Absolute that is comparatively unique. The Absolute is not found in the absolute in contrast to the relative. It is always found in the identity of the absolute and the relative, that is, the identity of any conditioned dharma (samskrita) and the ultimate unconditioned nature (asamskrita) as emptiness (sunyata), or the activity of jnana and the tathata or dharmata. In other words, the individuality or personality of Buddha and the universality or impersonality of tathata are never separated. The ultimate nature does not exist only by itself, and a buddha is one of many buddhas, even if people believe the Buddha as absolute. In Buddhism, buddhas as personal are filled with great compassion and work hard to guide people to become Buddha. They never judge people's guilt. Why is this so? This paper attempts to analyze the reasons in terms of questions such as whether or not the personality of the Absolute is rooted on emptiness, whether the Absolute is one or not, and so forth.3. Tanaka Yutaka, "God as the Locus of the World and the Ground of Human Freedom." This paper critically discusses Nishitani Keiji's arguments of "The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion" in his Religion and Nothingness. Comparing the Christian tradition of speculative mysticism or "panentheism" with the Zen Buddhist philosophy of "Nothingness," the paper seeks to show that God as the locus of the cosmos is the transcendental ground of human freedom and subjectivity.4. Yagi Seiichi, "Impersonal God in the New Testament." In the Pauline epistles and Johannine literature, the key words of a theology that indicates the oneness of divine-human activity can be identified: God working in us, as an expression of mutual... (shrink)

This volume contains the major papers presented at the Second International Conference of the International Society For Metaphysics held at Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India. The Society was conceived at the 14th International Congress of Philosophy meeting in Vienna in 1968, sponsored by leading members of the Metaphysical Society Of America, and was initiated at the International Congress of Philosophy held at Varna, Bulgaria in 1973. This is the first volume of their proceedings to be published. Subsequent (...) volumes are in preparation presenting the meetings in New York, also in 1976, and in Jerusalem in 1977. The theme of the Calcutta meeting in India was "Man And Nature," reflecting the renewed import of discussions of nature evident in the twentieth century, including the limits and possibilities it may offer for human personality. The depth and variety of the metaphysical analysis is too complex for serious comment in this brief space. The pluralism, geographical diversity and range of the conference is most evident from the contents of this volume: Part I, Science And Nature, includes papers by E. Agazzi, A. Mercier, and E. E. Harris. Part II, Progress and Nature, includes papers by M. Chatterjee, J. E. Smith, J. Kuszynski, A. N. Woznicki, and S. Chakravarti. Part III, Person And Nature, includes papers by K. Bhattacharya, S. C. Thakur, C. Chung-yuan, and T. A. Fay. Part IV, Transcendence And Nature, includes papers by M. Abe, K. K. Banerjee, T. M. P. Mahadevan, W. N. Clarke, E. Deutsch, and B. Bhattacharya. The essays offer considerations of animism, aesthetics, buddhism, causality, existentialism, Marxism, pragmatism, Tao, and conclude with a tribute to R. Tagore. It is most appropriate that in this journal congratulations be offered to the International Society For Metaphysics for the success of its early endeavors, and for this initial contribution to international discussion as evidence of the vitality of metaphysical reflection.--Harold A. Durfee, American University. (shrink)

This volume is a translation from the French original which appeared in 1965. It is a concise and critical examination of Soviet philosophical thought since the death of Stalin. The study is restricted to dialectical materialism probably on the supposition that this crucial area would provide significant clues to the status of Marxist philosophy as a whole in the post-Stalin period. The author discloses that Soviet philosophers, even before the 20th Congress, had already begun to criticize as thought-stifling Stalin's (...) dogmatic views on diamat. De-Stalinization has encouraged the renewed serious study of Hegel and the rediscovery of the importance of the categories for philosophical synthesis. But the author finds Soviet philosophic thought still barren of originality. Soviet philosophy is found to be the least critical of all philosophies. The easiest way to discredit Soviet philosophy, the author asserts, would be to translate one of their contemporary texts on the history of philosophy! Planty-Bonjour does not make any comparisons between the interplay of philosophers and working scientists in the western world and in the U.S.S.R. He reports that diamat is of no particular use to working Soviet scientists and that it has lost practically all control over scientific activity. The main body of the book is devoted to a critique of the Soviet notion of category and to the dialectification of the categories. In the author's view, Soviet philosophers are inevitably led to a dead-end by the incompatible and nonjustified concepts that the real is rational and that the real is matter. This incompatibility makes diamat inherently incoherent. Hegel's dialectic cannot serve as a means of avoiding the problem of transcendence toward which the basically realistic attitude of Soviet philosophy is leading. A genuine dialogue between Soviet philosophers and spiritualist philosophers is possible only if the former drop the dialectic of nature and allow the realistic tendency in their philosophy to develop.--H. B. (shrink)

Recently, some contradictory statements have been made concerning whether or not the Buddha taught free will. Here, a comparative method is used to examine what exactly is meant by free will, and to determine to what extent this meaning is applicable to early Buddhist thought as recorded in the Pāli Nikāyas. The comparative method reveals parallels between contemporary criticisms of Cartesian philosophy and Buddhist criticisms of Brahmanical and Jain doctrines. Although in Cartesian terms Buddhism promotes no recognizable theory of (...) free will, it does promote a primitive theory of compatibilism which shares some keyfeatures with Daniel Dennett's position on this issue. It is argued that the implicit Buddhist stance on freedom of the will allows the existence of choice and responsibility without calling upon an ultimate controlling agency that transcends the causal nexus of mind and body. (shrink)

In the 1958 lecture, “Hegel and the Greeks,” how does Heidegger intimate a complex sense of historical temporalization when he suggests that the ‘whole of philosophy in its history’ is contained in the title: “Hegel and the Greeks?” Our hypothesis may appear contrarian to contemporary assumptions: a complex notion of origin as paradoxically ‘futural’— particularly in its metaphysical breadth in say the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic—is also at work in Heidegger’s thought. This is particularly acute (...) when Heidegger examines the origin of philosophy in ancient Greek thought as a space that opens a future horizon of Being to dawn—that is, some calling that comes from the unforeseeable future to transcend what Heidegger sees as the end, finality, and ‘collapse’ ofphilosophy after Hegel. (shrink)

Daseok is a thinker who spent his whole life in searching out the principle of life for all the global citizens’ living together peacefully freed from the ‘absolute’ centripetal force of Europe. We are now at a juncture of drawing up a new grammar of life for living together in a pluralistic age where all kinds of ideologies and world religions should coexist intermingling with each other. Daseok, as a early thinker of the global village period, tried to search out (...) an alternative and integrative thought encompassing the thoughts of Daoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity throughout his whole life. He thought that a clue for solvingsuch a problem on a world philosophy level can be found in the spiritual mind and heart, the nature‐friendly lifestyle, and the integrative thinking structure of Korean people, and in the convivial [mutually vivifying] grammar of Korean language. In his youth, Daseok felt the mystery of life within his own body and spirit. He came to know that ‘I’ as the body is connected to all the life forms and even to all the lifeless forms till now as one unity with them all, the very present ‘I’ being a frontier [an end point] of the cosmological life event. Then, he became awakened to the truth that this ‘I’ should become firewood of the life event for the continuation of the cosmological life cord, in one of whose threads being transmitted even to ‘myself’ without interruption. Afterwards, he came to interpret thephenomenon of life as “an event for the achievement of heavenly commandment through the burning up of one’s own body.” In such an achievement, according to him, we can and should become cosmological persons living a cosmological life of vivifying and serving everything between heaven and earth in communication with the transcendent and yet omnipresent Spirit of heaven. (shrink)

In any given historical period, the fate of human beings is determined directly by their modes of existence and their ways of understanding to the future. In our time, the process of modernization leaves us uncertain about the future. This situation of uncertainty gives a new way of philosophizing and understandingphilosophy that must be appropriate to our new way of experiencing the future. We must recognize that the future has its own reality: that it transcends us and is also impact (...) within us, and that it is inherently unpredictable. Therefore, the mission of philosophy in our time is to embody this new way of experiencing the future and help people to see the future from the future. This way of living does not rest on the assumption that history has a given aim, but instead seeks to buildthe future that focuses on dialogue among people with different viewpoints. (shrink)

The discourse over secularization has undergone a pronounced change. In this context the debate over the social role of religions in post-modern societies started again about ten years ago and is still going on. This debate is also underway in political theory and political philosophy. Authors like Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Michael Walzer and Gianni Vattimo are key players in this debate. On the one hand, liberals such as Rorty tend to reduce religions to the private sphere. On the (...) other hand, a post-secular model has developed over the last decade. Habermas is probably the most well-known of these academics. In his view, deliberative democracy needs sources for motivation as an antidote, and religions could provide such a moral resource. The paper wants to explore this discourse about the social role of religion. This analysis will focus on the contribution of religions to the debate on justice. It will be argued, that religions could be interpreted as comprehensive social practices. More precisely, religions can be regarded as cultural practices through which people live and interpret their lives. The common characteristic of all religions is that they establish a comprehensive practice that enables discussion and reflection on a transcendent dimension of reality. In plural societies, in which different forms of reasons play an important role, religions as social practices could be one important social factor, especially when we are reflecting about the sources of global justice. (shrink)

At The paper analyzes the problems of cultural diversity and universality as elaborated in the concepts of “intercultural philosophy” (Ra 1 Fornet-Betancourt), “transculture” (Mikhail Epstein), and “discourse ethics” (Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, and Seyla Benhabib). In the postmodern theories of culture, there is an internal tension between multiculturalism and deconstruction. Multiculturalism implies an essentialist connection between cultural production and ethnic or physical origin. In contrast, the paper argues for a concept of cultural diversity free from determinism and representation. The (...) paper articulates a criticalphilosophical-methodological approach at the heart of which is Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy and the idea of “vnenakhodimost” (“outsidedness”). According to Mikhail Epstein’s concept of “transculture,” each culture is incomplete, thus needs to transcend its borders in dialogue with other cultures. Transculture is a path of liberation of the individual from the symbolic dependencies of culture itself and self-imposed identities. It is a state of virtual belonging of one individual to many cultures. Critical universality means diversity as a property of a single individual or a single culture insofar as they can include the diversity of others. It is viewed as an internal diversity of individuals, their dialogical openness to others and self-identification primarily as members of humanity. The paper focuses on Jürgen Habermas’s analysis of the problem of cultural identity and diversity in terms of the liberal conception of equality and cultural rights. Multiculturalism itself is not immune from knowledge/power relations. Its paradox is that individual basic liberties are restricted in the name of the securing collective rights of culture groups. Habermas argues that these problems can be solved only from the perspective of “the difference-sensitive egalitarian universalism of equal rights.” Mutual recognition requires a transformation of interpersonal relations through discourse and public debates over identity politics. Attention is paid to David Rasmussen’s analyses of conflict and toleration within the confines of a post-secular society. (shrink)

Some of the notorious interpretive puzzles of the Phaedrus arise from reading it in terms of a static version of mimesis; hence, the concerns about its apparent failure to enact its own norms and the status of its own self-commentaries. However, if the dialogue is read in the light of the more dynamic model of a perfectionist paideia — that is, Plato’s portrayal of Socrates as attempting to woo Phaedrus to philosophy is itself a rhetorical attempt to woo the (...) appropriate reader — then many of the puzzles fall into place as part of the rhetorical strategy. The apparent lack of formal unity arises out of Phaedrus’ own deficiencies; the written dialogue turns out precisely not to fall foul of the criticisms of writing that it contains, and its self-commentaries can be given their appropriate ironic weight. On this reading, a Platonic conception of philosophy that embodies yet transcends the dialectical is given persuasive expression. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of the translations of the term “ontology” in Chinese language, and argues that its translation as “bentilun”(in Chinese PinYinorthography) can be supported by ample evidence from the history of doctrine and the tradition of Chinese culture. Therefore, It is necessary to keep this translation on condition that one distinguish strictly “ontology” as a branch of philosophy from “bentilun” as a special morphology of philosophical theory. Examining the history of metaphysics, this thesis draws a (...) clear line of demarcation between “traditional ontology” and “modern ontology”, and reveals themain characteristics of traditional ontology. It holds that although the reformation of Marx’s Philosophy was realized through criticizing traditional ontology, his Philosophy did not abolish the concept of ontology as a branch of the discipline. The ontology of Marx’s philosophy is a theory that considers natural being, social being and human being as a unity. This theory emphasizes understanding the meaning of being from the perspective of a pattern. The main idea of ontology of Marx’s philosophy is that of a practical outlook and practical model of thinking. First, the concept of ontology and its translations would be reviewed. As regards itsderivation, we could find that Ontologie in German and in French both came from the word of Ontologia in Latin, which originated from the Greek. In the literal meaning of Greek,this word means the “logos” of “on”. In Greek, “on” corresponds to “being” in English. As to its signification, according to Heidegger, “on” has a twofold meaning that can signify both “being in general” and “the ground of being”. The former is close to essence while the latter to origin. From the angle ofhistory, Goclenius was the first one who used the term “Ontologia” in philosophy in 17th century. Since then this word was used and developed by subsequent philosophers. Although this term appeared in 17th century, yet its correlative questions had been studied from ancient Greece. The sticking point here is to pay attention to the demarcation between subject and theory. As a branch subject or as a universal noun, “Ontology” is counted in the historical tradition of western philosophy. Here all the problems discussed are public, but the concrete solutions and viewpoints are different. The former corresponds to the level of subject and the latter to the level of theory. These two levels must not be confused or substituted from one and other. That is, different ideas, schools and opinions could bebrought under the same problem. So it could be said that traditional ontology and modern ontology are two branches. Of course these two branches are very different in dealing with the problem of Ontology. This difference could be illustrated as following: (1) What to be→beings→substance —traditional ontology; (2) How to be→the mode of being→relation—modern ontology. Obviously both begin with the problem of being and end with Ontology, while their approaches are very different. The essential characteristic of traditional ontology is to seek the eternal substance, pursue the transcendent nature, establish the base of knowledge, and take the absolute truth as the ultimate telos. Traditional ontology ended with the critique of modern philosophy, Marxmade the crucial critique of traditional ontology in his remarks on Hegel’s philosophy. His critique of Hegel’s speculative method is actually the critique of traditional ontology although Marx himself never used the term of ontology explicitly in his new philosophy. Being in Marx’s philosophy is the real world of real beings. Concretely speaking, it is sensible world, objective world or human world that is integrated on the base of human praxis. The keystones here are natural being, social being and human being. There are some important similarities between Marx’s ontological approach and Heidegger’s ontology, that is, to understand the meaning of being through the mode and relation of being. In any case, the standpoint and thinking mode of praxis characterize the ontology of Marx’s philosophy. (shrink)

One vigorous line of thought in contemporary moral philosophy, which I shall call ‘Neo-Aristotelianism,’ centers on three things: a rejection of traditional enlightenment moral theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism; a claim that another look at the ethical concerns and projects of ancient Greek thought might help us past the impasse into which enlightenment moral theories have left us; more particularly, an attempt to reinterpret Aristotle’s ethical work for the late twentieth-century so as to transcend this impasse.

The critique to metaphysics has become one of the most important topics of contemporary philosophy. Marx’s philosophy has a special standing-point on this topic. On the one hand, Marx announces the end of metaphysics when metaphysics means a thinking-mode and philosophical form. But on the other hand, Marx tries to rescue the philosophical spirit behind metaphysics, namely the spirit of critique, the spirit of freedom and the spirit of transcendence. In the philosophical history, Marx establishes a unique (...) way to criticize metaphysics, we can call it “the social and historical critique of metaphysics”, through this approach, Marx tries to discard the dogmatic side of metaphysics and save its active elements at the same time. This special standing-point of Marx on metaphysics makes him differ from classical metaphysicians and contemporary deconstructionist. (shrink)

Sufism, as a mystic sect of Islam, can be defined as a philosophy of inner experience. The process of inner thought and experience plays an important role in sufism. Existentialism is also a philosophy of being. In existentialism being cannot be rationalized; it can be experienced in a personal venture which philosophy is the way to achieve. The aim of this paper is to compare sufi philosophers with theist existentialist philosophers mainly on the concept of person. How (...) religious elements play a role in forming the concept of person in each philosophical system is investigated by means of several basic parameters such as being, existence, transcendent self, despair, death, knowledge and freedom. Both in sufism and theological existentialism a religious significance is given to the concept of existence. In both philosophical systems, the finitude a person experiences in this world drives one to an alienation from one's essential being to the more profound dread of guilt and anxiety, and salvation can be reached by the unification of oneself with God. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political ChangeWilliam WalkerProfessional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change, by Stanley Fish; xi & 146 pp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, $22.00 paper.Our greatest living Miltonist, Professor Fish, continues to address the most hotly contested issues of the profession of literary criticism in prose which, if perhaps not quite the best in Anglo-American literary studies as he once judged it to be, is certainly (...) distinguished by coherence, power, and wit. In this version of material he presented in a workshop at the Folger Library in 1990 and as the Clarendon Lectures at Oxford University in 1993, Fish analyzes the relationship between literary criticism and political change. By literary criticism, he means the activity of determining what a literary text means. According to Fish, while in the eighteenth century just about any kind of commentary on literature counted as literary criticism, the determination of the meaning of literature is the essential job of literary criticism in the twentieth century. By political change, Fish means changes in things such as the way governments spend money, treat their citizens and foreign governments, establish the civil law, and appoint people to office. The major claim of the book is that doing literary criticism in the United States today rarely causes political change. The counsel he offers to all those literary critics who want to bring about political change through their literary work is thus to find a new job: “if you want to send a message that will be heard beyond the academy, get out of it” (p. 2).But why can’t observing that Lycidas means that Milton is afraid of women help to overthrow patriarchy and the legal/cultural system which continues to perpetuate it? Because, Fish claims, “there are, at present, no well-established routes by which literary criticism is first brought to the attention of those who inhabit the centers of power and then presented to them in a way that ties it to their concerns” (p. 52). That is to say that it is because American society is structured in a particular way that literary interpretive acts are politically inconsequential. Though he does not provide much evidence for this big claim about the structure of American society and its relation to literary criticism, Fish does support it by asking us to see the absurdity of imagining otherwise: “think about it. You are about to open a new business or introduce a bill in Congress or initiate an advertising campaign, but you pause to ask yourself, ‘What would the readers of Diacritics say?’” (p. 91). This is not to say that the segregation of literary work from political work is a given of the human condition. Fish cites Renaissance England and contemporary Israel as cases of societies structured in such a way that literary acts have immediate and important political consequences (though literary acts and political acts in these societies are still clearly distinct because their purposes are still different). The point is just that, because American society is currently structured as it is, the activity of identifying the meaning of works of literature is rarely [End Page 544] relevant to political change. The point holds even when one shifts the center of literary work from determining the meaning of literature to (i) observing how literature and the act of professing it are deeply implicated in society-wide structures of power and legitimization, or (ii) observing and “transcending” the boundaries between literary criticism and other disciplines. That is to say that even if one were to transform literary criticism in the way new historicists and several proponents of cultural studies whom Fish cites propose, work in this discipline would still rarely cause significant political change. For the contingent fact is that, regardless of what academics do, think they do, and intend to do, “no one cares very much about literary criticism outside the confines of its professional practice” (p. 55).But if literary criticism cannot, at least for the moment in the U.S., do significant political work, and if, as Fish also claims, it cannot do significant moral, cultural work (making people better, preserving the best that is said... (shrink)

Many post World War II thinkers have been perplexed by the problem of how or even whether people from different cultures can understand each other. The problem arose when we started to think of culture as formative of language and thought. The common assumptions of most theorists of language are that language is fundamental to thinking and culture; and language, thought, culture or humanity is a natural product of biological evolution. Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi-seen as diametrically opposed-both independently criticize (...) these assumptions and provide alternative theories of humanity whereby cross-cultural understanding is a real problem that can be broached through engaging in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. So, though language and culture creates hurdles for achieving cross-cultural understanding, the pursuit of science transcends the limitations of culture. (shrink)

Dans l'espace spirituel de la civilisation occidentale contemporaine il s'opere un croisement entre deux paradigmes mentaux selon lesquels le rapport entre le transcendant et le phenomenologique est percu d'une maniere fondamentalement differente: il est question des paradigmes de pre-renaissance et de la modernite. Dans le paradigme pre-renaissant, l'univers est percu comme etant ontologiquement divise en deux realites subordonnees, ce qui introduit le Transcendant dans le monde. Avec les progres des sciences, le paradigme mental se bätit sur l'idee principale de l'unidimensionnalite (...) du reel. Or. le monde se retrouve ainsi depourvu de sa dimension transcendante. La solution proposee dans l'expose serait la formation d'un nouveau paradigme mental qui assurerait ä l'homme une presence spirituelle dans le monde. (shrink)

One universal constituent element of human consciousness is belief in the existence of a divine reality that is experienced by persons as the most intimate and essential part of human life. Belief in transcendent reality, which is an immanent part of human nature, constitutes an awe-inspiring mystery — that is, a theantropy. Strictly speaking, ‘theantropy’ is a theological term which is used to express the "union of the divine and human natures in Christ". The novum of my understanding of theantropy (...) consists in the application of the concept to the phenomenological experience of the religious consciousness of humanity. Henceforth, I designate theantropy to mean an ontic union and an inherent disposition of the ‘human’ and ‘divine’ constituents in/of every human being. I will examine and reflect on theantropy as the philosophical principle of religious ecumenism as well as compare various solutions of theantropy not only with regard to a particular system of beliefs, but as it is experienced in each and every human being by following Augustine’s principle: "In interiorem hominem redi: ibi habitat Deus". (shrink)

Ethics is a device which is produced by the human consciousness to regulate the human behaviour or society in a sound manner. Organisms are manipulated by techniques of molecular biology these days. Then, it is so difficult to recognize the problems of life manipulation by the ethical principle raised by our sensing level. To regulate the society greatly influenced by modern life sciences, it is time to utilize the mechanistic knowledge about organisms as a basic principle of ethics (Molecular ethics). (...) Molecular ethics is not an ethics produced only by the humane logic, but adopts the property of genome operating system (OS) as a core principle clarified by the molecular biology. It is substantiated by life sciences, but is not a simple scientific decision-making means. It promotes scientific experiments with the integrity to knowledge. Scientific knowledges are projections of the rule of life. Molecular ethics is an ethics which seeks for the rules of evolution; i.e. rules for transcending human being. On the other hand, traditional ethics (individual ethics; ethics based on indivisualism) is an ethics which regards present human being as a terminus of evolution. In this respect, this is against the principle of genome OS (system of evolution). Life sciences and technologies has been developing to meet our wants, however, those activities nowadays seem to be against those rules of genome OS. Therefore, it is extremely important for us to consider the ethics applicable for the life manipulation era. (shrink)

The moral good, being the end that human beings ought to pursue, cannot be defined without referring to what human beings, as ontological entities, actually are. According to my conception, human mind (or spirit or person) is a triadic entity made of intellect, sensitiveness, and power which, through their outward or selfish activity (directed to the external objects), produce ideas, sentiments, and actions, whereas through their inward or moral activity (directed to mind itself), produce moral thoughts, moral feelings, and moral (...) acts, respectively. Moral thoughts allow us to understand that mind is an evolving entity, and that mind evolution consists of the development of intellect (knowledge), sensitiveness (sensitivity of the soul), and power (health/wealth/social status), through which mind continuously transcends itself. Moreover, moral thoughts give us the cognitive awareness that mind evolution, entailing changes into ever better states, is the objective human good, thus creating the ground moral principle. On the other hand, moral feelings enable human beings to feel that mind evolution is morally desirable or valuable, thus founding the moral values. The moral acts perform the good deeds under the guidance of the moral norms, which arise fromthe convergence of moral principles and moral values. The ground moral norm prescribes the promotion of mind evolution. The moral agent should help others until they reach the evolutionallowing condition, that is, the condition that allows the helped person to develop his own mind, thus fulfilling his moral duty toward himself. The conception of the moral good as consisting of mind evolution allows us to give ethics an ontological basis. (shrink)

Comment l'humanite peut-elle resoudre les problemes d'une cite close ou d'un monde clos? Un des problemes essentiels pose est celui de l'agrandissement, qui rend les societes difficilement gouvernables et dangereuses, et qui renvoie done ä la question de la guerre. En 1932, Bergson est un des premiers philosophes ä pressentir la possibility de l'extermination, du genocide. Quelle est la place de la democratic d'une part et d'une societe des nations d'autre part dans la resolution des problemes mondiaux? Pour Bergson, la (...) democratic est la conception politique la plus eloignee de la nature, la seule qui transcende, dans ses intentions au moins, les conditions de la societe close. Est-ce que les organisations de cooperation efficaces sont mondiales? Les problemes mondiaux se resolvent, mais seulement si, explique Bergson, une portion süffisante de l'humanite est decidee ä les surmonter. L'humanite, qui n'a cesse de contredire la nature, est capable, pourtant, explique Bergson, de fournir l'efTort necessaire pour depasser ce qui reste clos en 1'homme, de l'ordre de l'immobilite de l'espece. Or cet effort vise la mobilite meme, une conscience synonyme d'invention et de liberte. Penser l'humanite et ses problemes n'a pas pour ambition de decouper des essences, mais d'intervenir dans un processus humain en mouvement. Les problemes mondiaux ne sont ni speciflquement anthropologiques ni speciflquement politiques, mais ä l'articulation des deux, dans une jointure entre theorie et pratique, la ou l'humanite est consciente et, partant, agissante. La conscience des problemes de l'humanite, reels et possibles, est chez Bergson plus metaphysique qu'anthropologique, dans le sens ou il ne s'agit pas d'envisager l'humanite dans l'ensemble de ses determinations, mais d'appliquer ä certains de ses evenements la double perspective du voir et du vouloir propre ä l'intuition metaphysique. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts Nietzsche's conceptualization of the "artistic Socrates" with Kierkegaard's vision of the "knight of faith". The paper argues that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard attempted to transcend the rational-ethical sphere of human action in favor of a more spontaneous, yet deeper understanding of the universe. Nietzsche believes that the thread of causality and the principle of sufficient reason, embodied as they are in the personality of Socrates, are not capable of explaining our existence in its entirety. Hence he (...) suggests the tragic insight and the subsequent artistic worldview as a remedy. Nietzsche's vision is encapsulated in his eulogy of madness and humor as manifestations of an artistic worldview with the tragic insight. The paper argues that Kierkegaard deals with the same problem that Nietzsche faces in that he also wants to incorporate the recognition of the world beyond rational comprehension into our understanding of the Universe. Hence, both philosophers are attempting to comprehend what is beyond human comprehension. The paper claims that Kierkegaard is more successful in this endeavour because he introduces the virtue of the absurd as an organizing principle of the irrational space (space beyond the Grenzenpunkte). With a movement of infinite resignation the knight of faith renounces the world and moves beyond the Grenzenpunkte, but then with a movement of faith he embraces back the world he renounced. The theme that captures the condition of the knight of faith is anxiety and fear, rather than madness and humor as it was with Nietzsche. The paper concludes by emphasizing Kierkegaard's vision for offering a more comprehensive understanding of the Universe and of the human agency and action operating within it. (shrink)

In this paper, through external and internal observation (introspection), it is shown that the human mind (or spirit) can be defined as an evolving, conscious, triadic entity consisting of unitary-multiple components - intellect, sensitiveness, and power - which in turn are made of multiple ideas, sentiments, and actions, respectively. The three mind components are interdependent, each needing the support of the other two for its activity. This interdependence, which is linked to the problem of mind-body relationship, is explained by the (...) observational fact that no physical object can exist if not under particular patterns of forms/structures and associated movements/functions, patterns which are non-physical and represent the “activities” of that object. Conversely, no activity can exist if not associated to a structured and functioning physical object. “Intellect” and “sensitiveness” are regarded as the activities that necessarily arise from the extremely complex structure and physical functions of the brain and other body apparatuses (“power”). Mind can exert outwardly oriented activities, directed to external objects, or inwardly oriented activities, directed to mind itself. The latter activities give the awareness that mind is capable of undergoing evolution, i.e.,development of intellect, sensitiveness and actions. Evolution enables the mind to continuously transcend itself, and could be regarded as the source of “moral values”. Inward mind activity gives rise to moral thoughts, moral feelings and moral acts (counterpart of ideas, sentiments, and actions, produced by the outward mind activity). This conception of mind opens new perspectives in such diverse fields as ontology (the triadic nature might be extensible to all existing objects), ethics (identification of the “good” with the mind-evolution itself), and still others. (shrink)

This has been possible by the growing awareness of man about his own personal nature, about his larger society and culture and about the whole humanity. The foremost challenge of contemporary man is the discovery and affirmation of man’s spirituality and bringing it into full play in the play of life and for the attainment of some new leap forward in creation and transcendence. The cosmic dimension, therefore comprehends reason and faith, science and poetry. The cosmic dimension brings experience (...) of timelessness in love, worship and beauty The extension of this personal awareness to a larger awareness shared by thesociety enriches the social life and adds an essential element to all progress and development. This balance and harmony is the product of human creativity. Therefore the fullness of life is given to creative persons living harmoniously on all there dimensions of the cosmic, the elemental and the temporal. Some sense of discovery enters into the creative process. (shrink)

In conventional quantum mechanics, complementarity appears as a remarkable but somewhat useless consequence of the formalism. On the contrary, in Bohr’s view, his notion of complementarity – what I call Bohr’s complementarity – apart from offering a consistent interpretation of QM, was setting the requirement for a ‘thorough revision’ of our common attitude towards ‘physical reality’ and was teaching an ‘epistemological lesson’ transcending the domain of physical sciences. In the present paper, the discussion on the internal rationale of Bohr’s thought (...) from a contemporary philosophical viewpoint permits me to argue that BC stems from a realistic standpoint which starts by accepting an ontology compatible with the non-separable structure of quantum formalism and comes to recognize the necessity of largely revising the epistemological ideas of traditional scientific realism. In this respect, I propose an elaborated form of BC which recognizes the participation of the human perspective in the content of knowledge and, on this basis, attempts to ground scientific objectivity on the notions of ‘perspectival contextuality’ and ‘perspectival plurality’ which integrate reductionistic and holistic epistemological demands in a realistic worldview. The epistemology delineated here creates, I claim, a promising epistemological bridge between physical sciences and humanities. (shrink)

My paper utilizes the insights of F.W.J Schelling’s work on aesthetics to explain the unique appeal and power that aesthetic experience held for people of the Upper Paleolithic. This appeal is revealed most dramatically in the cave paintings of Chauvet and Lascaux. According to Schelling, genuine artistic activity expresses a fusion of the unconscious (der Bewußtlosen) and the symbolic (die Symbolik), which is irreducible to any other experience or product. This fusion creates a unique experience of self-transcendence and reintegration (...) that affirms the continuity between consciousness and the natural world. Consequently, genuine aesthetic products never have any simple pragmatic or utilitarian motive, but result from reconciling the deepest contradictions of the human experience. I argue that it is this experience of continuity and re-integration that is captured in the cave paintings of Chauvet and Lascaux, and which confirms the irreducible power of the aesthetic. (shrink)

Although Habermas has never worked out a conception of virtue and indeed criticizes this notion whenever he uses it, his theory crucially depends on the virtuous attitude of participants in discourse — be it in the realm of democracy and law or that of morality. In this paper, in which I deal only with the ethical foundations of morality, I argue first that the norms of discourse which are gained from a presuppositional analysis of speech as such have to be (...) complemented by the sensitive perception on the side of the recipients. Only when the claims are understood in their full significance for the speaker does the discourse live up to the ideal which is already anticipated in every speech act. This presuppositional analysis shows secondly that it is mainly the virtuous attitude that is morally relevant and not those capacities for acting morally that the agent already possesses. However, the virtuous attitude genuinely entails the obligation to strive to perfect all those capacities that enable us to sensitively understand the other's claim. A discussion of the capacities that have to be promoted leads to the singling out of sensitivity as contrasted to immediate empathy. It is the reflexive transcendence of the agent's evaluative patterns that allows this emotion to sit well with a post-conventional morality. Finally, I discuss a possible caveat of Wellmer and Habermas who might claim that the proposed conception of virtue would only be valid for participants in discourse, but not for agents acting in the life-world. However, because the discursive virtue is of wide latitude, it does not fall under this objection. (shrink)

How do we understand other people’s minds? This is a descriptive problem of other minds, a question concerning the descriptive nature of social cognition or interpersonal understanding. There are currently three prominent approaches to this problem, namely, the theory theory approach, the simulation theory approach and the direct perception approach. Instead of trying to resolve the conflict between them, I will conduct a preliminary exploration concerning the nature of social perception or the experience of seeing other people. TT, ST and (...) DP are all implicitly or explicitly committed to a particular conception of social perception. Thus, it is necessary to look into the nature of social perception in developing a theory of social cognition. I claim that social perception involves the following three characteristics: In social perception, other people are given to us; other people are given as transcendent; other people are given as transcendent but potentially accessible. They respectively constitute the Immediacy constraint, the Transcendence constraint, and the Accessibility constraint on theories of social cognition. I suggest that TT and ST fail to do justice to the Immediacy constraint and the Accessibility constraint, while DP does not pay due attention to the Accessibility constraint. (shrink)

In the ontological argument and the method of Anselm, we find many phenomenological elements. The proximity of the ontological argument to phenomenology shows itself especially from a parallel between Anselm's and Husserl's deriving a necessity of thinking from a necessity of being. But, Medieval proofs for the existence of God appear to contradict the principles of phenomenological method, particularly the 'bodily self-givenness,' the epoché as bracketing the real existence as well as the transcendence of essence vis-àvis consciousness. The phenomenological (...) method must indeed be rethought and reformulated to allow a transition from returning to 'things themselves' to a philosophical knowledge of God. It must be freed from Husserl's subjectivistic theory of 'constitution' and from any generalization of the methodological principle of epoché. In this way, Anselm's position contains the germ for a critical rethinking of the phenomenological method in the vein of realist phenomenology. (shrink)