Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...) illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology and a notable contribution to the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Russell. Russell provides replies to three critics of The Limits of Free Will. The first reply is to Robert Wallace and focuses on the question of whether there is a conflict between the core compatibilist and pessimist components of the "critical compatibilist" position that Russell has advanced. The second reply is to Angela Smith's discussion of the "narrow" interpretation of moral responsibility responsibility (...) (as defended by R. Jay Wallace) and how best to respond to it. The third and last reply is concerned with Christopher Bennett's criticism of Russell's views concerning "motivational scepticism" and the possibility of pure practical reasons. (shrink)

Contributed articles presented at the National Seminar on the Limits of Thought and Beyond, organized by the Department of Philosophy, Assam University, Silchar, India, during 28-29 November 2011.

The rhetoric of disgust is common in moral discourse and political propaganda. Some believe it's pernicious, for it convinces without evidence. But scientific research now suggests that disgust is typically an effect, not a cause, of moral judgment. At best the emotion on its own only sometimes slightly amplifies a moral belief one already has. Appeals to disgust are thus dialectically unhelpful in discourse that seeks to convince. When opponents of abortion use repulsive images to make their case, they convince (...) few, even if they rally their base. When champions of animal rights show graphic depictions of the torturous conditions of animals in factory farms, they convince only those previously ignorant of the severity of such conditions. Ultimately, disgust may be less pernicious than it is useless. (shrink)

Few debates in environmental philosophy have been more heated than the one over the nature of wilderness. And yet, when one surveys the present scene, one finds that a variety of different conceptions of wilderness are still quite popular – some more so in certain professions than others. In this paper, I look at three popular conceptions of wilderness with an eye toward sussing out the good and the bad them. I look at what I call (1) the folk view (...) of wilderness, (2) Leopold’s conception of wilderness, and (3) the legal conception of wilderness (as found in the Wilderness Act of 1964). In the final part of the paper, I sketch out a sort of spectrum account of wilderness, one that I argue allows us to capture more cases of wilderness and might serve as a useful tool in future conservation efforts. (shrink)

La limite peut être entendue dans deux sens dont les implications sont différentes, voire opposées. Elle peut être considérée comme un horizon indépassable, un mur infranchissable qui borne très distinctement des domaines d'étude et des champs d'action. Dans une seconde acception, la limite est, au contraire, la ligne qui peut être franchie et par extension, la limite devient amovible : elle peut être déplacée, même légèrement, en fonction des événements. Le thème de ce colloque nous invite non pas à étudier (...) "la limite du droit", comme le suggèrerait le premier sens du mot limite. Cette idée n'aurait pas de sens, sauf à considérer un système pur de droit, isolé de tous les autres paramètres qui peuvent graviter autour de lui. Nous sommes, à l'inverse, amenés à nous rendre "Aux limites du droit", dans cette zone d'interférence, de superposition, d'interpénétration non seulement des disciplines théoriques mais aussi des circonstances ponctuelles dont l'enchevêtrement donne à la pratique de la science juridique toute son ampleur. Les limites du droit font donc référence à un lieu de communication et de négociation où la recherche d'un équilibre spontané est autant permanente qu'impossible à pérenniser. En effet, les divers facteurs qui entrent dans les limites du droit sont si riches et pourtant si mouvants qu'il paraît judicieux de tenter, tant que faire se peut, de cerner leur essence. D'autant que les limites sont souvent révélatrices de la nature profonde du droit. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Limit Formations:Violence, Philosophy, RhetoricOmedi Ochieng For Megha Sharma SehdevNow days are dragon-ridden, the nightmareRides upon sleep: a drunken soldieryCan leave the mother, murdered at her door,To crawl in her own blood, and go scot-free;The night can sweat with terror as beforeWe pieced our thoughts into philosophy,And planned to bring the world under a rule,Who are but weasels fighting in a hole.—W. B. Yeats, "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen"Violence is (...) a limit formation. It is neither reducible to a brute fact nor is it ineffably ethereal. To write about violence, then, is to confront—if only as disavowed remainder—critical limits, no less of the writer than of the writing itself. Fewer subjects have proven as confounding for philosophy and rhetoric, this journal's primary charge. In both its general particulars and its specific manifolds, violence nonpluses philosophical commonplaces, upends rhetorical tropologies.Philosophy imagines itself mediator to reality's arche, the bedrock of being. Ancient Greek philosophy sought to distinguish necessity from contingency, essence from accident, dialectic from rhetoric, logic from fallacy. Those who took up this intellectual tradition came to conceptualize violence as first and foremost a question of "nature"—more specifically, those marked out by nature to rule (propertied male citizens) and those marked [End Page 330] out by nature for subjection (the enslaved, women, nonhuman animals). In the early modern context of European philosophy, still, despite its pretensions, deeply indebted to this Mediterranean legacy, the canonical lexicon of sensemaking centered on legitimacy and its conceptual appurtenances of sovereignty, will, and rights.Strikingly, it is in the opposed registers of analytic and continental philosophy that violence's cataphilosophic figuration appears most salient. Consider, for example, one such famous symposium convened in the analytic journal Philosophy and Public Affairs, as narrated by political philosopher Michael Walzer:In an earlier issue of Philosophy & Public Affairs there appeared a symposium on the rules of war which was actually (or at least more importantly) a symposium on another topic. The actual topic was whether or not a man can ever face, or ever has to face, a moral dilemma, a situation where he must choose between two courses of action both of which it would be wrong for him to undertake. Thomas Nagel worriedly suggested that this could happen and that it did happen whenever someone was forced to choose between upholding an important moral principle and avoiding some looming disaster. R. B. Brandt argued that it could not possibly happen, for there were guidelines we might follow and calculations we might go through which would necessarily yield the conclusion that one or the other course of action was the right one to undertake in the circumstances (or that it did not matter which we undertook). R. M. Hare explained how it was that someone might wrongly suppose that he was faced with a moral dilemma: sometimes, he suggested, the precepts and principles of an ordinary man, the products of his moral education, come into conflict with injunctions developed at a higher level of moral discourse. But this conflict is, or ought to be, resolved at the higher level; there is no real dilemma.(1973, 160–61)Analytic political philosophy's resolute disavowals could not be here better splayed. Morality is construed as all-encompassing. The political is not so much effaced as it is rendered derivative to a foundational drama of will, obligation, choice. Analytic philosophy's oft-preened claim to clear, transparent, terse style proves constitutive of its desire to contain, if it cannot altogether moralize away violence. [End Page 331]Where analytic philosophy conceives of violence as an object, its limits defined by morality's handmaiden, the "well-ordered society" (Rawls 2001, 8), continental philosophy conjures a sublime violence that shatters and transfigures normative violence. Walter Benjamin posits a binary opposition between mythical and divine violence: "If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates, if the former threatens, the latter strikes, if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Limits of Our ObligationsRyan C. MavesDisclaimers. No funding was utilized for this manuscript. Dr. Maves is a retired U.S. Navy officer, and the opinions contained herein are his own. The opinions in this manuscript do not reflect the official opinion of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, nor of the U.S. Government.In 2012, I was a commander in the United States Navy, deployed to the NATO (...) Role 3 Multinational Medical Unit in Kandahar Airfield (KAF), Afghanistan. The KAF Role 3 began as a tent hospital under Canadian command, built along the flight line at Ahmad Shah Baba International Airport as [End Page 176] part of an expanding NATO base. By the time of my arrival, it was a small but capable brick-and-mortar building under U.S. Navy command, with four operating rooms, two CT scanners, and a busy intensive care unit (ICU).Not long before my deployment, the KAF Role 3 was described as one of the busiest trauma hospitals in the world. Casualties arrived every day, usually by helicopter. Blast injuries from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were common, ranging in severity from concussions in passengers in armored vehicles, to multiple amputations from blast injuries with concomitant thoracic, abdominal, and pelvic trauma. KAF had a daytime population of over 30,000 in 2012, and our hospital was effectively the referral center for the region, so patients with non-surgical diagnoses were similarly common: myocardial infarctions, seizures, pulmonary emboli, and endemic infections, to name a few.As an infectious disease (I.D.) specialist, I functioned mainly as a hospitalist, managing patients postoperatively, but I also provided any consultative support when needed. During mass casualty events, the intensivists and I would act as backups in the trauma bay, freeing up the surgeons for the most acutely injured patients. It turned out that an I.D. doctor’s skillset lent itself well to acute trauma evaluations; we are well known for having an eye for fine details, combined with low-grade paranoia. These traits served me well during what I came to describe as “my involuntary trauma fellowship.”Our patients could be divided into five key groups: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF, including the army and national police), non-Afghan coalition military (mostly U.S. and other NATO members), Afghan civilians, NATO civilian contract staff, and the Taliban. Our approach to each of these groups was different. For all patient groups, we would provide the same emergency care, including acute resuscitation and immediate life-saving surgery. It was after this emergency care period that our management plans diverged.For coalition forces, our next priority after acute resuscitation and stabilization was to assess whether a patient could remain in theater. Stable patients with relatively minor injuries could often undergo rehabilitation at KAF; many personnel could subsequently return to combat duty with their units. More seriously-injured patients would be transported out of Afghanistan within 24-48 hours (if not faster). Usually, this would involve stops at Bagram Airfield near Kabul and then Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany before reaching a military hospital in their home countries. There were few limits on whom could be transported. Dedicated critical care air transport teams (CCATT) included intensivists, respiratory therapists, and critical care nurses, who could manage the most unstable patients on board what was effectively a flying ICU. The “lung team” in Landstuhl could fly to KAF to start patients with severe respiratory failure on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) and then fly them out on maximal support.NATO civilian contractors would receive comparable care, although the exact details of how they would be transported out of theater would depend on their home countries and the nature of their contract. We cared for one civilian contractor with newly-diagnosed HIV infection whom we were able to stabilize on the ventilator, get him extubated, start on initial antiretroviral therapy, and transport him home with a referral to his local HIV care program.Afghan soldiers were part of the coalition, but there was no distant home country where we could transport them. They were home. After their resuscitations and surgeries, we would arrange transfer to the Kandahar Regional... (shrink)

[Text is in German] Unsere Gegenwart scheint mehr und mehr Umbruechen zu unterliegen. Eine Innovation folgt der naechsten, Traditionen gelten schnell als ueberholt, moderne Trends werden altmodisch. Dieser permanente Wandel verlaeuft in unserer Wahrnehmung immer rasanter. Auch bei einem Blick in die Vergangenheit scheinen Umbrueche, neue Ideen und Erfindungen zu ueberwiegen und in staendigen Wertverschiebungen zu resultieren. Aber was ist mit den bestaendigen Dingen? Nicht nur Veraenderungen schaffen Werte, sondern auch Bestaendigkeit. Dabei stellt sich nicht nur die Frage, welche Werte (...) durch Kontinuitaet entstehen, sondern auch welche Werte sie bedingen. Traditionen sind identitaetsstiftend. Sie gehoeren zum kulturellen Gedaechtnis, bilden oftmals eine Basis fuer Innovationen und haben dadurch eine eigene Bedeutung im Hinblick auf Veraenderungen. Kontinuitaeten zu erkennen, ist in einer Welt im stetigen Wandel ein schwieriges Unterfangen und auch im Rueckblick nicht unproblematisch, vor allem wenn die Akteure selbst nicht mehr zu sprechen sind. Aber ein Blick auf die materielle Kultur erlaubt Aufschluesse ueber Bestaendigkeit. Von Menschen gefertigte Objekte sind Traditionstraeger, sie beherbergen die Ideen und Wertvorstellungen ihrer Gestalter und bleiben ueber Zeit und Raum hinweg erhalten. The Limits of Change umfasst Beitraege aus Archaeologie, Philosophie und Ethnologie, die sich auf unterschiedliche Weise mit der Thematik der Kontinuitaet auseinandersetzen und den Sachverhalt kritisch beleuchten. So wird zum einen der Blick in die Vergangenheit gerichtet und auf Basis archaeologischer ueberlieferungen das Thema untersucht. Zum anderen liefert die Diskussion zeitgenoessischer und globaler Sachverhalte wichtige Hinweise im Hinblick auf Kontinuitaet und Tradition. So wird beispielsweise diskutiert, welche Arten von Kontinuitaeten sich in heutigen Gesellschaften finden und wodurch sich diese auszeichnen bzw. sichtbar werden. Ferner wird die Frage gestellt, ob Tradition als kulturelles Marketing im Hinblick auf Tourismus genutzt werden kann. Mit Beitraegen von Torsten Bendschus, Arthur Depner, Stefan Eisenhofer, Martin Hensler, Elwira Janus, Thomas Knopf, Beate Loeffler, Bonka Nedeltscheva, Ton Otto, Laura Picht, Elnaz Rashidian und Geraldine Schmitz. (shrink)

According to a tradition going back to Socrates, one should thoroughly examine the grounds of one’s judgments before settling on what one has reason to do or believe. According to contemporary metaethical constructivism, assumed in this essay, reflective scrutiny is also central to assessing a judgment’s claim to justification. This essay argues against the injunctions to thoroughly examine oneself and seek ultimate reasons for one’s normative judgments. In other words, the essay argues against the ideal of the philosophical way of (...) life. It shows that in most cases one does not have reason to question the practical conclusion of one’s initial deliberation. It is only under very limited conditions, specified in the essay, that one is justified in engaging in further reflection. Furthermore, the essay argues that if one does go for full self‐examination, the consequences are most likely to be bad for oneself, given one’s practical interests. (shrink)

This volume frames the question of responsibility as a problem of agency in relation to the systems and structures of globalization. According to Ricoeur responsibility is a “shattered concept” when considered too narrowly as a problem of act, agency and individual freedom. To examine this Esther Reed develops a short genealogy of modern liberal and post-liberal concepts of responsibility in order to understand better the relationship dominant modern framings of the meanings of responsibility. Reed engages with writings by major modern (...) (Schleiermacher, Hegel, Marx, Weber) and post-liberal (Buber, Levinas, Derrida, Badiou, Butler, Young, Critchley) theorists to illustrate the shift from an ethnic responsibility built on notions of accountability and attributions to an ethic responsibility that starts variously from the 'other'. Reed sees Dietrich Bonhoeffer as the most promising partner of this theological dialogue, as his learning of responsibility from the risen Christ present now in the (global) church is a welcome provocation to new thinking about the meaning of responsibility learned from land, distant neighbour, (global) church and the bible. Bonhoeffer's reflections on the centre, boundaries and limits of responsibility remain helpful to Christian people struggling with an increasingly exhausted concept of accountability. (shrink)

Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: surveying the landscape and defining terms -- The seventeenth-century denigration of tradition and a nineteenth-century response -- Michael oakeshott and the epistemic role of tradition -- Alasdair macintyre's tradition-constituted inquiry -- Michael polanyi and role of tacit knowledge -- The incoherence of liberalism and the response of tradition -- Afterword: a conservatism worth conserving, or conservatism as stewardship -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

공정을 권리와 기회의 공평한 분배와 그 절차의 문제로 보는 일반적 관점은 롤즈(John Rawls)의 정의론에 뿌리를 둔다. 롤즈의 ‘공정으로서의 정의(justice as fairness)’는 합리적인 사회계약을 통해 도달할 수 있는 ‘적절한 분배 절차’를 정의의 조건으로 제안한다. 그의 ‘분배적 정의’와 ‘절차적 공정성’은 정의의 구체적이고 사회적인 실현 방안을 모색하게 한다는 점에서 강한 설득력을 갖는다. 그러나 ‘공정성’은 단순히 권리와 기회의 분배 문제로, 또 단순히 절차적 문제로 환원할 수 없는 가치론적 물음을 야기한다. ‘공정한 분배’란 무엇인가? 분배의 공정성을 판단하게 하는 척도는 무엇인가? 어디에서, 누구를 위해 말해지는 공정인가? 어떠한 (...) 공정인가? 이 글은 먼저 롤즈의 정의론에 대한 리쾨르(Paul Ricoeur)와 영(Iris Marion Young)의 비판을 검토하면서, 정의에 대한 숙고는 ‘분배 절차의 공정성’을 뛰어넘는 관계론적 성찰을 요청한다는 사실을 살피고자 한다. 나아가 데리다(Jacques Derrida)의 ‘해체가 곧 정의’라는 명제의 의미를 살피면서, 정의는 분배 절차의 공정성을 계산하는 일이 아니라 타자의 고유한 상황과 개별적인 고통에 주의를 기울이는 민감성을 통해서 추구되어야 하는 지향이라는 점을 보일 것이다. (shrink)

In this paper, we give an account of some of the necessary conditions for an effectively functioning public sphere, and then explore the question of whether these conditions allow for the expression of ideas and values that are fundamentally incompatible with those of liberalism. We argue that speakers who advocate or glorify violence against democratic institutions fall outside the parameters of what constitutes legitimate public debate and may in fact undermine the conditions necessary for the flourishing of free speech and (...) public dialogue more generally. (shrink)

Le monde moderne de par son mode de vie a reçu l'empreinte de l'hygiène et de la médecine ainsi que des principes résultant des découvertes de l'industrie pharmaceutique chimique, de Pasteur, de Flemming, etc. Ces produits sont certes d'un apport utile pour garantir le confort anatomique et physiologique de l'organisme humain, mais il faut raisonnablement les considérer aujourd'hui comme un triomphe d'une humanité à l'incessante poursuite d'une santé durable. La physiologie et l'anatomie n'étant pas les seules composantes de l'être humain, (...) la santé ne saurait en aucun cas être considérée, prise en charge ou ajustée, comme une simple machine industrielle ou être comparée à un plan d'ajustement structurel ou de relance économique pour assurer la croissance et la survie d'un peuple. C'est la colonne vertébrale de la thèse de l'auteur Gervais Mvogo dans son ouvrage Limites et échecs de la médecine occidentale. Théorie de la guérison. Le sujet de réflexion fascine dans son ancrage de parallélisme des sources ontologiques de la nature humaine, s'appuyant ainsi sur Dieu. Le titre ouvre le débat sur la démarche, la pratique, l'émergence et la radiance des firmes et des intelligences artificielles de l'industrie pharmaceutique, véritable politique de la médecine occidentale. (shrink)

At the end of BioShock Infinite, Booker is faced with the challenge of not allowing the tragedy to befall Columbia. There has to be a way, he believes, to prevent the rise of Father Comstock, the imprisonment and abuse of Elizabeth, and the creation of a Columbia that persecutes people for both religious and racial reasons. Booker's action is predicated on the necessity of Booker becoming Comstock. Elizabeth takes Booker back to Father Comstock's creation and it is revealed that Comstock's (...) coming to power took place when DeWitt accepted Christian baptism after his participation in the Wounded Knee massacre. The notion that Booker DeWitt had to become Father Comstock because of his baptism portrays a God that is overly deterministic, however. In reality, God may be omnipotent and omniscient, and yet humans may be free. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are areas of political behavior for which the usual assumption of wealth maximizing homo economicus is to narrow to generate convincing explanation of behavior. In particular, it is argued that for many political decisions, people choose according to some set of moral preconceptions while for others, people have insufficient information to make economic choices even if they were inclined to do so. This implies that normative public choice can only be part of a political decision (...) process in which non-pecuniary concerns influence choices. Finally, constitutional economics insofar as it is conceptually conceived, must presume some set of moral and informational properties of the parties to the social contract. (shrink)

The Limits of the Self, will be essential reading for anyone interested in the definition of biological individuality and the understanding of the immune system.

L’enjeu de ce recueil est de contribuer à repenser la notion de limite, en l’envisageant sous les différentes figures, philosophiques, écologiques, politiques, que lui confère notre présent. Comme le montrent, sous des modalités diverses, les contributions de ce collectif, la limite peut et doit être conçue en dehors des valeurs négatives – borne, restriction ou frontière –, qui en affaiblissent la portée. Elle peut alors être pensée sur le fond de cet illimité où s’ouvre la question même du dehors. Si (...) la finitude demeure la condition de l’existence, de l’art et de la pensée, assumer notre condition finie ne consiste donc pas à se murer dans le connu, mais bien à en transgresser les bornes, et ce faisant, à s’illimiter. Au plus loin de la fermeture des frontières que prônent certaines politiques, ou de la certitude dogmatique dans laquelle certains cherchent à réassurer leur pensée, la limite ne vit que de son rapport fécond à l’illimité. Interrogeant l’existence, la politique, l’art – autant dire, la pensée même –, les textes de ce recueil mettent au jour un certain don de l’illimité. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein's interest in the writings of Rabindranath Tagore, is recognized among scholars worldwide though little has been written on his fascination with Tagore's poetry and symbolic plays. In Language, Limits, and Beyond, Priyambada Sarkar explores Tagore and Wittgenstein's philosophical arguments on the concept of 'threshold of language and meaning', highlighting the systematic connections between Tagore's canon and Wittgenstein's early works. Situatingher study in the early 1900s, when Tagore's poetry had just become available in Europe, Sarkar finds similarities between Tagore's (...) and Wittgenstein's exploration of the limits of language. She argues that Wittgenstein's early philosophy can be better understood when juxtaposed with Tagore.Drawing parallels between the worlds of philosophy and poetry, Sarkar identifies the point of convergence of their two philosophies in the realm of language, tracing how they reach surprisingly similar conclusions through entirely different paths of inquiry. Sarkar finally claims that such important points of contact will help one to arrange the pieces of the Tractarian jigsaw puzzle in a manner where all the pieces of logic, language, world, and the mystical will fall into place and form acoherent picture. (shrink)

Don't pray for war -- Is democracy worth it? -- Taking speech seriously -- In recognition of limits -- The limits of politics.

Can autonomous systems replace humans in the performance of their activities? How does the answer to this question inform the design of autonomous systems? The study of technical systems and their features should be preceded by the study of the activities in which they play roles. Each activity can be described by its overall goals, governing norms and the intermediate steps which are taken to achieve the goals and to follow the norms. This paper uses the activity realist approach to (...) conceptualize autonomous systems in the context of human activities. By doing so, it first argues for epistemic and logical conditions that illustrate the limitations of autonomous systems in tasks which they can and cannot perform, and then, it discusses the ramifications of the limitations of system autonomy on the design of autonomous systems. (shrink)

Limits to Action: The Allocation of Individual Behavior presents the ideas and methods in the study of how individual organisms allocate their limited time and energy and the consequences of such allocation. The book is a survey of individual resource allocation, emphasizing the relationships of the concepts of utility, reinforcement, and Darwinian fitness. The chapters are arranged beginning with plants and general evolutionary considerations, through animal behavior in nature and laboratory, and ending with human behavior in suburb and institution. Topics (...) discussed include operant conditioning; the principle of diminishing returns; and issues in relation to mating strategies. Biologists, sociologists, economists, and psychologists will find the book interesting. (shrink)

이 글은 자유주의적 정의론의 한계를 다룬다. 특히 자유주의적 정의론의 이론적 토대를 제공하는 분배적 정의의 한계를 비판적으로 검토하는데 주된 목적을 갖는다. 자유주의가 산출하는 자유와 평등 사이의 갈등 내지는 모순의 주된 내용은 한 개인의 사적 자유의 추구가 타인의 자유와 평등을 침해하는 방향으로 이어질 수 있다는 것이었다. 이러한 상황에서 자유주의는 동등한 고려와 존중의 원칙을 제시하고 그 정당화 근거에 대한 합리적인 설명을 제공할 수 있는 분배적 정의론을 통해 스스로가 지닌 근본적 결함을 치유하려는 규범적 기획을 수립했다. 분배적 정의론은 합리적인 이성을 지닌 계약당사자들의 합의에 기초하여 도출될 (...) 것으로 기대되는 자유와 평등의 내용이 무엇인지를 규명함으로써 언제 어디서나 적용될 수 있는 보편적 정의론으로 간주되었다. 이처럼 이론적 간명성과 규범적 합리성을 토대로 보편성을 획득한 분배적 정의론은 민주주의 정치체제와 자본주의 경제질서의 유지 및 합리적 결합을 뒷받침하는 정의의 원칙을 제시했다. 그러나 자유주의적 정의론이 지닌 규범적 합리성과 보편성은 동시에 그 이론의 한계로 작용했다. 그 한계는 다음과 같은 두 가지 질문에 향해있다. 첫째는 “자유주의적 정의론이 그것이 적용될 사회의 구체적인 역사와 맥락이 지닌 중요성을 고려하고 있는가?” 이고 둘째는 “정치적 현실성의 측면에서 다루어져야 할 실질적인 사회의 억압과 부정의의 문제를 제대로 다룰 수 있는가?”이다. 이 글에서 필자는 자유주의적 정의론에 대해 제기되는 두 가지 질문 중 두 번째 질문의 유의미성을 비판적으로 검토하는데 초점을 맞출 것이다. 이러한 목적을 위해 우리는 먼저 자유주의적 정의론의 대표적인 이론가인 롤스의 분배적 정의론을 살펴볼 것이다. 이어서 정체성과 인정의 문제를 중심으로 분배적 정의론의 한계를 지적하는 프레이저의 인정이론을 살펴보고자 한다. 결론에서 필자는 자유주의적 정의론이 현실의 구체적 저항을 고려하지 않은 이상적 이론에 가까우며 정체성과 인정의 차원에서 제기되는 정의의 문제들을 제대로 다룰 수 없다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

Graham Priest presents an expanded edition of his exploration of the nature and limits of thought. Embracing contradiction and challenging traditional logic, he engages with issues across philosophical borders, from the historical to the modern, Eastern to Western, continental to analytic.

La science est inachevée comme l'Histoire. Tout au long de notes de lectures éparses sur des textes de Marx et divers auteurs de sa postérité, Pierre Roubaud pense avoir démontré que Marx s'est contredit et trompé sur des questions théoriques importantes.

Most people believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand. Although it would often be meritorious, we are not, in fact, morally required to do all that we can to promote overall good. What's more, most people also believe that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, morally off limits, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. In this provocative analysis Kagan maintains that despite the intuitive appeal of these views, they cannot be adequately defended. (...) In criticizing arguments for limited moral requirements as well as those for unconditionally prohibited acts, Kagan offers a sustained attack on two of the most basic features of ordinary common sense morality. (shrink)

이 글은 『향연』에서 ‘아름다움 그 자체(auto to kalon)’를 향하는 플라톤적 사랑의 상승이 비현실적이라는 오해를 해소하고, 그러한 사랑의 모습이 오히려 인류애적일 뿐 아니 라 윤리적이므로 추구할 가치가 있음을 밝히고자 한다. 대개 사랑은 어떤 감정보다도 개인 적인 차원의 감정으로서, 나의 연인, 나의 가족과 같은 개별적ㆍ특수적 대상에 대한 감정 이라고 여겨진다. 또한 우리는 그 대상이 그저 그 대상이기 때문에 사랑하는 것이지, 다른 이유는 없다고 말하기도 한다. 그러나 ‘나’와 관계되는 개별적인 대상에 대한 사랑은 ‘공동 체’와 관련하는 보편성에 부딪히면 그 한계를 직면한다. 우리는 자신과 아무런 (...) 관련이 없 는 사람을 구하기 위해 목숨을 희생하는 숭고한 행위를 목격할 때도 있기 때문이다. 보편 적 사랑에 근거를 둔 인류애적 행동들은 옳은 일을 해야 한다는 의무감에서 비롯되는 것이 기도 하지만, 플라톤의 설명에 따르면 ‘아름다움’을 향한 행위로도 해석할 수 있다. 플라톤 은 사랑의 본성을 설명하면서, 추하고 나쁜 상태의 무엇을 원하는 사람은 아무도 없으며, 사람은 ‘아름다움’에 ‘끌리기’ 마련이라고 주장하기 때문이다. 즉 현실이 추하고 나쁜 상태 임을 아는 사람이라면 누구나 ‘아름다움’을 향해 점진적으로 가까워지기를 원하며, 이것이 사랑이라는 감정이 가진 상승적인 에너지이다. 저마다의 인간이 가지는 개별성과 특수성을 강조하는 철학자인 누스바움은 플라톤의 ‘사랑의 사다리’를 두고 이 사다리는 우리로 하여금 인간의 욕구와 불완전성, 이타주의가 도달할 수 없는 곳으로 올라가기를 요구한다 고 주장한다. 그러나 이 글은 플라톤의 사랑에 대한 이와 같은 오해를 해소하고, 보편적 사랑의 현실성과 윤리적 정당성을 밝히고자 한다. (shrink)

One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that (...) X is F by perception is the ability to have a perceptual experience that represents something as being F . Call this the ‘Representation Objection’ to moral perception. In this paper I argue that the Representation Objection to moral perception fails. Thus I offer a limited defense of moral perception. (shrink)

Ils sont suisse, canadien, belge, roumain ou encore français et se sont réunis à Montréal pour se pencher sur la notion de «limite» dans les travaux de Jean Ladrière. On le sait, l'oeuvre de Jean Ladrière se déploie, avec génie et originalité, dans bien des domaines: la physique, les mathématiques, la logique, les sciences du langage, la philosophie et la théologie. Les textes réunis dans ce volume tentent de penser les «articulations du sens» de cette notion de «limite», en prenant (...) la mesure des questionnements les plus contemporains, que ceux-ci émanent de perspectives scientiques, politiques, éthiques ou encore pratiques. (shrink)

Kant and Heidegger argue that our subjectivity escapes scientific explanation, while also providing the conditions that enable it. This understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and science places limits on the explanatory scope of the sciences. But what makes transcendental reflection on the structure of subjectivity possible in the first place? Fink argues that transcendental philosophy encounters its own limits in attempting to characterize its own conditions of possibility. I argue that the limits of science and transcendental philosophy entail that (...) nature cannot be conceived as a specific object, or as a totality of objects in the world, but only as the ontological ground of phenomenal manifestation in general. Nature is not identical with anything discoverable in either science or phenomenology; it is, rather, the origin from which discovery of phenomena proceeds. (shrink)

The book's two essays, 'Limited Inc.' and 'Signature Event Context, ' constitute key statements of the Derridean theory of deconstruction. They are perhaps the clearest exposition to be found of Derrida's most controversial idea.

The book analyzes the sources of widespread dissatisfaction with democracies around the world and identifies directions for feasible reforms"--Provided by publisher.

Understanding cognitive processes with a formal framework necessitates some limited, internal prescriptive normativism. This is because it is not possible to endorse the psychological relevance of some axioms in a formal framework, but reject that of others. The empirical challenge then becomes identifying the remit of different formal frameworks, an objective consistent with the descriptivism Elqayam & Evans (E&E) advocate.

This philosophical narrative delves into deepening crises afflicting modern democracies, when extreme inequality and its resultant alienation grips not just adults but, even more anguishingly, children. These children and often their parents come in far under the social radar, so out-of-touch that even census takers overlook them. In this milieu, weapons and narcotics are as much an unquestioned part of life as breathing. The world beyond this invisible cage entirely escapes them, nor does the larger society miss them or know (...) about them. This documentary narrative follows a thirteen-year-old who forces himself to escape his oblivious father, not out of hope, but for sheer escape from the execrable situation, without even the will to be himself, whatever that is. He also must navigate through his nightmare existemce, relying on an illicit business, the only thing he knows as well as breathing. If the individuals in this milieu--which cut across racial boundaries--ever even hear of voting, they are drawn to strong-arm politicians, who appeal to these scattered inhabitants, as examples of strength, no-nonsense, even hatred. The ethics of such circumstances' mere existence--further extreme than even those in Les Miserable--in our societies poses a formidable challenge to the ethics of social and political philosophy and are hardly touched upon in the academic literature. The central philosophical question is whether it is possible for a political system to preempt such conditions, particularly when these individuals, especially the children, are veritably invisible. The metaphilosophical issue is why philosophy does not focus more concern about this ignored human morass. To say an indictment of soiciopolitical philosophy is not justified here, that the persons encountered here are merely messed-up self-indulgent people, only adds cause to the charge. (shrink)