In a context where individuals are increasingly more sensitive to corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and where mobilization of savings for the energy transition is essential, our article is the first to study the drivers of online green bank adoption. By analyzing 1075 questionnaires from a panel of French individuals in charge of financial decisions in their households, we show that altruism and green consumption values are significant drivers of individuals' green banking adoption and reveal that willingness to adopt a (...) green bank is mediated by the preference for green savings. These results extend the nascent literature dealing with the link between responsible consumption and saving behaviors. Briefly speaking, green banks (and associated savings products) have the potential to enable households to express their consumption values through their investments. That said, our results suggest that households' financial well-being and financial literacy can be barriers to the mobilization of green savings. Our results also demonstrate the significant influence of information system variables, such as personal innovativeness and trust, on willingness to adopt green banking. By shedding light on the drivers of individuals' green bank adoption, our results provide valuable insights for the banking industry. (shrink)

This article is a discourse analysis based on a theory of figures of speech advocated by Orecchionni that analyzes implicit not only as a mark of literality but also as trope of illocutionary type not lexical, lexical, metaphorical or semantic. It considers also the explicit information of the novel through four levels of competency: linguistic, encyclopedic, logical and pragmatic rhetorical and analyzes the romantic statement according to the maxims of quantity, quality, relation or relevance and modality. This study shows, through (...) verbal interactions of « Douane de mer » that the story is the heiress of the mnemonic representation than of historical representation. It sheds light on the dual role played by implicit as a mediator in relation to historical reality or an opaque screen over the truth of the world. (shrink)

This article presents a discussion of how postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical educational thinking relate to different theories of power. I argue that both Critical Theory and some poststructuralist ideas base themselves on a concept of power borrowed from a modernist tradition. I argue as well that we are better off combining a postmodern idea of education with a postmodern idea of power. To this end the concept of power presented by the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe is introduced. (...) This concept controverts a number of major educational concepts, i.e. concepts such as causality, autonomy, subjectivity and originality. In other words, it allows us to take a fresh look at old concepts. Finally, I relate the discussion to a number of recent theories of learning. (shrink)

Can failure be aesthetic or artistic? How can failure be described as an aesthetic phenomenon or as a work of art? Starting from a concept of aesthetic experience and presence this paper seeks answers to said question in four steps. After defining the event ›failure‹ (I), its aesthetic potential is determined (II), and distinguished from failure as art and the artfulness of failure (III). Finally, the significance of the aesthetic experience of failure for its existential understanding is examined (IV).

Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's ' moral twin earth argument' raises doubts about the naturalistic realist's ability to make sense of genuine disagreement. I offer three arguments the realist's behalf. First, I argue that the example at the heart of their argument is underdescribed; when fully developed, it loses its intuitive force. Second, I suggest that taking the stipulations of the Horgan-Timmons example seriously gives us reason to revise our initial judgments. Third, I propose combining naturalistic realism about moral judgments (...) with expressivism about the last ought before action in order to preserve the conflict between moralists and twin -moralists. (shrink)

This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for identifying narrowly (...) moral disagreements. If they do, we can construct cases of intuitively real dispute that do not rest on the theory's preferred mental states. This strategy is possible because our intuitions about moral concept-ascription do not track speakers' noncognitive states. I discuss various ways of developing this basic argument, then apply it to the work of the two most sophisticated proponents of expressivism, Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. I argue that neither is successful in meeting the challenge. (shrink)

Ist das Spurenlesen archaischer Restbestand eines \textgreaterwilden Wissens\textless oder läßt es sich in allen entfalteten Zeichen-, Erkenntnis- und Interpretationstechniken aufspüren? Wie kann das Spurenlesen vom Textlesen und vom Interpretieren sprachlicher und bildlicher Zeichen abgegrenzt werden? Bilden Spuren die Nahtstelle der Entstehung von Sinn aus Nichtsinn? Verbinden sie unsere Zeichenpraktiken mit der Dinghaftigkeit, Körperlichkeit und Materialität der Welt? Werden Spuren entdeckt oder werden sie im Akt des Spurenlesens überhaupt erst hervorgebracht? Das sind Fragen, auf die der Band Antworten sucht. Seine Leitidee (...) ist, daß das Spurenlesen eine Orientierungstechnik und eine Wissenskunst verkörpert, die nicht nur in der Philosophie und den Geisteswissenschaften, sondern auch in den Naturwissenschaften wirksam wird. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to interpret the educational philosophy of John Dewey in a way that accomplishes two goals. The first of these is to avoid any reference to Dewey as a propagator of a particular scientific method or to any of the individualist and cognitivist ideas that is sometimes associated with him. Secondly, I want to overcome the tendency to interpret Dewey as a naturalist by looking at his concept of intelligence. It is argued that ‘intelligent experience’ is (...) the basic concept of education. I suggest how this concept should be understood. I propose to look at it as an interplay between the faculties of imagination and judgment. (shrink)

This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for identifying narrowly (...) moral disagreements. If they do, we can construct cases of intuitively real dispute that do not rest on the theory’s preferred mental states. This strategy is possible because our intuitions about moral concept-ascription do not track speakers’ noncognitive states. I discuss various ways of developing this basic argument, then apply it to the work of the two most sophisticated proponents of expressivism, Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. I argue that neither is successful in meeting the challenge. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to interpret the educational philosophy of John Dewey in a way that accomplishes two goals. The first of these is to avoid any reference to Dewey as a propagator of a particular scientific method or to any of the individualist and cognitivist ideas that is sometimes associated with him. Secondly, I want to overcome the tendency to interpret Dewey as a naturalist by looking at his concept of intelligence. It is argued that ‘intelligent experience’ is (...) the basic concept of education. I suggest how this concept should be understood. I propose to look at it as an interplay between the faculties of imagination and judgment. (shrink)

In this essay it is argued that the educational philosophy of John Dewey gains in depth and importance by being related to his philosophy of nature, his metaphysics. The result is that any experiental process is situated inside an event, an existence, a thing, and I try to interpret this “thing” as schools or major cultural events such as the French revolution. This basic view is correlated to Dewey’s concept of transaction, of experience and finally, it is related to a (...) discussion of methods in education. (shrink)

In much theory there is a tendency to place thought above action, or the opposite, action over thought. The consequence of the first option is that philosophy or scientific evidence gains the upper hand in educational thinking. The consequence of the second view is that pragmatism and relativism become the dominant features. This article discusses how different branches of the Aristotelian tradition can mediate between these two views. I argue, contrary to some other Aristotelian approaches, that thinking and action are (...) both separated and yet prerequisites for each other and point to some educational consequences of this way of thinking. To build this argument I draw on selected aspects of the philosophy of Hanna Arendt, Leo Strauss and John Dewey. (shrink)

Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our (...) moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts. (shrink)

Stehen sich Kants Ethik und die mit Edmund Husserl beginnende phänomenologische Bewegung tatsächlich in Form eines Antagonismus gegenüber? Noch immer wird diese Frage nicht selten bejaht. Die Hypothese der vorliegenden Studie ist jedoch, dass die Behauptung eines solchen Antagonismus letztlich weder aus der Perspektive der kantischen Schriften noch aus der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Phänomenologie heraus aufrecht erhalten werden kann. Denn gibt es nicht in Kants Ethik und ihrer Grundlegung Perspektiven, die den Vorwurf des abstrakten, lebensfernen Formalismus bereits entkräften? Und findet sich (...) im Nachgang zu den materialen Wertethikern nicht innerhalb der phänomenologischen Bewegung der Versuch einer Erneuerung gerade der formalistischen Tendenz der kantischen Ethik? Die systematische Perspektive, die aus dieser Untersuchung hervorgeht, ist eine Ethik des Begehrens der reinen praktischen Vernunft, in der sich das individuelle Begehren angesichts einer gebietenden Vernunft auf je eigenem Wege konkretisiert, einer reinen praktischen Vernunft, deren Aufkommen allerdings mit Levinas als genuin intersubjektiv verstanden wird. (shrink)

Front Matter -- Copyright page -- Dedication -- Einleitung -- Die Suche nach einer eigentlichen Existenz nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg -- Krise und euphorischer Aufbruch: Heidegger als nationalsozialistischer Aktivist -- Kritik, Beharrung und Hoffnung: Heideggers kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Nationalsozialismus und Moderne und die Hoffnung auf eine Zeitenwende -- Nach 1945: Auf dem Weg zur Gelassenheit? Vernichtende Kritik der Neuzeit, Vision einer Kehre und das Hegen vom Rettenden im Alltäglichen -- Schluss -- Anmerkungen -- Back Matter -- Literatur -- Personenregister.

The “therapeutic obligation” is a physician’s duty to provide his patients with what he believes is the best available treatment. We begin by discussing some prominent formulations of the obligation before raising two related considerations against those formulations. First, they do not make sense of cases where doctors are permitted to provide suboptimal care. Second, they give incorrect results in cases where doctors are choosing treatments in challenging epistemic environments. We then propose and defend an account of the therapeutic obligation (...) that solves the problems that undermined previous efforts at formulating the TO. We conclude by considering how apparent problems with our proposal actually rest on difficulties with informed consent. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that education should be conceived of as a thing in itself. To lift this view, I present aspects of Graham Harman’s philosophy, a speculative realism that can be seen as a radical break with social constructivism and similar approaches. Next, I attempt to outline a rough sketch of an educational “thing”, drawing on concepts such as protection, love, swarm, tension and shadow. Finally, I briefly discuss some implications of this vision for philosophy of education. In (...) particular, I think that my discussion point to philosophy of education as the basic discipline in an educational science. (shrink)

In this paper, I work out a five-stringed criticism of John Hattie’s theory of Visible Learning. First, I argue that the theory is a theory of evaluation that denies education as such. Second, I show that there are problems with the dependent variable, learning, i.e. the effect of a given intervention. Thirdly, I show that Hattie's theory belongs to the radical constructivist paradigm. Thus, the problems of constructivism, i.e. problems of normativity and the outside world, walks directly into Hattie’s concept (...) of teaching, resulting in a double breakdown of the essence of teaching. Fourth, I argue that Hattie’s concept of feedback has a centralizing trend which ultimately has the potential to transform the country’s educational activities into a big hierarchical and data-driven organism. Finally, I show that Hattie’s reference to Karl Popper’s theory of “three worlds” is based on a highly problematic reading, where Popper’s objective world is reduced to a subset of a radical subjectivity. (shrink)

Dans le chamanisme occidental, riche de multiples cosmologies syncrétiques, hybrides et multiculturelles, l’apprenti construit sa propre cosmologie par une succession d’interprétations de ses expériences cognitives et perceptuelles qui le constituent en tant que « chamane ». Les stages, initiations et diverses expériences tendent à la fabrication de ce corps chamanique capable de se mettre en contact et d’interagir, dans une relation volontaire et maîtrisée avec les autres mondes, qu’ils soient vécus comme extérieurs ou intérieurs à soi, mondes autres, parallèles ou (...) faisant partie d’une intériorité élargie. Cet article propose une anthropologie des ressentis et des images intérieures associée à une analyse des techniques du corps dans le champ des études sur le chamanisme. (shrink)

Is Gert Biesta is a philosopher of Bildung? The answer is “both yes and no. First I argue that Biesta's philosophy is based on a denial of the concept of Bildung, and that he, by the very nature of...