ABSTRACT 'The Duologue of King/Governor Pāyāsi' has long been recognised as a source for the proto-materialism current at the time of the Buddha. What needs to be stressed is the significance of the text as a pointer to the development of Logic in India. Perception, which is an accepted method of experimental enquiry, and reasoning from analogy, which can lead at best to a probable conclusion - these two are the only means employed to settle the dispute concerning the (...) existence of the other-world. The Jain version of the same duologue-cum-parable, though varying in minor details regarding the name and identity of the monk refuting the king/governor, contains the same contrast, namely, perception versus analogical reasoning. There can be little doubt that the original parable was conceived with a view to asserting the existence of the other-world. In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, an earlier Brahmanical text, however, instead of argument by analogy, verbal testimony was invoked to settle the same point. Naciketas is assailed by doubt about the existence of a person after his or her death. The authority of Yama, the Pluto of Indian mythology, is invoked to convince him that the other-world does exist. Thus, the three parables taken together exhibit three means of knowledge in operation: verbal testimony and argument by analogy pitted against perception. RESUMO 'O duólogo do rei/governador Pāyāsi' há muito tempo é reconhecido como uma fonte da corrente protomaterialista da época do Buda. O que é necessário ressaltar é o significado desse texto como um indicador do desenvolvimento da lógica na Índia. Percepção, aceita como método de investigação experimental, e raciocínio por analogia, que no máximo pode conduzir a uma conclusão provável - apenas esses dois são os meios utilizados para dirimir a disputa que diz respeito à existência do outro-mundo. A versão jaina do mesmo duólogo-cum-parábola, mesmo com variações que concernem ao nome e à identidade do monge que se opõe ao rei/governador, contém o mesmo contraste, a dizer, percepção contra raciocínio por analogia. Não há muita dúvida de que a parábola original foi concebida com o intuito de afirmar a existência do outro-mundo. Entretanto, na Kaṭha Upaniṣad, um texto bramânico mais antigo, em vez do argumento por analogia, o testemunho verbal foi invocado para resolver o mesmo ponto. Naciketas é tomado pela dúvida sobre a existência da pessoa depois da sua morte. A autoridade de Yama, o Plutão da mitologia indiana, é invocada para convencê-lo que o outro-mundo existe. Portanto, as três parábolas juntas exibem três meios de conhecimento em função: testemunho verbal e argumento por analogia opostos à percepção. (shrink)

In the book, the author has confronteed mainly three types of such recent thinking that has boomed large, of late, on the horizon. Perhaps such thinking are evident enough of our academic terrorism and destructive intellectural chaos. The first layer dealing with the Micro materialistic approach of a Marxism historian, Prof. Sumit Sarkar where he was very scathing about the religious movements, specially about Sri Ramakrishna and the advent of the Ramakrishna Movement.

Asl. Atthasalinl of Buddhaghosa, ed. PTS. 1897. BB. Bibliotheca Buddhica, Petrograd. BC. Buddhacarita, ed. Cowell, Oxford, 1893. BCA. ...

This Book Is An In-Depth Study Of Buddhist Philosophy In India And Tibet. The Concentration Is On Ontology/Epistemology And, To A Somewhat Lesser Extent, Soteriology. It Is Based On The Writings Of The Buddhist Philosophers Themselves, From The Unknown Authors Of The Pali `Abhidhamma' Books Down To The Present Dalai Lama Of Tibet. It Takes Into Consideration The Work Of Many Twentieth Century Scholars Of Buddhism In Order To Bring Our Knowledge Of Buddhist Philosophy Up-To-Date. An Exhaustive (...) Index (And Glossary) Has Been Prepared In Order To Help The Reader With The Technical Terms Of Buddhist Philosophy.;;The Two Parts And Fourteen Chapters Of The Book Are As Follows: Part I (India): Ch.I: The Theravada. Ch.Ii: The Sarvastivada. Ch.Iii: The Madhyamaka (1) The Prasangikas Nagarjuna And Candrakirti. Ch.Iv: The Madhyamaka (2) The Prasangikas Aryadeva And Santideva. Ch.V: The Madhyamaka (3) The Svatantrikas. Ch.Vi: The Yogacara (1) Two Yogacara Sutras And Asanga And Vasubandhu. Ch.Vii: The Yogacara (2) Dignaga And Dharmakirti. Ch.Viii: The Yogacara (3) Santarakshita And Kamalasila. Ch.Ix: The `Tathagata-Garbha'. Part Ii (Tibet): Ch.X: The Vajrayana, General Features. Ch.Xi: The Nyingmapa. Ch.Xii: The Sakyapa. Ch.Xiii: The Kagyupa. Ch.Xiv: The Gelugpa. (shrink)

Indian philosophical thought has been deeply metaphysical, and it is no surprise that, faced with the anti-metaphysical thrust of contemporary philosophy, one of the issues uppermost in the minds of Indian thinkers is the question of the possibility of metaphysics. In recent philosophical literature, two tendencies are discernible: an attempt to defend metaphysics in the traditional grand style, and a concern with the idea of descriptive metaphysics as an alternative. For the former, we may turn to Kalidas Bhattacharyya and (...) J. N. Chubb; for the latter to J. N. Mohanty and S. N. Ganguly. (shrink)

Mode of philosophizing in post-colonial India is deeply influenced by two centuries of British rule, wherein a popular divide emerged between doing classical Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. However, a closer look reveals that the divide is not exclusive, since there are several criss-cross modes of philosophizing shaped by the forces of colonialism and nationalist consciousness. Contemporary challenges lie in raising new philosophical questions relevant to our time, keeping in view both what has been inherited and what (...) has been imbibed in these centuries-old civilizational journeys. One needs to recognize India’s rich intellectual traditions based on cultural diversity, and at the same time raise fundamental questions that are transcendental in nature, yet historically rooted in our temporal presence. The challenge to articulate the nature of Indian philosophy has remained one of the daunting tasks for scholars of philosophy. Contemporariness of Indian philosophy is another issue to be deliberated. Contemporariness lies not only in raising new questions to classical Indian philosophies, but also in finding newness in old questions. It should further include engaging the classical philosophies with new methodological questions, be it Western philosophical methods or ones internally generated. Contemporariness will include narrating new stories driven by the dynamics of the present, where drive for questioning comes from the authentic philosophical issues of our time. (shrink)

भारतीय चिन्तन परम्परा में पंच-महाभूत का बहुत महत्वपूर्ण स्थान है. भारतीय प्राचीन ग्रन्थों से लेकर अब तक विश्व की सरंचना सम्बन्धी सिद्धांतों में पंच-महाभूत सबसे स्वीकार्य सिद्धांत माना जाता रहा है. ये पांच तत्व हैं: पृथ्वी, जल, वायु, अग्नि और आकाश. परन्तु चार्वाक जैसे दार्शनिक और आर्यभट्ट (पांचवीं शताब्दी) जैसे विज्ञानी यह कहते आ रहे हैं की तत्व पांच नहीं, चार हैं. इन लोगों ने आकाश को स्वतंत्र तत्व के रूप में स्वीकर नहीं किया. चार्वाक का यह भी विचार रहा (...) है की सारा भौतिक व प्राक्रतिक परिदृश्य न किसी ने रचा है, न इसका कोई उद्देश्य है, प्रक्रति में परिवर्तन, विकास, रुपनान्तरण आदि इसकी अपनी प्रकिया है जो तब भी लाखों करोड़ों वर्षों से हो रहा था और आज भी विभिन्न रूपों में हो रहा है. पंच-तत्व के सिद्धांत को मानने वालों का विचार है की इन पांच तत्वों से जब शारीर बनता है तब आत्मा बाहर से प्रविष्ट होती है जबकि चार तत्व को मानने वाले चार्वाक का कथन है की इन चरों तत्वों के विशेष रूप में परस्पर मेल से ही चैतन्य (चेतना ) की उत्पत्ति होती है, आत्मा कहीं बाहर से नहीं आती- भूतेभ्य: चैतन्यम.आज विज्ञानं बहुत आगे बढ़ गया है और चार्वाक उसके अनुसार नये तत्वों की बात करते हैं. वास्तविकता तो यह है की जिन्हें हम तत्व कह रहे हैं वे तत्व न होकर यौगिक या मिश्रण हैं. तत्व वह होता है जिसमें एक तरह कर परमाणु रहते हैं और जिसे सरलतम पदार्थ के रूप में विभाजित नहीं किया जा सकता. चार्वाक प्रकृति के जड़ रूप से ही, भौतिक तत्वों से चैतन्य की उत्पत्ति को मानता है. जैसे किनव, मधु और शर्करा आदि के मिलने से मादकता उत्पन्न होती है उसी प्रकार शरीर में चैतन्य की उत्त्पति होती है. जब भौतिक तत्वों का तालमेल बिगड़ जाता है तो चैतन्य भी खत्म हो जाता है- सदा के लिए, सर्वदा के लिए – भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमन कुत:.चार्वाक का कहना है की चैतन्य आत्मा काआकस्मिक गुण नहीं बल्कि मौलिक गुण है और चैतन्ययुक्त शरीर ही आत्मा है . यद्यपि आज चार्वाक के चार तत्व भी आदर्शवादियों के पांच तत्वों की तरह ही रद्द हो चुके हैं तथापि उनकी स्थिति दूसरी है. उन्होंने चार तत्वों को प्रकृति के प्रतिनिधि कह कर इन से चेतना की उत्पत्ति मानी है, प्रकृति एकतत्ववाद का उनका सिद्धांत आज विज्ञानसम्मत सिद्धांत है, भले ही उन की तत्वों की बात तकनीकी रूप में सही न हो. उनके लिए चार तत्वों को मानना न अनिवार्य है और न ही उसे मानने के लिए कोई ईश्वरीय आदेश है क्योंकि तत्व उनके लिए प्रकृति के प्रतिनिधि मात्र हैं, जो तब यदि चार थे तो आज 118 हैं. इससे उन्हें कोई फर्क नहीं पड़ता जबकि अन्य दर्शनों के लिए के लिए स्वीकार करना दुरूह है. अत: हम कह सकते हैं की चार्वाक का दर्शन अनात्मवादी, प्रत्यक्षवादी और भौतिकवादी है. अत: इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य विष्ण पंच-महाभूतों की अवधारणा की चार्वाक के सन्दर्भ में समीक्षा करना है और चार्वाक दर्शन की आज की प्रासंगिकता को देखना है. (shrink)

Philosophy was born in India in the late 8th century, at a crucial but troubled time in the emergence of a civilization which integrated peoples of northern India with contrasting Aryan and Indus Valley heritages. This book begins with a recalling of the extended historical dynamic that culminated in that time. Given the sketch of the historical background and matrix, the book then attempts an exposition of a number of the important Upanisads . Richard Gotshalk provides fresh (...) interpretations and translations of the Upanisads, and places his exposition of the philosophical material in the relevant historical context. The work concludes with a brief sketch of features and emphases which mark the Upanisadic realization of philosophical thought and distinguish it from philosophy as realized in its beginnings in China and Greece. In an appendix the work also offers a translation of the parts of the eleven Upanisads treated in the main text. (shrink)

Jābāli, one of the priest-cum-counsellors of king Daśaratha, has long been recognized as an odd character, preaching materialism in order to persuade Rāma to go back to Ayodhyā after the death of his father. The critical edition of the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa reveals several stanzas interpolated in the vulgate so as to denigrate Jābāli and brand him as a rank opportunist. In spite of that, whatever remains of Jābāli’s speech addressed to Rāma evinces one of the basic tenets of materialist ontology, (...) i.e., denial of the existence of any other-world, and hence the futility of performing rites for the ancestors. However, nothing is said about the epistemology,, ethics, and metaphysics of materialism as it existed at the time when the Rāmāyaṇa was redacted. Considering all this it is better to call Jābāli a proto-materialist who speaks of a philosophy akin to the teachings of Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, whose doctrine has been dubbed as that of annihilation in the Tipiṭaka. Both of them belong to the pre-Cārvāka materialist tradition in India. (shrink)

Review of Westerhoff, J.. The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Description: Based on primary sources this book presents a survey of development of Moral Philosophy in India and offers an authentic account of Indian ethics from the point of view of Vedas, Upanisads, Mimamsas, Smrtis, the Bhagavad-gita and the Paficaratras, Vedanta, Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-VaiSesika, Buddhism and Jainism. Indian ethics has taken a positive attitude towards life hi its concrete 'and varied aspects as is evident in die discussions of karma, rebirth, nirvana, and moksa. Life has to be lived for (...) harmonious development of our character for a spiritual end. Indian ethics has therefore a positive goal to achieve freedom of the self from its bondage of passions and desire this is the message of India and is the essence of all her moral thought The study will, no doubt, prove invaluable to the scholars and general readers as well. (shrink)

The classical Indian Cārvāka (“Materialist”) tradition contains three branches with regard to the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). First, the standard Cārvākas accept a single means of knowledge, perception, supporting this view with a critique of the reliability and coherence of inference (anumāna). Second, the “more educated” Cārvākas as well as Purandara endorse a form of inference limited to empirical matters. Third, radical skeptical Cārvākas like Jayarāśi attempt to undermine all accounts or technical definitions of the means of knowledge (even perception) (...) in order to enjoy a life free from philosophical and religious speculation. These branches respectively present something akin to David Hume’s problem of induction, endorse a fallibilistic, mitigated skepticism, and embody a thoroughgoing skepticism about philosophy itself. While all three branches are skeptics about religious matters, each branch exemplifies a different variety of epistemological skepticism. (shrink)

The one great quality of Socratic gift is that thinking as an activity continues but not repetitively but every time thinking takes place, it takes place a new. Thinking is the one activity that cannot be repeated like prayers and other pieties. All philosophical thinking is new thinking; it has to be new in order to be thinking. Philosophy had to become the handmaid of sociology and could not be allowed to remain surrogate sociology. When this happened new concepts (...) or new conceptualizations became the need of the hour: in the place of the age-old hierarchic social stratification a novel concept of materialism had to be inducted - after all matter is what matters. And in India morally entangled sociology was holding down the rich human resources of the sub-continent and a development-oriented ideology had to convert this moral society into a legal society: An unlegislated, unlegislatable society is condemned to be unstable andcollapsible; in its place a stable, legislatable society had to be created. With this felt-need Dr. Ambedkar came into the Indian political arena and gave a modernist rethinking to the outmoded Indian social structure: His hallmark was think to change. (shrink)

Original in content and approach, Philosophy in Classical India focuses on the rational principles of Indian philosophical theory, rather than the mysticism usually associated with it. Ganeri explores the philosophical projects of a number of major Indian philosophers and looks into the methods of rational inquiry deployed within these projects. In so doing, he illuminates a network of mutual reference and criticism, influence and response, in which reason is simultaneously used constructively and to call itself into question.

There are some tantalizing suggestions that Pyrrhonian skepticism has its roots in ancient India. Of them, the most important is Diogenes Laertius’s report that Pyrrho accompanied Alexander to India, where he was deeply impressed by the character of the “naked sophists” he encountered (DL IX 61). Influenced by these gymnosophists, Pyrrho is said to have adopted the practices of suspending judgment on matters of belief and cultivating an indifferent composure amid the vicissitudes of ordinary life. Such conduct, and (...) the attitudes that it embodied, became inspirations to later skeptical thinkers. It is a fact that practices of the sort attributed to Pyrrho are richly evident in a number of ancient Indian philosophical and ascetic movements. On this basis, attempts have been made to determine the identity of these gymnosophists and, further, to pinpoint the dialectical tropes within Pyrrhonism that may have their basis in Indian thought. But despite these attempts, and in the absence of any new discoveries, these suggestions will likely remain just that. The paucity of the historical data and the problematic nature of the data itself prevent us from reconstructing a solid bridge between ancient India and Greek skepticism that may serve as the basis of robust historical theorizing. Classical India does, however, lay claim to a sophisticated and diverse culture of epistemological reflection, which includes a number of innovative skeptical thinkers deserving study on their own merits. This chapter is meant to provide such a study, or perhaps more accurately, a prolegomena for such. After some initial ground-laying, I will discuss three leading Indian skeptics and situate them historically and conceptually within the network of competing schools that comprise classical Indian philosophy. They are Nāgārjuna (c. 150 CE), the founder of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Jayarāśi (c. 800), associated with the Indian materialist tradition, and Śrīharṣa (c. 1150), a thinker connected to the school of Nondual (Advaita) Vedānta. (shrink)

This dissertation, located at the crossroads of Continental political philosophy, feminist theory, critical theory, intellectual history, and cultural studies, provides a critical cartography of contemporary new materialist thought in its various constellations and assemblages, while using diffractive theorizing to examine two Continental terror(ist) events. It is argued that such a critical cartography is not only a novel but also much needed undertaking, as we, more than almost two decades after the Habermas-Derrida dialogues on terror(ism), are in need of a (...) Zeitgeist-adjusted conceptual framework, and, thus, a revitalization of philosophizing as such, that could lead to an analysis of the complex ontological, epistemological, and eco-ethico-political entangled aspects of global crises, and, specifically, terrorist events, the actual terror they produce, and the bio-/necropolitical repercussions they often engender. -/- Using the new materialist methodologies of critical cartography and diffraction, this project’s first part explores what it means to “theorize from the ground up” in a feminist manner, while furthermore offering a situated critical cartography of new materialist thought. Within the contours of this Deleuzoguattarian mapping exercise, new materialist thought is shown to be grounded in foregoing materialist philosophies, transversal and trans(/)disciplinary, and, moreover, a revitalizing ever-evolving philosophical strand of thought with crisscrossing, transcontinental roots and a strong foundation in (post-)Foucauldian poststructuralist thought. Particular attention is paid to what in this project are called “critical” new materialisms, or those new materialist philosophies that take the necessity of critical power analyses seriously, and could be said to be “eco-ethico-political” in nature. This cartography is furthermore accompanied by a digital critical cartography that can be utilized for pedagogical means. -/- The second and final part of this dissertation, preceded by an excursus that accentuates the importance of Harawayan ecophilosophical thought for critical new materialist philosophies, consists of one chapter that puts the idea of diffractive theorizing into practice; subsequently exploring theorizing on terror(ism), the Habermas-Derrida dialogues with regard to 9/11, and the Paris 2015 and Brussels 2016 attacks as affect-inducing events of “feeling-thinking-through.” This chapter ends with a diffractive rereading of Habermas, Derrida, Benjamin, and also partially Levinas, on the subject of the contemporary democratic state, terrorism, and the legitimacy of lockdowns and emergency state declarations. By doing so, this final chapter anticipates on this dissertation’s epilogue, in which the need for an up-to-date critical new materialist eco-ethico-political model of justice and responsiveness-as-response-ability, is highlighted. (shrink)

“A Survey on Study and Research in Philosophy in India” is a multivoloume series. It is an attempt to present an overview about status of teaching and research in Philosophy in India. Present volume aims to serve two basic purposes: (1) To provide aid to prospective researcher to refer already carried out works in the area. This is helpful to save time, energy and money of a researcher and making him/her aware of existing works so that (...) he/she could forego further in the area. Conversely, it avoids duplication in research work. (2) To present an overview of the Ph.D. research areas, where neglected area or over pursued area may be observed and planning and support may be implemented. So far, there has been no attempt to gauge the research trends in the area of Philosophy in our country. This is partly because of unavailability of database involving long correspondences and poor responses and partly because of lack of methodology for analyzing the trends. A novel concept of ‘research inclination’ and innovative methodology for measuring the trends, have been developed in this book, which may be helpful for analyzing the status/trends in Ph.D. researches in other subjects also. (shrink)

Sāyaṇa-Mādhava closed his exposition of the Cārvāka philosophy in his Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, Chap. 1 by quoting 11 and a half verses, the authorship of all of which was attributed to Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of materialism in India. One of these verses is presumably taken from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. However, it is not Bṛhaspati but some demons, deluded by a Jain and a Buddhist monk, who say this. Bṛhaspati does not appear at all in this Purāṇa. Variant versions of the (...) same story are found in other Purāṇas but Bṛhaspti is not invariably present in all of them. The origin of the story may be traced back to the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. Although Bṛhaspati plays a leading part in that story, the background is quite different. By comparing all the versions found in the Purāṇas and the subject matter of the epigrams attributed to Bṛhaspati the paper proposes to show that the Viṣṇupurāṇa story has nothing to do with the materialists, whether the Pre-Cārvākas or the Cārvākas; the Jains and the Buddhists are the target of attack. Sāyaṇa-mādhava, by placing these satirical epigrams either in their original or in altered forms, and attributing them to Bṛhaspati, has mixed up the views of all sorts of nāstikas, particularly the Jains and the Buddhists, with the Cārvākas and thereby succeeded in deceiving several generations of readers and misleading even the best of scholars. (shrink)

The one great quality of Socratic gift is that thinking as an activity continues but not repetitively but every time thinking takes place, it takes place a new. Thinking is the one activity that cannot be repeated like prayers and other pieties. All philosophical thinking is new thinking; it has to be new in order to be thinking. Philosophy had to become the handmaid of sociology and could not be allowed to remain surrogate sociology. When this happened new concepts (...) or new conceptualizations became the need of the hour: in the place of the age-old hierarchic social stratification a novel concept of materialism had to be inducted - after all matter is what matters. And in India morally entangled sociology was holding down the rich human resources of the sub-continent and a development-oriented ideology had to convert this moral society into a legal society: An unlegislated, unlegislatable society is condemned to be unstable andcollapsible; in its place a stable, legislatable society had to be created. With this felt-need Dr. Ambedkar came into the Indian political arena and gave a modernist rethinking to the outmoded Indian social structure: His hallmark was think to change. (shrink)

_An Introduction to Indian Philosophy_ offers a profound yet accessible survey of the development of India’s philosophical tradition. Beginning with the formation of Brahmanical, Jaina, Materialist, and Buddhist traditions, Bina Gupta guides the reader through the classical schools of Indian thought, culminating in a look at how these traditions inform Indian philosophy and society in modern times. Offering translations from source texts and clear explanations of philosophical terms, this text provides a rigorous overview of Indian philosophical contributions to (...) epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and ethics. This is a must-read for anyone seeking a reliable and illuminating introduction to Indian philosophy. (shrink)

Secularism in India SECULARISM IN PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD Secularism in India is not something totally new. Its roots can be found in a history that traces back ...

The one great quality of Socratic gift is that thinking as an activity continues but not repetitively but every time thinking takes place, it takes place a new. Thinking is the one activity that cannot be repeated like prayers and other pieties. All philosophical thinking is new thinking; it has to be new in order to be thinking. Philosophy had to become the handmaid of sociology and could not be allowed to remain surrogate sociology. When this happened new concepts (...) or new conceptualizations became the need of the hour: in the place of the age-old hierarchic social stratification a novel concept of materialism had to be inducted - after all matter is what matters. And in India morally entangled sociology was holding down the rich human resources of the sub-continent and a development-oriented ideology had to convert this moral society into a legal society: An unlegislated, unlegislatable society is condemned to be unstable andcollapsible; in its place a stable, legislatable society had to be created. With this felt-need Dr. Ambedkar came into the Indian political arena and gave a modernist rethinking to the outmoded Indian social structure: His hallmark was think to change. (shrink)

Philosophy News in India An attempt to provide Information about Philosophy in India .

This volume focuses on the gradual emergence of modern Indian philosophy through the cross-cultural encounter between indigenous Indian and Western traditions of philosophy, during the colonial period in India, specifically in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This volume acknowledges that what we take 'Indian philosophy' or 'modern Indian philosophy' to mean today is the sub-text of a much wider, complex and varied Indian reception of the West during the colonial period. Consisting of -twelve chapters (...) and a thematic introduction, the volume addresses the role of academic philosophy in the cultural and social ferment of the colonial period in India and its impact on the development of cross-cultural philosophy, the emergence of a cosmopolitan consciousness in colonial India; as also the philosophical contribution of India to cultural globalization. The issue of colonialism and emergence of new identities in India has engaged the critical attention of scholars from diverse fields of inquiry such as history, sociology, politics, and subaltern studies. However, till today the emergence of modern Indian philosophy remains an unexplored area of inquiry. Much of the academic philosophical work of this period, despite its manifest philosophical originality and depth, stands largely ignored, not only abroad, but even in India. This neglect needs to be overcome by a re-reading of philosophical writings in English produced by scholars located in the universities of colonial India. This edited volume will facilitate further explorations into the presence of colonial tensions as they are visible in the writings of modern Indian academic philosophers like B. N. Seal, Hiralal Haldar, Rasvihary Das,, G. R. Malkani, K. C. Bhattacharyya,. G. N. Mathrani and others. (shrink)

Paradigms of historiography of philosophy in India have being changed since late 19th c. till present, depending on the social and cultural context of the history of Indian philosophy as a part of contemporary Indian culture. This change manifests itself in the conceptions of Indian historians concerning the teaching of Buddhist Mahāyāna school of Yogācāra (4th c. and later). Historians of colonial times, basing themselves on the philosophy of Neovedаntism (S. Radhakrishnan, S. Dasgupta), regarded Buddhism as (...) a derivate of late Vedic culture and Yogācāra as a teaching that reflected - though in an essentially transmuted form - the ideology of Upaniṣads. The latter, according to Neovedantists, was based on the postulate of the existence of the single cosmic soul - Brahman, the true human Self (Ātman) being identical to it. Historians of the late colonial and early postcolonial times (P.T. Raju, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, A.K. Chatterjee, partly also S. Dasgupta) brought Yogācāra closer to the teachings of European idealism, mainly to conceptions of G. Berkeley, G.W.F. Hegel, F. Bradley, J.E. McTaggart, trying to demonstrate a principal identity of fundamental problems in Indian and Western philosophy. At the same time, they brought Yogācāra together with the teaching of Brāhmaṇic school, Advaita Vedānta, regarded as another form of Indian idealism. In later times, following the evolution of contemporary Indian culture and changings in its social and political context, historians like D.J. Kalupahana became to analyze Yogācāra as a kind of philosophy of mind. All these facts show the dependence of strategies of historico-philosophical studies in India on its social, political and cultural context: in the Yogācāra teaching mainly those aspects call attention that a historian sees as the closest to the problematic field of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: THE NAME MADHYAMAKA The Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism goes back to Nagarjuna, the great Indian Buddhist philosopher who is placed ...

India has been the seat of deep philosophical engagements since the Vedic period. However, Indian philosophical wisdom, albeit different from Western philosophy in many respects, was not widely known to the rest of the world before colonial thinkers started their dialogue with Indian philosophy through their translations and academic exegeses. Western scholars, primarily the Indologists, analyzed Indian thought through the lens of Western thought in spite of the traditional insular approach of Indian pandits. Amidst this tension between (...) traditional Indian scholars and Western scholars who encountered Indian philosophy, was born a unique breed of Indian scholars, thanks to the colonial milieu of education and... (shrink)

Why did Greek philosophy begin in the sixth century BCE? Why did Indian philosophy begin at about the same time? Why did the earliest philosophy take the form that it did? Why was this form so similar in Greece and India? And how do we explain the differences between them? These questions can only be answered by locating the philosophical intellect within its entire societal context, ignoring neither ritual nor economy. The cities of Greece and northern (...) India were in this period distinctive also by virtue of being pervasively monetised. The metaphysics of both cultures is marked by the projection and the introjection of the abstract, all-pervasive, quasi-omnipotent, impersonal substance embodied in money. And in both cultures this development accompanied the interiorisation of the cosmic rite of passage. (shrink)

Originally published in 1962. This book discusses and interprets the main themes of Buddhist thought in India and is divided into three parts: Archaic Buddhism: Tacit assumptions, the problem of "original Buddhism", the three marks and the perverted views, the five cardinal virtues, the cultivation of the social emotions, Dharma and dharmas, Skandhas, sense-fields and elements. The Sthaviras: the eighteen schools, doctrinal disputes, the unconditioned and the process of salvation, some Abhidharma problems. The Mahayana: doctrines common to all Mahayanists, (...) the Madhyamikas, the Yogacarins, Buddhist logic, the Tantras. (shrink)

The Charvakas were the sceptic‐materialists of classical India, existing about the same time as the beginnings of early atheistic Buddhism and overlapping with the rise of both Buddhism and Jainism. This chapter examines the primary source literature that focuses on Charvakas in order to glean information about them and to assess the extent of materialist influence. Materialists were of sufficient influence, it seems, for other sects to take heed of them and to offer criticism of their beliefs. The materialists (...) challenged the very basis of established religion and gained the displeasure not just of the orthodox Hindus but also of the heterodox Buddhists and Jains, who accused them of lacking any morality, hence the long‐lasting accusation of hedonism that has been attached to the Charvakas. Another, more well‐known, text that castigates the materialists is the Bhagavad Gita written perhaps around the second century BCE. (shrink)

This study accounts for disparate portrayals of divine destroyer Śiva in the normative Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata as opposed to Kālidāsa’s amatory Kumārasaṃbhava and Raghuvaṃśa by contrasting the primary and secondary Sanskrit epic authors’ respective reliances on the Mānavadharmaśāstra and the Kāmasūtra. By arguing, per Richard Johnson’s postpoststructuralism, that these mythological and philosophical differences deliberately reflect those poets’ specific sociohistorical contexts, this inquiry accounts more accurately for Śiva’s classical-epic depictions than do Stella Kramrisch’s and Wendy Doniger [O’Flaherty]’s investigations informed by Claude (...) Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism and Don Handelman and David Shulman’s researches influenced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s poststructuralism. The present work, in revising such prevailing Indological notions as Romila Thapar’s traditional construal of the “classical,” Donald R. Davis Jr.’s anthropocentric definition of puruṣārtha (human aim), and Sheldon Pollock’s unvarying characterization of śāstras (treatises), models a historically aware approach that appreciates the interrelationship of mythological philosophy and philosophical mythology. (shrink)