Since the inception of the Minimalist Program, Noam Chomsky has increasingly pushed the boundaries of a minimalist conception of grammar, one that pares the mechanisms specific to language down to the bare bones. In addition to the structure‐building operation of Merge, grammar involves some mechanism for feature interaction. Chomsky has explored several different varieties of a mechanism AGREE responsible for these kinds of feature interactions, for example feature matching, feature valuation, and feature movement, as discussed in this chapter. (...) The Minimalist Program leads to the question of whether Merge could be sufficient for narrow syntax. Actual implementations of even simple grammatical descriptions of real natural languages always appear to require more than Merge, but this chapter explores some of the ways in which various different mechanisms might be reduced to Merge, in the spirit of the Minimalist Program. (shrink)

Primary and methyl aliphatic halides and tosylates undergo substitution reactions with nucleophiles in one step by the classic S N 2 mechanism, which is characterized by second-order kinetics and inversion of configuration at the reaction center. Tertiary aliphatic halides and tosylates undergo substitution reactions with nucleophiles in two (or more) steps by the classic S N 1 mechanism, which is characterized by first-order kinetics and incomplete inversion of configuration at the reaction center due to the presence of ion (...) pairs. When the nucleophile is also the solvent, the substitution reaction is called a solvolysis, and both the S N 2 and S N 1 reactions now obey first-order kinetics. Schleyer and Bentley have provided solid, but not conclusive, evidence that secondary substrates undergo solvolysis by a merged mechanism, one that blends characteristics of both the S N 2 and S N 1 mechanisms. The following paper presents the history of their sustained pursuit of a merged mechanism and subsequent rebuttals to this claim. Several issues related to the philosophy and sociology of science are also discussed. (shrink)

This work considers the formalisation of the merging process of stratified belief bases, where beliefs are stored in different layers or strata. Their strata are ranked, following a total order, employing the value the agent using the belief base assigns to these beliefs. The agent uses an argumentation mechanism to reason from the belief base and obtain the final inferences. We present two ways of merging stratified belief bases: the first is defined by merging two strata without belief preservation, (...) and the second by merging two strata with belief preservation. For these operators, as layers merge, it is possible that some information has to be deleted from the stratum to maintain consistency. The latter merge operator will be defined as performing their actions so that information removed from the stratum is preserved after the merging by moving it to a stratum containing information perceived as having a lower value and where those beliefs may trigger a new revision, possibly starting a cascading effect. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the treatment of variables in dynamic semantics. Referent systems are introduced as a flexible mechanism for working with variables. In a referent system we carefully distinguish the variables themselves both from the machinery by which we manipulate them - their names - and from the information that we store in them - their values. It is shown that the referent systems provide a natural basis for dynamic semantics. The semantics with referent systems is compared (...) with the familiar formalisms in dynamic semantics, DRT and DPL. (shrink)

Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, seeks to explain mental activities such as reasoning, remembering, language use, and problem solving, and the explanations it advances commonly involve descriptions of the mechanisms responsible for these activities. Cognitive mechanisms are distinguished from the mechanisms invoked in other domains of biology by involving the processing of information. Many of the philosophical issues discussed in the context of cognitive science involve the nature of information processing. For philosophy of science, a central question is (...) what counts as a scientific explanation. But what is a mechanistic explanation and how does it work, how can philosophy of science use it as a solution for the problem of integration in cognitive science? By answering these questions and merging my answers with discussion of concepts of philosophy, normativity and generality, I will investigate the following claim. -/- I claim that philosophy by using strength concepts such as normativity, generality, and a mechanistic philosophy of explanations, can be a most important contributor to cognitive science. I also investigate how philosophy of science could be (can be) a bridge between psychology and neuroscience. We need a distinction between philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy in cognitive science; I am talking about the latter. -/- This claim is very important for the integration and the future of the interdisciplinary field known as cognitive science. -/- Philosophy as a true cognitive science -/- When the Cognitive Science Society was founded, in the late 1970s, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology were playing smaller roles. The three disciplines that formed the core group were artificial intelligence, psychology, and linguistics. The curious thing is that George Miller, a psychologist and an important founder of cognitive sciences in a hexagon diagram that he presented, put philosophy at the top of the diagram and neuroscience at the very bottom. There is enough agreement now that neuroscience is the most important contributor to cognitive science and there are fair connections between philosophy and neuroscience. In that diagram there was almost no connection between philosophy and neuroscience. -/- The developments and rise of cognitive science in the last half-century has been accompanied by considerable amount of philosophical activity. Perhaps no other area within analytic philosophy in the second half of that period has attracted more attention or produced more publications. (Bechtel and Graham, 1998. Rumelhart and Bly 1999. Bechtel, Mandik, Mundale 2001. Thagard, 2007. Bennett and Dennett et al, 2007. Bennett and Hacker, 2008. Andler, 2009. Frankish and Ramsey, 2012.) -/- Many philosophers of science offer conclusions that have a direct bearing on cognitive science and its practitioners can profit from closer engagement with the rest of cognitive science. For example, William Bechtel has discussed three projects, two in naturalistic philosophy of mind and one in naturalistic philosophy of science that have been pursued during the past 30 years, that he contends, can make theoretical and methodological contributions to cognitive science (Bechtel, 2009). Paul Thagard is another example of the mentioned emerging school of philosophers of science that define cognitive science as the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence (Thagard, 2006). Thagard by presenting some general but important philosophical questions such as, “What is the nature of the explanations and theories developed in cognitive science?”, and by providing answers to these central questions has showed how philosophy of science can help cognitive science by the advantage of its generality. Andrew Brook, however, believes that philosophical approaches have never had a settled place in cognitive science but he is listed in a group of the philosophers of science that they are contributing very closely the cognitive science (Brook, 2009). Daniel Dennett , as well as being a member the mentioned naturalistic philosophers of science, believes that there is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science. -/- What are mechanisms? Let us begin abstractly before considering an example. Mechanisms are collections of entities and activities organized together to do something (cf. Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Craver & Darden, 2001; Bechtel &Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996). These explanations are known as ‘mechanistic explanations’. By using and developing these mechanistic explanations of philosophy of science one can draw normative consequences for cognitive science. Paul Thagard (Thagard, 2006 and 2009), William Bechtel (Bechtel, 2008 and 2009), Andrew Brook (Brook, 2008) investigated and promoted using the ‘normativity’ in philosophy to show a better and crucial role for philosophy of science in an interdisciplinary known as cognitive science. Some philosophers have thought that, in order to pursue this normative function, philosophy must distance itself from empirical matters, but there are examples where the investigations of descriptive and normative issues go hand in hand. ( Thagard, 2009). -/- I will investigate how we can reduce a higher-level science such as psychology to neuroscience without the problems of reductionism but via mechanistic explanations. By problem I mean psychology does not lose its autonomy. -/- Conclusion -/- If cognitive science is all about understanding the human mind, or if cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence, since the whole life of philosophy was involving with the ways of knowing (epistemology) and conceptions of reality (metaphysics), also philosophy has considered the so-called mind-body problem ( identity theory, functionalism, and heuristic identity theory) , then philosophy could be the most deserved discipline to be a most contributor in cognitive science. I tried to discuss this by using the three advantages in philosophy, normativity, and generality and by introducing an emerging school of mechanistic (not mechanical) philosophers. One thing left, as cognitive science is a two-way street, philosophers need also to stop in a station of cognitive science and learn from the most important advances in brain and neuroscience. -/- . (shrink)

It is rare that we have Arthur Schopenhauer and Thomas Hobbes in the same publication, and when this occurs, it is usually aimed at exploring their dissenting political views. However, this study is based on the belief that both philosophers have significant similarities in their theories about the creation of the individual as a human being. Schopenhauer and Hobbes have, in their constructions, the pessimistic view of human nature and, furthermore, there are prominent similarities in the construction of the human (...) machinery, similarities that at times appear to merge. The goals that Hobbes and Schopenhauer had when they wrote their works were different, however, what we show in this study is that pessimism is a prolific path for philosophical theory. (shrink)

Besides mechanistic explanations of phenomena, which have been seriously investigated in the last decade, biology and ecology also include explanations that pinpoint specific mathematical properties as explanatory of the explanandum under focus. Among these structural explanations, one finds topological explanations, and recent science pervasively relies on them. This reliance is especially due to the necessity to model large sets of data with no practical possibility to track the proper activities of all the numerous entities. The paper first defines topological explanations (...) and then explains why topological explanations and mechanisms are different in principle. Then it shows that they are pervasive both in the study of networks—whose importance has been increasingly acknowledged at each level of the biological hierarchy—and in contexts where the notion of selective neutrality is crucial; this allows me to capture the difference between mechanisms and topological explanations in terms of practical modelling practices. The rest of the paper investigates how in practice mechanisms and topologies are combined. They may be articulated in theoretical structures and explanatory strategies, first through a relation of constraint, second in interlevel theories, or they may condition each other. Finally, I explore how a particular model can integrate mechanistic informations, by focusing on the recent practice of merging networks in ecology and its consequences upon multiscale modelling. (shrink)

Inquiry into language evolution has been controversial, mainly because there is no consensus as to the nature of both ‘evolution’ and ‘language.’ Berwick and Chomsky make sense of the evolution of language by treating it as a biological phenomenon. In contrast to functional characterizations of language as ‘communication’ or ‘speech,’ the authors define it as, essentially, a mind-internal computational mechanism. Within their minimalist approach, hierarchical syntactic structure is achieved through the recursive application of a basic operation called ‘Merge.’ The (...) simplicity of the basic operation is consistent with archeological evidence suggesting an evolutionary recent origin of language. (shrink)

Adaptive phenotypic plasticity allows organisms to cope with environmental variability, and yet, despite its adaptive significance, phenotypic plasticity is neither ubiquitous nor infinite. In this review, we merge developmental and population genetic perspectives to explore costs and limits on the evolution of plasticity. Specifically, we focus on the role of modularity in developmental genetic networks as a mechanism underlying phenotypic plasticity, and apply to it lessons learned from population genetic theory on the interplay between relaxed selection and mutation accumulation. (...) We argue that the environmental specificity of gene expression and the associated reduction in pleiotropic constraints drive a fundamental tradeoff between the range of plasticity that can be accommodated and mutation accumulation in alternative developmental networks. This tradeoff has broad implications for understanding the origin and maintenance of plasticity and may contribute to a better understanding of the role of plasticity in the origin, diversification, and loss of phenotypic diversity. (shrink)

Recently, the group of McBride reported a stunning observation regarding peroxisome biogenesis: newly born peroxisomes are hybrids of mitochondrial and ER-derived pre-peroxisomes. What was stunning? Studies performed with the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae had convincingly shown that peroxisomes are ER-derived, without indications for mitochondrial involvement. However, the recent finding using fibroblasts dovetails nicely with a mechanism inferred to be driving the eukaryotic invention of peroxisomes: reduction of mitochondrial reactive oxygen species generation associated with fatty acid oxidation. This not only explains (...) the mitochondrial involvement, but also its apparent absence in yeast. The latest results allow a reconstruction of the evolution of the yeast's highly derived metabolism and its limitations as a model organism in this instance. As I review here, peroxisomes are eukaryotic inventions reflecting mutual host endosymbiont adaptations: this is predicted by symbiogenetic theory, which states that the defining eukaryotic characteristics evolved as a result of mutual adaptations of two merging prokaryotes. See also the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/HtyKhQ3DSxg Eukaryotic peroxisomes illustrate effects of symbiogenesis, following the non-phagocytotic merger of an archaeon and a bacterium. Internal ROS formation upon fatty acid oxidation was reduced by the invention of peroxisomes for extra-mitochondrial FA oxidation. Both peroxisomal membranes and their oldest enzymes seem ultimately derived from the pre-mitochondrion. (shrink)

Landauer's principle, often regarded as the basic principle of the thermodynamics of information processing, holds that any logically irreversible manipulation of information, such as the erasure of a bit or the merging of two computation paths, must be accompanied by a corresponding entropy increase in non-information-bearing degrees of freedom of the information-processing apparatus or its environment. Conversely, it is generally accepted that any logically reversible transformation of information can in principle be accomplished by an appropriate physical mechanism operating in (...) a thermodynamically reversible fashion. These notions have sometimes been criticized either as being false, or as being trivial and obvious, and therefore unhelpful for purposes such as explaining why Maxwell's Demon cannot violate the second law of thermodynamics. Here I attempt to refute some of the arguments against Landauer's principle, while arguing that although in a sense it is indeed a straightforward consequence or restatement of the Second Law, it still has considerable pedagogic and explanatory power, especially in the context of other influential ideas in nineteenth and twentieth century physics. Similar arguments have been given by Jeffrey Bub. (shrink)

The widespread critical evidence surrounding executive compensation of listed corporations has boosted shareholder activism in recent decades. The say-on-pay (SOP) mechanism—a vote in which shareholders express their (dis)agreement with executive pay designs—is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that has led to this activism among listed firms. Merging agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) arguments, this paper analyzes how effective SOP voting results are among listed family firms in terms of CEO compensation efficiency and equity. Using a sample of UK (...) listed firms from 2011 to 2018, our results show that SOP effectiveness is positively influenced by family ownership and is strongly moderated by family involvement in management and in governance as well as by family generation. Our findings stress the strong family effect and the ethical perceptions of family shareholders on SOP voting, showing how family participation in the firm encourages fairer and more aligned CEO compensation packages. SOP institutional and practical implications oriented to preserve shareholder value and family wealth are finally outlined. (shrink)

Written for non-experts, this volume introduces the mechanisms that underlie reticulate evolution. Chapters are either accompanied with glossaries that explain new terminology or timelines that position pioneering scholars and their major discoveries in their historical contexts. The contributing authors outline the history and original context of discovery of symbiosis, symbiogenesis, lateral gene transfer, hybridization or divergence with gene flow, and infectious heredity. By applying key insights from the areas of molecular (phylo)genetics, microbiology, virology, ecology, systematics, immunology, epidemiology and computational science, (...) they demonstrate how reticulate evolution impacts successful survival, fitness and speciation. Reticulate evolution brings forth a challenge to the standard Neo-Darwinian framework, which defines life as the outcome of bifurcation and ramification patterns brought forth by the vertical mechanism of natural selection. Reticulate evolution puts forward a pattern in the tree of life that is characterized by horizontal mergings and lineage crossings induced by symbiosis, symbiogenesis, lateral gene transfer, hybridization or divergence with gene flow, and infective heredity, making the “tree of life” look more like a “web of life.” On an epistemological level, the various means by which hereditary material can be transferred horizontally challenges our classic notions of units and levels of evolution, fitness, modes of transmission, linearity, communities, and biological individuality. The case studies presented examine topics including the origin of the eukaryotic cell and its organelles through symbiogenesis; the origin of algae through primary and secondary symbiosis and dinoflagellates through tertiary symbiosis; the superorganism and holobiont as units of evolution; how endosymbiosis induces speciation in multicellular life forms; transferrable and non-transferrable plasmids and how they symbiotically interact with their host; the means by which pro- and eukaryotic organisms transfer genes laterally (bacterial transformation, transduction and conjugation as well as transposons and other mobile genetic elements); hybridization and divergence with gene flow in sexually-reproducing individuals; current (human) microbiome and viriome studies that impact our knowledge concerning the evolution of organismal health and acquired immunity; and how symbiosis and symbiogenesis can be modelled in computational evolution. (shrink)

Vibrant Death links philosophy and poetry-based, corpo-affectively grounded knowledge seeking. It offers a radically new materialist theory of death, critically moving the philosophical argument beyond Christian and secular-mechanistic understandings. The book's ethico-political figuration of vibrant death is shaped through a pluriversal conversation between Deleuzean philosophy, neo-vitalist materialism and the spiritual materialism of decolonial, queerfeminist poet and scholar Gloria Anzaldua. The book's posthuman deexceptionalizing of human death unfurls together with a collection of poetry, and autobiographical stories. They are analysed through the (...) lens of a posthuman, queerfeminist revision of the method of autophenomenography (phenomenological analysis of autobiographical material). Nina Lykke explores the speaking position of a mourning, queerfeminine "I", who contemplates the relationship with her dead beloved lesbian life partner. She reflects on her enactment of processes of co-becoming with the phenomenal and material traces of the deceased body, and the new assemblages with which it has merged through death's material metamorphoses: becoming-ashes through cremation, and becoming-mixed-with-algae-sand when the ashes were scattered across a seabed made of fiftyfive million-year-old, fossilized algae. It is argued that the mourning "I"'s intimate bodily empathizing (theorized as symphysizing) with her deceased, queermasculine beloved life partner facilitates the processes of vitalist-material and spiritual-material co-becoming, and the rethinking of death from a new and different perspective than that of the sovereign, philosophical subject. (shrink)

The concept of the republic is a complex meta-principle that facilitates and conceals global relations of domination. Specifically, it enables the invisibility of racism as the core of political power. From its very origins the concept of republic serves to seize constituent power or politeia. In modernity, as it merges with private property, it will serve as the launchpad of a vast colonization project that then evolves in a new form of power in coloniality. The article applies the theory of (...) the ‘encryption of power’—to decrypt the historical concept of the republic. In doing so, we will demonstrate the key antidemocratic role it has played at the heart of global coloniality. We will bear witness as to how, from within the concept of republic, a refined mechanism of domination raises and expands, conforming the most magnificent and lethal form of power of our times. We exemplify our theory showing that the concept of ‘republic’ is the common thread between the law that abolished slavery in Brazil and the 1988 constitution. Within this scope, we propose a vital space of reconsideration of political ontology through radical democracy as the only means to build the world from immanent difference. (shrink)

Argumentation represents a way of reasoning over a knowledge base containing possibly incomplete and/or inconsistent information, to obtain useful conclusions. As a reasoning mechanism, the way an argumentation reasoning engine reaches these conclusions resembles the cognitive process that humans follow to analyze their beliefs; thus, unlike other computationally reasoning systems, argumentation offers an intellectually friendly alternative to other defeasible reasoning systems. LogicProgrammingisacomputationalparadigmthathasproducedcompu- tationallyattractivesystemswithremarkablesuccessinmanyapplications. Merging ideas from both areas, Defeasible Logic Programming offers a computational reasoning system that uses an argumentation (...) engine to obtain answers from a knowledge base represented using a logic programming language extended with defeasible rules. This combination of ideas brings about a computationally effective system together with a human-like reasoning model facilitating its use in applications. (shrink)

An integrated statement is made concerning the semantic status of nodes in a propositional semantic network, claiming that such nodes represent only intensions. Within the network, the only reference to extensionality is via a mechanism to assert that two intensions have the same extension in same world. This framework is employed in three application problems to illustrate the nature of its solutions.The formalism used here utilizes only assertional information and no structural, or definitional, information. This restriction corresponds to many (...) of the psychologically motivated network models. Some of the psychological implications of network processes called node merging and node splitting are discussed. Additionally, it is pointed out that both our networks and the psychologically based networks are prone to memory confusions about knowing unless augmented by domain‐specific inference processes, or by structural information. (shrink)

The Serial Endosymbiotic Theory explains the origin of nucleated eukaryotic cells by a merging of archaebacterial and eubacterial cells. The paradigmatic change is that the driving force behind evolution is not ramification but merging. Lynn Margulis describes the symbiogenetic processes in the language of mechanistic biology in such terms as “merging”, “fusion”, and “incorporation”. Biosemiotics argues that all cell-cell interactions are (rule-governed) sign-mediated interactions, i.e., communication processes. As the description of plant communication demonstrates, the biosemiotic approach is not limited to (...) the level of molecular biology, but is also helpful in examining all sign-mediated interactions between organisms on the phenotypic level. If biosemiotics also uses the notions of “language” and “communication” to describe non-human sign-mediated interactions, then the underlying scientific justification of such usage should be critically considered. Therefore, I summarize the history of this discussion held between 1920 and 1980 and present its result, the pragmatic turn. (shrink)

In the nineteenth century there were as many formulations of Darwinian evolution as there were Darwinians. Consequently, Michael Ruse defines a “Darwinian” as “someone who identified with Darwin, but not necessarily someone who accepted all of Darwin’s ideas.” Therefore, the only way to determine what William James meant by Darwinian evolutionary science is by checking his references to it and his adoption of recognizably Darwinian theory and methods. By “Darwinian evolution” he sometimes refers to a reductionist interpretation according to which (...) consciousness is nothing but brain processes, and survival of the fittest is applied to reality mechanistically. He excepted himself from this interpretation, however, and his own evolutionary Darwinism was a merging of idealist philosophical and empirical scientific commitments. James was confident that his reading of Darwin and particular application of it were consistent with the Darwinian texts and that the reductionist Darwinians who understood the survival of the fittest as a justification for a Hobbesian state of nature were misreading Darwin. (shrink)

Mammalian sperm undergo discharge of a single, anterior secretory granule following their attachment to the zona pellucida surrounding the oocyte. This secretory discharge is known for historical reasons as the acrosome reaction. It fulfils a number of purposes and without it, sperm are unable to penetrate the zona pellucida and fuse with the oocyte. In this review, we focus on the role of the acrosome reaction in the development of fusion competence in sperm. Any naturally occurring membrane fusion has two (...) major sequential steps: a docking or adhesion step, in which two membranes adhere, and a fusion step, in which their lipid bilayers are destabilized and merged and a cellular compartment is either created or destroyed. Recent evidence suggests that there is an important role for oocyte integrins and sperm‐bound disintegrins in mammalian sperm/oocyte adhesion and fusion. The fusion mechanism employed by sperm remains poorly understood, however, and circumstantial evidence suggests it is more complex than the interaction between a single protein species and its target. Sperm/oocyte fusion is probably the most accessible eukaryotic model for intercellular fusion currently available, partly because it is temporally separated from gene expression. Elucidation of the mechanism of sperm/oocyte fusion may throw light on the mechanism of other intercellular fusions such as myoblast fusion, and the evolutionary relationship of intercellular membrane fusion to intracellular membrane fusion. (shrink)

We rarely acknowledge the achievements of doctoral candidates who fought with all they had but still lost the battle and dropped out – we know so little about what becomes of them. This reflective article is about the betrayals of PhD supervisors in one institution, the trauma and stigma of withdrawing from that institution, writing poetry as a coping mechanism and the triumph in completing a Thesis by Publication (TBP) in another institution. Thus, I build on Lesley Saunders’s idea (...) about using poetry to operate on ‘a personal capacity’ in educational research. Accordingly, I present an original autoethnographic poem and other poetic artefacts as well as reflections to sharpen the sociological eye of my story. In it, I merge two different segments of experiences in poetry – trauma and triumph – to draw an image of my doctoral journey, in the moment and in retrospection. By doing so, I illuminate the struggles involved in becoming an independent researcher. I also encourage practitioners to conceive that their negative experiences in doing educational research can be transformed into an achievement depending on the stand they take when faced with it. Certainly, poor academic performance can be closely associated with abandoning doctoral studies, but that is not always the case. Therefore, it is my hope that this autoethnographic work may instill hope in doctoral candidates who are still in the struggle to find a voice. (shrink)

Parte de um percurso em que tratamos de expor a estrutura filosófica LÊtre et lê Néant (EN), o presente estudo procura mostrar que essa obra é o ponto fundamental de transição onde se dá, no pensamento sartriano, a metamorfose de uma teoria do tempo como destino trágico numa teoria do tempo como salvação. Completa-se, aqui, o processo de radicalização de Heidegger efetivado por Sartre: do pessimismo próprio do Dasein, que caminha impotente e solitário para a morte, passamos ao otimismo resultante (...) da descoberta de uma temporalidade que cura. Na tentativa de compreender o sentido e a função dessa nova figura da temporalidade, desmontamos o mecanismo do curto-circuito especulativo que inverte, em EN, o sinal do Tempo do Mundo heideggeriano. Tal desmontagem levou-nos a surpreender o fio filosófico do livro entrelaçado numa trama históricoliterária. Ao examinar os termos desse reencontro da elaboração filosófica com a matéria viva da história, circunscrevendo uma zona (recuada) em que estruturas díspares se interpenetram, terminamos por identificar o conteúdo de experiência cifrado no movimento especulativo dos conceitos desse que é considerado o mais abstrato (e técnico) tratado de Metafísica dos Tempos Modernos. Pretendendo apenas descrever (no sentido da fenomenologia alemã) as estruturas universais da realidade humana (intemporais por definição), Sartre dá com o cerne de uma conjuntura histórica precisa: não a matéria bruta, é claro, mas sua reconstrução política e literária, talhada nos moldes da Resistência e transposta para a forma filosófica de EN.Sartre. Tempo. Metafísica. Política. When Time heals the Wounds of Time itself AbstractPart of a trajectory in which we expose the philosophical structure of L´Être et le Néant (EN), this study aims at demonstrating that this work is the fundamental transition point where, in Sartre´s thought, a theory of time as a tragic destiny metamorphoses itself into a theory of time as salvation. Here, Sartres project of radicalizing Heidegger is completed: from Daseins peculiar pessimism, which proceeds in a lonely and impotent way towards death, we move to the optimism resulting from the discovery of a temporality that cures. In the attempt to understand the meaning and the function of this new figure of temporality, we dismantle the speculative short circuit mechanism that inverts, in EN, the sign of Heideggers Time of the World. This dismantling leads to our discovery of the philosophical red thread of the book entwined in a historical literary plot. When we examine the terms of this reencounter of philosophical creation with the living matter of history, establishing a zone (set back) in which different structures merge, we end up identifying the contents of experience which appear in the conceptual speculative movement of that work which is considered as the most abstract (and technical) treatise of Metaphysics of Modern Times. Intending only to describe (in the sense of German phenomenology) the universal structures of human reality (intemporal by definition), Sartre encounters the core of a precise historical conjunction not the raw material, of course, but its political and literary reconstruction, shaped in the patterns of the Resistance and transposed to the philosophical form of EN.Sartre. Time. Metaphysics. Politics. (shrink)

A session-based recommendation system is designed to predict the user’s next click behavior based on an ongoing session. Existing session-based recommendation systems usually model a session into a sequence and extract sequence features through recurrent neural network. Although the performance is greatly improved, these procedures ignore the relationships between items that contain rich information. In order to obtain rich items embeddings, we propose a novel Recommendation Model based on Multi-channel Convolutional Neural Network for session-based recommendation, RMMCNN for brevity. Specifically, we (...) capture items' internal features from three dimensions through multi-channel convolutional neural network firstly. Next, we merge the internal features with external features obtained by a GRU unit. Then, both internal features and external features are merged by an attention mechanism together as the input of the transformation function. Finally, the probability distribution is taken as the output after the softmax function. Experiments on various datasets show that our method's precision and recommendation performance are better than those of other state-of-the-art approaches. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Wilhelm Griesinger”Aaron L. Mishara (bio)Arens situates Wilhelm Griesinger in a historical context with which we are no longer familiar. In doing so, she has performed an important task for contemporary clinicians, philosophers, and historians. We find ourselves working and thinking (both in everyday clinical practice and in the construction of our models of mental disorder) with the same categories that Griesinger struggled to sort out and redefine; (...) we often do so, however, without awareness of their history or lack of permanence. Ackerknecht writes that all the dominant trends in modern psychiatry can be traced back to Griesinger; he states that Griesinger is the “founder of neuropsychiatry,” a “merging of the two disciplines” neurology and psychiatry. Griesinger presents us with a “systematic synthesis of the anatomical, physiological, psychological and clinical points of view” (Ackerknecht 1959, 63). Somewhat contrarily, Karl Jaspers, in his General Psychopathology, groups Griesinger with the great observers and describers of clinical experience rather than among the systematic analyzers (Jaspers 1963, 849–50). Although Griesinger is best known for his identification of mental disorders as a subset of brain diseases, Karl Bonhoeffer, a successor to Griesinger as director of the Charité Clinic in Berlin, cautions that Griesinger “continued to see in psychological causes the most frequent and abundant source of mental disorders” (Bonhoeffer 1911, 53). Kales, Kales, and Vela-Bueno, however, write, “Griesinger was representative of a clinical movement that minimized the value of psychological concepts in the understanding of mental diseases” (Kales, Kales, and Vela-Bueno 1990, 15). Precisely because of his importance, contention surrounds his legacy.If Griesinger is the pioneer of empirical approaches in biological neuropsychiatry (as Ackerknecht and others claim), he is also precursor to philosophical criticisms of their limits. It is not so easy to lump Griesinger to one side of the oppositions with which we think today: Griesinger’s scientific psychiatry (formed on the basis of the newly emergent empirical physiology) was meant to steer between the Scylla of the previously reigning overspeculative romantic medicine and the Charybdis of the antitheoretical and “positivistic” materialism of Magendie. As Arens suggests, even during the same generation of university psychiatry which Griesinger was critical in forming, he was posthumously denounced as belonging to the Hegelian idealists; later, he was proclaimed to be an empiricist. Griesinger’s work contained both idealism and empiricism in a fragile synthesis that soon broke asunder.Hermeneutic theory points out that we inevitably interpret an author, in this case, Griesinger, in terms of the prejudices of our own present context of understanding and our current problems of application to clinical practice (Gadamer 1993). On the one hand, we benefit from the advantage of seeing all that follows Griesinger’s work and are able to “understand the author [End Page 165] better than he understood himself.” We are able to see what he only anticipates but is still not able to explicitly articulate as the unpredicted effects of his work. On the other hand, our interpretations are encumbered by the sedimentations of the views of his successors: his work lies buried under the subsequent interpretations and vicissitudes of a reception with its own agendas, contexts of interpretation, and realms of application. It would be easier if we could simply assign him to one side of our current debates concerning mind/body, individual/culture, and explanation/understanding rather than seeing that our present quandaries in understanding, classifying, and treating mental disorder result precisely from a reading of Griesinger that is not careful enough. It is here that Arens can help us develop our present views further by reviewing their past.Although Griesinger is heralded as the pioneer of an empirical physiological approach which employs a natural scientific concept of mechanism (Ackerknecht, O. Marx, Verwey), Arens situates him in the tradition of Kant and German idealism. It is perhaps this solution of being both philosophical and empirical which seems hard for us, today, to understand. We have come to view these directions as contradictory, to be necessarily in a mutually exclusive relationship. (But that is rather the expression of the present impasse and not the way that Griesinger originally approached these problems.) Arens ambitiously retraces the genealogy of Griesinger’s model... (shrink)

Kojin Karatani wrote the essays in _History and Repetition_ during a time of radical historical change, triggered by the collapse of the Cold War and the death of the Showa emperor in 1989. Reading Karl Marx in an original way, Karatani developed a theory of history based on the repetitive cycle of crises attending the expansion and transformation of capital. His work led to a rigorous analysis of political, economic, and literary forms of representation that recast historical events as a (...) series of repeated forms forged in the transitional moments of global capitalism. _History and Repetition_ cemented Karatani's reputation as one of Japan's premier thinkers, capable of traversing the fields of philosophy, political economy, history, and literature in his work. The first complete translation of _History and Repetition_ into English, undertaken with the cooperation of Karatani himself, this volume opens with his innovative reading of _The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte_, tracing Marx's early theoretical formulation of the state. Karatani follows with a study of violent crises as they recur after major transitions of power, developing his theory of historical repetition and introducing a groundbreaking interpretation of fascism (in both Europe and Japan) as the spectral return of the absolutist monarch in the midst of a crisis of representative democracy. For Karatani, fascism represents the most violent materialization of the repetitive mechanism of history. Yet he also seeks out singularities that operate outside the brutal inevitability of historical repetition, whether represented in literature or, more precisely, in the process of literature's demise. Closely reading the works of Oe Kenzaburo, Mishima Yukio, Nakagami Kenji, and Murakami Haruki, Karatani compares the recurrent and universal with the singular and unrepeatable, while advancing a compelling theory of the decline of modern literature. Merging theoretical arguments with a concrete analysis of cultural and intellectual history, Karatani's essays encapsulate a brilliant, multidisciplinary perspective on world history. (shrink)

We address the question of why particular laws were selected for the universe, by proposing a mechanism for laws to evolve. Normally in physical theories, timeless laws act on time-evolving states. We propose that this is an approximation, good on time scales shorter than cosmological scales, beyond which laws and states are merged into a single entity that evolves in time. Furthermore the approximate distinction between laws and states, when it does emerge, is dependent on the initial conditions. (...) These ideas are illustrated in a simple matrix model. (shrink)

Kojin Karatani wrote the essays in _History and Repetition_ during a time of radical historical change, triggered by the collapse of the Cold War and the death of the Showa emperor in 1989. Reading Karl Marx in an original way, Karatani developed a theory of history based on the repetitive cycle of crises attending the expansion and transformation of capital. His work led to a rigorous analysis of political, economic, and literary forms of representation that recast historical events as a (...) series of repeated forms forged in the transitional moments of global capitalism. _History and Repetition_ cemented Karatani's reputation as one of Japan's premier thinkers, capable of traversing the fields of philosophy, political economy, history, and literature in his work. The first complete translation of _History and Repetition_ into English, undertaken with the cooperation of Karatani himself, this volume opens with his innovative reading of _The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte_, tracing Marx's early theoretical formulation of the state. Karatani follows with a study of violent crises as they recur after major transitions of power, developing his theory of historical repetition and introducing a groundbreaking interpretation of fascism as the spectral return of the absolutist monarch in the midst of a crisis of representative democracy. For Karatani, fascism represents the most violent materialization of the repetitive mechanism of history. Yet he also seeks out singularities that operate outside the brutal inevitability of historical repetition, whether represented in literature or, more precisely, in the process of literature's demise. Closely reading the works of Oe Kenzaburo, Mishima Yukio, Nakagami Kenji, and Murakami Haruki, Karatani compares the recurrent and universal with the singular and unrepeatable, while advancing a compelling theory of the decline of modern literature. Merging theoretical arguments with a concrete analysis of cultural and intellectual history, Karatani's essays encapsulate a brilliant, multidisciplinary perspective on world history. (shrink)

I hypothesize that the appearance of sex facilitated the merging of the endosymbiont and host genomes during early eukaryote evolution. Eukaryotes were formed by symbiosis between a bacterium that entered an archaeon, eventually giving rise to mitochondria. This entry was followed by the gradual transfer of most bacterial endosymbiont genes into the archaeal host genome. I argue that the merging of the mitochondrial genes into the host genome was vital for the evolution of genuine eukaryotes. At the time this process (...) commenced it was unprecedented and required a novel mechanism. I suggest that this mechanism was meiotic sex, and that its appearance might have been THE crucial step that enabled the evolution of proper eukaryotes from early endosymbiont containing proto‐eukaryotes. Sex might continue to be essential today for keeping genome insertions in check. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/aVMvWMpomac. (shrink)

This is another one of those “let’s see how we can misuse the insights of modern physics to justify a crackpot theory of the universe” type of books. The most worthy such attempt known to me is. It is difficult to take seriously an author who claims that Nazism is an “astral epidemic”, who sees trinitarian implications in the American constitutional system of checks and balances, who accepts without qualification the statement of another researcher that subjects under the influence of (...) LSD were able to recall events in the womb, who is enthusiastic about reincarnation, going so far as to claim that “…we are living within the vortex of all the previous cultures”, and who alleges that the full meaning of a symbol is to be grasped through meditation that removes the opposition of the cognizer and the cognized, through entering of the essence of the object and complete merging with it”. Skepticism toward any of this, moreover, is treated as a sign of latent mechanism, the product of “…a scornful attitude toward human inner experience”, and analogous to the disbelief which at first greeted the Wright brothers. If you like Jung, particularly the theories of archetypes and collective unconscious, you will love Nalimov. He is a talk show host’s dream: full of stories and experiments [sic] similar to those concocted by Targ and Puthoff at Stanford Research Institute during the 1960s—all of which have been thoroughly discredited by. His sincerity is undeniable; he is just an incredibly bad, or else naive, scientist, at least concerning this motley collection of subjects. He is also prone to gobbledygook, for example: when characterizing the difference between humans and computers, he writes “…an illusion is semantically meaningful. We call this semantics illusory only because we are ignorant of the mechanism of interaction of the unconscious myth-like images with the manifestations of consciousness”. Or, talking about “bimodal distribution functions” for a set of exclusive disjunctions, the author alludes to “…the increasing informational entropy of concepts” which creates “…smoothed bimodality”. Very impressive, but what does it mean in plain English—or plain Russian, if the translator is to blame? (shrink)

In an attempt to develop a synthesis between biology and metaphysics, the author argues that the categories of metaphysics should properly come not from an abstract logic, but rather from "organic nature." The arguments of the mechanists and vitalists are re-interpreted; the position of the vitalist is defended and broadened so as to provide a foundation for the new science of psycho-biology, which is to merge with metaphysics.--A. R.

Descartes argued that productivity, namely our ability to generate an unlimited number of new thoughts or ideas from previous ones, derives from a single undividable source in the human soul. Cognitive scientists, in contrast, have viewed productivity as a modular phenomenon. According to this latter view, syntactic, semantic, musical or visual productivity emerges each from their own generative engines in the human brain. Recent evidence has, however, led some authors to revitalize the Cartesian theory. According to this view, a single (...) source or a single mechanism in the human brain produces productivity in every cognitive domain, whether in the domain of music, semantics or syntax. In this article, we will address recent evidence concerning the single source hypothesis from brain-imaging studies, linguistics, cognitive theories of music perception, biology of cognition and cognitive development, along with several objections that have been presented against this hypothesis. We formulate two versions of the Cartesian theory which combine the more recent computational theory of cognition with Descartes' view on productivity. (shrink)

For some time now, commentators in and out of the scientific community have been expressing concern over the direction of scientific research. Cogent critics have labeled it excessively commercial, out of touch with its “pure,” public-spirited roots, and generally too much a creature of its entrepreneurial, self-interested times. In most if not all of this hand-wringing, the scientific community's growing reliance on intellectual property rights, especially patents, looms large. Indeed, for many the pursuit of patents is emblematic of just what (...) is rotten in the republic of science today. (shrink)

The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also (...) unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences. (shrink)

The book examines the psycho-religious mechanism behind the violent extremism of suicide attacks in the post-9/11 world. It employs the mindsponge concept, an original dataset, and original research results obtained from the authors' statistical investigations using the Hamiltonian Markov chain Monte Carlo technique. It provides insights and implications for policymakers and strategists in their efforts to engage in peace talks and reduce violent conflicts worldwide.

Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on (...) several of our own experiments, reported herein. (shrink)

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification (...) enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception. (shrink)

We examine physicists’ charge of ad hocness against the Higgs mechanism in the standard model of elementary particle physics. We argue that even though this charge never rested on a clear-cut and well-entrenched definition of “ad hoc”, it is based on conceptual and methodological assumptions and principles that are well-founded elements of the scientific practice of high-energy particle physics. We further evaluate the implications of the recent discovery of a Higgs-like particle at the CERN’s Large Hadron Collider for the (...) charge of ad hocness against the Higgs mechanism. (shrink)

In recent years, developmental psychologists have increasingly been interested in various forms of prosocial behavior observed in infants and young children—in particular comforting, sharing, pointing to provide information, and spontaneous instrumental helping. We briefly review several models that have been proposed to explain the psychological mechanisms underpinning these behaviors. Focusing on spontaneous instrumental helping, we home in on models based upon what Paulus :77–81, 2014) has dubbed ‘goal-alignment’, i.e. the idea that the identification of an agent’s goal leads infants to (...) take up that goal as their own. We identify a problem with the most well-known model based upon this idea, namely the ‘goal contagion’ model. The problem arises from the way in which the model specifies the content of the goal which is identified and taken up. We then propose an alternative way of specifying the content of the goal, and use this as a starting point for articulating an alternative model based upon the idea of alignment, namely the ‘goal slippage’ model. By elucidating the difference between goal contagion and goal slippage, we contribute to the articulation of experimental criteria for assessing whether and when the mechanisms specified by these two models are at work. (shrink)

Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case (...) is one in which it seems subjects' beliefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism. (shrink)

This thesis examines some mind-body problems traditionally ascribed to Descartes' philosophy. One such problem focuses on inconsistencies in Descartes' general causal claims. Another problem, first put forward by Simon Foucher, concerns Descartes' purported espousal of the following inconsistent triad: mind-body causal interaction, mind-body distinctness, and "the causal likeness principle." The final problem is one regarding free will and determinism. ;In the first Chapter I examine the content and number of Descartes' causal principles. An analysis of the main concepts used in (...) these principles, for example, "perfection," "eminent containment," and "formal containment," is provided. This examination includes a discussion of some medieval antecedents of these concepts. I argue that there is no blatant inconsistency generated by Descartes' causal claims. ;In the second chapter I utilize the analysis of "eminent containment" to show that Descartes was not committed to a "causal likeness principle." Since this principle is crucial for generating the "Foucher mind-body problem," I thus demonstrate that this problem is not one that applies to Descartes' philosophy. ;In this chapter I also examine Descartes' views about the details of psycho-physical change. While there is no blatant inconsistency among these views, I show that Descartes is committed to the inexplicability and indeterminism of the acts of the will. This presents a problem given Descartes' acceptance of psycho-physical interaction and of Laplace-like determinism. ;In the final chapter I argue that Descartes could have avoided this problem by denying Laplacean determinism, but since he lacks a clear position on the matter, it is not the move he himself makes. I also show how Descartes vacillates between a compatibilist and an incompatibilist view of free will. (shrink)

Are causal explanations (e.g., “she switched careers because of the COVID pandemic”) treated differently from the corresponding claims that one factor caused another (e.g., “the COVID pandemic caused her to switch careers”)? We examined whether explanatory and causal claims diverge in their responsiveness to two different types of information: covariation strength and mechanism information. We report five experiments with 1,730 participants total, showing that compared to judgments of causal strength, explanatory judgments tend to bemoresensitive to mechanism andlesssensitive to (...) covariation – even though explanatory judgments respond to both types of information. We also report exploratory comparisons to judgments of understanding, and discuss implications of our findings for theories of explanation, understanding, and causal attribution. These findings shed light on the potentially unique role of explanation in cognition. (shrink)

This paper considers Margaret Cavendish's distinctive anti-mechanist materialism, focusing on her 1664 Philosophical Letters, in which she discusses the views of Hobbes, Descartes, and More, among others. The paper examines Cavendish's views about natural, material souls: the soul of nature, the souls of finite individuals, and the relation between them. After briefly digressing to look at Cavendish's views about divine, supernatural souls, the paper then turns to the reasons for Cavendish's disagreement with mechanist accounts. There are disagreements over the explanation (...) of particular phenomena, but also a broader disagreement over what to take as one's most basic causal model. (shrink)