In contemporary discussions of the Ramsey Test for conditionals, it is commonly held that (i) supposing the antecedent of a conditional is adopting a potential state of full belief, and (ii) Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. I argue on the basis of Thomason Conditionals (such as ' If Sally is deceiving, I do not believe it') and Moore's Paradox that both claims are wrong. I then develop a double-indexed Update Semantics for conditionals which takes these two results (...) into account while doing justice to the key intuitions underlying the Ramsey Test. The semantics is extended to cover some further phenomena, including the recent observation that epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's Paradox. (shrink)

A dynamic semantics for iffy oughts offers an attractive alternative to the folklore that Chisholm's paradox enforces an unhappy choice between the intuitive inference rules of factual and deontic detachment. The first part of the story told here shows how a dynamic theory about ifs and oughts gives rise to a nonmonotonic perspective on deontic discourse and reasoning that elegantly removes the air of paradox from Chisholm's puzzle without sacrificing any of the two detachment principles. The second part of the (...) story showcases two bonus applications of the framework suggested here: it offers a response to Forrester's gentle murder paradox and avoids Kolodny and MacFarlane's miners paradox about deontic reasoning under epistemic uncertainty. A comparison between the dynamic semantic proposal made in this paper and a more conservative approach combining a static semantics with a dynamic pragmatics is provided. (shrink)

A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the same time avoiding (...) the complexities of alternative theories. The second part of the story extends the basic framework to cover some complicated data about retraction and the interaction between epistemic modality and tense. A comparison between the suggestion made in this essay and current versions of the orthodoxy is provided. (shrink)

This paper investigates the effects of (surface) DP-internal quantifying expressions on semantic interpretation. In particular, I investigate two syntactic constructions in which an adjective takes scope out of its embedding DP, thus raising an interesting question for strict compositionality. Regarding the first construction, I follow Larson (1999) and assume that the adjective incorporates into the determiner of its DP, forming a complex quantifier [D+A]. I present new evidence in favor of this analysis. Since Larson's semantic analysis of complex quantifiers [D+A] (...) makes a wrong prediction, I propose an alternative, empirically more adequate analysis that treats D+A compounds as pluractional quantifiers in the sense of Lasersohn (1995). Finally, I turn to the second construction, arguing that – despite superficial similarities to the first construction - it should not be analyzed in terms of complex quantifier formation, but in terms of LF-movement of the adjective to Spec,DP. The discussion suggests that there is more than one way for DP-internal modifiers to take DP-external scope in natural language. (shrink)

Algorithms have developed into somewhat of a modern myth. On the one hand, they have been depicted as powerful entities that rule, sort, govern, shape, or otherwise control our lives. On the other hand, their alleged obscurity and inscrutability make it difficult to understand what exactly is at stake. What sustains their image as powerful yet inscrutable entities? And how to think about the politics and governance of something that is so difficult to grasp? This editorial essay provides a critical (...) backdrop for the special issue, treating algorithms not only as computational artifacts but also as sensitizing devices that can help us rethink some entrenched assumptions about agency, transparency, and normativity. (shrink)

To what extent, if at all, should a just society adopt public policies that regulate and limit the amount of time people work? Attempts to answer this question face a dilemma: Either, we can adopt a laissez-faire view, according to which governments must refrain from imposing working time policies on the labour market. But this view generates a situation in which many citizens experience deep regret about the balance between work and leisure in their lives. Or, we can endorse an (...) interventionist view that advocates government imposition of working time policies. However, such a view appears to be objectionably perfectionist insofar as it imposes on citizens a particular conception of the ideal balance between work and leisure. This article proposes a way out of this dilemma. It shows that the interventionist view can be defended on the anti-perfectionist grounds that this helps address a collective action problem in the labour market – the working time rat race. Employers often use working time as a proxy for their employees’ productivity and commitment. Those who work particularly long hours are often awarded benefits such as raises or promotions or are spared from dismissals. This makes it individually rational for each worker to work extra hours in an attempt to outcompete colleagues. However, if many workers pursue this strategy, it loses its effectiveness. Workers with preferences for more leisure have a claim to state intervention to remove the rat race when this doesn’t impose disproportionate harm on third parties. (shrink)

Mindfulness meditation describes a set of different mental techniques to train attention and awareness. Trait mindfulness and extended mindfulness interventions can benefit self-control. The present study investigated the short-term consequences of mindfulness meditation under conditions of limited self-control resources. Specifically, we hypothesized that a brief period of mindfulness meditation would counteract the deleterious effect that the exertion of self-control has on subsequent self-control performance. Participants who had been depleted of self-control resources by an emotion suppression task showed decrements in self-control (...) performance as compared to participants who had not suppressed emotions. However, participants who had meditated after emotion suppression performed equally well on the subsequent self-control task as participants who had not exerted self-control previously. This finding suggests that a brief period of mindfulness meditation may serve as a quick and efficient strategy to foster self-control under conditions of low resources. (shrink)

The study of word meanings promises important insights into the nature of the human mind by revealing what people find to be most cognitively significant in their experience. However, as we learn more about the semantics of various languages, we are faced with an interesting problem. Different languages seem to be telling us different stories about the mind. For example, important distinctions made in one language are not necessarily made in others. What are we to make of these cross-linguistic differences? (...) How do they arise? Are they created by purely linguistic processes operating over the course of language evolution? Or do they reflect fundamental differences in thought? In this sea of differences, are there any semantic universals? Which categories might be given by the genes, which by culture, and which by language? And what might the cross-linguistic similarities and differences contribute to our understanding of conceptual and linguistic development? The kinds of mapping principles, structures, and processes that link language and non-linguistic knowledge must accommodate not just one language but the rich diversity that has been uncovered. The integration of knowledge and methodologies necessary for real progress in answering these questions has happened only recently, as experimental approaches have been applied to the cross-linguistic study of word meaning. In Words and the Mind, Barbara Malt and Phillip Wolff present evidence from the leading researchers who are carrying out this empirical work on topics as diverse as spatial relations, events, emotion terms, motion events, objects, body-part terms, causation, color categories, and relational categories. By bringing them together, Malt and Wolff highlight some of the most exciting cross-linguistic and cross-cultural work on the language-thought interface, from a broad array of fields including linguistics, anthropology, cognitive and developmental psychology, and cognitive neuropsychology. Their results provide some answers to these questions and new perspectives on the issues surrounding them. (shrink)

Every adequate semantics for conditionals and deontic ought must offer a solution to the miners paradox about conditional obligations. Kolodny and MacFarlane have recently argued that such a semantics must reject the validity of modus ponens. I demonstrate that rejecting the validity of modus ponens is inessential for an adequate solution to the paradox.

The received wisdom on ability modals is that they differ from their epistemic and deontic cousins in what inferences they license and better receive a universal or conditional analysis instead of an existential one. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the empirical picture about the semantics of ability modals, and to propose an analysis that explains what makes the can of ability so special but that also preserves the crucial idea that all uses of can share a common (...) lexical semantics. The resulting framework combines tools and techniques from dynamic and inquisitive semantics with insights from the literature of the role of agency in deontic logic. It explains not only why the can of ability, while essentially being an existential modal operator, sometimes resists distribution over disjunction and interacts with its duals in particular and hitherto unnoticed ways, but also has a tendency to license free choice inferences. (shrink)

Algorithms have become a widespread trope for making sense of social life. Science, finance, journalism, warfare, and policing—there is hardly anything these days that has not been specified as “algorithmic.” Yet, although the trope has brought together a variety of audiences, it is not quite clear what kind of work it does. Often portrayed as powerful yet inscrutable entities, algorithms maintain an air of mystery that makes them both interesting and difficult to understand. This article takes on this problem and (...) examines the role of algorithms not as techno-scientific objects to be known, but as a figure that is used for making sense of observations. Following in the footsteps of Harold Garfinkel’s tutorial cases, I shall illustrate the implications of this view through an experiment with algorithmic navigation. Challenging participants to go on a walk, guided not by maps or GPS but by an algorithm developed on the spot, I highlight a number of dynamics typical of reasoning with running code, including the ongoing respecification of rules and observations, the stickiness of the procedure, and the selective invocation of the algorithm as an intelligible object. The materials thus provide an opportunity to rethink key issues at the intersection of the social sciences and the computational, including popular concerns with transparency, accountability, and ethics. (shrink)

Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this (...) capacity to intervene does not amount to agential control or action. I illustrate this with a case study of how passive breathing, a mere behavior, is misclassified by mere capacity views. I end by revisiting the central alternative to mere capacity views: causal control views. Advances in our understanding of how agents exert control over unfolding movements indicate that the nature of control is characterized by ubiquitous, small-scale causal interventions. (shrink)

Epistemic modals are a prominent topic in the literature on natural language semantics, with wide-ranging implications for issues in philosophy of language and philosophical logic. Considerations about the role that epistemic "might" and "must" play in discourse and reasoning have led to the development of several important alternatives to classical possible worlds semantics for natural language modal expressions. This is an opinionated overview of what I take to be some of the most exciting issues and developments in the field.

In dem Band werden erstmals Grundlagentexte zur Phänomenologischen Erziehungswissenschaft von ihren Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart zusammengestellt. Die Sammlung gibt einen Überblick über Struktur, Entwicklung und Ausdifferenzierung der phänomenologischen Bewegung in der deutschsprachigen Pädagogik in den Feldern systematische Pädagogik, Bildungs-, Lern- und Erziehungstheorie, Pädagogik der frühen Kindheit, Schul- und Sonderpädagogik und der Erwachsenenbildung. Der Inhalt • Anfänge Phänomenologischer Erziehungswissenschaft • Anthropologie und Phänomenologische Erfahrungstheorie des Lernens und Erziehens • Koexistentiale Phänomenologie der Erziehung und Strukturpädagogik • Fremdheit und Andersheit im Lernen (...) und Umlernen • Aktuelle Ansätze Phänomenologischer Erziehungswissenschaft Die Zielgruppen Erziehungs- und Sozialwissenschaften, Erziehungs- und Bildungstheorie, Philosophy of Education, Historische Erziehungswissenschaft, Anthropologie, Frühpädagogik, Rehabilitationspädagogik, Schulpädagogik Der Herausgeber Dr. Malte Brinkmann ist Professor für Allgemeine Erziehungswissenschaft an der Humboldt-Universität Berlin. (shrink)

What should be the ‘informational base’ of welfare economics if one takes the insights from behavioral economics seriously? Sugden proposes individuals’ sets of opportunities. This paper discusses...

Comparative biology is afield that deals with morphology. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe recognised comparative biology, not as a passive science obsessed with counting similarities as it is today, but as an active field wherein he sought to perceive the inter-relationships of individual organisms to the organic whole, which he termed the archetype. I submit that Goethe's archetype and his application of a technique termed the Anschauung are rigorous and significant ways to conduct delicate empiricism in comparative biology. The future of (...) comparative biology lies in the use of the Anschauung to communicate the archetype as a set of inter-relationships of homologues that we perceive intuitively. In this essay I present how the extension of our own intuitive perception forms the foundations of a method for seeing and discovering the archetype in comparative biology. (shrink)

This paper offers a unified semantic explanation of two observations that prove to be problematic for classical analyses of modals, conditionals, and disjunctions: the fact that disjunctions scoping under possibility modals give rise to the free choice effect and the fact that counterfactuals license simplification of disjunctive antecedents. It shows that the data are well explained by a dynamic semantic analysis of modals and conditionals that uses ideas from the inquisitive semantic tradition in its treatment of disjunction. The analysis explains (...) why embedding a disjunctive possibility under negation reverts disjunction to its classical behavior, is general enough to predict less studied simplification patterns, and also makes progress toward a unified perspective on the distinction between informative, inquisitive, and attentive content. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of ‘ignorance’ in philosophy and science, particularly with respect to the conceptualization, study and solution of environmental problems. We begin by distinguishing between ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ignorance’. We then offer a categorization of ignorance, and use these categories to assess the role of science as a means of reducing ignorance. We note that to proceed with science, several 'acts of faith' are necessary. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of an attitude of openness (...) in science and philosophy, especially regarding environmental problems. Throughout, we illustrate our discussion of ignorance, and the problems involved in its reduction, by reference to environmental issues. (shrink)

Machery (2009) has proposed that the notion of ‘concept’ ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology. I raise three questions about his argument: (1) Is there a meaningful distinction between concepts and background knowledge? (2) Do we need to discard the hybrid view? (3) Are there really categories of things in the world that are the basis for concepts? Although I argue that the answer to all three is ‘no’, I agree with Machery's conclusion that seeking a (...) single characterization of concepts will not be fruitful for understanding cognitive representations and processes. (shrink)

Demands for free time protections are often justified with appeal to a concern for individuals' welfare. The idea is that people would enjoy greater levels of welfare if they had more access to free time. This article shows that the currently most sophisticated version of the welfare argument is inconclusive. It then shows how this argument can be modified and extended to become conclusive. The main claim is that policymakers have a decisive welfare-based reason to implement free time protections that (...) go even further than those already in place in countries that are known for their good work–life balance. (shrink)

In diesem Band werden ausgehend von systematischen Studien zum Verhältnis von Leib, Lernen, Bildung und Erziehung neue Impulse aus der empirischen Bildungsforschung, den Neurowissenschaften und der Postphänomenologie aufgegriffen: Phänomenologische und pädagogische Perspektiven auf Leiblichkeit und Embodiment werden mit diskurs- und praxistheoretischen, neurophänomenologischen sowie Perspektiven der Gender Studies verknüpft und auf die pädagogischen Praxisfelder Digitalisierung, Schule und Kindergarten bezogen.

Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this (...) capacity to intervene does not amount to agential control or action. I illustrate this with a case study of how passive breathing, a mere behavior, is misclassified by mere capacity views. I end by revisiting the central alternative to mere capacity views: causal control views. Advances in our understanding of how agents exert control over unfolding movements indicate that the nature of control is characterized by ubiquitous, small-scale causal interventions. (shrink)

The notion of a recognitional concept (RC) is stated precisely and shown to be unrelated to the proper notion of a perceptually based concept, defining of concept empiricism. More fundamentally, it is argued that the notion of an RC does not reflect a potentially sensible candidate theory of concepts at all and therefore ought to be abandoned from concept-theoretical discourse. In the later parts of the paper, it is shown independently of these points that Fodor's attacks on RCs are in (...) all central respects based on fallacies and confusions. Thus, even if the notion of an RC were one worth defending, it could not be threatened by Fodor's attacks on it. Throughout the paper, I aim at clarification regarding the logical relations between various concept-theoretical options. (shrink)

Folklore has it that Sobel sequences favor a variably strict analysis of conditionals over its plainly strict alternative. While recent discussions for or against the lore have focussed on Sobel sequences involving counterfactuals, this paper draws attention to the fact that indicative Sobel sequences are just as felicitous as are their counterfactual cousins. The fact, or so I shall argue here, disrupts the folklore: given minimal assumptions about the semantics and pragmatics of indicative conditionals, a textbook variably strict analysis fails (...) to predict that indicative Sobel sequences are felicitous. The correct lesson to draw from Sobel sequences is that their felicity challenges classical implementations of the variably strict and of the plainly strict analysis alike. In response to this challenge I develop a dynamic strict analysis of conditionals that handles indicative Sobel sequences with grace while preserving intuitive constraints on the semantics and pragmatics of their members. A discussion of how such an analysis may handle the challenge from reverse Sobel sequences is provided. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungMit Schellings Spätphilosophie verabschiedet sich im Deutschen Idealismus die Vernunft vom Versuch ihrer Letztbegründung. Die Vernunft kann sich nicht in der Wirklichkeit eines absoluten Grundes ihrer eigenen Wirklichkeit versichern. Zwar realisiert die Vernunft, auf ein Absolutes bezogen zu sein, aber dessen Wirklichkeit als schöpferische Freiheit entzieht sich dem konzipierenden Ausgriff der Vernunft . Allerdings befreit die von der Vernunft eingesehene Möglichkeit dieser rational uneinholbaren Wirklichkeit zu einem – theoretisch nicht erzwingbaren, aber auch nicht als irrational denunzierbaren – Perspektivenwechsel . Danach (...) ist der »entsicherten« Vernunft eine Diagnose der Welt im Horizont der schöpferischen Freiheit des Absoluten möglich .So zeigt Schellings Spätphilosophie: Gerade eine Theorie des Absoluten kann der Unbestimmtheit, die sich in Phänomenen wie Ambivalenz, Zufall und Unausdeutbarkeit ausdrückt, Raum verschaffen. Damit nimmt Schelling vorweg, was die Moderne in ihrer Selbstcharakterisierung, und zwar gegen die theologischen und absolutheitstheoretischen Überlegungen des Deutschen Idealismus, gerne für sich beansprucht. Anders jedoch als manche Vertreter des Postidealismus loziert Schelling das Andere der Vernunft nicht strikt jenseits der Vernunft , sondern verbindet die Einsicht in das Andere der Vernunft mit der Selbstaufklärung der Vernunft. Das Andere der Vernunft ist ihr absoluter Grund. Und dieser Grund ist ursprüngliche Kreativität, schöpferische Freiheit: die Freiheit, aus der und durch die alles ist.SummaryWith Schelling's later philosophy, the rationality in German idealism bids a farewell to the attempt of its last justification. In the reality of an absolute reason, rationality cannot affirm its own reality. Rationality indeed achieves the aim of being linked to an absolute, but whose reality as a creative freedom eludes the conceptualising reaching out of the rationality . However, the possibility of this rationally ungraspable reality, as understood by rationality, liberates to create a theoretically non-enforceable change of perspective , which is nonetheless not to be denounced as irrational. Afterwards, the “unlocked” rationality is able to diagnose the world in the view of the creative freedom of the absolute .This is what Schelling's later philosophy demonstrates: a theory of the absolute can create scope for uncertainty, which is expressed in phenomena such as ambivalence, coincidence and indecipherability. In so doing, Schelling anticipates what the ‘modern’ likes to lay claim to in its self-characterisation, which is, indeed, contrary to the theological and absolutist theoretical considerations of German idealism. Different, however, from other representatives of post-idealism, Schelling locates ‘the other’ of rationality not strictly as being on the other side of rationality but links the insight into the other of rationality with the self-enlightenment of rationality. The other of rationality is its absolute reason. This reason is original creativity and creative freedom: the freedom from and through which everything is. (shrink)

"Verstehen" ist im Umgang mit Musik sowohl in der Alltagssprache als auch in historischen, asthetischen und padagogischen Konzeptionen ein zentraler, zugleich aber ein problematischer Begriff. NAch einer einfuhrenden Klarung und Systematisierung theoretischer Positionen zwischen einem "existenzialen" und einem "identifizierenden" Verstehensbegriff werden Konturen eines "posthermeneutischen" Begriffs von "Musikverstehen" skizziert, der den Anspruch auf Universalitat, Intentionalitat und Koharenz sowie die diskursive Verfasstheit des Hermeneutischen problematisiert und stattdessen auf "Alteritat", "Differenz" und "Prozessualitat" setzt. Die Auseinandersetzung mit historisch und stilistisch sehr unterschiedlichen Beispielen konkretisiert (...) die Frage nach einer "posthermeneutischen" musikalischen Analyse: In Klavierkonzerten John Cages, Klaviersonaten Ludwig v. Beethovens, Klavierliedern Robert Schumanns sowie aktuellen Kompositionen von Kanye West und Akufen erweist sich in je anderer Weise der Anspruch eines umfassenden Verstehens, insbesondere an formale Koharenz und eine Kongruenz von Wort und Ton, als problematisch. Ein veranderter Begriff von "Musikverstehen" hat auch Konsequenzen fur didaktische Zielsetzungen und padagogische Inszenierungen, die die Dynamik von Interpretationsprozessen erfahrbar machen konnen und als "asthetische Operationen" nicht auf ein diskursives Verstehen angewiesen sein mussen. (shrink)

Grundsätzlich geht es dem Menschen darum, im Lichte seiner Endlichkeit ein gelingendes Dasein zu führen. Doch wie kann und soll dieses Dasein geregelt werden? Nichts erscheint vernünftiger als eine politische Ordnung im Lichte der Sakralität der Person - an die jedoch geglaubt werden muss. Nach einer kulturgeschichtlichen Aufarbeitung wird deutlich: Die "heilige Ordnung der Menschenwürde" erweist sich dem moralischen Dogmatismus absoluter Ordnungsprinzipien überlegen und vermag darüber hinaus das Prinzip politischer Selbstbestimmung zu garantieren, indem die Selbstgefährdung völlig ergebnisoffener Ordnungsformen überwunden wird. (...) Auf anthropologischer und psychologischer Basis wird die Sakralität der Person erklärt, begründet und vor dem Hintergrund des Konflikts zwischen Politik und Religion problematisiert. Die auf dem Prinzip der Sakralität der Person aufbauende "heilige Ordnung der Menschenwürde" wird darüber hinaus als vielversprechende Zukunft unserer Zivilisation diskutiert. (shrink)

High‐throughput genomic technologies are revolutionizing human genetics. So far the focus has been on the 1.5% of the genome, which is coding, in spite of the fact that the great majority of genomic variants fall outside the coding regions. Recent efforts to annotate the non‐coding sequence show that over 80% of the genome is biochemically active. The genome is divided into regulatory domains consisting of sequence regions that enhance and/or silence the expression of nearby genes and are, in some cases, (...) separated by boundaries with insulator activity. In this paper, we review the recent advances in the identification of variations that influence gene regulation and their consequences for human disease. We hypothesize that structural variations outside of the coding genome can interfere with normal gene regulation by disrupting the regulatory landscape. Therefore, the regulatory landscape of the genome has also to be taken into consideration when investigating the pathology of human disease. (shrink)

Biogeography is a multidisciplinary field with multiple origins in 19th century taxonomic practice. The Origins of Biogeography presents a revised history of early biogeography and investigates the split in taxonomic practice, between the classification of taxa and the classification of vegetation. This book moves beyond the traditional belief that biogeography is born from a synthesis of Darwin and Wallace and focuses on the important pioneering work of earlier practitioners such as Zimmermann, Stromeyer, de Candolle and Humboldt. Tracing the academic history (...) of biogeography over the decades and centuries, this book recounts the early schisms in phyto and zoogeography, the shedding of its bonds to taxonomy, its adoption of an ecological framework, and its beginnings at the dawn of the 20th century. This book assesses the contributions of key figures such as Zimmermann, Humboldt and Wallace, and reminds us of the forgotten influence of plant and animal geographers including Stromeyer, Prichard and de Candolle, whose early attempts at classifying animal and plant geography would inform later progress. The Origins of Biogeography is a science historiography aimed at biogeographers, who have little access to a detailed history of the practices of early plant and animal geographers. This book will also reveal how biological classification has shaped 18th and 19th century plant and animal geography and why it is relevant to the 21st biogeographer. (shrink)

English summary: As a functioning part of the human body and mind, our internal information technology systems belong to our physical makeup just as much as body parts and substances do to the realm of reproductive medicine, genetic information does to gene technology and brain scans do to neurological technology. Bio-information law concerns itself with the rights of these roving human components. German description: Bio- und Informationstechnologien generieren standig neue, bislang kaum fur moglich gehaltene Verhaltnisse, Verknupfungen und Anschlusse zwischen Technischem (...) und Lebendigem. Im Recht werfen diese technisch-lebendigen Assoziationen grundsatzliche Fragen auf, wenn es beispielsweise darum geht, welche Personlichkeits- oder Eigentumsrechte an extrakorporal gelagerten Korpersubstanzen oder auch an genetischer Information bestehen. Ebenso hat das Recht eine Antwort darauf zu finden, welche Bedeutung neuronalen Daten und Abbildungen von Hirnaktivitaten, etwa fur den Beweis psychischer Schadigungen im Schmerzensgeldprozess, zukommt. Und nicht zuletzt erhebt sich die keineswegs mehr abwegige Rechtsfrage, ob der Eingriff in ein informationstechnisches System als personlichkeitsverletzend gelten darf, weil dieses womoglich wie ein ausgelagerter Teil des Korpers zu behandeln ist. Malte Gruber untersucht, wie sich diese Problemstellungen auf die privatrechtlichen Deutungen von Person, Sache und Rechtsverhaltnis auswirken und dabei ein technologieubergreifendes Recht formieren: Bioinformationsrecht handelt von der engen, untrennbaren Verbindung informationstechnisch-artifizieller und korperlich-lebendiger, gewissermassen kunstlicher und naturlicher Prozesse, von Expansionstechnologien und bioartifiziellen Rechtsverhaltnissen, in denen sich die Personlichkeit des Menschen in technisierter Verfassung entfaltet. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

Evoked potentials in the amplitude-time spectrum of the electroencephalogram are commonly used to assess the extent of brain responses to stimulation with noxious contact heat. The magnitude of the N- and P-waves are used as a semi-objective measure of the response to the painful stimulus: the higher the magnitude, the more painful the stimulus has been perceived. The strength of the N-P-wave response is also largely dependent on the chosen reference electrode site. The goal of this study was to examine (...) which reference technique excels both in practical and theoretical terms when analyzing noxious contact heat evoked potentials in the amplitude-time spectrum. We recruited 21 subjects. We applied seven noxious contact heat stimuli using two temperatures, 51°C, and 54°C, to each subject. During EEG analysis, we aimed to identify the referencing technique which produces the highest N-wave and P-wave amplitudes with as little artifactual influence as possible. For this purpose, we applied the following six referencing techniques: mathematically linked A1/A2, average reference, REST, AFz, Pz, and mathematically linked PO7/PO8. We evaluated how these techniques impact the N-P amplitudes of CHEPS based on our data from healthy subjects. Considering all factors, we found that mathematically linked earlobes to be the ideal referencing site to use when displaying and evaluating CHEPS in the amplitude-time spectrum. (shrink)

This dissertation has three parts. Part I, comprising chapters 1 and 2, addresses some basic commitments which must be presupposed in theorizing about concepts. Concepts, to a first approximation, are mental representations that are constituents of thoughts. Chapter 1 attempts to clarify the notion of representing. Chapter 2 reconstructs arguments in the work of Frege against the mental nature of thoughts and (by the same token) of concepts, arguing that they are confused and leave the notion of concepts as mental (...) representations unscathed. Part II, comprising chapters 3 to 5, pursues the aim of closing in on concepts in light of the widely shared understanding that concepts form a more specific class than just any kind of subpropositional mental representations. This part, if successful, should also help clarify the interrelations among a certain cluster of ideas which are customarily connected to the property of being a concept. Chapter 3 advocates storage in long-term memory as a basic, explanatorily principled criterion of delimiting concepts from nonconceptual mental representations. In leading up to this criterion, the chapter subjects to methodological critique the typical manner in which philosophers justify their assumption of a conceptual/nonconceptual-distinction. Chapter 4 investigates the idea that concepts are, in some sense, mental representations under which we categorize things in the world. Two versions of this idea of categorizing mental representations are distinguished, one metaphysical, the other psychological in kind. Both of these ideas, it is claimed, are inadequate to capture concepthood as such. Chapter 5 continues on the positive side, reconnecting to an earlier introduced idea which places concepts, other than sensory-perceptual events, in the realm of so-called high-level cognition. Concepts are not only stored in long-term memory, they are also capable of entering into cognitive processes that are “flexible”, rather than “hardwired”. Subdistinctions and explanations are provided that hopefully make the relevant notions workably precise. Part III of the dissertation moves on to engage in more specific debates in the theory of concepts. In one way or another, all three chapters in this part take as their points of departure the influential compositionality arguments against prototype theory often reiterated by Fodor, until recently the agenda-setting concept theorist in the philosophy of psychology. The chapters jointly aim to identify and correct a number of errors committed in the context of this debate: in the basic, generally accepted, presuppositions of these arguments (chapter 6); in the topography of concept-theoretical positions assumed by Fodor and adopted by subsequent commentators (chapter 7); and in the followup comments with which Fodor has intended to support and supplement these arguments (chapter 8). (shrink)

Metaethical noncognitivists have trouble arriving at a respectable semantic theory for moral language. The goal of this article is to make substantial progress toward demonstrating that these problems may be overcome. Replacing the predominant expressivist semantic agenda in metaethics with a dynamic perspective on meaning and communication allows noncognitivists to provide a satisfying analysis of negation and other constructions that have been argued to be problematic for metaethical noncognitivism, including disjunctions. The resulting proposal preserves some of the key insights from (...) recent work on the semantics of expressivism while highlighting the widely neglected early noncognitivists' sympathies to the kind of dynamic story I intend to tell here. A comparison between the advertised dynamic semantic story and current proposals that treat expressivism as a pragmatic rather than semantic theory about moral language is provided. (shrink)

The International Network for Economic Method (INEM), in collaboration with College of Global Futures, Arizona State University (ASU), was honored to host the 15th Biennial Conference in Tempe, Ari...