Je me propose de réfléchir ici sur une éthique pour notre temps, un temps où l'on reconnaît à chacun de nous la liberté de trouver sa propre voie, ses propres sources d'épanouissement, de choisir la forme d'existence qui lui convient. Il importe, m'a-t-il semblé, de déterminer et de s'approprier dès lors une éthique véritablement compatible avec des existences faites sur mesure, une éthique à laquelle chacun, malgré sa singularité, peut s'identifier. Où est le droit chemin quand tant de parcours différents (...) sont possibles? Quels jugements moraux porter sur ses semblables quand ils se comportent de manière si dissemblable? Quelle éthique convient-il de se donner pour vivre de manière constructive dans un monde en constante évolution sociale, technologique et scientifique? Comment surmonter la crise des valeurs que plusieurs considèrent comme caractéristique de notre époque? La réponse réside dans ce que j'appellerai une éthique de la coexistence. L'idée centrale en est la suivante : ce qui compte moralement, ce n'est pas la manière dont on existe (individuellement), mais la manière dont on coexiste. A mon sens, une éthique nous parlera d'autant plus aujourd'hui qu'elle ambitionnera d'en dire le moins sur ce que c'est que d'être homme ou femme, qu'elle spéculera le moins possible au niveau métaphysique, pour porter toute son attention sur la relation entre les humains et sur leur diversité. C'est à ce prix qu'il est possible de donner véritablement un sens concret à la liberté individuelle et au principe d'égalité sans rien enlever à la solidarité humaine. (shrink)

We prove that the category of Nachbin’s compact ordered spaces and order-preserving continuous maps between them is dually equivalent to a variety of algebras, with operations of at most countable arity. Furthermore, we observe that the countable bound on the arity is the best possible: the category of compact ordered spaces is not dually equivalent to any variety of finitary algebras. Indeed, the following stronger results hold: the category of compact ordered spaces is not dually equivalent to any finitely accessible (...) category, any first-order definable class of structures, and any class of finitary algebras closed under products and subalgebras. An explicit equational axiomatisation of the dual of the category of compact ordered spaces is obtained; in fact, we provide a finite one, meaning that our description uses only finitely many function symbols and finitely many equational axioms. In preparation for the latter result, we establish a generalisation of a celebrated theorem by Mundici: our result—whose proof is independent of Mundici’s theorem—asserts that the category of unital commutative distributive lattice-ordered monoids is equivalent to the category of what we call MV-monoidal algebras.Abstract taken directly from the thesis.E-mail: marco[email protected]: https://air.unimi.it/retrieve/handle/2434/812809/1698986/phd_unimi_R11882.pdf. (shrink)

ObjectivesIn 2015, the Province of Quebec, Canada passed a law that allowed voluntary active euthanasia. Palliative care stakeholders in Canada have been largely opposed to euthanasia, yet there is little research about their views. The research question guiding this study was the following: How do palliative care physicians in Quebec position themselves regarding the practice of VAE in the context of the new provincial legislation?MethodsWe used interpretive description, an inductive methodology to answer research questions about clinical practice. A total of (...) 18 palliative care physicians participated in semistructured interviews at two university-affiliated hospitals in Quebec.ResultsParticipants positioned themselves in opposition to euthanasia. Their justifications were framed within their professional commitment to not hasten death, which sat in tension with the value of patients’ autonomy to choose how to die. Participants described VAE as unacceptable if it impeded opportunities to evaluate and alleviate suffering. Further, they contested government rhetoric that positioned VAE as a way to improve end-of-life care. Participants felt that VAE would diminish the potential of palliative care to relieve suffering. Dilemmas were apparent in their narratives, about reconciling respect for patient autonomy with broader palliative care values, and the value of accompanying and not abandoning patients who make requests for VAE while being committed to neither prolonging nor hastening death.ConclusionsThis study provides insight into nuanced positions of experienced palliative care physicians in Quebec and confirms expected tensions between an important stakeholder and the practice of VAE as guided by the new legislation. (shrink)

Research suggests that the experience of meaningless work is prevalent in various occupations, and that it is destructive for organizations and individuals, making this an issue of major ethical importance. In this paper, we present the results of a qualitative study based on interviews with Canadian public servants who self-identified as experiencing meaninglessness at work. Our main goal is to better understand participants' responses to the experience of meaningless work and the broader implications their experiences had on the rest of (...) their lives. We surface and explore the harms inflicted on participants through their experiences with meaningless work and suggest that these harms may have been made worse by structural features of our study's public-sector setting. We contribute to organization studies literature by showing the intersection of meaningless work with three related concepts: bullshit jobs, empty labour, and functional stupidity and argue that our empirical findings complement and complicate these frameworks by presenting the complex but hidden emotional experiences that can accompany outwardly observable workplace behaviours. (shrink)

In this article I examine two mathematical definitions of observational equivalence, one proposed by Charlotte Werndl and based on manifest isomorphism, and the other based on Ornstein and Weiss’s ε-congruence. I argue, for two related reasons, that neither can function as a purely mathematical definition of observational equivalence. First, each definition permits of counterexamples; second, overcoming these counterexamples will introduce non-mathematical premises about the systems in question. Accordingly, the prospects for a broadly applicable and purely mathematical definition of observational equivalence (...) are unpromising. Despite this critique, I suggest that Werndl’s proposals are valuable because they clarify the distinction between provable and unprovable elements in arguments for observational equivalence. (shrink)

In Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature, Marc Lange has presented an engagingly written, tightly argued, and novel philosophical account of the laws of nature. One of the intuitions behind the notion of a law of nature is, roughly, that of the many regularities we observe in the world there are some which appear to be due to mere happen-stance (“accidental” regularities, in the philosopher’s jargon), while others, which we call “laws,” seem to be possessed of (...) a degree of necessity. For example, if the only music ever to come out of my stereo system during the entirety of its existence were that of James Brown, we would term this an accidental regularity: it seems that it could have been otherwise had the world been different, perhaps by the stereo having a different owner or my having different tastes. On the other hand, the various relations and properties that determine the electrical functioning of my stereo seem more necessary and lawlike: presumably Ohm’s law would have held even had my stereo never been built.1 But even if Ohm’s law is somehow necessary, it seems less necessary than other “broadly logical” truths. Certainly Ohm’s law could have been different, perhaps by a factor of two, yet it seems unreasonable to say that the number 6 could have been prime. Although many philosophers, and certainly most scientists, will readily agree that there is a difference between logical, law-like, and accidental regularities, spelling out the nature of this difference has proved a remarkably difficult task. It is precisely this puzzle which Lange intends Laws and Lawmakers to address. In this review I shall first give a quick and broad outline of Lange’s account of natural laws as I understand it, followed by a brief summary of the contents of the book, and then close with a few critical comments. (shrink)

In this paper I examine two mathematical definitions of observational equivalence, one proposed by Charlotte Werndl and based on manifest isomorphism, and the other based on Ornstein and Weiss's ε-congruenceε-congruence. I argue, for two related reasons, that neither can function as a purely mathematical definition of observational equivalence. First, each definition permits of counterexamples; second, overcoming these counterexamples will introduce non-mathematical premises about the systems in question. Accordingly, the prospects for a broadly applicable and purely mathematical definition of observational equivalence (...) are unpromising. Despite this critique, I suggest that Werndl's proposals are valuable because they clarify the distinction between provable and unprovable elements in arguments for observational equivalence. (shrink)

There seems to be a proliferation of prizes and rankings for ethical business over the past decade. Our principal aims in this article are twofold: to initiate an academic discussion of the epistemic and normative stakes in business-ethics competitions; and to help organizers of such competitions to think through some of these issues and the design options for dealing with them. We have been able to find no substantive literature — academic or otherwise — that addresses either of these two (...) broad topics and audiences. Our modest aim, therefore, is to suggest an agenda of issues, and to begin to explore and analyse some of the possible arguments for and against various philosophical or practical solutions. Part I explores the challenges facing a prize-organizing committee, including problems derived from what Rawls calls the "fact of pluralism" in democratic societies (reasonable people will always disagree over some basic values, including those relevant to evaluating business practices), and epistemic issues about how we can justify qualitative judgments on the basis of incomplete quantitative data. We also try to identify risks and opportunity costs for ethics-prize granters. In Part II we spell out (a) a range of design options and (b) some advice about how any particular prize-awarding committee might select among these options to best achieve its goals (which typically involve highlighting and publicizing best practices for ethical business). (shrink)

This paper looks at how the idea of pointless topology itself evolved during its pre-localic phase by analyzing the definitions of the concept of topological space of Menger and Nöbeling. Menger put forward a topology of lumps in order to generalize the definition of the real line. As to Nöbeling, he developed an abstract theory of posets so that a topological space becomes a particular case of topological poset. The analysis emphasizes two points. First, Menger's geometrical perspective was superseded by (...) an algebraic one, a lattice-theoretical one to be precise. Second, Menger's bottom–up approach was replaced by a top–down one. (shrink)

We consider the set of jumps below a Turing degree, given by JB={x':x≤a}, with a focus on the problem: Which recursively enumerable degrees a are uniquely determined by JB? Initially, this is motivated as a strategy to solve the rigidity problem for the partial order R of r.e. degrees. Namely, we show that if every high2 r.e. degree a is determined by JB, then R cannot have a nontrivial automorphism. We then defeat the strategy—at least in the form presented—by constructing (...) pairs a0, a1 of distinct r.e. degrees such that JB=JB within any possible jump class {x:x'=c}. We give some extensions of the construction and suggest ways to salvage the attack on rigidity. (shrink)

We study the weak truth table degree spectra of first-order relational structures. We prove a dichotomy among the possible wtt degree spectra along the lines of Knight’s upward-closure theorem for Turing degree spectra. We prove new results contrasting the wtt degree spectra of finite- and infinite-signature structures. We show that, as a method of defining classes of reals, the wtt degree spectrum is, except for some trivial cases, strictly more expressive than the Turing degree spectrum.

Steeve Bélanger | : Depuis le xixe siècle, la question de la « séparation » entre le « judaïsme » et le « christianisme » anciens a soulevé de nombreux débats entre spécialistes. Pour tenter d’expliquer ce phénomène historique complexe, les chercheurs n’ont pas hésité à recourir à de nombreuses métaphores et à divers paradigmes interprétatifs. Or, la recherche des trois dernières décennies a contribué à renouveler et à nuancer notre connaissance du « judaïsme » et du « christianisme » (...) anciens obligeant alors à revoir les métaphores et paradigmes par lesquels on a tenté d’expliquer la « séparation » entre ces deux entités religieuses. | : Since the 19th century, the question of the “separation” between the “Judaism” and “Christianity” in Antiquity has raised many debates among specialists. Many researchers have tried to explain this complex historical phenomenon, and they did not hesitate to use many metaphors and various interpretative paradigms. The research during the three last decades contributed to renew and to moderate our knowledge of “Judaism” and “Christianity.” The community then had to re-examine the metaphors and paradigms by which the “separation” between these two religious entities has been there explained. (shrink)

Steeve Bélanger,Frédérique Bonenfant | : Le concept d’« innovation religieuse » est rarement, mais surtout particulièrement mal défini dans la recherche actuelle. De plus, il est souvent associé aux nouveaux mouvements religieux qui ont émergé à l’époque contemporaine, ce qui limite indéniablement son utilisation comme outil et catégorie d’analyse des phénomènes de changement, de nouveauté, de transformation et de mutation religieux d’hier comme d’aujourd’hui. Afin de la distinguer d’une nouveauté, d’une mode ou d’une tendance religieuse passagère, nous proposons de considérer (...) que l’innovation religieuse consiste en un processus collectif qui, par volonté et/ou par désir de changement face à une situation considérée comme ne répondant pas ou plus aux besoins ou aux aspirations actuelles, introduit une nouveauté religieuse et qui conduit, par négociation ou par imposition au moyen d’un réseau de communication, à un changement socioreligieux significatif, effectif et durable des pratiques et/ou du système de significations. Cette proposition de définition, qui se veut ouverte et englobante, permet de considérer que toute nouveauté introduite dans le domaine religieux peut se transformer en innovation religieuse à condition de traverser les quatre phases qui caractérisent, selon nous, les processus d’innovation religieuse, soit celle de proposition d’une nouveauté, celle de diffusion de la nouveauté, celle d’appropriation de la nouveauté puis celle d’adoption de la nouveauté par changement des pratiques et/ou du système de significations. | : The concept of “religious innovation” is seldom, but most of all very badly defined in current research. Furthermore, it is often associated to new religious movements that have emerged in the contemporary period. This undeniably limits its use as a tool and a category of analysis of the phenomena of religious change, novelty, transformation and mutation yesterday as today. With a view to distinguish it from a novelty, a fashion or a passing religious tendency, we propose to consider that religious innovation consists in a collective process which, either willingly or through a desire for change in the face of a situation deemed not or no longer to answer to actual needs or aspirations, introduces a religious novelty, and which leads, through negotiation or imposition by means of a network of communication, to a socio-religious change, significant, effective and durable, of practices and/or of the system of meanings. This proposed definition, intended as it is to be open and inclusive, allows one to consider that every novelty introduced into the religious domain may be transformed into a religious innovation provided it passes through the four phases characterizing, according to us, the processes of religious innovation, namely that of a proposition of novelty, that of a diffusion of the novelty, that of an appropriation of the novelty and that of an adoption of the novelty through a change of practices and/or of the system of meanings. (shrink)

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...) will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6). (shrink)

La fin des années 1960, en Amérique du Nord, demeure, dans l’imaginaire d’un bon nombre, une ère dominée par la contre-culture où s’affichent une sexualité affranchie et un certain anarchisme à prétention de gauche. C’est l’époque de la contestation étudiante qu’alimente l’implication grandissante des Américains au Viêt-nam. Or, comme en contrepoint, presque en opposition,..

We find many embedded letters in ancient historiographic narratives. These letters are not simply literary ornaments, but truly historical causes of the narrated events. In other words, they contribute significantly to the course of the plot. Pioneer in Christian historiography, the author of Luke-Acts also uses embedded letters in the second part of his diptych. By reconsidering the embedded letters in the Acts of the Apostles, this paper will question their narrative functions and credibility.

Dans sa thèse complémentaire intitulée « Essai sur l’unité des sciences mathématiques dans leur développement actuel » Albert Lautman analysa la question de l’unité des mathématiques en considérant différentes paires antithétiques de concepts mathématiques, notamment le continu et le discret. Dans le cadre de sa refonte de la géométrie algébrique abstraite, le mathématicien français Alexandre Grothendieck considéra également l’opposition traditionnelle du continu et du discret selon un cadre conceptuel fort similaire à celui de Lautman. En comparaison, l’introduction du concept de (...) topos lui permit de donner une réponse strictement mathématique et parfaitement claire à cette question.Albert Lautman’s complementary thesis, entitled “Essai sur l’unité des sciences mathématiques dans leur développement actuel”, analysed the unity of mathematics through various antithetical pairs of mathematical concepts such as the continuous and the discrete. As part of his renewal of abstract algebraic geometry, French mathematician Alexandre Grothendieck also considered the traditional opposition between the continuous and the discrete and adopted a conceptual framework very similar to that of Lautman. However, the topos concept allowed Grothendieck to come up with a purely mathematical and, in comparison, much clearer solution. (shrink)

In this article, I address a controversial aspect of Rawls’s treatment of the question of justice between generations: how the parties in the original position could be motivated to select Rawls’s preferred principle of intergenerational savings, which he dubs the just savings principle. I focus on the explanation found in his later work, where he proposes that the correct savings principle is the principle that any generation would have wanted preceding generations to have followed. By expanding upon this explanation, I (...) respond to the objection that this explanation disregards the perspective of the first generation. I demonstrate that this objection ceases to be a concern when a proper account of the parties’ reasoning is developed. What is notable about the explanation I defend is that it relies on the parties adopting maximax – not maximin – as a rule for rational decision making. Having established this intermediary conclusion, I depart with Rawls and consider what savings principle the parties would choose if given more options. Ultimately, I argue that the parties would select a principle that Rawls would have undoubtedly rejected if presented to him at face value. This is because the principle of savings I argue would be selected requires continual economic growth over generations to increase upwards indefinitely – a conclusion Rawls is explicitly trying to avoid in his theory of justice. (shrink)

Scientific models are often said to be more or less general depending on how many cases they cover. In this paper we argue that the cardinality of cases is insufficient as a metric of generality, and we present a novel account based on measure theory. This account overcomes several problems with the cardinality approach, and additionally provides some insight into the nature of assessments of generality. Specifically, measure theory affords a natural and quantitative way of describing local spaces of possibility. (...) The generality of models can be understood as the measure of possibilities to which the models apply. In order to illustrate our view, we consider the example of structural genomics, the ongoing project of building three-dimensional models of biological macromolecules like proteins. Using measure theory, we interpret the practice of homology modeling, where such models are understood to apply widely but imperfectly to the space of possible proteins. (shrink)