The experience of psychosis can sweep into a life like a violent storm. In this paper, I first attempt to fully imagine the experience of such a storm by drawing on first person accounts and then consider the clinical encounter between mental health practitioners and those who find themselves amidst this storm. I reflect on ways we can better support meaning-making of, and purposefully living with, these potentially intensely distressing and disturbing experiences. Drawing on narrative and collaborative practices, I consider (...) grounding the embodied experiences related to psychosis, honouring the stories of severe and enduring mental health problems and the life experiences that lead to them, accompanying people in their meaning-making of these experiences and joining in the fight against stigma. In particular, the importance of walking alongside those in the throes of the storm and bearing witness to their suffering is highlighted. Finally, the implications for the training of mental health professionals are considered. (shrink)

This study aimed to explore postgraduate students’ lived experiences of managing research ethics committee processes. Whilst there is a wide range of research that explores ethics principles/guidan...

PurposeThrough an evaluation of the information technology adoption and diffusion models and the free and/or open source policy of the South African Government, the underlying assumption is that the developmental divide between those with and those without access to technology is purely technical. This paper aims to illustrate that if Free and/or Open Source Software is to be used as a building block to bridge the “digital divide” a more social and environmental perspective, which embraces the philosophy behind the software, (...) needs to complement the technical perspective. The human environmental model is presented as a useful alternative which, if embraced, can inform more holistic information and communication technology policies.Design/methodology/approachThrough a review of diffusion of innovations models an alternative diffusion framework is described and applied to an interpretive open source case study in South Africa.FindingsContemporary diffusion and innovation models are narrowly focused on IT as a purely technological linear phenomenon. This perspective also underlies many ICT policies. A more socio‐technical adoption model can assist in providing a more holistic approach to ICT policy development.Originality/valueThe application of a new innovation model, the human environmental model, to ICT policy provides a holistic framework in which the complexity of the innovation process can be reflected in policy. Such an approach to ICT policy formulation will assist with broadening the perspective of policy makers from IT as a technical solution to IT as part of a socio‐technical solution and recognise the duality of the innovation process. (shrink)

Climate change will cause large numbers of casualties, perhaps extending over thousands of years. Casualties have a clear moral significance that economic and other technical measures of harm tend to mask. They are, moreover, universally understood, whereas other measures of harm are not. Therefore, the harms of climate change should regularly be expressed in terms of casualties by such agencies such as IPCC’s Working Group III, in addition to whatever other measures are used. Casualty estimates should, furthermore, be used to (...) derive estimates of casualties per emission source up to a given date. Such estimates would have wide margins of error, but they would add substantially to humanity’s grasp of the moral costs of particular greenhouse gas emissions. (shrink)

Moral life often presents us with trade-offs between the sufferings of some individuals and the sufferings of others. Researchers may need to consider, for example, whether the suffering imposed on animals by a certain line of medical experimentation justifies the relief that the resulting discoveries may bring to others. Often in such cases, the suffering of some individuals is incomparable with—that is neither greater than nor less than nor equal to—the suffering of others. While this complicates moral decision-making across species, (...) it does not undermine it. (shrink)

It has sometimes been claimed (usually without evidence) that the harm caused by an individual's participation in a greenhouse-gas-intensive economy is negligible. Using data from several contemporary sources, this paper attempts to estimate the harm done by an average American. This estimate is crude, and further refinements are surely needed. But the upshot is that the average American is responsible, through his/her greenhouse gas emissions, for the suffering and/or deaths of one or two future people.

An outline of the material covered in courses on Formal and Informal Logic. The outline includes chapters on mathematical approaches to logic as well as on fallacies, deduction and induction, probability, and other major topics. Logic is traditionally taught by means of problem solving exercises, so the subject is well suited to a Schaum's Outline approach.

This book explores the question of how international law is applied by domestic courts. Through case studies and analysis the contributors consider how traditions and diversity affect the interpretation of international law, from a mixture of doctrinal, practical, and theoretical approaches.

In recent years, a new factor for work stress has been studied along with stress as an offense to self-theory. Illegitimate tasks refer to assignments that are unnecessary or are not related to the employee’s role. Because of this, the Bern Illegitimate Tasks Scale was developed, which measures illegitimate tasks in terms of unreasonable tasks and unnecessary tasks. There are no studies in Latin America on illegitimate tasks, so the purpose of this research is to translate and validate the Bern (...) Illegitimate Tasks Scale. The study was performed with a sample of nursing staff from a hospital in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Written informed consent was obtained from each of the participants. The reliability of the questionnaire was evaluated and its structural validity was verified by exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. The internal consistency of the whole scale, measured by Cronbach’s alpha, was 0.857. Moreover, the unnecessary and unreasonable subscales measure were 0.846 and 0.841, respectively. The exploratory factor analysis supported a two-factor model that explained 73.96% of the variance. Additionally, the confirmatory factor analysis showed good indexes of fit. The Spanish version of the Bern Illegitimate Tasks Scale presents good psychometric properties and can be applied to nurses in the Ecuadorian population. (shrink)

A Land Imperiled not only illustrates the many ways in which the health of this bioregion is being affected, but also provides examples of how the damage can be ...

People tend to rank values of all kinds linearly from good to bad, but there is little reason to think that this is reasonable or correct. This book argues, to the contrary, that values are often partially ordered and hence frequently incomparable. Proceeding logically from a small set of axioms, John Nolt examines the great variety of partially ordered value structures, exposing fallacies that arise from overlooking them. He reveals various ways in which incomparability is obscured: using linear indices to (...) summarize partially ordered data, relying on an inadequately defined concept of parity, or conflating incomparability with vagueness. Incomparability can enrich and clarify a range of topics including the paradoxes of Derek Parfit, rational decision theory, and the infinite values of theology. Finally, Nolt shows how to generalize many of the concepts introduced earlier, explores the intricate depths of certain noteworthy partially ordered value structures, and argues for the finitude of value. Incomparable Values will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, value theory, rational decision theory, and logic. (shrink)

Broad in scope, this introduction to environmental ethics considers both contemporary issues and the extent of humanity’s responsibility for distant future life. John Nolt, a logician and environmental ethicist, interweaves contemporary science, logical analysis, and ethical theory into the story of the expansion of ethics beyond the human species and into the far future. Informed by contemporary environmental science, the book deduces concrete policy recommendations from carefully justified ethical principles and ends with speculations concerning the deepest problems of environmental ethics. (...) Pedagogical features include chapter outlines, annotated suggestions for further readings, the explanations of key terms when first mentioned, and an extensive glossary. (shrink)

A standard view in philosophy is that knowledge entails justification. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. We argue that this admirable and striking research suffers from an important limitation: participants were asked about knowledge but not justification. Thus it is possible that people attributed knowledge partly because they thought the belief was justified. Perhaps though, if given the opportunity, people would deny justification while still attributing knowledge. It is also possible that earlier findings were due to perspective taking. This paper reports (...) further research that directly addresses these questions. Our findings support the hypothesis that knowledge entails justification on the ordinary view. (shrink)

The move from good to ought, a premise form found in many justifications of environmental ethics, is itself in need of justification. Of the potential moves from good to ought surveyed, some have considerable promise and others less or none. Those without much promise include extrapolations of obligations based on human goods to nonsentient natural entities, appeals to educated judgment, precautionary arguments, humanistic consequentialist arguments, and justifications that assert that our obligations to natural entities are neither directly to those entities (...) nor derived from our obligations to humans. Some arguments that extrapolate obligations based on goods involving sentience from humans to sentient animals are promising, but whether they are sufficient is controversial. Gandhian andAristotlian arguments are also promising, provided we can justify their ought premises. (shrink)

Suppose, as biocentrists do, that even microorganisms have a good of their own - that is, some objective form of welfare. Still, human welfare is vastly greater and more valuable. If it were infinitely greater, individualistic biocentrism would be pointless. But consideration of the facts of evolutionary history and of the conceptual relations between infinity and incommensurability reveals that there are no infinite welfare differences among living things. It follows, in particular, that there is some very large number of bacteria (...) whose aggregate overall welfare is not less than the welfare of a human being. (shrink)

I am grateful to all the respondents to ‘How harmful are the average American's greenhouse gas emissions?’. Their comments were individually and collectively very rich. Since there is...

The move from good to ought, a premise form found in many justifications of environmental ethics, is itself in need of justification. Of the potential moves from good to ought surveyed, some have considerable promise and others less or none. Those without much promise include extrapolations of obligations based on human goods to nonsentient natural entities, appeals to educated judgment, precautionary arguments, humanistic consequentialist arguments, and justifications that assert that our obligations to natural entities are neither directly to those entities (...) nor derived from our obligations to humans. Some arguments that extrapolate obligations based on goods involving sentience from humans to sentient animals are promising, but whether they are sufficient is controversial. Gandhian andAristotlian arguments are also promising, provided we can justify their ought premises. (shrink)

Environmental ethicists often hold that organisms, species, ecosystems, and the like have goods of their own. But, even given that such goods exist, whether we ought to value them is controversial. Hence an environmental philosophy needs, in addition to an account of what sorts of values there are, an explanation what, how and why we morally ought to value—that is, an account of moral valuing. This paper presents one such an account. Specifically, I aim to show that unless there are (...) eternal goods (and maybe even if there are), we have a duty of self-transcendence toward nature—that is, a duty to value nature's goods as ends. This duty is owed, however, not to nature, but to ourselves. It is grounded in what I call an imperative of hope. The argument, in a nutshell, is that we have a duty to ourselves to (in a certain sense) optimize hope. This optimization requires self-transcendence toward entities whose goods are more diverse and enduring than any human goods. But unless there are eternal goods, such goods occur only in nature. (shrink)