Feminist Policymaking in Turbulent Times offers a unique and timely reflection of the critical debates around the institutionalisation of feminist and gender-focused ideas and norms into policy. Many states and non-governmental organisations are increasingly invested in 'feminist policymaking' at the domestic and international levels. Yet, this liberal (feminist) agenda is also vastly disputed by critical, intersectional and decolonial voices on the one hand, and by anti-gender movements around the world on the other. Indeed, while opposition to 'gender ideology' is mounting (...) from reactionary, religious and secular forces, feminist policymaking is also being challenged in important ways from within. Thus, this book situates feminist policymaking in a challenging and 'turbulent', global context. This book explores feminist policymaking in multiple areas of policy, examining various gender-focused programmes that states and international organisations have undertaken in the last decade, offering critical interventions and rethinking the relationship between feminism and policy. The book not only reflects on the advances of feminist policymaking globally, but also critically assesses the intersectional challenges embedded within it and lying ahead. It moves the field forward by creating opportunities, based on lived experiences, for re-imagining the transformative potential of the nexus between feminism and policymaking. Interdisciplinary in scope and bringing to the fore the voices of both academics and practitioners, the book is the product of an international collaboration, forging links and dialogue that are increasingly necessary to question some of the exclusionary, militaristic and hierarchical assumptions of policymaking which is labelled as feminist. Feminist Policymaking in Turbulent Times will be of interest to all scholars, students and practitioners interested in the role of gender in policymaking and concerned with contestations around gender-focused projects. (shrink)

Slavoj Zizek ist einer der prominentesten linken Intellektuellen. Der Sammelband lädt ein, Zizeks Ideen kritisch zu diskutieren, insbesondere sein Verständnis von Politik, politischen Organisationen und dem (vergangenen, gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen) Staat.

The rethinking of the events of the Soviet past largely concerns the sphere of church-state relations. The significant losses of cultural and architectural heritage during the Soviet period make it expedient to study the mechanisms of liquidation of church buildings in the second half of the 1960s. The purpose and objectives of the article. To determine the principles of state policy in the field of religion and methods of its implementation by party-state structures concerning the church (...) network of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian SSR. The research methodology. The research methodology is based on a set of philosophical, general scientific, and historical methods and principles. To solve the specific tasks of the study, the principles of objectivity, historicism, systematicity, and comprehensiveness were also used. Research results. The period of the second half of the 1960s was marked by the liberalization of official views on the religious sphere, the abandonment of repressive methods of fighting religion and the Church, the beginning of the latent destruction of sacred buildings, and the dominance of the Soviet state’s nihilistic attitude toward cultural heritage. The Russian Orthodox Church remained entirely subordinate to the Soviet state, which disregarded its legitimate rights and interests. Discussion. The repressions of the “Thaw“ period and the failure of building a communist society led to a loss of public confidence in the possibility of a just welfare state. It became clear that by practicing persecution, restricting the rights of priests, and banning them from studying in theological schools, the Soviet government was undermining its authority. Therefore, in the 1970s, ideologues of the CPSU Central Committee proposed a new model of churchstate relations — the adaptation to communism. There were no fundamental changes in party policy, as it was based on the Marxist doctrine of religion as the opium of the people. The anti-church orientation of state policy remained, only its forms and methods were transformed. The period of massive closure of Orthodox churches was replaced by a new long-term period, called the period of “streamlining the religious network”. Conclusions. One of the directions of the state’s policy towards religion in the mid-1960s was the targeted liquidation of religious buildings of the Russian Orthodox Church. The main reasons for it were the ideological and political priorities of the state leadership. The closure and destruction of religious buildings were systematic actions of the party-state structures in the process of implementing their policy in the field of religion in the Ukrainian SSR. (shrink)

This longitudinal case study identifies corporate governance responses in a Chinese state-owned enterprise facing institutional logic multiplicity and demands to shoulder sociopolitical responsibilities beyond economic responsibility. We find that overseas listing led to the incorporation of market logic into an enterprise in which party-state logic prevailed. The prioritization of sociopolitical responsibilities vis-à-vis economic responsibility has shifted through three phases, reflecting changes in institutional logic centrality amid changing politico-institutional and firm conditions. In response, the enterprise developed hybrid corporate (...) governance structures based first on decoupling (2001–2011) and then on translation of a “foreign” corporate governance model to fit the domestic context (2012–2016) but has since sought to dehybridize by strengthening the state-controlled governance structure (2017–2019). Our study contributes to the varieties-of-capitalism approach to corporate governance and offers perspectives on institutional change, institutional logic, and hybrid organizing as well as the implicit ethical issue. (shrink)

Introduction At the 4th Plenum of the Communist Party of China (CPC), held in September 2004, the CCP set out on a new self-declared path to establish itself as a permanent “governing party” (zhizheng dang) instead of remaining a “revolutionary” party.1 The 36-page resolution on the Enhancement of the Party's Governance Capability says that China's reform and development have reached a critical stage in which new situations and new problems are mushrooming.2 The CPC concedes that it (...) needs to enhance its governance capability to consolidate its ruling status and meet domestic and global challenges. A new…. (shrink)

Many concerned citizens, including judges, bureaucrats, politicians, activists, journalists, and academics, have been claiming that Indian democracy has been imperilled under the premiership of Narendra Modi, which began in 2014. To examine this claim, the Article sets up an analytic framework for accountability mechanisms liberal democratic constitutions put in place to provide a check on the political executive. The assumption is that only if this framework is dismantled in a systemic manner can we claim that democracy itself is in peril. (...) This framework helps distinguish between actions that one may disagree with ideologically but are nonetheless permitted by an elected government, from actions that strike at the heart of liberal democratic constitutionalism. Liberal democratic constitutions typically adopt three ways of making accountability demands on the political executive: vertically, by demanding electoral accountability to the people; horizontally, by subjecting it to accountability demands of other state institutions like the judiciary and fourth branch institutions; and diagonally, by requiring discursive accountability by the media, the academy, and civil society. This framework assures democracy over time – i.e. it guarantees democratic governance not only to the people today, but to all future peoples of India. Each elected government has the mandate to implement its policies over a wide range of matters. However, seeking to entrench the ruling party’s stranglehold on power in ways that are inimical to the continued operation of democracy cannot be one of them. The Article finds that the first Modi government in power between 2014 and 2019 did indeed seek to undermine each of these three strands of executive accountability. Unlike the assault on democratic norms during India Gandhi’s Emergency in the 1970s, there is little evidence of a direct or full-frontal attack during this period. The Bharatiya Janata Party government’s mode of operation was subtle, indirect, and incremental, but also systemic. Hence, the Article characterizes the phenomenon as “killing a constitution by a thousand cuts.” The incremental assaults on democratic governance were typically justified by a combination of a managerial rhetoric of efficiency and good governance (made plausible by the undeniable imperfection of our institutions) and a divisive rhetoric of hyper-nationalism (which brands political opponents of the party as traitors of the state). Since its resounding victory in the 2019 general elections, the Modi government appears to have moved into consolidation mode. No longer constrained by the demands of coalition partners, early signs suggest that it may abandon the incrementalist approach for a more direct assault on democratic constitutionalism. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyse the relationship that exists between state capture, party patronage, and the conduct of electoral processes in the settings of post-communist countries, of which Albania is one. A characteristic of the political developments of the transition period in many post-communist countries has been the phenomenon of state capture, which has occurred mainly through the endemic party patronage and politicization of state institutions. The phenomenon of state capture by the ruling political (...) parties has had a negative conditional impact on the conduct of competitive, free and fair elections in these countries, leading to distrust regarding the credibility and integrity of the process. This study argues that phenomena such as state capture and extensive party patronage as informal practices/mechanisms in the hands of the ruling political parties affect the creation of a skewed playing field and the production of hyper-incumbency advantages in holding electoral contests between political parties, making the possibility of political power rotations difficult. Albania, in the case of its last parliamentary elections, held on 25th April 2021, constitutes the case study (Section IV) to which the theoretical framework of the paper is applied, by identifying the informal practices and methods through state capture that the ruling political party used to provide structural, institutional, and financial advantages in its favour regarding elections. (shrink)

In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia's President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the (...) political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. (shrink)

In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the (...) political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov’s Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. (shrink)

What explains the breakout of violence following the repression of moderate Islamist groups in some Muslim countries? Part of the answer can lie in the political organization style of those groups, which can constrain or expand their long-term strategy choices in unpredicted ways. Using examples from Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey, this study suggests that organizing as a political party can initially restrict the means of action otherwise available to a moderate Islamist movement, while the loose framework of a (...) political front reduces its organizational costs and lends remarkable flexibility to attract a wider range of followers. Later, paradoxically, the political party framework can enable limited access of an Islamist group into the political system otherwise completely inaccessible earlier, and help to enhance its power, while political fronts are exposed to attacks from both incumbent regimes and radical Islamists groups alike. (shrink)

Political parties do not merely reflect social divisions, they actively construct them. While this point has been alluded to in the literature, surprisingly little attempt has been made to systematically elaborate the relationship between parties and the social, which tend to be treated as separate domains contained by the disciplinary division of labor between political science and sociology. This article demonstrates the constructive role of parties in forging critical social blocs in three separate cases, India, Turkey, and the United States, (...) offering a critique of the dominant approach to party politics that tends to underplay the autonomous role of parties in explaining the preferences, social cleavages, or epochal socioeconomic transformations of a given community. Our thesis, drawing on the work of Gramsci, Althusser, and Laclau, is that parties perform crucial articulating functions in the creation and reproduction of social cleavages. Our comparative analysis of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, Islamic and secularist parties in Turkey, and the Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress parties in India will demonstrate how “political articulation” has naturalized class, ethnic, religious, and racial formations as a basis of social division and hegemony. Our conclusion is that the process of articulation must be brought to the center of political sociology, simultaneously encompassing the study of social movements and structural change, which have constituted the orienting poles of the discipline. (shrink)

The distinguished historian Steven Pincus has recently argued that “Patriotism” was a distinctive ideology in the middle of the eighteenth century that indicated “governmental activism” and support for “the British way of governing, grounded in the principles set forth in England’s Revolution of 1688–89.” By contrast, this essay shows that “Patriot” was more commonly used as a generic term for opposition politicians in eighteenth-century Britain. Moreover, for much of the century, the term was frequently associated with a slightly more precise (...) and substantial set of political arguments: those associated with the “Country party” platform. In its eighteenth-century guise, the Country party’s raison d’être was opposition to the growth of executive power since the Glorious Revolution. It was not a party as such but rather an opposition stance and a set of principles which occasionally brought together Tories, Whigs, and independent Country gentlemen as well as self-proclaimed Patriots. In the eighteenth century, “the Country” was especially scathing of the “financial revolution” and the growth of the fiscal-military state in the years after 1688–1689. By its continuous association with the Country party tradition, Patriotism and suspicion of the growth of executive power and government finance were intimately linked. (shrink)

In recent years, the law in the area of recovered memories in child sexual abuse cases has developed rapidly. See J.K. Murray, “Repression, Memory & Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Abuse Trials,” University of Colorado Law Review, 66 : 477-522, at 479. Three cases have defined the scope of liability to third parties. The cases, decided within six months of each other, all involved lawsuits by third parties against therapists, based on treatment (...) in which the patients recovered memories of sexual abuse. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478, allowed such a claim to survive, while the supreme courts in Iowa, in J.A.H. v. Wadle & Associates, 589 N.W.2d 256, and California, in Eear v. Sills, 82 Cal. Rptr. 281, rejected lawsuits brought by nonpatients for professional liability. (shrink)

While research on political violence often focuses on its outcome, there is little attention to the process of political violence. Filling the knowledge gap, the present research applies the theory of instrumentalism to understand political violence as a means to achieve certain political ends. The research is a qualitative case study on Lyari, which was a comparatively peaceful neighborhood in Karachi but transformed into a violent no-go area during 2000s. The paper describes the process of instrumentalization of political violence in (...) Lyari with the objective of outlining the relationship of three key actors – political parties, state authorities, and criminal gangs – using violence for their respective interests. The paper explains how the convergence of their interests influenced the intensity of political violence and converted it into an ethnic conflict. Hence, it expands the literature on political violence by outlining the complexities of the real world where multiple political actors simultaneously use violence to achieve varied objectives that sometimes compliment and sometimes clashes with each other, resulting in further extension of violence. (shrink)

Research participants are afforded protections to ensure their rights and welfare are not unduly jeopardized by research activities. Yet people who do not meet the criteria for research participant status may likewise be impacted by research activities, and ethicists argue that protections should be afforded these “research bystanders.” The standard rationale for extending protections to research bystanders contends that they are sufficiently like research participants that the ethical principles governing health research ought to extend to them. In this article we (...) argue that this analogical reasoning is mistaken. Salient moral differences mean that research ethics frameworks are not fit for purpose. We defend the research bystander category by articulating a novel foundation for this new class of stakeholder. Focusing on bystanders directly impacted by publicly funded health research, we argue that bystanders are sometimes owed protections—but neither because of their similarity to research participants nor because research ethics principles should extend to them. Instead, we reframe the issue as a question of justice. Building on the work of Douglas MacKay, we argue that bystanders to publicly funded health research are owed protections as citizens of liberal states to whom the state owes duties of justice. The state has duties to protect the interests of citizens and to conduct health research. When the means by which the state fulfils the latter duty comes into conflict with the means by which it fulfils the former, the state must ensure that those impacted, including research bystanders, are afforded protections. (shrink)

I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved in the (...) process, but only concepts, rudimentary enough, of others’ emotions: contentment and discontentment. Strictly speaking, all the empirical data and findings in developmental psychology only support the hypothesis that children in the pre-linguistic phase understand perceptual facial expressions of contentment and discontentment. My proposal consists of the following thesis: The direct perception of others' elementary mental states is not a perception in the usual sense of the word according to which we just perceive things, but rather a “perception of facts.” But how to understand that? It is nothing more than an epistemological process that is automatic and reliable at the same time. It is reliable in the epistemological-externalist sense of not involving any inference, reflection, theorizing or epistemic justification: a baby’s perception of her mom’s facial expression of discontentment (in the usual sense of “per- ception”) does not constitute a reason supporting the belief that mommy is discontent. The very word “belief” should not be understood in the usual sense but rather in the sense of a natural inclination for truth. But at the same time, it is automatic because the belief is a result or output of a process entirely subliminal and computational in nature. Thus, for instance, a child perceives that her mom is discontent (fact-awareness) by perceiving consciously (“perception” in the usual sense) a facial expression of discontentment (sensorial input) but recognizes that her mother is discontent as a result (output) of an entirely subliminal process. (shrink)

Elements of the relation between religion and politics are standard themes in political theory: toleration and free exercise rights; the parameters of separation of church and state; arguments for and against constraints imposed on religious discourse by philosophic norms of public reason. But religious parties and partisanship are no part of political theory, despite contemporary interest in value pluralism and in liberal democratic theory's capacity to address multicultural, religious, and ethnic group claims. This essay argues that religious parties are (...) missing elements in discussions of identity politics. They play an important role not just in expressing but also in constructing and mobilizing religious political identity. Political activity linked to parties is a principal way of bringing diffuse, politically unorganized groups, whose leaders are self-appointed and not regularly accountable for the way they represent co-religionists in political life, into the democratic mainstream. With political organization and especially partisanship, the fact of pluralism is made concrete for democratic purposes. (shrink)

Modern democracy is impossible without political parties. They are necessary in the process of the construction of the political class and building of relations between politicians and ‘ordinary people’. So, in Poland in the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries the significance of parties is also very important. Their history is older than the history of the reborn Poland. Especially in Galicia, an autonomous province of the Hapsburg empire, we can see the activities of many politicians. A part of them in (...) 1895 declared the birth of the Popular Party which is a constant element of the Polish political scene. The second traditional current is the socialistic movement, which is also always legally active in Poland. These two camps represent, in simplification, the ‘two Polands’—the first more traditional, conservative and provincial, and the second more progressive, ‘European’ and urban. Actually, in the typical consciousness of a Polish citizen, the political representation of the ‘black’ country is the party Law and Justice of Jarosław Kaczyński, and the ‘red’ country admires the Citizen Platform with Donald Tusk as a leader. But probably the idea of a twoparty system, like in the Anglo-Saxon world, is still very distant to reality, because in the European continent, the tradition of pluralism in a policentric version is still very significant. In Poland, even in the period of the ‘real socialism’ this conception of the organization of political life was realized, though naturally in the specific version. There were three legal parties and the Polish United Workers’ Party (the PUWP) was the most important. From 1976, the PUWP in the light of the Constitution had the official hegemony in the Republic. It is possible to compare this situation with the period 1926–39, when, after the coup d’état by Marshal Piłsudski, the Government still won in the election and the official elite wanted to create a stable political force with a perspective of permanent rule. But we must remember that between the wars opposition always was legal. In our times of demoliberalism, this is quite normal (though under the Constitution, unconstitutional parties, for example, communist or fascist, are unacceptable); however, interesting is the fact that when you observe sine ira et studio the evolutional trend of the Polish political system, you easily find the tendency of the ‘stabilization’ of the party system in the way of legal operations. From 1997, the laws concerning political parties have changed the possibilities of the conquest of seats in the Seym. Actually, only the parties having 5 per cent (or 8 per cent in coalition) of votes can gain the representation in the Diet. So it is possible to claim that the little parties today are in a more complicated situation than in the first years after the ‘operation of Round Table’ in 1989. The contemporary system is maybe more stable, but less liberal. There are theoreticians who note the danger of the alienation of the political class in the situation of the renewal of the alienation of the political elite, which de facto is more connected with the state than with the society. Many theoreticians emphasize that in the future the role and the character of political structures will be profoundly different from today. Maybe they are prophets, but we can expect that the Polish political parties or ‘post-parties’ and also political structure as a whole will have many similarities with their actual equivalents, because the mentality of the Polish nation, including the politicians, is more or less enduring. (shrink)

The text introduces a translation of Ilyenkov’s famous text “On the State of Philosophy,” which was meant as a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU and expressed his exasperation with the development of Soviet philosophy. In our introduction, we describe the historical context of the emergence of the letter, including the main changes in Soviet philosophy in the 1960s (esp. rise in popularity of cybernetics), and the institutional details of Ilyenkov’s biography. We point to the contemporary relevance (...) of the letter by emphasizing how Ilyenkov’s dialectical account of science can enrich contemporary discussions in the sociology of science and STS. (shrink)

Dans un régime comme celui de la République populaire de Chine, où prévaut la suprématie d’un Parti-État unique, la politique et le politique constituent, a fortiori plus qu’ailleurs, la chasse gardée de l’élite dirigeante du pays, à savoir les cadres du Parti communiste. Cet article tente de saisir qui sont les élites politiques aux commandes de la Chine d’aujourd’hui à travers l’analyse du modus operandi de l’École des cadres du Parti de Shanghai. L’étude de cette institution, qui participe à la (...) régulation de la circulation des élites et constitue l’un des lieux privilégiés de la transmission et de l’exercice du pouvoir, permet, par-delà son propre fonctionnement, d’éclairer la nature et le devenir même du régime. S’il apparaît que les forces modernisatrices, en assimilant davantage l’École du Parti à un institut d’administration publique, œuvrent à la professionnalisation du métier de cadre, c’est également et avant tout afin de mieux perpétuer l’hégémonie du Parti-État unique.In a regime where the one Party-State rule still prevails, as is the case in the People’s Republic of China, the polity and politics constitute – here more than anywhere else – the private ground of the country’s ruling elite, i.e. the cadres of the Communist Party. This article attempts to grasp who the political elites in control of contemporary China are, by analyzing the modus operandi of the Shanghai Party School for Cadres. The study of an institution that takes part in the circulation of the elites and hence constitutes one of the privileged playing fields for the transmission and the exercise of power, allows, beyond the understanding of its own working, to shed light on the very nature and evolution of the regime. If the modernizing forces appear to work towards the professionalization of the cadres’ craft by equating the Party School to an institute of public administration, they ultimately do so in order to better perpetuate the supremacy ofthe one-Party system. (shrink)

Often ‘nationalism’ and ‘having a state proper to the nation’ are considered as inseparable. Relatedly, when these thoughts are applied to the reality of sub-state nations, such as Flanders, Catalonia Basque Country and Québec, sub-state nationalism (SSN) and separatism seem to be conceptually entangled in their aim for an independent state. This chapter considers sub-state nationalism and sub-state separatism as conceptually distinct, and aims at examining the relationship between sub-state separatist political parties and (...) immigration policies. This requires, on the one hand focusing on the integration policies, given that often immigration policies with regard to admission and removal lies beyond the competence of sub-state nations. On the other hand, it focuses on the two major Flemish pro-independence parties, namely the Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), and Vlaams Belang (VB). While sub-state separatist movements appear to be particularly opposed to increasing immigration, they operate under a particular ‘legitimacy dilemma’ with its paradoxical tendencies to both exclude and include immigrants. The chapter will show contextually that even the relatively more inclusive political party positions, such as the ones taken by the N-VA, are not sufficiently inclusive, when the normative distinction between ‘cultural assimilation’ and ‘cultural integration’ is taken seriously. Theoretically, it will engage with a renowned articulation of the legitimacy dilemma offered by Will Kymlicka, to argue that it is not sufficient to account for the normative necessity to respect the ‘autonomy of immigrants’. As I will demonstrate, this has to do with the inability of the dilemma to distinguish sufficiently ‘cultural assimilation’ from ‘cultural integration’. In other words, on the one hand the chapter contributes to the apparent absence of strong defenses for ‘moral autonomy of immigrants, by describing what such an autonomy might imply for designing of integration policies. On the other hand, it critically assesses Flemish pro-independence parties’ concrete policies with respect to integration. By offering a contextual political theory on these issues, it offers an example of how a moral principle might be implemented, and serve as a critical focal point to evaluate public policies. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relation between communication and preservation of social norms guarded by third-party sanctions. In 2001 Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak derived deductively the existence of such norms from a simple boundedly rational choice model. Their analysis was based on a perfect public information case. We take into account communication and analyse at the micro level the process of production and interpretation of information on which decisions are based. We show that when information is fully private and (...) we allow for communication a state of anomie can result. If some social control mechanisms are available, social stability can be maintained. The less efficient the social control mechanisms however, the more restrictive rules will be needed to sustain the social norms. Furthermore not all cognitive strategies for interpreting received messages are equally effective. Strategies based on reputation are better than strategies based on profit analysis. (shrink)

This paper examines the reasons why peasant migrants in Chinese cities, a long exploited but silent working class, recently started to voice out claims for better protection of their legal rights. As legal consciousness develops among migrant workers, who slowly learn how to mobilize the law in an effort to resist an oppressive system, so does the awareness of the regime's failings and of the need for alternative forms of representation. However, the migrants' attempts to achieve more autonomy have so (...) far been hijacked by the Party_state and hardly give rise to society empowerment. mobilization of the grassroots, how to guide the new civil rights movement towards a nonviolent and legal form of expression; how to limit the negative developments caused by the reform through political reform, protect society’s rights and constrain officials’ rights in order to establish a political system that respects human rights—these are the challenges confronting the Chinese Communist regime if it wants to appease the wrath of the people. (shrink)

This article challenges dominant explanations in the comparative political economy literature on the origins and purposes of social protection. Far from being a tool of working-class mobilization, social protection in southern Spain was strategically employed by a left party to politically demobilize its supposedly “natural” constituencies. This peculiar outcome is the result of a setting that is common in welfare states outside of northern Europe: the context of a divided left, in which parties and unions are seeking to mobilize (...) different constituencies and in which left parties are themselves divided between moderate and far-left groups. The result in Spain was that social policy became a weapon in parties' efforts to undermine their political competition. This suggests the need to rethink the received wisdom about what the welfare state does to build working-class power in the context of a divided left. (shrink)

When President Donald Trump honored radio host Rush Limbaugh with the Presidential Medal of Freedom during the State of the Union Address in 2020, nearly everyone knew why this was happening. A rad...

The policy projected by the Eighth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany rests on two cornerstones. First, there is the task of further raising the material and cultural living standard of the people on the basis of the higher rates of development of socialist production which result from increased efficiency, scientific-technological progress, and a rise in labor productivity. Second, there is the foreign policy task decided jointly with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries: "to create (...) favorable external conditions for the building of socialism, to further the strengthening of the community of socialist states, to strengthen international solidarity with peoples fighting for their freedom, to realize the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence between states having different social systems, and to struggle actively against aggressive imperialism." (1. (shrink)

The article is about defining ethnic parties and their classification. We define and discuss the terms politics, political party, ethnis group and ethnical party. We state differences about the traditional model of politics and the modern one. We analyze the importance of the political parties in representing the political rights of the people and what is needed so a political party can be established in the Republic of Macedonia. Also we show how to determine which (...) class='Hi'>party is an ethnical party and show a number of ethnic parties in Republic of Macedonia using the name of the party as an indicator. In this part we discuss the indicators and we state that good indicator is the program of the election campaign of the party. But still this is not 100% sure indicator if the party is ethnical. We concluded this because there are a lot of examples when the ruling party before the start of the election campaign does a research about the ethnical groups and after the research makes projects meant for the ethnic groups so the party can get the votes from the chosen ethnicity. At the end we concluded that the programs and the statues of the political parties are the best indicators and answer if a political party is a non-ethnical, multi-ethnical or ethnical political party. (shrink)

While the transnational public sphere has existed in the Arendtian sense at least since the mid-19th century, a new kind of reflexively political global civil society emerged in the late 20th century. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and networks have limited agendas and legitimacy and, without the support of at least one state, limited means to realise changes. Since 2001, theWorld Social Forum (WSF) has formed a key attempt in forging links and ties of solidarity among diverse actors. (...) Although the WSF may seem a party of opinion when defined negatively against neoliberal globalisation, imperialism, and violence, in more positive ideological terms it remains a rather incoherent collection of diverse actors; while itself defined as a mere open space. There is a quest for new forms of agency such as a world political party. Various historical predecessors of global political parties, real and imagined, provide conceptual resources, useful experiences for envisaging the structure, and function of a possible planetary partyformation. H.G. Wells’s ‘open conspiracy’ is a particularly important future-oriented leftdemocratic vision. Wells believed that only a mass movement of truly committed individuals and groups could have the power to transform the world political organisation, by creating a democratic world commonwealth. Recently, for instance, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have formulated similar ideas. I argue that transformative political agency presupposes a shared programme, based on common elements of a wider and deeper world-view, and willingness to engage in processes of collective will-formation in terms of democratic procedures. From this perspective, I outline a possible organisation and some substantial directions for a global political party. The point is also to respond to the criticism of existing parties and cultivate the critical-pluralist ethos of global civil society, but in terms of democratic party-formation. Keywords: Arendt; citizenship; civil society; participation; political party; republicanism; rotation; Wells; world parliament; World Social Forum (Published: 22 June 2011) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 4 , No. 2, 2011, pp. 81-102. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v4i2.7334. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE PARTY'S OVER (ALMOST): TERMINAL CELEBRATION IN CONTEMPORARY FILM Tony Bartlett Syracuse University Movies are a universal language, and as we approach more and more integrated levels of global economy and communication they increasingly become a universal symbol system. At these levels a modern movie from China orNigeria will display swiftly recognizable sensibilities and situations to any viewer in Europe or the USA, and vice versa. But should (...) we not, therefore, also feel prompted to indicate a universal de-symbolization, if movies along with the modern world reflect constitutive elements of decomposition and collapse. For I would like to suggest in this essay that not only do movies constitute a kind ofplanetary envelope, literally a "film" of collective imaginai references wrapped around the world, but that this "film" is peculiarly apt to dismemberment, to breaking up before our eyes even as it still holds together, to abuilt-in "crisis" that is part ofits very nature. The two films that form a background to these remarks, Natural Born Killers and Pulp Fiction, are, I suggest, movies that set out actively to represent this cinematic crisis. In Adam Smith's The Wealth ofNations (Bk. 2, Vol. 5, 795-97), the grandfather ofmodern capitalism discusses the fate ofthe laborer who leaves arural village in which he is known and his life observed, or "attended to," by others. He moves to a great city where promptly "he is sunk in obscurity and darkness." Smith's concern is not directly to remedy this misery ofthe worker forced to seek employment in the anonymity ofthe city, but to avoid a possible course ofaction he might take. He wishes to divert him from the possibility of joining "a small religious sect," in whose company the newly depersonalized worker will achieve "a degree of consideration which he never had before." 2 Tony Bartlett Adam Smith does not relish the prospect ofthe mushroom growth ofclosed, "unsocial" religious factions within the heart of industrialized political economies, and he proposes two remedies by which the state, "without violence," might correct these tendencies. His proposals are remarkable both for their conjunction ofcertain themes and their prescience. The first is a plan for the imposition of the study of science and philosophy on the middle ranks ofthe poor, for science is "the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition." Next to this classic Enlightenment nostrum comes the following: The second ofthose remedies is the frequency and gaiety of publick diversions. The state, by encouraging, that is by giving entire liberty to all those who for their own interest would attempt, without scandal or indecency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, musick, dancing; by all sorts ofdramatic representations and exhibitions, would easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse ofpopular superstition and enthusiasm. Publick diversions have always been the object of dread and hatred, to all the fanatical promoters ofthose popular frenzies. Here are the movies before the fact. Adam Smith in his charter for emergent industrial capitalism sketches an alliance between education and entertainment that together will prevent any reversion to the darkness ofsmallscale society and its ready excrescence of religious fanaticism. All of the components of cinema aesthetic are assembled in Smith's prophetic vision: cinematography, script, score, choreography, plot, spectacle. The only thing lacking was the technology to capture them together on film, and with the release ofinventive energies attending division oflabor that would only be a matter of time. Cinema is the born ally ofrational modernity, and is in itself the child of industrial alienation and the need to find a mass aesthetic to substitute for the control exercised by the sacred in a traditionally local setting. But, ofcourse, there are several levels ofirony that are not lost on us here. First, Smith says explicitly that the state has a direct interest in such mass entertainment. What then is the relationship between the much prized freedom ofthe creative artist and the very concrete concern for self-preservation on the part ofthe state? He specifies that the people's entertainment must be without scandal or indecency: what now should be said when political leaders... (shrink)

The lead article in the Hastings Center Report's November‐December 2020 issue reconsiders the rationale for requiring that patients have a prescription from a physician to obtain a drug. Madison Kilbride, Steve Joffe, and Holly Fernandez Lynch conclude that growing respect for patient autonomy should lead to a new default for drug access: drugs should be available over the counter unless there are special concerns about harms to third parties or about patients' ability to make decisions for themselves. This conclusion would (...) be a substantial reorientation of drug policy in the United States. Bioethics at a societal level is a theme in the second article, “The Social Risks of Science,” and throughout the issue. (shrink)

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to (...) provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship. (shrink)

Based on qualitative analysis of the Soviet press and official state documents, this article argues that the Communist Party was, counter intuitively, an agent of capitalist dispositions in the Soviet Union during 1970s-1980s. Understanding the spirit of capitalism not simply as an ascetic ethos but in broader terms of the cult of individualism, I demonstrate that the Soviet party-state promoted ideas and values of individuality, self-expression, and pleasure seeking in the areas of work and consumption. By (...) broadening our conception of the spirit of capitalism, tracing the formation of capitalist dispositions as well as institutions, and showing that the culture of capitalism can come from within the old regime, I further the agenda of neoclassical sociology of studying varieties of origins, paths, and destinations of modern capitalisms. (shrink)

The contrast between the normative functions of political parties in representative democracies and their empirical working is stark and rapidly increasing. This article starts from a sober, realist account of the empirical state of affairs and from structural problems of democracy and participations – in terms of limits of time, information, qualification and relevant expertise – that have to be acknowledged by any realist–utopian proposal of alternatives beyond the exclusive alternative of ‘thin, realist democracy’ or emphatic ‘strong, participatory, direct, (...) or mass democracy’. We can do better. My search for institutional alternatives looks not for the replacement of political parties but for their relief. Many, not all, of their normative tasks can be shared with other functional networks, associations and organizations. In exploring such a new division of political labour I draw on older debates and designs of associative democracy and on recent discussions to democratize expertise and to expertise democracy in order to address urgent societal problems of high-risk decisions under conditions of extreme complexity, contingency, unpredictability and uncertainty and deep contestedness of our knowledge, problems that turn out to be unmanagable by party politics and representative democracy. (shrink)

This article analyses the legal basics of the Member States liability in damages for the breach of European Union law and the conditions for liability. It is emphasized that the Member States liability in damages for the breach of European Union law has three different grounds—one direct legal background (Article 4 of the Treaty of the European Union) and two indirect basics—principles of direct effect and that of effectiveness of European Union law. The author subsequently examines the content of each (...) condition for liability established in the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union —the intention of the rule of European Union law infringed to confer rights on private parties, the sufficiently seriousness of the breach and the direct causal link between the breach and the damage. It is stated that in order to prove that a Member State is liable for the breach of European Union law, one more condition for liability should be established—a private party must prove that he has incurred particular damage. It is also highlighted that the second condition for the Member States liability in damages for the breach of European Union law —sufficiently seriousness of the breach—restricts the right of a private party to obtain compensation. (shrink)

In their report in this supplement on research regulatory systems, Barbara Bierer and Mark Barnes note that, when research misconduct has been detected but not yet proven, the individual with institutional responsibility for oversight of research misconduct investigations “may determine that notification of relevant journals or professional societies and correction or full retraction of implicated papers or presentations is appropriate. In those cases, even when a finding of research misconduct per se has not been made or has not been explicitly (...) stated, the journal, professional society, and their readers or members may draw their own conclusions as to what led to the retraction or correction.” This statement highlights an aspect of the reviewed regulatory schemes that creates vulnerability for institutions of higher education subject to the regulations: while, as the authors suggest, it may be “appropriate” to notify third parties (that is, journals, professional societies, and other academic institutions) of suspected research misconduct, there is no regulatory obligation to provide such a notification, and, in fact, providing early (or any) notification is contrary to the confidentiality provisions of the research misconduct regulations. Moreover, the institution—and individuals acting on behalf of the institution—may face legal exposure for notifying outside entities. (shrink)