This paper challenges the view that justice leads to or generates peace. Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Daoist and Chinese military philosophical perspectives on violence and peace are reviewed. Based on insights derived from these Asian traditions concerning the relationship between violence and peace, the author argues that the quest for world peace is not attainable. The author proposes that people need to direct their attention, energy and action to support personal and community peace, and to support justice, which entails legitimate (...) and sanctioned acts of violence, and just war. (shrink)

This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s unique interpretation of smṛti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdarśan (1911), I argue that his interpretation of smṛti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of smṛti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on smṛti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipaṭṭhānasutta and Buddaghośa’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, he also builds into (...) his complex account of the practice of smṛti certain fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“īśvara”) and mental identification with the Puruṣa, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of smṛti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of smṛti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu straightforwardly identify smṛti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the aṣṭāṇgayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that smṛti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the aṣṭāṇgayoga. (shrink)

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)

El presente artículo se centra en el concepto de no-dualidad en las sabidurías orientales. En primer lugar, se expondrán y comentarán sus definiciones y su relevancia en el pensamiento y la filosofía oriental. Tras analizar los diferentes significados de no-dualidad propuestos por Loy, se trazará su origen en el taoísmo, budismo, zen, hinduismo y vedanta advaita. Además, se examinarán los principales textos de las sabidurías orientales mencionadas anteriormente para encontrar posibles afirmaciones no-duales.

The dynamic process of karmic activity is one of the key philosophical concepts of the Buddhist doctrine, and is traditionally explained as the operation of a chain of 12 mutually interlinked members of dependent origination. Textual research, however, reveals that a series of alternative chains of members of dependent origination coexisted prior to the systematization of this earlier textual material into the standardized list of 12 members. Such an alternative list consists of 10 members. This article examines the importance of (...) this particular list of 10 members in the development of Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy. This philosophy, the basic interpretation of the mundane world of which is that the world around us only xists as the working of the human mind, i.e. the domain of perceptual consciousness, matured in the late fourth–early fifth century CE. This examination of the 10-fold formula of dependent origination also adds to our knowledge of the region of origin of Yogācāra philosophy, and thus on the geographical diversities within the development of Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

The notions of selflessness ( an tmaka ) and karman are two key concepts in Buddhist philosophy. The question how karman functions with respect to the rebirth of a worldling who is, actually, devoid of a self, was a major philosophical issue in early Buddhist doctrine. Within the Sarv stiv da school, the Vaibh ⋅ ikas became the representative of an interpretation of this problem that hinges on the notion of 'possession' ( pr pti ). Their theory was contradicted by (...) the Sautr ntikas, whose interpretation is based on the notion of 'seed' ( bīja ). The Sarv stiv da H daya treatises, compiled in a time period spanning from the beginning of the common era to the fourth century AD, i.e. the period of the rise of the Sautr ntika school, are a particularly interesting set of works, as they reflect the gradual development of these two major theories. (shrink)

The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom of the will, (...) but not the minimal power of free will. It seems that the Buddha’s view shifts from agent causation (independent ownership) to a causal sequence of impersonal processes (psychophysical factors). This paper claims to shed clarity on ‘whether free will is viable in the context of the anattāvāda in Buddhism.’ It mainly studies the secondary sources (even though it has also discussed the primary sources) and their interpretations of freedom of the will and how it further does argue for a compatibility approach of free will in Buddhist thought. (shrink)

This paper presents an integration of transpersonal structural theory. It is claimed that a “dichotomy debate” is currently taking place within transpersonal psychology, which involves what Wilber has called the “pre/trans fallacy” and the “ascender/descender debate” . The pre/trans fallacy states that early, prepersonal life experiences are confused for transpersonal experiences of higher consciousness. Yet Grof and Washburn contend that early, prenatal, life experiences are legitimate sources of transpersonal experience, and can be thought of as the presence of deeper consciousness. (...) Consequently, it is suggested that confusing prepersonal life experiences for prenatal life experiences—as well as preferring higher stages over deeper stages of transpersonal consciousness—commits the “trans/trans fallacy.” Finally, it is claimed that Avatar Adi Da’s spiritual revelation provides the missing link whereby transpersonal structural theory can be integrated: the “conjoining” of the prenatal and prepersonal selves. (shrink)

This paper claims that the ultimate issue confronting transpersonal theory is that of nondualism. The revelation of this spiritual reality has a long history in the spiritual traditions, which has been perhaps most prolifically advocated by Ken Wilber , and fully explicated by David Loy . Nonetheless, these scholarly accounts of nondual reality, and the spiritual traditions upon which they are based, either do not include or else misrepresent the revelation of a contemporary spiritual master crucial to the understanding of (...) nondualism. Avatar Adi Da not only offers a greater differentiation of nondual reality than can be found in contemporary scholarly texts, but also a dimension of nondualism not found in any previous spiritual revelation. (shrink)

His Divine Grace Śrīla A.C. Bhaktivedānta Swami Prabhupāda was a highly revered ācārya from the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition, an important Hindu lineage of Kṛṣṇa bhakti that historically can be traced back to the venerated saint Śrī Kṛṣṇa Caitanya Mahāprabhu in sixteenth-century Bengal. Among a variety of other groundbreaking achievements, Bhaktivedānta Swami is notable for being the founding Ācārya of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness in New York City in 1966. At a surprising rate, it quickly became a large international (...) movement and, therefore, is an interesting case study for theologies of religion in the contemporary, global era. (shrink)

Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way Chapter 2 contain paradoxical, dialectic arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, with modern philosophy and physics (...) we find that the link from no explanation to no phenomena is invalid and that there is a valid explanation and understanding of physical motion. Hence, those arguments are both invalid and false, which banishes the MMK/2 and The Arrow under this and derivative interpretations to merely the history of philosophy. However, a view that maintains their relevance is that each is used as a koan or sequence of koans designed to assist students in spiritual meditation practice. This view is partly justified by the realization that both Nāgārjuna and Zeno were likely meditation masters in addition to being logicians. The works are, therefore, not works that should be assessed as having valid arguments and true conclusions by the standards of modern analytic philosophy—contrary to some of the literature—but rather are therapeutic and perhaps more appropriately considered as part of an experientially focused philosophy such as existentialism, phenomenology or religion. (shrink)

The early documents depict Gautama’s ascent to Enlightenment in heroic and mythical proportions. Written several centuries after the fact, much of the narrative is no doubt hagiography, embellished by the creative imagination and the hindsight of doctrinal rationalizations. Nonetheless, in sum, the documents chronicle an intensely personal pilgrimage that incorporates and supersedes competing spiritual landscapes. The narrative assumes the primacy of mind and efficacy of mental concentration.

This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman. Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva). The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through (...) a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman. I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism. I then challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-Brahman. I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience. I conclude by showing that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies. (shrink)

In Chan/Seon/Zen (禪, hereafter referred to as Chan) Buddhism, the gongan (公案), a word that can be literally translated as “public case”, is conceived as both the tool by which enlightenment is brought about and an expression of the enlightened mind itself. Among the diverse styles of gongan, perhaps the most puzzling is a form of its key phrase, huatou (話頭), that utilizes specific things in the world. These things are either real and empirically observable, or conversely, unreal and merely (...) hypothetical. A typical example is the figure of the “cypress tree in the front yard”. This paper tries to demonstrate that such a huatou has a structural similarity to the dṛṣṭānta (喩), an element within the three-part syllogism of Buddhist logic, insomuch as it functions as an epistemic instrument for the disclosing of a truth. (shrink)