Develops a theory of culture based on a metaphysics that elaborates on the Platonic and Confucian traditions. In Metaphysics of Goodness, Robert Cummings Neville extends Alfred North Whitehead’s project of cultural studies, which was based on a new metaphysics that Whitehead developed in Adventures of Ideas. Neville’s focus is value or goodness in many modes. The metaphysics treated in this book derive from the Platonic and Confucian traditions, with significant modifications of Whitehead, Peirce, Dewey, Confucius, Xunzi, (...) and Zhou Dunyi. Part one develops a theory of form based on a metaphysics of harmony. Part two elaborates a theory of art based on a metaphysics of beauty. Part three sketches a theory of personhood based on a metaphysics of obligation. Part four discusses civilization in a systematic way based on a metaphysics of flourishing. Throughout the book, Neville elaborates a theory of interpretation that is inspired by Peirce, Dewey, and Xunzi but is not limited to their ideas. While the reasoning of the book is concise, it employs methodologies from many kinds of philosophy, art criticism, ethics, and cultural studies, and sees philosophy as needing to learn from all these disciplines. “Neville’s work is informed by a lifelong engagement with the most important philosophers in history, including Plato, Aristotle, Whitehead, and Dewey. Here, he offers an important argument that there is beauty not only in how people see the world, but also in the world itself.” — Kevin Schilbrack, Appalachian State University. (shrink)

Two of Jacques Maritain's enduring classics are Existence and the Existent and The Person and the Common Good. In the first he explores the key themes of his constructive Thomism while engaging broad currents of existentialist thought. In the second he proposes a personalist-communitarian vision that illuminates the common good. Maritain's paired concerns of metaphysics and politics, and their often-surprising connections, set the stage for this new volume. In Search of Harmony: Metaphysics and Politics is comprised of (...) original essays by twenty scholars. Some contributors are well-established, while others bring fresh voices to the perennial philosophy. The authors trace the metaphysical commitments of political thought and highlight the political implications of metaphysical perspectives. Of special note are the essays that examine the roots of our political predicaments and how we might heal our cultural confusions. Still other essays examine the sources of conscience in the context of a secular liberal polity that seems unable to recognize them. To be sure, the interplay of metaphysics and politics has a rich historical background. History tells us that there have always been implications for conscience. We need only think of Plato and Aristotle and Augustine for classical antecedents, of Hobbes and Locke and Kant for early modern antecedents, of Hegel and Marx in the nineteenth century, of Buber and Mounier and Arendt in the twentieth century. In their reflections the contributors to this volume explore many of these figures. Nonetheless, this work has its own distinct purpose and perspective. Drawing these essays together is the tradition of The American Maritain Association and its signature commitment to the work of Jacques and Raïssa Maritain and of other Thomists who clarify our "interesting times" and challenge the established disorder. (shrink)

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT LEIBNIZ’S NOTION OF HARMONY plays a crucial role in his philosophical system. Leibniz drew on this concept of harmony in motivating, and explaining, numerous areas of his thought: everything from Leibnizian mathematics and metaphysics to ethics and social philosophy, incorporates the notion of harmony as a central descriptive and explanatory concept. While there has been much discussion of some the applications of harmony in Leibniz’s system– especially the mind-body harmony, (...) and the so-called universal harmony of simple perceiving substances–little attention has been paid to Leibniz’s very concept of harmony. Yet it seems important for understanding Leibniz’s holistic philosophy that we grasp this concept, for he employed the term “harmony” when describing so many features of the created world: there is a harmony between geometry and physics, between efficient and final causation, between nature and grace, to mention just a few. (shrink)

This article offers a study of the early formation and development of the ideal of harmony in ancient Chinese philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy. It shows that, unlike the Pythagorean notion of harmony, which is primarily based on a linear progressive model with a pre-set order, the ancient Chinese concept of harmony is best understood as a comprehensive process of harmonization. It encompasses spatial as well as temporal dimensions, metaphysical as well as moral and aesthetical dimensions. It (...) is a fundamentally open notion in the sense that it does not aim to conform to any pre-set order. This broader, richer, and more liberal understanding of harmony has had a profound influence on Chinese culture as whole in its long history. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the different understandings of “harmony”, which are rooted in ancient Greek and Chinese thought, can be recapitulated in the name of “dialectic harmony” and “ambiguous harmony” regarding the representation of the beautiful. The different understandings of the concept of harmony lead to at least two kinds of aesthetic value as well as ideality – harmony in conciliation and harmony in diversity. Through an explication of the original meaning and (...) relation between the concept of harmony and beauty, we can learn more about the cosmo-metaphysical origins in Western and Eastern aesthetics, with which we may gain insights for future aesthetics discourse. (shrink)

In this article, we critically discuss the ideal of alignment, unity and harmony in cross-sector partnerships for wicked problems like sustainable development. We explore four characteristics of the concepts of identity, unity and difference which are presupposed in the partnership and collaboration literature, and point at their metaphysical origin. Based on our analysis of these four characteristics, we show the limitations of the metaphysical concepts of identity and difference in the case of CSPs for wicked problems like sustainable development.

This paper shows that a careful reading of Laozi’s The Way and Its Power enables one to come up with a metaphysics of awareness. This is done by rejecting those accounts that paint Laozi as a mystic or cosmologist and by arguing for the human-centeredness of his approach. It is shown that three central ideas in Laozi’s work can all be understood as referring to properties of awareness. These three ideas are the Way , return , and non-action . (...) The “Way” refers to awareness itself, “return” refers to the way in which awareness oscillates between activity and stillness, and “non-action” refers to how awareness expresses itself in action. This interpretation fits with the Daoist project of articulating a way of living that brings human existence into harmonious relation to the world. (shrink)

Se plantea la cuestión del papel de la armonía en la concepción de la racionalidad de Leibniz. Se sitúa esta noción en el marco de la metafísica de la individualidad sistémica, y aparece en dos lugares concretos. En primer lugar en el eje categorial uniformidad-diversi­dad, como principio de equilibrio entre ambos polos. Y en segundo lugar, aparece la noción de armonía en el nivel último de la racionalidad, concretamente en plano de la lógica de los principios. Este nivel se rige (...) por el principio general del orden, y precisamente este principio es explicado por Leibniz frecuentemente en relación con la armonía. (shrink)

in the context of neville’s other work, the first thing to say about this book is that its main topic, the metaphysics of goodness, carries forward one of the major themes of his entire philosophical corpus, starting with his first article “Man’s Ends,” published in 1962. Together with his ontological theory of creation ex nihilo, Neville’s axiological-relational metaphysics—his metaphysics of harmony—is what most distinguishes his thought and unifies it as a system. Moreover, for Neville, axiology and (...) ontology are integrally related topics. My focus here, however, will be on his axiology.Within the context of modern thought, Neville’s insistence on the reality of goodness is enough to mark him as an outlier, but... (shrink)

The 1695 publication of the “New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and of the Union which Exists between the Soul and the Body” in the June 27 and July 4 issues of the Parisian Journal des sçavans marks an important milestone in Leibniz’s philosophical trajectory. It presented the first comprehensive public presentation of his metaphysics as it had matured over the preceding decades, and it would spark many lively exchanges and debates between Leibniz and his (...) philosophical contemporaries in the decades to come. This chapter provides background regarding the text’s genesis and reception, and introduces its main philosophical themes. After highlighting some interpretative challenges raised by both the “New System’s” form and philosophical content, it goes on to explore two key elements of the metaphysical picture it advances: Leibniz’s account of individual substances, and his theory of the pre-established harmony between them. (shrink)

Argues that Leibniz's denial of counterfactual or transworld identity is grounded in metaphysical considerations – specifically in his belief in a coalescence of conceptual connections and causal connections, which is marked by his revival and adaptation of the Scholastic Aristotelian notion of substantial form. Exploration of Leibniz's views about miracles and about perceptual relations leads to the conclusion that his denial of counterfactual identity does not claim intrinsic metaphysical necessity, but appeals to considerations of God's wisdom and goodness; and that (...) he can deny transworld identity only on the assumption that only aggregates of mutually harmonious substances count as worlds. (shrink)

Decolonization is synonymous with liberation. It is invoked in multiple overlapping geopolitical projects that demand both the undoing of imperial-colonial structures and the amelioration of their effects. In his essay “Decolonizing Western Epistemology/ Building Decolonial Options,” Walter Mignolo describes decoloniality as a double-faced concept. Decolonization is a geopolitical project while decoloniality is an epistemological, political, and ethical process that enables decolonial futures (Mignolo 2011, 20). In this way, decoloniality is an analytical that critiques coloniality but also a generative utopian project (...) that relies on decolonial epistemologies to materialize these futures. Like settler colonialism, coloniality is a structure that exceeds colonization and capitalism, expressing itself as modernity. It is the epistemic and hermeneutical processes of decoloniality that reveal ways of living and being—what Mignolo calls “living in harmony and reciprocity”—that ultimately build a nonimperial, noncapitalist world (Mignolo 2011, 25). In this article I put decolonial theory in conversation with Indigenous articulations of decolonization and religious life to illustrate what Indigenous decolonial futures may look like. I argue that reclamations of Indigenous metaphysical life regenerate Indigenous ontologies (intersubjective personhood) in ways that not only secure decolonial futures but also heal historical trauma, which can be understood as ontological dispossession. (shrink)

Perfect Harmony and Melting Strains assembles interdisciplinary essays investigating concepts of harmony during a transitional period, in which the Pythagorean notion of a harmoniously ordered cosmos competed with and was transformed by new theories about sound - and new ways of conceptualizing the world. From the perspectives of philosophy, literary scholarship, and musicology, the contributions consider music's ambivalent position between mathematical abstraction and sensibility, between the metaphysics of harmony and the physics of sound. Essays examine the (...) late medieval and early modern history of ideas concerning the nature of music and cosmic harmony, and trace their transformations in early modern musico-literary discourses. Within this framework, essays further offer original readings of important philosophical, literary, and musicological works. This interdisciplinary volume brings into focus the transformation of a predominant Renaissance worldview and of music's scientific, theological, literary, as well as cultural conceptions and functions in the early modern period, and will be of interest to scholars of the classics, philosophy, musicology, as well as literary and cultural studies. (shrink)

The notion of harmony has played a pivotal role in a number of debates in the philosophy of logic. Yet there is little agreement as to how the requirement of harmony should be spelled out in detail or even what purpose it is to serve. Most, if not all, conceptions of harmony can already be found in Michael Dummett's seminal discussion of the matter in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Hence, if we wish to gain a (...) better understanding of the notion of harmony, we do well to start here. Unfortunately, however, Dummett's discussion is not always easy to follow. The following is an attempt to disentangle the main strands of Dummett's treatment of harmony. The different variants of harmony as well as their interrelations are clarified and their individual shortcomings qua interpretations of harmony are demonstrated. Though no attempt is made to give a detailed alternative account of harmony here, it is hoped that our discussion will lay the ground for an adequate rigorous treatment of this central notion. (shrink)

Mereological harmony is the idea that the mereological structure of objects mirrors the mereological structure of locations. Grounding harmony is the idea that there is a similar mirroring between the grounding structure of objects and locations. Our goal in this paper is exploratory: we introduce and then explore two notions of grounding harmony: locative and structural. We outline potential locative and structural harmony principles for grounding, and show which of these principles may entail, or be entailed (...) by, principles of mereological harmony. We then present a case study in grounding harmony, by applying it to Schaffer’s :31, 2010a) specific version of priority monism. We show that, given a strong form of grounding harmony, Schaffer-style monism is inconsistent, but that this inconsistency can be resolved by offering bespoke notions of grounding harmony. We use Schaffer’s priority monism to demonstrate a broader tension within certain packages of metaphysical views, including versions of priority pluralism. We close by briefly considering the case against structural grounding harmony. (shrink)

Among late Renaissance and early Modern philosophers, the concepts of “sympathy” or “harmony” are a recurring theme. My goal is to show that theories which rely on such concepts, far from being an attempt to avoid the emerging mechanistic or empirical trends, are actually the form which these trends took in the wake of an increasing disenchantment with Aristotelian psychology. Fracastorius, Suarez and Descartes provide the texts: their accounts of the interaction between cognitive faculties exhibit a growing awareness that (...) the conception of causality had to be supplemented. And while each appears to share the general belief that aspects of the Thomistic-Aristotelian framework can survive the necessary changes, they disagree about how much dogmatic psychology has to be discarded. What they decide to leave in and the reasons given for discarding the rest provide insight into the history of explanation. It is in the metaphysics of harmony that we can trace the early growth of Rationalism. (shrink)

Whitehead’s metaphysics provides resources for understanding a world in value-realist terms. Central to this value realism is an aesthetic conception of rationality that sees a hope implicit in our practices—the hope that our linguistic tools are suited to the task of getting things right in our fields of inquiry. This pragmatic hope entails an understanding of individual freedom and responsibility to participate in a patient restructuring of the world toward the highest retention of value. It also enables an understanding (...) of individual freedom as obstructive to this restructuring. One task of this article is to show that attunement in theory to the hope implicit in practice can ameliorate this obstructiveness. A subsequent task is to show that, insofar as this preliminary hope is not a metaphysical premise, but a regulative ideal seeking satisfaction, it can serve as a warrant for an implicit theology in linguistic pragmatism. In this way, I argue that we can come to see pragmatism as a method lending itself to a philosophical theology of the Whiteheadian variety. We can do this precisely insofar as rationalism is seen as predicated on an aesthetic ideal of harmony—a harmony between what is and what ought to be our matters of concern. We can come to see the structure of rationality in terms of an aestheticism corrective of analytic conceptions of meaning and truth. (shrink)

He (和), or harmony, has traditionally been a central concept in Chinese thought, and to this day continues to shape the way in which people in China and East Asia think about ethics and politics. Yet, there is no systematic and comprehensive introduction of harmony as has been variously articulated in different Chinese schools. This edited volume aims to fill this gap. The individual contributions elaborate the conceptions of harmony as these were exemplified in central Chinese schools (...) of thought, including Daoism, Confucianism, Legalism, Mohism, Buddhism, and trace their impact on contemporary Chinese philosophy. The volume explores the various meanings and implications of harmony so as to consider its relevance as a value and virtue in the modern world. It provides an accessible but substantial introductory work for readers interested in learning about pertinent core concepts and theories in Chinese thought, as well as engages specialists in Chinese philosophy by explicating its implications for ethical, political, epistemological, and metaphysical reflection as the basic point of reference. (shrink)

Do human beings have a special and distinguished place in reality? In Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality Thomas Hofweber contends that they do. We are special since there is an intimate connection between our human minds and reality itself. This book defends a form of idealism which holds that our human minds constrain, but do not construct, reality as the totality of facts. Reality as the totality of facts is thus not independent of our minds, and (...) our minds play a metaphysically special role in all of reality. But reality as the totality of things is taken to be completely independent of us. Hofweber's proposed form of conceptual idealism is formulated via the notion of a harmony between our minds and reality. This harmony is defended through considerations in the philosophy of language. How can one possibly defend a metaphysical thesis like idealism from considerations about our own representation? A key step in the book's argument is to consider a special class of concepts--inescapable concepts--which we cannot rationally replace with different ones. This leads to a new approach for making progress in metaphysics--immanent metaphysics--which is broadly neo-Kantian in spirit. (shrink)

According to a common reading, Spinoza and Leibniz stand on opposite ends of the modal spectrum. At one extreme lies ‘‘Spinoza the necessitarian,’’ for whom the actual world is the only possible world. At the other lies ‘‘Leibniz the anti-necessitarian,’’ for whom the actual world is but one possible world among an infinite array of other possible worlds; the actual world is privileged for existence only in virtue of a free decree of a benevolent God. In this paper, I challenge (...) both of these readings. Spinoza is no necessitarian and Leibniz is no anti-necessitarian – at least as these characterizations are usually understood. Rather, I contend, Spinoza and Leibniz are both anti-essentialists; they believe that the modality of objects can vary relative to how those objects are conceived. This shared commitment to anti-essentialism allows them to consistently affirm both necessitarianism and its denial, relative to different ways of conceiving the world. Their embrace of this modal theory, I further argue, is grounded in their similar views on metaphysical perfection, ontological plentitude, and the principle of sufficient reason. (shrink)

Supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to their locations, has recently been defended in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. One of the most powerful arguments in its favour is the so-called argument from harmony. There is a certain harmony between material objects and their locations. Necessarily, if material object x is located at a spherical region, x is spherical. Necessarily, if material object x is located at region r, any part of x is located at (...) a part of r. Supersubstantivalism offers a straightforward explanation of such harmony. By contrast, dualism, the view that material objects are distinct from their locations, does not offer any explanation and should regard harmony principles as unexplained coincidences. In this paper I put forward a theory, which I shall call the ‘Inheritance Theory’, that does provide a straightforward explanation of harmony on behalf of dualists. (shrink)

Although idealism was widely defended in the history of philosophy, it is nowadays almost universally considered a non-starter. This holds in particular for a strong form of idealism, which asserts that not just minds or the mental in general, but our human minds in particular are metaphysically central to reality. Such a view seems to be excessively anthropocentric and contrary to what we by now know about our place in the universe. Nonetheless, there is reason to think that such a (...) strong form of idealism is indeed correct. In this paper, I will present an argument for idealism of this kind through considerations about a harmony between our thought and reality. The central argument in favour of idealism will come from a possibly unexpected source: we can see that a strong form of idealism is true simply from considerations about our language alone. I shall argue that thinking about how we represent reality allows us to conclude that idealism is true, and thus that reality must be a certain way. But no argument of this kind seems to allow for a metaphysical conclusion like idealism, since considerations about our language alone only show how we represent reality, not how reality is. And thus idealism can’t possibly follow, since it concerns how reality is, not just how we represent it to be. A good part of the second half of the paper is devoted to showing how such an argument is possible after all, and that it really does establish idealism. (shrink)

Say that mereological harmony is the view that there is at least some mirroring between the mereological structure of material objects and the mereological structure of their locations: each, in some way, mirrors the other. As it turns out, there is a confusing array of systems of harmony available to the substantivalist. In this paper, I attempt to bring some order to these systems. I explore some systems found in the literature, as well as some natural systems which (...) haven’t been discussed. Along the way, I explore a number of metaphysical consequences of the different systems of harmony. The paper ends with a roadmap of possible views for the substantivalist. (shrink)

The many equivocations that, in several respects, characterised the reception of Leibniz's Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce and Monadologie, up until the last century, find their origins in the genetic circumstances of their manuscripts, which gave rise to misinformation published in an anonymous review that appeared in the Leipzig Acta eruditorum in 1721. Archival research demonstrates that the author of this review, as well as of the Latin review of the Monadologie, which appeared, the same year, in (...) the Supplementa of the Acta eruditorum, was Christian Wolff, who possessed a copy of the Leibnizian manuscrip since at least 1717. This translation figured as a precise cultural strategy that aimed to defuse any idealist interpretation of Leibniz’s monadology. An essential part of this strategy consists in reading the theory of pre-established harmony as a doctrine founded on a strictly dualistic substance metaphysics. (shrink)

This article revisits the "harmony doctrine" school of economics and its distinctive understanding of how ethics and economics intersect. Harmony doctrine thinkers staked out a “natural” understanding of economic phenomena that in many ways fused the classical political economy of Adam Smith with the earlier French Physiocratic School. Their metaphysically grounded interpretation was largely eclipsed by the developments of utilitarian and marginalist schools by the end of the nineteenth century. Yet harmony doctrine thinking adhered to a distinct (...) understanding of how ethical processes and outcomes play out within the economic sphere that has to date gone under examined by business ethicists. This paper outlines three characteristics of harmony doctrine views: the belief in curative forces empowered to "heal" the economic order, a dichotomous interpretation of the economic realm that distinguishes the “natural” from the “artificial,” and an overarching belief in a harmonious social order actualized by cooperative interdependencies within economic enterprises. Despite falling into obscurity in the economic discipline, all these ideas found new life in intellectual currents of organizational and political thought at the turn of the twentieth century. After surveying these historical developments, this article concludes by demonstrating how harmony doctrine thinking helpfully illuminates persisting metaphysical dimensions of contemporary business ethics. (shrink)

This study of the metaphysics of G. W. Leibniz gives a clear picture of his philosophical development within the general scheme of seventeenth-century natural philosophy. Catherine Wilson examines the shifts in Leibniz's thinking as he confronted the major philosophical problems of his era. Beginning with his interest in artificial languages and calculi for proof and discovery, the author proceeds to an examination of Leibniz’s early theories of matter and motion, to the phenomenalistic turn in his theory of substance and (...) his subsequent de-emphasis of logical determinism, and finally to his doctrines of harmony and optimization. Specific attention is given to Leibniz’s understanding of Descartes and his successors, Malebranche and Spinoza, and the English philosophers Newton, Cudworth, and Locke. Wilson analyzes Leibniz’s complex response to the new mechanical philosophy, his discontent with the foundations on which it rested, and his return to the past to locate the resources for reconstructing it. She argues that the continuum-problem is the key to an understanding not only of Leibniz’s monadology but also of his views on the substantiality of the self and the impossibility of external causal influence. A final chapter considers the problem of Leibniz-reception in the post-Kantian era, and the difficulty of coming to terms with a metaphysics that is not only philosophically "critical" but, at the same time, “compensatory.” Originally published in 2050. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

This book amounts to a set of prolegomena to any future metaphysics of the self that might qualify as a science. It seeks to locate the traditional concerns of what is now called "virtue ethics" within the naturalistic parameters of contemporary evolutionary biology, not so much by arguing that those parameters are the necessary ones or the only ones available but by considering what ethical intuitions can be maintained on their hypothesis. Within what the author calls "naturalistic brackets" he (...) proceeds to explore "what would become of ethics if we had no higher ideal to pursue than our own natural health". Those who have already found philosophical stimulation in such writers as Konrad Lorenz, E. O. Wilson, and Mary Midgley, for example, will welcome what amounts to a bridge between a contemporary scientific idiom and the traditional philosophical idioms of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, and Nietzsche. The chief question might be put: How can we make intelligible the nobility of virtue, once we have eschewed all transcendent consolation? The author's positive, optimistic answer requires a careful analysis of the notion of health, both bodily and mental, and a great deal of conceptual sophistication in order to avoid the various pitfalls of reductionist and scientistic thinking. One of the book's striking successes is just how sensibly its author negotiates those potential traps, deftly finding his own clear path through the sorts of debates that have for some time now typically been used to upset or derail metaphysical inquiry: nature vs. nurture, essence vs. freedom, univocity vs. language games, universality vs. contingency. There are no simplistic, irritating either/ors here. Furthermore, the book's "transformational, therapeutic vision of ethics is something very different from the justification of rules of correct behavior that we now think of as moral philosophy". Deontologists will find little comfort in this timely return to exploring the continuities between nature and the good. (shrink)

Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) found phenomenology very helpful for the analysis of concrete human experience and for overcoming the ethical formalism ofKant. Phenomenology, he believed, could also enrich classical Thomism by exploring the lived experience of freedom, interiority, and self-governance. But phenomenology, in his opinion, needed to be supplemented by metaphysics in order to ground experiences such as the sense of duty in the real order. He criticized much modern philosophy for abandoning metaphysics and thus neglecting (...) the sapiential dimension. Since his career as a professor was very short, he did not have time to complete his project of a personalist Thomism in which phenomenology and metaphysics would be harmoniously combined. (shrink)

One of the seemingly dominant traits of pragmatic thought is its “antimetaphysical” attitude. And, indeed, the general methodology of pragmatism may seem by its very nature to exclude the possibility of speculative philosophy, for any pragmatic metaphysics must be at once faithful to the limits of meaningfulness and knowledge imposed by a pragmatic epistemology and in harmony with the scientific spirit of pragmatic philosophy in general. The following essay will examine a pragmatic methodology for metaphysics as it (...) emerges when the philosophies of C. S. Peirce and C. I. Lewis are used for mutual clarification. It is not here held that all pragmatists would accept the methodology which will emerge from such a mutual clarification; neither is it held that no pragmatists other than Peirce or Lewis would accept it. Moreover, it is not held that either Peirce or Lewis consciously embraced it in its entirety. This, however, is not to say that the present procedure is arbitrary, for it is justifiable by the intelligibility of the methodology of metaphysics which emerges and the usefulness of this methodology in clarifying the systematic consistency of epistemology and metaphysics in a pragmatically oriented philosophy. Indeed, according to the basic doctrines of pragmatism, no other justification can be offered for this or any interpretive schema. (shrink)

This volume is intended for professional philosophers and laymen with an interest in East-West studies and comparative philosophy and religion. The central focus is the concept of comparing perspectives from both the Eastern and the Western philosophical traditions on harmony and strife. The unique and happy result is an East-West anthology which is directed at analyzing a single philosophical problem which is of importance to both traditions. Unlike many anthologies which tend to be collections of isolated and unrelated essays, (...) the Editors' focus on a single theme has resulted in a unified volume which maintains a high continuity of interest throughout. The Editors have carefully culled and organized essays from a select group of philosophers from the United States, West Germany, Japan, Australia, Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong. Harmony and strife are analyzed as systematic concepts in Western philosophy, as parts of classical Chinese thought, as central concepts in Buddhism, as metaphysical concepts, as dialectical concepts and even as null concepts. The Editors have taken great care so that a continuity and a coherence of presentation is achieved despite the striking variety of perspectives from which harmony and strife are analyzed. It is both unusual and important to have such a systematic and thorough investigation of a topic of paramount social and philosophical significance by some of the leading minds of the day. Besides, the essays included are eminently readable. The volume is likely to become a standard work in this area for some years to come. (shrink)

This book proposes three new metaphysical categories: Meta-One (元一), Multi-One (殊一), and Utter-One (全一). The author argues that this new system of metaphorical metaphysics is rooted in and developed from traditional Chinese philosophy and is the metaphysical foundation of twenty-first century philosophy.

Contains a brief survey of the first Critique’s Transcendental Dialectic, but it is primarily devoted to a treatment of Kant’s changing views on the fundamental question of how to arrive at a theoretical account of the unity of the world that overcomes the shortcomings of occasionalism, theories of pre-established harmony, and naïve versions of the doctrine of ‘physical influx’. It stresses that although it is very difficult to determine exactly how Kant comes to a distinctive and stable position on (...) this question, the topic is clearly of fundamental importance in all stages of his work, and throughout all of them he favours the affirmation of real interaction between finite substances. Draws on ideas and materials from lectures by Kant, and it also relies heavily on several newly found sets of notes from Kant’s lectures on metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper attempts to reexamine the relationship between metaphysics and psychology. It proposes that the rejection of metaphysics in psychology is due to a conception of metaphysics in more traditional terms, despite the fact that much of psychology is influenced by this traditional metaphysics. Our proposal is to look at metaphysics in a way that emphasizes the personal. By accomplishing this paradigm shift, psychology can be seen as intrinsically harmonious with an underlying metaphysical position accurately (...) reflecting lived human existence. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The Metaphysical Society was founded in 1869 at the instigation of James Knowles (editor of the Contemporary Review and then of the Nineteenth Century) with a view to "collect, arrange, and diffuse Knowledge (whether objective or subjective) of mental and moral phenomena" (first resolution of the Society in April 1869). The Society was a private club which gathered together a latter-day clerisy. Building on the tradition of the Cambridge Apostles, they elected talented members from across the Victorian intellectual spectrum: Bishops, (...) one Cardinal, philosophers, men of science, literary figures, and politicians. The Society included in its 62 members prominent figures such as T. H. Huxley, William Gladstone, Walter Bagehot, Henry Edward Manning, John Ruskin and Alfred Lord Tennyson. The papers they produced are key primary sources which shed new light on the ideas of their authors on the burning subjects of the day, ranging from the existence and personality of God to the nature of conscience or the existence of the soul. They are a legacy of a period when intellectuals were wondering how, and what, to believe in a time of social change, spiritual crisis, and scientific progress. The dissolution of the Society in 1880 did not diminish the value of the papers: they illustrate a tradition of private, open discussion among famous men of the most widely varying views; they offer detailed insight into the evolution of the relationships between different schools of Victorian scientific and religious thought; and they bring to light heretofore under-represented points of conflict and harmony. All 95 papers are included, accompanied by introductions and scholarly notes that set each paper into their proper context. (shrink)

Karol Wojtyła found phenomenology very helpful for the analysis of concrete human experience and for overcoming the ethical formalism ofKant. Phenomenology, he believed, could also enrich classical Thomism by exploring the lived experience of freedom, interiority, and self-governance. But phenomenology, in his opinion, needed to be supplemented by metaphysics in order to ground experiences such as the sense of duty in the real order. He criticized much modern philosophy for abandoning metaphysics and thus neglecting the sapiential dimension. Since (...) his career as a professor was very short, he did not have time to complete his project of a personalist Thomism in which phenomenology and metaphysics would be harmoniously combined. (shrink)

Though deceptively simple and plausible on the face of it, Craig's interpolation theorem has proved to be a central logical property that has been used to reveal a deep harmony between the syntax and semantics of first order logic. Craig's theorem was generalized soon after by Lyndon, with application to the characterization of first order properties preserved under homomorphism. After retracing the early history, this article is mainly devoted to a survey of subsequent generalizations and applications, especially of many-sorted (...) interpolation theorems. Attention is also paid to methodological considerations, since the Craig theorem and its generalizations were initially obtained by proof-theoretic arguments while most of the applications are model-theoretic in nature. The article concludes with the role of the interpolation property in the quest for "reasonable" logics extending first-order logic within the framework of abstract model theory. (shrink)

Totemic unity as key to community in thought and action -- Myth : the emergence of diversity within unity -- The individual in the Greek polis -- The synthesis of personal uniqueness and social unity in Christian and Islamic thought -- Modern alienation of individuals and society -- Opening a new paradigm for civil society and social harmony : a contemporary metaphysics of freedom -- The diversified unity of a global whole.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 437-438 [Access article in PDF] Michael V. Wedin. Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford Aristotle Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 482. Cloth, $55.00. Michael Wedin has written the equivalent for Aristotle of what biblical scholars would call a "harmony of the gospels." It is a wonderfully rich and argumentatively dense (...) reconstruction of Aristotle's two most important treatises on substance, the Categories and Metaphysics Zeta, works that many of our most able Aristotle scholars have declared irreconcilable.The first chapter, on "the plan" of the Categories, includes a sensible account of the role in that work of the "onymies," as Wedin calls homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy. The second chapter, which focuses on "nonsubstantial individuals" in the Categories, gives the most philosophically sophisticated reconstruction known to me of how Aristotle might have conceived this white in Socrates to be a nonrecurrent particular. Having myself contributed to the glut of recent scholarship on nonsubstantial individuals in the Categories, I have personal, as well as professional, reasons to praise the rigor and insight of this chapter.In Chapter 3 Wedin tries to pin down the ontological commitment of Aristotle's Categories. Since, if there were no primary substances there would not be anything else, the fundamental ontological commitment of the Categories is a commitment to primary substances. Individual nonsubstances exist just in case there are primary substances in which they inhere. As for species and genera of substances and species and genera of the nonsubstantial individuals that inhere in them, Wedin finds Aristotle curiously indifferent to their existence.Chapter 4, a transitional chapter, takes up a range of possible views on the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Incompatibilism is argued against, yet the arguments for compatibilism in recent commentaries are found to be insufficient. In the next chapter Wedin moves on to his own statement of, and justification for, compatibilism.The key to Wedin's compatibilist interpretation is the distinction he draws between being a substance and being the "substance-of" something. Zeta can then be seen to be supplementing, rather than revising, let alone contradicting, the Categories, if Zeta can be understood to be about the substance-of the primary substances of the Categories (157-8).Aristotle proposes in Z3 three candidates for what the substance of, say, Socrates, is, namely, his matter, his form, and the compound of the two. Aristotle settles on form and discusses form as essence in Z4 and Z5, which discussion Wedin takes up in his own [End Page 437] Chapter 6. Then in Chapter 7 Wedin takes on the enigmatic claim of Z6, "In the case of things that are primary and spoken of per se, it is clear that the thing and the essence of the thing are the same" (1032a4-6).Wedin makes Chapter 8, which is primarily a treatment of Z10 and Z11, a discussion of Aristotle on "compositional plasticity," that is, on whether, say, the form of human being might be realized in something other than flesh and bones. "[O]ne could grant," Wedin writes, that to be a human being is just to be a member of a determinate biological species and so to have a very specific material nature, and yet insist that the form of such creatures be realizable in quite different sorts of matter. Creatures so constituted would not be human beings but they would be entities with similar functional capacities and states... From the point of view of philosophy of mind, for example, what matters are the psychological capacities, functions, and states characteristic of persons. Just what these are is determined by a form—the form that happens to be realized in human matter. (340-41) In Chapter 9 Wedin turns to Z13, which, as he acknowledges, has often been thought to be the most confounding chapter in Zeta. Wedin draws on Z16 to help resolve the aporia with which Z13 ends (roughly this... (shrink)

This book offers a major reassessment of Leibniz's metaphysics. Christia Mercer has exposed the underlying doctrines of Leibniz's philosophy. By analysing Leibniz's early works she demonstrates that the metaphysics of pre-established harmony developed many years earlier than previously believed and for reasons which have not been understood. As a result of this analysis she has unearthed a philosophical school that Leibniz scholars have not recognized. A much deeper understanding of some of Leibniz's key doctrines emerges. Moreover, since (...) the Leibniz that is revealed here does not fit neatly into the standard accounts of the history of philosophy and science, Christia Mercer's study will prompt scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

This essay seeks to contribute to our understanding of William James's ethics by reexamining a classic text— The Varieties of Religious Experience—that is not usually read in an ethical light. It shows that James develops an ethics of human flourishing in Varieties, which he grounds in a "piecemeal supernaturalist" cosmology and account of human nature. It also shows that, under the terms of James's view, religious and ethical issues are fundamentally interconnected, and leading a religious life is a necessary (though (...) not a sufficient) condition of maximal human flourishing. Overall, I show that for James the highest degree of human flourishing can be achieved only through the experience of metaphysical intimacy, or the self's harmonious relationship or unification with "a wider self.". (shrink)

: This essay seeks to contribute to our understanding of William James's ethics by reexamining a classic text—The Varieties of Religious Experience—that is not usually read in an ethical light. It shows that James develops an ethics of human flourishing in Varieties, which he grounds in a "piecemeal supernaturalist" cosmology and account of human nature. It also shows that, under the terms of James's view, religious and ethical issues are fundamentally interconnected, and leading a religious life is a necessary (though (...) not a sufficient) condition of maximal human flourishing. Overall, I show that for James the highest degree of human flourishing can be achieved only through the experience of metaphysical intimacy, or the self's harmonious relationship or unification with "a wider self.". (shrink)

This volume is intended for professional philosophers and laymen with an interest in East-West studies and comparative philosophy and religion. The central focus is the concept of comparing perspectives from both the Eastern and the Western philosophical traditions on harmony and strife. The unique and happy result is an East-West anthology which is directed at analyzing a single philosophical problem which is of importance to both traditions. Unlike many anthologies which tend to be collections of isolated and unrelated essays, (...) the Editors' focus on a single theme has resulted in a unified volume which maintains a high continuity of interest throughout. The Editors have carefully culled and organized essays from a select group of philosophers from the United States, West Germany, Japan, Australia, Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong. Harmony and strife are analyzed as systematic concepts in Western philosophy, as parts of classical Chinese thought, as central concepts in Buddhism, as metaphysical concepts, as dialectical concepts and even as null concepts. The Editors have taken great care so that a continuity and a coherence of presentation is achieved despite the striking variety of perspectives from which harmony and strife are analyzed. It is both unusual and important to have such a systematic and thorough investigation of a topic of paramount social and philosophical significance by some of the leading minds of the day. Besides, the essays included are eminently readable. The volume is likely to become a standard work in this area for some years to come. (shrink)

The author of the article analyses the historical and philosophical principles used by B. Russell, L. Couturat, E. Cassirer, H. Heimsoeth, W. Kabitz, B. Jansen, D. Mahnke and others to interpret the relation between logic and metaphysics in the philosophy of G. W. Leibniz. The article proves that the approach of W. Kabitz is a significant regression compared to the approach of E. Cassirer due to the ignoring of Leibniz's contribution to the history of logic, methodology and theory of (...) cognition, as well as due to the too narrow modernised understanding of logic. The author disagrees with the interpretation of B. Jansen, who based Leibniz's philosophy on non-cholastic pre-established harmony. The disadvantage of D. Mahnke's approach is, in the author's opinion, a failure to understand that synthesis for the sake of synthesis can never be creative, and the construction of a universal philosophical system can never be the goal of true philosophical creativity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume: Between Leibniz and Kant (The role of pre-established harmony in Hume's philosophy) Vadim Vasilyev 1. Introduction In the history of eighteenth century European philosophy, Hume appears as an important connecting link between Leibniz and Kant. I mean, however, not only the well-known historical fact that Hume "awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber" (and it was the "dogmatism" ofLeibnizian metaphysics), but I shall try to show that (...) it is true from the philosophical point of view as well. The first problem I would like to discuss is the actual relationship between Hume and Leibniz. Hume never openly criticized the views of Leibniz. On the other hand, Hume did not admit himself to be a follower of him. Did Hume everread any works ofLeibniz? Hume has never said thathe did. Hume also hasn't directly quoted these works, so it looks like Hume wasn't acquainted with them at all. Nonetheless, we can show that already in 1739 Hume had known Theodicée which can be considered as the main treatise ofLeibniz. In his Abstract Hume writes: The celebratedMonsieurLeibnitz has observed it tobe a defect in the common systems of logic, that they are very copious when they explain the operations ofthe understanding in the forming ofdemonstrations, but are too concise when they treat of probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely depend, and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations. In this censure, he comprehends the essay on human understanding, Ie recherche de la vérité, and l'art dépenser.1 The fragment is a rendering of the following passage from Theodicée: caril n'y a rien de plus impartaitqui nostre Logique, lorsqu'on va au delà des argumens nécessaires; et les plus excellens philosophes de nostre temps, tels que les Auteurs de l'Art de penser, de la Recherche de la vérité, et de l'Essai sur Volume XLX Number 1 19 VADIMVASILYEV l'entendment, ont été fort éloignés de nous marquer les vrais moyens propres à aider cette faculté qui nous doit faire peser les apparences du vrait et du faux: sans parler de l'art d'inventer.2 So, it is highly probable that Hume knew Theodicée. The ideas ofLeibniz in Hume's philosophy The most important philosophical ideas of Theodicée are: the definitions ofpossibility and oftwo kinds ofnecessity, a theory of"the best possible world" and a conception ofthe pre-established harmony. As we shall see, all these ideas, one way or another, were assimilated by Hume. In his Theodicée Leibniz states that a distinction should be made between two kinds of necessity and, correspondingly, between two kinds ofnecessary knowledge: metaphysical and moral.? ne faut done que bien entendre des distinctions, comme celle que nous avons pressée bien souvent entre le necessaire et le certain, et entre la nécessité métaphysique et la nécessité morale. (Theodicée, 284, par. 282) Metaphysical or mathematical truths are such that propositions which are opposite to them imply contradictions. Or les vérités de la Raison sont de deux sortes; les unes sont ce qu'on appelle les Vérités Eternelles, qui sont abolument nécessaires, en sorte que l'opposé implique contradiction. (Theodicée, 50, par. 2) Not so regarding the moral truths; the opposite statements may be false but they imply no contradictions and are possible: "? est vray qu'il n'y auroit point eu de contradiction dans la supposition que Spinosa fût mort à Leide, et non pas à La Haye; il n'y auroit rien de si possible" (Theodicée, 218, par. 174). The possibility is equivalent to logical consistency and what is possible may be distinctly conceived: puisqu'il y a bien des choses qui ne sont jamais arrivées et n'arriveront jamais, et qui cependant sont concevables distinctement, et n'impliquent aucune contradiction, comment peut on dire qu'elles sont absolument impossibles? (Theodicée, 257, par. 234) 20Hume Studies HUME: BETWEEN LEIBNIZ AND KANT Hume uses all these definitions. The following fragment is a good example. The non-existence ofany being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an... (shrink)

This article aims to make further progress in revising the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a popularisation and systematisation of Leibniz’s doctrines. It focuses on the topic of the communication among substances and the metaphysics of simples and activity underlying it. It is argued that Wolff does not accept the pre-established harmony in its orthodox Leibnizian version. The article explains Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s PEH as stemming from his rejection of Leibniz’s construal of the activity of every (...) simple as representational power and of the metaphysics of unity and activity in which that construal is rooted. (shrink)

This paper takes a close look at the thought that mereological relations on material objects mirror, and are mirrored by, parallel mereological relations on their exact locations. This hypothesis is made more precise by means of a battery of principles from which more substantive consequences are derived. Mereological harmony turns out to entail, for example, that atomistic space is an inhospitable environment for material gunk or that Whiteheadian space is not a hospitable environment for unextended material atoms.

The article presents a dialogue between Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow. It argues that a process metaphysic provides an alternative to the Christian liberation paradigm and could help feminists in religion to articulate alternatives to the concept of God as a dominant male other found in classical theism. A shared metaphysic could help feminists in different religious traditions to recognize common concerns and commitments, to guard against claims of uniqueness and exclusivity of religious traditions, and to engage with the (...) complexities of diversity. Anticipating arguments against a feminist process paradigm, the dialogue addresses further questions: Is the idea of divinity as unfailing sympathy too good to be true? How do we explain bad things happening – is divinity evil as well as good? How does a process idea of divine sympathy differ from the traditional notions of God as love? Other issues considered are: self-sacrifice as love; the place of anger in a relational theology; co-creation and power with versus over. In conclusion the author suggests that the foundation of a shared spiritual feminist ethic would be understanding that life in the body is to be enjoyed by all and accepting responsibility to co-create a more just and harmonious world. (shrink)