Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320 (2010)

Authors
Justin McBrayer
Fort Lewis College
Abstract
One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that X is F by perception is the ability to have a perceptual experience that represents something as being F . Call this the ‘Representation Objection’ to moral perception. In this paper I argue that the Representation Objection to moral perception fails. Thus I offer a limited defense of moral perception.
Keywords Moral perception  Moral realism  Representation  Moral knowledge
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9363-0
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.
Moral Perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge.Robert Audi - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
On Experiencing Moral Properties.Indrek Reiland - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):315-325.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

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