“Enlightenment and the Practice of Meditative Reading” examines the practices of reading and the critiques of reading that were common in the first few centuries of Chinese Chan Buddhist monasticism. Although interpreters frequently conclude that reading ceased to be a central practice in the institutions of Chan, classical texts show that, reading and writing were just as central to Chan practice as they had been in earlier forms of Chinese Buddhism. Because China’s culture of literacy inevitably extended into Chan practice, (...) a highly unusual and sophisticated theory of reading developed, while practices of reading aimed at enlightenment thrived. This historical realization raises questions about the relation between practices of meditation and reading, suggesting that our own practice of reading might be developed and deepened by learning to conceive of it as a form of meditative practice. (shrink)

“From the Thought of Enlightenment to the Event of Awakening” follows the philosophical reflections of Fazang of the Huayan school of Chinese Buddhism as he explores the progression along the Buddhist path from an initial concept or image of what enlightenment might be all the way through to the culminating experience of enlightenment. His paradoxical claim that complete enlightenment is already fully contained in the first legitimate thought of enlightenment is analyzed in this chapter by understanding it in relation to (...) the basic components of the Huayan Buddhist worldview of thoroughgoing interdependence. Fazang’s Huayan Buddhist philosophy includes in an early philosophical form the basic conceptual elements of the historic debate in China concerning the experience of enlightenment—the widely cited controversy about whether enlightenment occurs gradually over time or through a sudden, momentous breakthrough. This chapter explores the enlightening consequences of meditation on the interdependent character of all realities. (shrink)

relphiPhilosophy of ReligionWHEN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUALS in the late eighteenth century engaged in high-profile, public debate on the question “What is enlightenment?,”1 Buddhist answers to this question never came up for consideration, and it is safe to say that no participant in these debates would have or could have believed that this “oriental” religion had anything even remotely to do with “enlightenment.” Although knowledge of Buddhism was already accumulating in Europe by that time through the merchants, missionaries, and soldiers that the (...) various European empires had dispatched to Asia, what they “knew” about Buddhism was that this ascetic, monastic religion was curiously nihilistic in its central goal:... (shrink)

“Secular Buddhism and the Religious Dimension of Enlightenment” follows Stephen Batchelor’s impressive effort to articulate what Buddhist awakening might mean in the current secular culture. Assessing the issues that have prompted the creation of a new nonsectarian “secular Buddhism,” this chapter raises questions about whether this form of secularity nevertheless continues to carry religious meaning as its most fundamental motivation. Reflecting on the possibility of nontheistic forms of religious practice and experience, it links insights in contemporary Western religious thought to (...) the a-theism that runs throughout the Buddhist tradition in order to further inquiry into the qualities and character that Buddhist enlightenment might take under contemporary, secularized conditions. The chapter aspires to cultivate insight into the inevitable relationship between religiosity and any quest for enlightenment and aims to stimulate reflection on what religion might be in our time. (shrink)

“The Awakening of Character as an Image of Enlightenment” describes in some detail two unforgettable characters in the Korean Buddhist film Mandala in order to consider the range of diversity that enlightenment can encompass. Two very different Buddhist monks are presented in the film as both deeply enveloped in ordinary human suffering and as breaking through that suffering to experience a transformation of character that we can only understand as enlightenment. While the kinds of character that emerge in each case (...) are quite distinct, viewers are left to puzzle over how these entirely different paths through human life could both be legitimate instances of enlightenment. While each character in the film provides an image of the Buddhist path, readers are presented with the task of sorting out how their own paths align or contrast with the two provided. (shrink)

“The Bodhisattva’s Practice of Enlightenment” interprets a Los Angeles Times newspaper opinion piece by Thich Nhat Hanh as a contemporary image of enlightenment with far-reaching implications. Written in response to the brutal police beating of Rodney King and not intended for a Buddhist audience, this brief newspaper article nevertheless provides glimpses into the contemporary meaning of enlightenment. The chapter considers Thich Nhat Hanh’s comments in relation to the basic principles of Buddhist ethics before turning to the Vimalakīrti sūtra, a classical (...) Mahayana Buddhist scripture, to extend an understanding of what it would mean to experience the world through an in-depth awareness of “no-self.” Dwelling on the bodhisattva’s effort to cultivate generosity of spirit, the chapter considers the kinds of human relations that Thich Nhat Hanh’s sense of enlightenment entails. (shrink)

“The Thought of Enlightenment and the Dilemma of Human Achievement” examines the Buddhist concept of bodhicitta—the thought of or aspiration for enlightenment. The chapter compares this Buddhist concept to the Greek philosophical notion of the “idea of the good” and finds both playing similar roles in articulating ideal ends—the ultimate goals of human life. If in actual human life, however, these ideals are never fully achieved, a dilemma emerges at the heart of human practice. Although the transformations cultivated through practice (...) may be substantial and far-reaching, perfection remains always beyond out of reach. This chapter examines several reasons for that inevitable unreachability and concludes that, rather than undermining the value or legitimacy of the quest, this dilemma of human achievement adds nuance and depth to the meaning of human enlightenment. Because human beings will always strive toward some form of excellence, humility and the capacity to release the tension of compulsive perfectionism become essential features of enlightenment. (shrink)

The essays in this companion volume prefigure, elaborate, or defend the proposals put forward in that landmark work.

Dummett's objections to the coherence of the strict finitist philosophy of mathematics are thus, at the present time at least, ill-taken. We have so far no definitive treatment of Sorites paradoxes; so no conclusive ground for dismissing Dummett's response — the response of simply writing off a large class of familiar, confidently handled expressions as semantically incoherent. I believe that cannot be the right response, if only because it threatens to open an unacceptable gulf between the insight into his own (...) understanding available to a philosophically reflective speaker and the conclusions available to one confined to observing the former's linguistic practice; for an observer of our linguistic practice could never justifiably arrive at the conclusion that ‘red’, ‘child’, etc., are governed by inconsistent rules. But the Sorites is not the subject of this paper. The points I hope to have made plausible are: that a generalized intuitionist position cannot be so much as formulated and that even a most local intuitionism, argued for the special case of arithmetic, is hard pressed effectively to stabilize and defend itself; that strict finitism remains the natural outcome of the anti-realism which Dummett has propounded by way of support for the intuitionist philosophy of mathematics; that it is powerfully buttressed by the ideas of the latter Wittgenstein on rule-following; and that there is no extant compelling reason to suppose that its involvement with predicates of surveyability calls its coherence into question. The correct philosophical assessment of strict finitism, and its proper mathematical exegesis, remain absolutely open, almost virgin issues. This is not a situation which philosophers of mathematics should tolerate very much longer. (shrink)

Although D. Petrovich’s recent book The World’s Oldest Alphabet: Hebrew as the Language of the Proto-Consonantal Script advances several claims about the origin of the alphabet and biblical history, its main arguments are linguistic. In particular, Petrovich identifies the language of the early alphabetic inscriptions as Hebrew as part of a larger argument for the historicity of the biblical Exodus tradition. In this review essay, I will summarize and critique Petrovich’s linguistic arguments. Along the way, I will consider two important (...) questions in the classification of the Canaanite languages. (shrink)

The concept of biological mimicry is viewed as a ‘process of life’ theory rather than a ‘process of change’ theory—regardless of the historical interest and heuristic value of the subject for the study of evolution. Mimicry is a dynamic ecological system reflecting the possibilities for mutualism and parasitism created by a pre-established bipartite signal-based relationship between two organisms – a potential model and its signal receiver (potential operator). In a mimicry system agency and perception play essential, interconnected roles. Mimicry thus (...) describes emergent biologically meaningful relationships based on synergy, and is not an object-based theory. Biosemiotics offers a particularly valuable discipline for analysing the dynamics and nuances of mimicry systems, and can thus pave the way for a better and more complete understanding of how mimicry has evolved in the past, and how it might evolve in the future—presented here with special reference to the need for an integrated, ‘third way of evolution’ approach to biological relativity. A revised definition of mimicry is proposed. (shrink)

This paper explains how the notion of justification transmission can be used to ground a notion of knowledge transmission. It then explains how transmission theories can characterise schoolteacher cases, which have prominently been presented as counterexamples to transmission theories.

This book is for any among us who has ever had a discussion that turned on the subject of “happiness” which went nowhere, or nowhere good, because the word “happiness” itself has become so ambiguous that it seems at times to have lost any common meaning. Deal Hudson here clearly articulates the range of meaning packed into the word, by contrasting happiness and satisfaction, well-being and well-feeling, objective eudaimonism and the view that any subjective profession of happiness is unimpeachable. Since (...) the ascendancy of one or the other views has such radical personal, intellectual, and social implications, any of us who are interested in speaking more clearly with each other, across lives or disciplines or generations, might do well to take this book as a starting point for that conversation. (shrink)

The author seeks to respond to the philosophical appeal of W. Norris Clarke, S.J., “to uncover the personalist dimension lying implicit within the fuller understanding of the very meaning and structure of the metaphysics of being itself, not hitherto explicit in either the metaphysical or personalist traditions themselves.” She does this by discussing the distinctions drawn by Karol Wojtyla: (1) between a human being’s personhood and his humanity, and (2) between the ontological dignity and the ethical dignity of the human (...) person. (shrink)

When we consider the issue of linguistic justice, we must define what we mean by language. Standardisation of languages is closely associated with the development of the nation state, and the de Saussurian conception of language as system is in concert with nationalism and its divisions. In the early twenty-first century, however, this view of the world as a mosaic of stable national monolingualisms is outdated. In a globalising world, much of the political, social and economic structure that is developing (...) is transnational and patterns of contact, both real and virtual, have become extraordinarily complex. In the resulting communities of communication of this superdiverse world, much language practice is more function driven than in the recent past. New practices mean that we cannot consider questions of linguistic justice in this new world order using the linguistic toolkit of the old. The flows, exchanges and networks of globalisation present us with a new paradigm and we need to recalibrate concepts. (shrink)

Lesley Wright; The Concept of Development and its Legitimacy in the Philosophy of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006.

: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism and methodological contextualism. I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for (...) changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa has recently argued that the knowledge we get from instruments and the knowledge we get from testimony is similar in important ways. Most importantly, the justification that supports it is similar in kind – both instrumental justification and justification from testimony is to be understood in terms of reliability. I argue that Sosa’s theory is problematic. Specifically, I argue that we can take certain attitudes towards people that we cannot coherently take towards instruments. This, I argue, grounds a (...) distinction between the kind of justification that testimony can make available and the kind of justification that instruments can make available. The result is that reliability cannot provide a complete explanation of the justification that testimony makes available. (shrink)

Lesley Wright; The Distinction Between Play and Intrinsically Worthwhile Activities, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages.

Wright, Ken Review of: Taking god to school: The end of Australia's egalitarian education?, by Marion Maddox, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2014, pp. xxiii + 248, $29.99.

Wright, Ken Review(s) of: Universe from nothing: Why there is something rather than nothing, by Lawrence M. Krauss, Free Press, New York 2012; xix + 202 pp.; hardback, $29.99.

Wright, Ken Review(s) of: What money can't buy: The moral limits of markets, by Michael J. Sandel, Allen Lane, London, 20012, 244 pp., hardback $24.90.