Bioethic reflects — like many other disciplines — the cultural fragmentation and the complexity of what has come to be known as the postmodern condition. The case of bioethics is particularly acute because of its epistemological indeterminacy and the moral pluralism characterizing post liberal societies. A provisional solution to this situation is the retrieval of a neo-Kantian version of ethical formalism in which concern for a consensus on rules replaces universal dialogue on moral content. The article analyzes the possible consequences (...) of this solution with reference to theological ethics. In particular, the reduction of ethical rationality to a function of political regulation on the one hand, and the implicit legitimization of ethical relativism on the other, push any theological contribution to bioethics to the margins. The central methodological issue for the articulation of theological discourse in bioethics is how to avoid the pitfall of privatism while creating the conditions for ethical dialogue across different traditions. (shrink)

The article asks about the function of clinical ethics. It does so by confronting the assumption that ethics is supposed to help in the solution of concrete problems, relying upon a defined set of principles and rules. The scientific character of such an approach to clinical ethics complements the very understanding of modern medicine as being increasingly scientific and technical; that is, as oriented toward the production of effects. The paper claims that, rather tan sharing in the “suspension of meaning” (...) pursued by medicine for the sake of scientific objectivity, the main task of clinical ethics consists of a retrieval, or “anamnesis,” of the very questions medicine seems to suspend: the significance of illness and disease, of birth, suffering and death, and of the service to the ethos of generosity that sustains the healing professions. Also, the paper offers a cultural “etiology” of “the suspension of meaning” in ethics, and pleads for a moral reflection that begins with a free and open confrontation with clinical experience. Attending to the moral meaning of concrete situations, the paper argues that formal modes of logical argumentation are only derivative functions of the moral language and, thus, cannot exhaust the broad spectrum of ethical discourse in medicine. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2016.20.1.9. (shrink)

This article studies an illuminated manuscript of St. Augustine’s Enarrationes in Psalmos: Vat. lat. 451 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana). The manuscript was commissioned by the bishop Giovanni Capogallo, when he was in Lombardy in close contact with the court of the duke Gian Galeazzo Visconti. The article examines the cultural milieu of Pavia in the early 15th century, highlighting the role of the Order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine in the monastery of San Pietro in Ciel d’Oro. (...) The two incipit pages ff. 1r and 239r, illuminated by Michelino da Besozzo, are an example of the International Gothic style and this article analyses not only their stylistic aspect, but also their allegorical meaning, as an interesting case of decoration of a patristic text. (shrink)

Think Rich. Look Poor.Andy Warhol 1 Quadro introduttivo: la vita e l’opera di Danto Arthur C. Danto inizia la sua biografia intellettuale My Life as a Philosopher, a tutt’oggi inedita, con l’affermazione: «ho avuto l’immensa fortuna di crescere nel mezzo di due epoche d’oro — quella della filosofia e quella dell’arte». Sarà questa costellazione [Konstellation; N. d. T.] a modellare i suoi interessi, il suo sviluppo filosofico e in particolare la sua filosofia dell’arte che è stata influenzata...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Origins and Evolution of Bioethics: Some Personal ReflectionsEdmund D. Pellegrino (bio)AbstractBioethics was officially baptized in 1972, but its birth took place a decade or so before that date. Since its birth, what is known today as bioethics has undergone a complex conceptual metamorphosis. This essay loosely divides that metamorphosis into three stages: an educational, an ethical, and a global stage. In the educational era, bioethics focused on a (...) perceived “dehumanization” of medicine by the rising power of science and technology. Remedies were sought by introducing humanities, ethics, and human “values” into the medical curriculum. Ethics was one among the humanistic disciplines, but not the dominant one. In the second era, ethics assumed a dominant role as ever more complex dilemmas emerged from the rapid pace of biological research. As such dilemmas were applied to medical practice, the need for a more rigorous and more formal analysis of their moral status was clear. Philosophically-trained ethicists had an obvious role. They began to teach, write, and profoundly influence medical education and practice. In the third—and present—period, the breadth of problems has become so broad that ethicists must, themselves, draw on disciplines well beyond their expertise—e.g., law, religion, anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and the like. The era of bioethics as a global enterprise is upon us. The original hope for humanizing medicine has not been overtly successful; however, much has been accomplished of value to patients, the profession, and society. Medical morality has been transformed into a formal, systematic study of a whole range of issues of the greatest significance to humanity. Now the major challenge is one of identity, or inter-relationships and connections between the theoretical and the practical. Bioethics has outgrown its beginnings.I have been invited to give a “personal recollection” of the early development of bioethics. Such invitations are notoriously hard to resist, but also problematic when they are the recollections of a participant [End Page 73] in the events to be described. We need only be reminded of the vagaries common to the plethora of memoirs on the book stands today. Few have escaped the perils of selective memory, self-promotion, or the settling of old scores. Yet their perils notwithstanding, memoirs may serve some useful purpose. They are the raw material—verbal kitchen middens so to speak—out of which historians can later sift fact from fancy. They enable “tribal elders” to give witness to the past from which the present can fashion some sense of continuity.I will organize my reflections around three very arbitrary time periods that represent my own way of thinking about the evolution of bioethics: (1) an era of “proto-bioethics” (1960–1972), (2) an era of philosophical bioethics (1972–1985), and (3) an era of global bioethics (1985-present). Each era, of course, overlaps with the others, and the dominant strand of each runs through the others as well.In the proto-bioethics period, the language of human values predominated; in the era of bioethics philosophically construed, it was the language of philosophical ethics; and in the era of bioethics globally construed, the social and behavioral sciences have gained greater prominence. In each period, interest in the traditional humanities other than philosophy waxed and waned. In the earlier years, religion and theology predominated. Beginning in the 1970s, philosophy took a dominant role. In the last two decades, other disciplines, like law, literature, and the social sciences, have exerted more and more influence (McNeur 1963; Pellegrino 1997; Barker 1987).I make no pretense here of writing any part of the formal “history” of bioethics. Works of this nature are beginning to appear (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 1998 ; Dell’Oro and Viafora 1996). Thomas McElhinney and I are preparing our own account of the work and influence of the Institute on Human Values in Medicine, one of the influential programs of the Society for Health and Human Values (Pellegrino and McElhinney, n.d.). Space limitations as well as prudence preclude any attempt to do justice to all the events, institutions, and people who have made the field of bioethics what it is today. I apologize for these omissions, for any unintentional lapses of... (shrink)

L’articolo intende proporre una lettura del _Breve trattato sulle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d’oro e d’argento_ di Antonio Serra incentrata su una storia delle arti di governo. Ricostruendo il dibattito napoletano sulle cause della crisi monetaria degli inizi del XVII secolo e focalizzando l’attenzione sul problema delle pratiche di governo della moneta, l’obiettivo del saggio è quello di sottrarre il trattato di Serra all’ipoteca di una retrospettiva sulla scienza economica per inquadrarlo all’interno dei problemi politici del proprio (...) tempo. (shrink)

Giuseppina D'Oro explores Collingwood's work in epistemology and metaphysics, uncovering his importance beyond his better known work in philosophy of history and aesthetics. This major contribution to our understanding of one of the most important figures in history of philosophy will be essential reading for scholars of Collingwood and all students of metaphysics and the history of philosophy.

This article discusses R. G. Collingwood’s account of re-enactment and Donald Davidson’s account of radical translation. Both Collingwood and Davidson are concerned with the question “how is understanding possible?” and both seek to answer the question transcendentally by asking after the heuristic principles that guide the historian and the radical translator. Further, they both agree that the possibility of understanding rests on the presumption of rationality. But whereas Davidson’s principle of charity entails that truth is a presupposition or heuristic principle (...) of understanding, for Collingwood understanding rests on a commitment to internal consistency alone. Collingwood and Davidson diverge over the scope of the principle of charity because they have radically different conceptions of meaning. Davidson endorses an extensional semantics that links meaning with truth in the attempt to extrude intensional notions from a theory of meaning. Since radical translation rests on a truth-conditional semantics, it rules out the possibility that there may be statements that are intelligible even though based on false beliefs. Collingwood’s account of re-enactment, on the other hand, disconnects meaning from truth, thereby allowing for the possibility of understanding agents who have false beliefs. The paper argues, first, that Davidson’s account of radical translation rests on inappropriately naturalistic assumptions about the nature of understanding, and that Davidson commits this error because he develops his account of radical interpretation in response to an epistemological question that is motivated by a skeptical concern: “how can we know whether we have provided the correct interpretation?” Second, that in the twentieth century far too much philosophizing has been driven by epistemological concerns that have obscured attempts to provide adequate answers to the sort of conceptual question with which Collingwood is concerned, namely: “what does it mean to understand?”. (shrink)

How should one respond to scepticism? Should one seek to refute it? Or should scepticism be ignored? This paper argues that descriptive metaphysics occupies an intermediate logical space between truth-directed transcendental arguments aimed at refuting the sceptic and the quietist stance of the Humean naturalist who declines to take up the sceptical challenge. Descriptive metaphysics is neither quietist nor confrontational. It seeks to show, rather, that the sceptic is not a genuine partner in conversation.

The behaviour and roles of the microtubule network and the microfilaments following fertilization in the mouse oocyte are described. The microtubule network is organized by multiple microtubule organizing centres (MTOCs) and these play a major role in establishing spindle structure and pronuclear movement following fertilization; in contrast to sea urchin and frog eggs, the sperm centriole plays little part in organization of the post‐fertilization spindle. The microfilaments are required for spindle rotation, polar body formation, certain changes in the egg cortex, (...) and also for pronuclear movement. Influences of the chromosomes on microtubule and microfilament organisation are also discussed. (shrink)

This article offers a comparative analysis of the phenomenon of pre-trial non-disclosure of criminal evidence, as exhibited by police and prosecution authorities in the US and English legal systems...

This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that (...) as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda. (shrink)

This paper argues that Collingwood's philosophy of mind offers an interesting and compelling account of the nature of the mind and of the irreducibility of the mental, an account whose viability and relevance to contemporary debates ought to be given serious consideration. I suggest that the reason why Collingwood's contribution to the philosophy of mind has been neglected is due to the fact that his philosophy of mind is widely, even if mistakenly, regarded as the target of Ryle's attacks on (...) the dogma of the ghost in the machine and proceed to undermine the assumption that Collingwood is a twentieth century adherent of the dogma. (shrink)

This paper explores and defends a form of transcendental argument that is neither bold in its attempt to answer the sceptic, as ambitious transcendental strategies, nor epistemically humble, as modest transcendental strategies. While ambitious transcendental strategies seek to meet the sceptical challenge, and modest transcendental strategies accept the validity of the challenge but retreat to a position of epistemic humility, this form of transcendental argument denies the assumption that undergirds the challenge, namely that truth and falsity may be legitimately predicated (...) of the conditions of knowledge. As a result, although this form of transcendental argument is not truth-directed, it is not vulnerable to a charge that is often levelled against modest transcendental arguments, namely that they amount to the adoption of a strategy of sophisticated capitulation. This form of transcendental argument, which is implicit in Collingwood’s conception of philosophy as the search for absolut... (shrink)

Das Buch geht von dem heute angenommenen Stand der Wissenschaft aus: die Peripatetiker brachten eine Terminuslogik zustande, während die stoische Logik eine Aussagenlogik war. Sie standen feindlich einandern gegenüber.Der Verfasser, mit Hilfe eines Textes Avicennas, wo er die Lehre der hypothetischen Syllogismen behandelt, versucht zu beweisen, dass auch die Peripatetiker eine, von der Terminuslogik nicht in jedem Hinblick losgelöste Aussagenlogik hatten, und diese peripatetische Aussenlogik wurde under dem Namen hypothetische Syllogismen" in den griechischen Quellen erwähnt. Die zerstreuten Bermerkungen der Griechen (...) über die hypothetischen Syllogismen lassen sich im Lichte des Textes Avicennas in einem neuen Sinn deuten.Die klassischen/griechischen und lateinischen/ Quellen, wenn wir sie richtig deuten, und wenn wir die versammelten Bruchstücke der Lehre richtig zusammenstellen, zeigten uns das ganze, von dem stoischen abweichende System der peripatetischen Aussagenlogik.Man kann aber nicht nur die ganze Theorie rekonstruieren, sondern auch die Geschichte der peripatetischen Aussagenlogik, von Theophrast bis zu unserem Jahrhundert.". (shrink)

Cet article a pour objectif d’initier, voire de former, les enseignants à l’exploitation phonologique d’un texte littéraire en classe de Français Langue Étrangère. À travers deux textes de genre littéraire différent, un poème et une nouvelle, nous proposons des moyens pratiques, accompagnés de conseils pédagogiques, qui permettraient aux enseignants d’introduire le texte littéraire dans leur classe de langue. Dans le cadre du présent article, nous nous attachons à travailler la compétence réceptive au moyen du poème de Paul Verlaine et la (...) compétence lectorale au moyen de la nouvelle de Marguerite Yourcenar. (shrink)

: This article explores certain issues that arise at the borderline between conceptual analysis and metaphysics, where answers to questions of a conceptual nature compete with answers to questions of an ontological or metaphysical nature. I focus on the way in which three philosophers, Kant, Collingwood and Davidson, articulate the relationship between the conceptual question "What are actions?" and the metaphysical question "How is agency possible?" I argue that the way in which one handles the relationship between the conceptual and (...) the ontological question has important implications for one’s conception of the nature of philosophy, and that thinking hard about what it takes to defend the autonomy of the mental and of the agent-centred perspective should force us to think about our underlying conception of philosophy and to choose between one that understands it as first science and one that understands it as the under-labourer of science. (shrink)

It is the ambition of natural science to provide complete explanations of reality. Collingwood argues that science can only explain events, not actions. The latter is the distinctive subject matter of history and can be described as actions only if they are explained historically. This paper explains Collingwood’s claim that the distinctive subject matter of history is actions and why the attempt to capture this subject matter through the method of science inevitably ends in failure because science explains events, not (...) actions. It argues that Collingwood’s defence of the methodological autonomy of history vis-à-vis natural science is not based on a commitment to human exceptionalism, i.e. the exclusion of human beings and their doings from the rest of nature, but on the view that explanations which appeal to norms are different in kind from explanations which appeal to empirical regularities. Given the close relationship between the method and the subject matter of a form of inquiry, actions elude any attempt to explain them through the scientific method because the application of this method entails that what is thus explained is not an action but an event. (shrink)

The aim of our study was to analyze the behavioural responses of horses to familiar humans and to find factors that may affect these responses in three tests: approach to, standing beside, and following the familiar person. We investigated the impacts of horse-related factors and human-related factors. Horses with one handler needed less time to approach the human than horses with more handlers. Standing beside the human correlated positively with following. Following was mainly affected by training. According to our results, (...) the number of handlers has an important effect on horses' responses to familiar humans, especially regarding approach and follow behaviour. However, following behaviour is fundamentally determined by training. (shrink)

The aim of our study was to analyze the behavioural responses of horses to familiar humans and to find factors that may affect these responses in three tests: approach to, standing beside, and following the familiar person. We investigated the impacts of horse-related factors and human-related factors. Horses with one handler needed less time to approach the human than horses with more handlers. Standing beside the human correlated positively with following. Following was mainly affected by training. According to our results, (...) the number of handlers has an important effect on horses’ responses to familiar humans, especially regarding approach and follow behaviour. However, following behaviour is fundamentally determined by training. Keywords: human–horse interaction; approach; follow. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) was an English philosopher, historian and practicing archaeologist. His work, particularly in the philosophy of action and history, has been profoundly influential in the 20th and 21st century. Although the importance of his work is indisputable, this is the first book to consider how and why it actually matters. Giussepina D'oro considers the importance of Collingwood as a thinker who thinks kaleidoscopically and, unlike lots of contemporary philosophers, refuses to focus on narrow, technical interests but instead, observes (...) the whole world of thought. Why Collingwood Matters revives Collingwood's conception of the role and character of philosophical analysis and shows how it informs his understanding of the mind, what it means to act, and what it means to understand the past historically. It also argues for the relevance of his metaphilosophical approach to the challenge posed by the Anthropocene and the global environmental crisis. Both an elucidation of Collingwood's thought and a lively exploration of it's contemporary relevance, Why Collingwood Matters provides a much-needed examination of a 20th-century polymath. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone reflexionar, a partir de la obra de H. A. Murena, sobre el ‘sentido’ de lo político en América. A partir de categorías teóricas del autor, busca preguntarse si es posible construir una práctica política propia que no se resigne a definir el sentido desde el pasado americano o desde lo europeo. América es la tierra donde la ausencia de un origen petrificado permite a sus habitantes crear una comunidad auténtica. Es gracias a dicha ausencia que los (...) americanos no precisamos poner entre paréntesis la ontología para dar paso a la ética, ya que la comprensión del origen como ausencia impide operar a la lógica metafísica que reduce el tiempo a la presencia. (shrink)

The paper is divided in two parts. In the first I consider the nature of Ryle's attack on Collingwood's appropriation of the ontological argument and Collingwood's defence in the unpublished correspondence. In the second, I go beyond the confines of the Ryle-Collingwood exchange in the mid 'thirties to say something much more general about the nature of Collingwood's metaphysics as well as to advance an explanation of the compatibility of Collingwood's combined defence of descriptive metaphysics and the ontological proof.