Authors
Renee Jorgensen
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
The problem of moral disagreement has been presented as an objection to contextualist semantics for ‘ought’, since it is not clear that contextualism can accommodate or give a convincing gloss of such disagreement. I argue that independently of our semantics, disagreements over ‘ought’ in non-cooperative contexts are best understood as indirect metalinguistic disputes, which is easily accommodated by contextualism. If this is correct, then rather than posing a problem for contextualism, the data from moral disagreements provides some reason to adopt a semantics that allows contextual variance in the meanings of ‘ought’.
Keywords metalinguistic negotiation  deontic modal  should  ought  contextualism  disagreement
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2020.1850336
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References found in this work BETA

Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

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